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ABSTRACT 
The main object of the thesis is to explore the concepts 'literature' 
and 'dogma' in relation to education. It considers the place of literature 
in the educational curriculum and examines its relationship with religion, 
moral education and science. 
The point of departure for the study is Matthew Arnold's Literature 
and Dogma (1873) which, in conjunction with related writings, is considered 
first within the cultural and educational climate of its own age, and then 
evaluated for its relevance and educational implications for the present 
day. Matthew Arnold, a distinguished social critic, professor of poetry 
and Inspector of Education, wrote Literature and Dogma at a time of consid- 
erable social and intellectual upheaval; and the pattern of social change 
bro ught about by accelerating technology over the past century, with its 
increasing clash of cultures and diverse dogmatic and ideological systems 
has given new significance to Arnold's thought. In particular, his ideas 
on moral, scientific and religious education have implications for the 
modern curriculum and for the place of literature within it, which the 
research endeavours to bring into focus and develop. 
In a shrinking and increasingly complex world1where there is evidence 
of an increasing need for education to provide young people with both a 
sense of security and a flexible capacity to cope with unexampled change, 
Arnold's own upbringing is shown to be of some educational interest. 
The conclusion reached is that, while it is'impossible to prove the 
moral. efficacy of literature, there seems to be some justification for 
believing that imaginative literature, appropriately taught, has an in- CI 
creasingly significant role to play as a means of ordering emotions, con- 
veying values, enhancing our capacity for empathy and communicating insights, 
as religious certainties and moral dogmas come under challenge'from altern- 
ative competing dogmas and agencies for change. 
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'In a culture such as ours, where there is so much pressure 
towards uniformity of taste in our mass media of communication... 
it becomes the more important to nurture confident intuition in 
the realm of literature and the arts, yet one finds a virtual 
vacuum on this topic in educational research. ' 
Jerome Bruner (1963) 
... The wiser people become, whether in science, religion, 
politics, or art, the less dogmatic they become. Apparently, 
the better we know the territory of human experience, the more 
aware we are of the limitations of the verbal maps we can make 
of it..., 
SI Hayakawa (1966) 
5' 
T, ACE 
Matthew Arnold's Literature and DogLna (1873) is the fraison dt6tret and 
point of departure for this study: a century old, it still has a modern 
ring, and touches significantly on matters of vital cultural and educational 
importance today. 
One of the outstanding social critics and educationists of the 
nineteenth century, Matthew Arnold's reputation rests principally perhaps 
on Culture and Anarchy which is widely accepted as an unusually perceptive 
analysis of the social and political milieu of mid-Victorian England. 
As educationist his reports on continental education, his advocacy of 
state education and opposition to the application of the principle of 
'payment by resultst, together with his continuous work for t1iirty-five 
years as Inspector of Schools (finally Chief Inspector of Schools) assure 
him of a. noteworthy place in the history of English education. lie was 
also -tit emincitt poet, holding tfie Chair of P oetry at Oxford from 1857 
to 1866, and a major literary critic of his time. 
With these credentials, 'it is perhaps surprising that what he him- 
self regarded as the 'most important' of all his prose works and 'most 
capable of being useful' - Literature and Dognna - should until recently 
have been largely disregarded by his biographers and critics once the 
initial furore caused by its publication had died doim. The climate of 
opinion in 1873 seemed to be ripe for such a publication for it was pop- 
ularly received, although from the orthodox (both among scientists and 
theologians) it received what the author described as 'more than its 
fair share of misrepresentation'. With prophetic insight, however, 
Arnold recognized that the issues it dealt with wouldv after a lapse of 
time, come urgently to the fore again, and then would be the time for 
renewed consideration of his thesis. Now that a century has passed since 
the publication of Literature and Dogmap the present cultural climate arid 
the educational problems related to it seem remarkably appropriate to 
warrant a new analysis and reassesment of ArnoldIs book and its implications. 
(I 
Educationists faced with cov. 9tructing a curriculum for a fast- 
changing world, with ethical values and doctrinal assertions in the 
melting pot,, and scientific and technological advance escalating at a 
bewildering rate, can benefit from Arnold's views on the dangers of 
dogmap and on the nature and potentialities of literature. Arnold's 
approach also raises important issues as to man's best means of accomno- 
dating himself to the Zeitgeist (tTime-Spiritt) an(] our changing Eeltan- 
schauung: ('World-view'). 
Topics of educational importance upon uiUch Literature and Dogma has 
bearing include the nature of, and relationship between literature, science 
and religion; the place and value of literary studies; problems of over- 
specialization and the integration or compatibility of disciplines; 
problems of religious and moral education in a pluralistic society; 
problems of freedom and duthority in educational organization and content. 
In short, a variety of closely interrelated qualitative questions not easily 
subjected to experimental study, but nonetheless of crucial importance to 
education, and matters of increasing concern to society. In such a com- 
plex field this study will not seek to be inclusive (which would clearly 
be impossible), or conclusive (whichmould be foolhardy), but suggestive; 
and it is hoped that the subject-matter will itself justify the validity 
of a primarily suggestive approach. 
At this time perhaps more than ever before imaginative insight needs 
to be brought to bear on practical issues facing society, and in this 
sphere Arnold is pre-eminent. William Robbins (1959) is among the in- 
creasingnumber of critics Mio recognize this: 
... in an age which can solve the problem of survival only 
by more 
than mere physical co-operationg by a pooling of moral and spiritual 
re'sources, the sanity and catholicity of attitudes like (Arnoldts) are 
desperately needed. The practical idealism of his values can give meaning 
and purpose to education, which often has neithett and it can be a means 
of reconciling the persisting differences of Christianj scientist, and 
humanist. 
In the following pages this conception and its implications will be further 
explored; from a critical study of Literature 2DILE20A in conjunction with 
Arnoldis other critical and educational writings, it is boped to 
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extract something of his epistemology and ethical outlook. 
F 
ACKNOWLEDGMINTS 
With debts extending so far I cannot be comprehensive, so I shall try 
to be brief. 
For hospitality to a 'stray' thesis I must thank the Curriculum Studies 
Department of the University of London Institute of Education. An 
eclectic, non-empiricall non-statistical study is something of a cuckoo 
in the nest:. I am grateful that it was allowed to hatch out where it 
was. In particular I wish to thank a succession of long-suffering 
tutors - Dr 
(now Professor) Denis Lawton, - Mrs Maggie Ing and Dr Peter 
Gordon -, for their sensitive adviceand patience. 
For initial encouragement to undertake the research I must thank my 
former tutor, the late Professor Doris Lee. 
For informal, critically stimulating, discussions along the way I must 
thankinnumberable academic colleagues and students, and particularly 
Professor, William Wall, Dr Ian Michael and Dr James Henderson at the 
University of London Institute of Education. 
For a termis Teacher Fellowship (in 1975) at the School of Oriental and 
African Studies to study the educational implications of cultural diver- 
sity I must thank the Inner London Education Authorityp and my former 
Principal , Miss Mary Puddephat; and for invaluable insights gained from 
discussions during the term I -wish to thank Mr Ted O'Connor, Professor 
PM Holto Professor Kenneth Ballhatchet and Professor Kenneth Strong. 
At S. O. A. S. I bit off as much as I could chew in a term, and more than 
I could digest and assimilate into one thesis. (I hope to do justice 
to Fukuzawa1s1Al-Afghani! s and other Eastern liberal thinkers' response 
to the same Zeitaeist that touched Matthew Arnold, at some future date. 
For the-generous long-tem'loan of his invaluable typescript onlArnold 
and Religion' I must thank Professor Basil Willey, whose sensitive 
appreciation of Matthew Arnold has been a constant source of inspiration. 
For generous hospitalityt encouragement and stimulating discussion 
both sides of the Atlanticq I must thank Professor Robert H Super, to 
-vhiose definitive eleven-volume edition of Arnold's prose all Arnoldian 
scholars are indebted. 
For efficiency, help and patience I am indebted tothe staffs of a 
number of librariest including in particular the British Museum, Senate 
House, the London Institute of Education, Rachel McMillan College of 
Education, Goldsmithat College, the I. L. E. A., the School of Oriental 
and African Studies, and (in America) the University of Chicago, Ann 
Arbor University and Columbia University, New York. 
For. a year's study leave to complete this thesis I wish to thank the 
University of London, Goldsmiths? College. 
For living patiently with-this second thesis from its inception, through 
its long growing pains to its hoary completion I must thank my Wife and 
family. I 
Finally, this thesis - an analysis of two concepts - is a synthesis of 
the thoughts and ideas of many writers. I am conscious of my indebted- 
ness to them all, and hope that I have done justice tongme of them in 
what follows. 
9 
ABBREVIATIONS 
All references refer by author and date of publication to the final 
Bibliography, with. two exceptions: 
For convenience, references to RH Super's Complete Prose Works of 
Matthew Arnold are indicated simply by the editor's name and the volume 
number, as follows: 
Super I 
IV, etc. (to volume XI) 
(The complete title of each of these volumes is included in the final 
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PART ONE 
VALUE-ACQUISITION IN EDUCATION: BACKGROUND 
TO THE CURRENT SCENE 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis examines the concepts ofIliteraturel and ? dogma? in relation 
to society in general and to the school curriculum in particular, and 
explores how far literature, and a 'literary' approach to studies$ 
can provide an antidote to the dangers inherent in dogmatism in a fast- 
shrinking world, where the incidence of cultural plurality must increasing- 
1'! ý bring. time-honoured value systems into conflic t, and challenge their 
traditional authority and sanctions. 
It is a basic premise of this thesis (although initially it must be 
expressed in a somewhat oversimplified form) that literature seeks to 
nourish the individual for his own sake; dogma (and its successor, 
ideology) seeks to nurture the individual for the sake of society. Since 
education is concerned to prepare the individual for his entry into the 
wider society it is important for educators concerned with tile curriculum 
to pay some attention to these two concepts. It is primarily in the 
realm of values rather than cognitive development that literature and 
dogma hold sway, and it is this aspect of education that is the central 
concern of the following thesis, although it recognizes that the, cogni- 
tivq, affective and conative domains cannot be dealt with in mutual 
isolation, and so both literature and dogma will be considered in their 
relation to science and the 'scientific attitude' as well as to each other. 
The thesis, it must j3e stated at the outset, is concerned less with 
details of curriculum content than with principles of curricular orien- 
tation. The implications of the principles developed, however, will 
inevitably have a bearing on content, particularly in relation to the place 
of literature and of moral and religious education in the curriculum of a 
technological age. 
A series of urgent educational. questions upon which Matthew Arnold's 
ideas would appear to have some bearing are posed later in this Introduction. 
Part One then details relevant source-material and research on Matthew 
Arnold and surveys some of the. major developments in moral, religious 
and 'literary' education up to the present time, setting them within 
the context of rapid technological advance and cultural change. Part 
Two proceeds to a descriptive analysis of Literature and Dogma; an 
account of its reception by Arnold's contemporaries; and a discussion 
of the significance of the ironicaLapproach by means of -which Arnold's 
ideas are communicated. Part Three is devoted to an analysis of three 
key concepts: tliteraturel in Chapter 7, 'dogma' in Chapter 8, and 
the Zietgeist (with its accompanying counterpart Weltunschuung) in 
chapter 9. Arnoldis views on the relationship between the 'Time-Spirit' 
and 'Worldview? and literature and dogma are compared with those of 
others, and the contemporary significance of 41licir interrelationsilip is 
examined. In Part Four some of the curricular implications of Arnold's 
thought are developed. The educational implications of Arnold1s own moral 
development and epistemological outlook are outlined; the significance of 
the- inclusion of imaginative literature in sebools is examined; and the 
application of Iliteraryt and 'dogmatic' approaches in Religious Education 
and Moral Education as well as in other relevant parts of the curriculum 
is discussed. Finally the principles of 'openness' and 'security' (inherent 
in the concepts of literature and dogma, respectively) are applied to some 
consideration of the question of authority in curriculum construction, and 
to problems of specialisation and integration in the curriculum. 
Before surveying some of the work which has already been done - the 
foundations upon which this thesis will be built - it may be helpful to. make 
one or two general observations to provide a preliminary perspective within 
which the argument which follows may be viewed. 
Matthew Arnold's Literature and Dogma, published in 1873, anticipating 
the demise of authoritarian dogmatic theology in'the face of the advance of 
scientific and democratic developments, sought to preserve the essence of 
Christianity and its ethical values by demonstrating that the language of 
scriptural material was essentially literary, and not scientific. Truths 
12- 
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embodied in poetic form, Arnold orgued, must be apprehended by the 
exercise of literary tact and imagination an(] not use(] as the building 
blocks for metaphysical speculation. 
Despite the outcry from both scientific and Christian dogmatists 
at the time - the book was too 'religious' for the scientists and too 
scandalously heterdox for the theologians - and despite the relative neg- 
lect of Literature and Dogma since, events in the ensuing century have 
vindicated Arnold's foresight. The proliferation of titles such as, The 
Death of God,. The Disappearance of God, The Secularisation of Religion 
and Me Kvth of God Incarnate bear witness -to the virtual collapse of 
organized dogmatic theology. But a moral vacuum, disturbing for society 
in general and for educationists in particular, creates a situation wherp 
it is often difficult to provide adequate guidelines for action for the 
coming generation. 
Vastly improved communications and technological advances generally 
have brought together disparate and sometimes alien communities on a 
global scale, and in our own society have created a pluralistic, multi- 
cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-faith community, challenging to the 
utmost our educational resources and capacity for adaption. While Arnold 
was concerned primarily with the nineteenth century clash between scientific 
and religious cultural values, his insights are relevant to the problem of 
culture-clash generally. Purthermore, although Christian theologians are 
burying most of their dogmatic differences in the interest of ecumenism 
and adaptation to the prevailing scientific -world-view, other dogmas abound, 
separating nations, communities and groups, to their mutual disadvantage 
and peril. 
This thesis, therý is concerned with education for the acquisition of 
values capable of meeting the severe demands of our fast-changing contem- 
porary world, and in particular in our own democratic, multicultural society. 
It seeks to explore two rival approaches to value acquisition - an approach 
through literature and an approach through dogma - by means of a critical 
examination and application of certain leading ideas of Matthew Arnold, 
one (as I hope to show) of the most 'modern' and far-sighted of Victorian 
educationists. 
Many of the problems facing Arnold and his contemporaries in England 
in the 1870s are facing the world at large in the 1970s, and with increas- 
ing urgency. This is one justification for adding to the voluminous array 
of Arnoldian scholarship extant. My further excuse, if one is needed, 
is t, hat nobody has yet sought to apply the implications of what Arnold 
believed to be his most important and potentially useful work (Super VI, 
p. 141) Literature and Dogma, to the central concern of his professional 
life - education. 
Educational research should involve - like Arnold's definition of 
criticism -ra disinterested endeavour to learn and propagate the best that 
is known and thought in the world, and thus to establish a current of fresh 
and true ideas'(Supei IlIg p. 282) Our current preoccupation with problems 
of religious and moral education in a secular societyt and of freedom and 
authority in, relation to the school curriculum, make this an opportune. 
time for a disinterestedScrutiny of Arnold's own, self-designated tbeatt, 
since these, too, were Arnold's preoccupations (although in the context of 
society at large) in Literature and Dogma,. In order to develop an adequate 
interpretation of ArnoldIs ideaA expressed in Literature and Dog-Ma in 
relation to the school curriculum, supporting material will be drawn from 
Arnol. dis other works wherever relevant, from his criticism, for example, 
and from his inspectorial. Reports on Elementary Schools, (Marvin, 1908) and 
his special reports on continental education (Super Il). 
Although I will be drawing upon a variety of sourcesq thescope of 
this thesis will be limited to considering the, implications of literature 
and, dop-ma alone within the curriculum. There will be no attempt9 for 
example, to cover the whole range of English studies. On the other hand, 
the use of literature, or a literary approach, within other subject areas, 
for example in moral and religious education, will be discusset] where this 
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seems appropriate. Die concept oC dogma will be taken in its widest 
sense to include ideology in general (see Chapter 8). Where discussion 
of religious education occurs - its reference will be limited to state 
schools since voluntary and independent schools have their own terms 
of reference in this sphere. A further limitation of this study will be to 
confine discussion to primary a nd secondary schools, largely ignoring further 
and higher education, although a number of the implications of the argument 
would be relevant there too. 
It is hoped that an examination of Arnold's later criticism, and 
I notably Literature and Dogma, will throw light on a number of specific 
questions of current concern in education, and it may be helpful to enum- 
erate some of the more important of these questions here. Firstly, what 
contribution can imaginative literature make to moral and religious 
education? Closely related to this qu . estion are the recognition (or 
otherwise) of the place of religious writings within the field of litera- 
ture; and problems concerned with the justification for religious and 
moral education in a pluralistic and largely secular society. Secondly, 
what bearing has an examination of 'literature' and 'dogma' on an 'open, 
and 'closed' approach to the curriculum at large? This entails some 
consideration of the balance and compatibility of subjects within the 
curriculum, and of the relative advantages of specialization and integration. 
Ibirdly, what is the cultural significance of literature, as opposed to 
dog, ma, as a means of value-acquisition in relation to anarchy, democracy 
and totalitarianism? Fourthlyp how far in general does Arnold's view of 
knowledge prefigure modern developments (for example in science and 
theology) and offer relevant pointers to meeting current educational needs? 
Subsumed in this area are questions relating to the educational implications 
of Arnold's own upbringing and subsequent outlook, and the relation between 
his ironic approach to Literature and Dogma and our contemporary world- 
view. And lastly, can a case be made our for imaginative literature in 
schools as 'experience' rather than as examination fodder, and for the 
f6 
cultivation of a 'literary frame of referencel relevant to the lives and 
fleeds (if pupils? 
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CHAPTER ONE 
LITERATURE. DOGMA AND EDUCATION: ARNOLDIAN SOURCES AND RESEARCH 
Because he was a critic and an educational reformer, Arnold wished to 
restate the creeds in modern terms, but because he was also a poet he 
saw that even greater than the need for restatement was the need to 
conserve, and preserve from destructiont all the beauty and the power 
. 
of tradition. For this amongst many other reasons, he has, worn better 
than most Victorian liberals, and those religious books of his, now 
seldom read... still contain matter of importance for all who are con- 
cerned today to preserve a spirit of sober piety and rational religion. 
. 
Basil Willey, 1949 
Arnold... cannot, be summarized. I say this with an eye, not on his 
weaknesses and inconsistencies as a thinker, but on his essential 
strength. And here we have a reason for his being worth special study. 
He is not easy to do justice tog and to attempt it seriously is to 
refine pne's understanding of the nature of intelligence... 
FR Leavis, 1950 
This chapter seeks to place Matthew Arnold's Literature and Domma 
in context; to review briefly-some ot the changing critical reactions 
to the work; to specify examples of the personal published sources 
consulted; and to give some indications of relevant educational 
criticism extant** 
In order to keep this thesis within bounds it has been necessary 
to prune severely from the wide range of material surveyed. There is 
a good deal of literature about dogma; and no lack of dogma about 
literature. There arep for example, well over a hundred PhD theses 
on 'dogmatism in education' stemming from North American universities 
alone; and getting on for five hundred American PhD theses on the place 
of literature in education. Since in recent years Matthew Arnold's writings 
have been given more attention across the Atlantic than in Great Britain, 
it. is not surprising to find nearly a hundred American PhD theses on 
Arnoldq including among those I have had occasion to consult. much sensi- 
tivep critical evaluation. 
Perhaps the beat known example of American scholarship on Arnold is 
Lionel Trilling's workt Matthew Arnold (1939). Originally a PhD thesis, 
it has since been regarded an a standard criticism by all Arnold scholars. 
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More recently a valuable contribution to Arnold studies is Tollers (1974) 
A Bibliography of Matthew Arnold 1932-1970, a well-indexed reference work 
which I found most helpful in reducing the gaps in my own studies of 
Arnold. Without any doubt, bowe ver, the most important achievement of 
American scholarship on Arnold is the monumental eleven-volume Complete 
Prose Work of Matthew Arnold completed in 1977. In editing these 
volumes, RH Super has drawn on, a wide range of scholarship from both 
sides of the Atlantic and the critical and explanatory. notes appended 
to each volume are extremely helpful for the light they throw on the 
background top and the relations between, Arnold's works. Literature 
and Dogma is located in Volume VI. Unless otherwise stated, for some 
particular reasong all references quoted in this thesis to Arnold1s 
prose works will be from Professor Super's 
-editions. 
(This includes 
ArnoldIs reports on continental education, but not his Reports on 
Elementarv Schools which were edited by FS Marvin (1908) in a govern- 
ment publication which has not since been superseded. ) In his critical 
and explanatory notes to Literature and Dogm , Super draws together a 
number of key critical references to the study of this work, and although 
I had independently consulted many of the sources quoted below before the 
appearance of Super's work, I must acknowledge here my indebtedness to 
his helpful selection of pertinent details from the critical material 
extant. There will inevitably, therefore, be some overlap in references 
which follow. 
The context of Arnold's Literature and Dogma 
For details of the circumstances of the publication of Literature 
and Dogma first in part as a series of essays in the Cornhill Magazine in 
1871 and subsequently completed in book form in 18739 the reader is referred 
to Super's outline (Super VI9 pp-448-454). Of more particular importance 
herep however, are the general cultural and educational background to the 
publication of Literature and Dogma and the sources upon which Arnold 
drew for the ideas there expressed. Professor Super draws attention to 
the secular and sectarian squabbling attendant upon the bill to intro- 
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duce the first complete system of compulsory education in Great Britain 
in 1870. WE Forsterp son-in-law of Thomas Arnold and brother-in-law to 
Matthewq was. Vice-President in charge of the Education Department. As 
a Quaker he was, perhaps well fitted to steer the perilous course between 
secular and sectarian demands. In his parliamentary speech introz, tucing 
the bill, he referred to three regulations requiring acceptance: 
an effectual Conscience Clause; undenominational inspection; a com- 
plidnce with conditions securing secular efficiency - then no other 
regulations will be enforced, and P especially, the present restrictions 
against secular schools will be removed. (Maclure, 1968, p. 101) 
Sectarian resistance to the removal of these restrictions was to be 
"Allayed by adopting the 'dual system' which left denominational schools 
intact alongside the new secular schools. Howeverp as Super observes, 
the debate 'upon the question of the sort of religious education that 
should be required of the new board schools' continued untilt 
on June 30,1870, Sir Stafford Northcotels amendment to include the 
catechism and religious formularies in the instruction provided by 
rate supported schools was defeated. (Super VIP p. 454) 
Finally, the famous Cowper-Temple clause was agreed, which laid down that 
in schools -- 'hereafter established by means of local rates, no catechism 
or religious formulary vhich is distinctive to any particular denomination 
shall betaught' (Maclure, 19689 p. 98). Some of the implications of 
these enactments, and of subsequent developments under the 1944 Educa- 
tion Act will be considered later in this thesis. Suffice here to 
mention that constitutionally (as a deeply religious, but unorthodox 
'liberal' Christian)q domestically (as brother-in-law to WE Forster) 
and professionally (as H. M. I. ), Matthew Arnold was deeply involved in 
these developments as they took place. 
Arnold's. Culture and Anarchy, then published only recently in 1869, 
had insisted on the need for 'culturel - wide reading and the harmonious 
development of all our faculties. When on June 21,1870, he attended 
the University of Oxford for anhonorary degree of D. C. L. to be conferred 
2-0 
on him by the Chancellorp Lord Salisburyp although he was in Super's 
words 'naturally gratified by the attention': 
some of Salisbury's remarks during the ceremonials of the week led him 
to conceive that Salisbury was, as he. wrote to his moýher, 'a dangerous 
man ... chiefly from his want of any true sense and experience of litera- 
ture and its beneficent function. Religion he knowsp and physical 
science he knowsp but the immense work between the twoq which is for 
literature to accomplish, he knows nothing of, and all his speeches at 
Oxford pointed this way". (Super V1, p. 488)- 
The idea of developing the theme of the 'beneficent function' of 
literature as a means of countering dogma and reconciling our 'scientific' 
and 'religious' propensities was born. It only remained for Arnold's 
friend JC Shairp to publish a series of lectures in November 1870 under 
the title Culture and Religion - including consideration of the relation- 
ship between scienceg literature and 'spiritual growthl - for Arnold to 
join in the debate. 
Another factor influencing Arnold's writing of Literature and Domna 
was his concern to say something constructive about religion in the face 
of what often unintentionally proved to be the destructive influence of 
the 'higher criticisml emanating from Germany but now beginning to lead 
to somewhat clumsier applications of biblical criticism among English 
adherents. Arnold had challenged Bishop Colensols well-intentioned 
but ultimately destructive 'mathematical' criticism of biblical 'facts 
and figures' (see Super IIIv PP-40-55); now it was his turn to show 
what kind of critical analysis he believed to be more appropriate for 
scriptual material. At the same time, as Super points out, ArnoldIs 
criticism was to include the 'rejection of the strict concept of 
"inspiration" on the part of the authors of the Bible and ... emphasis 
upon the ethical rather than the metaphysical significance of Scripture., 
(Super VI, p. 455). In this regard, among others, as Professor Eugene 
L Williamsono Jr. (1961) showag Matthew shared his father Thomas Arnold's 
views: 'for both men, the crown of the Biblical ethic was to be found 
in the personality and teachings of Jesus. ' Similarly Matthew's opposition 
2i 
to 'religious anthropomorphism' approximates to Dr Arnold's repudiation 
of Ipantheistic doc: brines'. The educational relevance of these and other 
points raised by Eugene L. Williamson in this, and another paper by him 
(1960) must 4wait further discussion in chapters 9 and 10 of this thesis. 
Distrust of 'divine inspiration' and anthropomorphic metaphor were 
a fairly natural outcome of Arnold's literary experience and understanding 
of the na ture of myth. As Catherine Runcie (1969) points out in her 
study of Matthew Arnold and Walter Pater, Arnold 
was acquainted with a whole history of opinion on myth and the burgeoning 
of current views, which Andrew Lang calls the "philological" and the 
"anthropological" schools of mythology. Arnold knew in the 1840s the 
mythological findings that are still being assimilated and refined in 
this century, by Cassirer or Jung or Frye. (P-17) 
Farther reference will later be made to Arnold's sources and links 
with other writersy notably in chapter 10; but herep in order to give 
some preliminary indication of the multi-faceted nature of Arnold's 
writings, it may be instructive to mention some of the names that have 
been linked with Arnold's in studies of the last two or three decades: 
Matthew Arnold and Carlyle (Tillotson# 1956), Matthew Arnold and John 
Stuart Mill (Alexander, 1965), Matthew Arnold and TH Hux (Armytage, 
1953)9 Matthew Arnold. John Ruskin and the Modern Temper (Alexanderv 1973) 
Matthew Arnold and Edmund Burke, (Tobias, 1957), Matthew Arnold and Ernest 
Renan: a study of their literary relationship (Dichmann, 1954)t etc. etc. 
He has also been linked : with the Cambridge Platonists (1A. M. t, 1943), 
the Oriel Noetics at Oxford (Blackburnt 1946), the German Theologians 
(via Thomas Arnold) - (Christensen, 1957), jand the Romantics 
(Gottfried, 
1958) and (James, ý1961), etc. 
Professor Basil Willey (1975), one of the most sensitive of modern 
English critics to Arnold's intentions in Literature and D a,, gives 2JO 
a briefq helpful list of his main sources of inspiration: 
If I were trying to enumerate all the influences that moulded ArnolVs 
mind (he writes) I should have to mention at least Senancour..., George 
Sand, Spinoza, Goethe, Wordsworth, Newman, Renan and Sainte Beuve.... ' 
(pp. 240-241) 
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And specifically in relation to Arnold's religious writing he adds: 
Bishop Butler, Bishop Wilson, Thomas h Kempis, the Cambridge Platonists, 
and above all the Bible. Some of these connections will be followed 
upIater where they throw light on the educational implications of 
Arnold's writing. 
'The immediate and more remote background' of Literature and Dogma 
is the theme of an unpublished doctorial dissertation produced at Yale 
University in 1943 by WM Blackburn. Professor Blackburn makes reference 
to most of the sources mentioned above in his thesis, and three pub- 
lished articles based upon his findings have been particularly helpful 
to the writer. That on the Oriel Noetics has already been referred to 
(Blackburn, 1946); another on 'Bishop Butler and the Design of Arnold's- 
Literature and 
ýogma` (1948), throws interesting light on Arnold's 
conception of conscience and his eudaemonian association of right conduct 
with happiness; and a third entitled IThe Background of Arnold's 
Literature and Dogmal(1945), discusses the relationship between Arnol. (1113 
work and the educational d4bacle and religious controversies of 1870. 
The problem as to what sort of religious education, if any, was to be 
provided in the new board schools; the significance of the 'Westminster 
Scandall (when the wrath of the dogmatic'Bishops of Winchester and 
Gloucester was aroused because a Unitarian minister had been given Holy 
Communion in Westminster Abbey by Arnold's friend Dean Stanley); the 
Athanasian Creed controversy; and the arguments about the catechism and 
its place in education are shown to be among factors provoking Arnold to 
write. Professor Blackburn also brings out something of the sympatby of 
outlook between Arnold and the scientist Thomas Henry Huxleyq and of 
Arnold's hostility to dogmatic religion generally and in particular 
to the kind of schizophrenic compartmentalization of scientific and 
religious world-views in the thinking of the influential Lord Salisbury. 
William Blackburn makes three important observations on Arnold's 
motivation for writing Literature and Downa: 
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We may note -(he writes) more particularly: 
(1) his recognition of the 
alights which scientifically minded men were putting upon literary 
studies., a theme which he was to develop for the first time in the 
opening pages of Literature and Dogma; (2) his recognition also of 
the "immense work" to be done in reconciling "the old ecclesiastical and 
dogmatic form of religion" with the new scientific spiri 
,t 
-- by which he 
mcanso quite simplyp the immense work of teaching people to read the 
Bible as literature rather than as a collection of theologically sci- 
entific data; and (3) his frank acknowledgement of his own role as 
medi , ator, "a healing and reconciling influence, " between the claims of 
science and those of religion. (P133) 
Chanzina response to Arnold's Literature, and Dogma 
Some preliminary account of the sources and motivation of Literature 
and Dogma has been given; a descriptive analysis of the work itself 
follows in chapter 4 and so requires no discussion at this point; some 
indication of the sources consulted in relation to the reception of 
Literature and Dol_rma, however, may be appropriate here. In the first 
place, a survey was made of the Victorian periodicals and journals 
reviewing Literature and Dogma on its appearance in 1873. The work 
provoked a lively reception in British and American journals and periodi- 
'cals and also among Continental critics, and it was instructive to discover 
the wide range of reactions to it from the highly favourable response in 
The Contemporary Revie and Th e, Athenaeum to the very hostile condemna- 
tion of it in The Guardian. Between these extremes opinion ranged from 
Ofavourablel in The Westminster Review, through 'cool' in The Examiner 
afid. The Fortnightly Review to the bemused and sadly critical responses 
of, The Spectator's reviewers and the hostile reception from Blackwoods 
Edinburgh Magazine. and The QuarterlX Review. These articles were selected 
to provide a primary spectrum of eriticism for chapter 
5. 
Two theses focusing closely on the reception of Literature and Dop-ma 
are those of Gudas (1953) and Coulling (1974). Fabian Gudas discusses 
not only the reception of Literature and Dop-ma on its appearance but also 
Arnold's defence of his position in su. býsequent writings - notably in God 
and the Bible (1897)**, Last Essays on Church and Religion 
(1877)47' and 
For references to this and the other reviews mentioned in this 
paragraph see Chapter 3 
See Super, vols VII and VIII 
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A Comment on Christmas (1884)* -a defence which had to be conducted in 
time strenuously wrested from his arduous work of school inspecting. 
Gudas considers criticism of Arnold's ideas on religion and morality 
up to those of Eliot (1933), Trilling (1939), Bonnerot (1947) and 
Willey (1949). Gudas concludes that: 
Much of ArnoldIs religious criticism was conditioned by current religious 
controversy. His Biblical exegesis, as a whole, probably can not be 
defended; nor is it likely that his recommendation for the retention of 
the Aberglaube of the traditional religion as a poetic symbolism for a 
new faith likely to be accepted. But a study of Arnold which would 
consider him as anticipatory of certain twentieth century developments, 
such as Humanism and Modernism, might show his, real significance. 
(Gudas, 1953, P-363), 
From thd point of view of religiong Gudas's view expressed here is 
consistent with Arnoldian criticism at the timev bearing in mind the 
theological ethos of the first half of this century. But the quarter 
century since then has seen considerable change in this sphere. Bonnerot 
saw Arnold as a Humanist; on the other hand Eliot and Trilling rejected 
the validity of Arnold's version of Christianity; Basil Willey alone of 
the four critics mentioned above saw ahead to the possibility of Arnold's 
concept of Christianity finding a more liberal and permissive theological 
climatet and (in Gadas's words) 'pleads for a serious restudy of Arnold's 
religious writings by the liberal-Christian' (P-362). Gudas, however, 
mentions George Tyrrell, a 'we 11-known Catholic Modernist' as being 
influenced by Arnold, and refers to an article in the liberal Christian 
Hibbert Journal in -which HS Shelton (1946) addressing liberal clergymen, 
pleads for a Ireturn to Arnold's religious works as a source of suggestions 
for the reconstruction of religion which would appeal to the "modern" 
mind (p. 362). 
These hints - straws in the wind in Gudas's thesis turn out to be 
much more readily justifiable in the changed theological and philosophical 
ethos of twenty years later, and Sidney Coulling's study of Matthew Arnold 
*See Super, vol. X 
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and His Critics (1974) is able to be much less defensive about Arnold's 
theological excursions. Coulling like Gudas allows Arnold to defend his 
own case against his critics, using the replies embodied in his later 
'works against the criticisms of earlier ones. While by no means un- 
critical of Arnold's theological, writing, Coulling is sensitive to his 
intentions within the framework of contempora ry controversies, regarding 
Arnold as Ithe most adequate of all the Victoriansl and admiring . the 
qualities of 'sanity, lucidity, wit and seriousness' (P-301) in Arnold's 
controversial prose. Even in a purely theological issue - Arnold's re- 
attribution of the essence of the Fourth Gospel to John (Super VII, 
chapters 5-6) -'Arnold is vindicated by twentieth-century scholarship' 
against the 'radical view of the TtIbingen critics' (p. 260). 
Between the critiques of Gudas and Coulling two significant 
interpretations of Arnold's Literature and Dogma must be taken into 
account. The contributions of Dorothea Krook (1959) and William Robbins 
(1959), published simultaneously, reflect shifting perspectives in both 
Humanist and theological quarters. In Three Traditions of Moral Thourkht 
Krook reappraises FH Bradley's critique of historic Christianity. 
While both TS Eliot and Trilling had considered that Bradley had ex- 
ploded Arnold's interpretation, Krook found that fit was necessary to 
distinquish between the admirable intention and the subtly inadequate 
execution of his (Bradley's) critique' (p. 294) -a critique which she 
asserts 'could only be done -as any work of imaginative literature - 
on the internal. literary evidences. ' On the other hand, 'in Matthew 
Arnold's Humanist reinterpretation of historic Christianity ... it was 
Arnold's developed literary intelligence in handling the Bible texts 
that gave his interpretations their authcdty and persuasiveness' 
(p. 294). 
In Krook's view Arnold's account robs orthodox Christianity of some of 
its saving and motivating power (particularly in relation to the signifi- 
cance of the Church and of prayer) but provides a valuable stepping stone 
towards a c. onstructive and transforming order of Christian 
(as distinct 
Wo 
from Anthropological) Humanism, w1iich combines a rational self- 
coherence with a degree of emotional commitment necessary to provide 
ground s for hope in the presence of our twentieth century malaise. 
In The 1ýthical Idealism of Matthew Arnold, William Robbins 
(1959) 
shows the relation of Arnold's 'imaginative reason' to matters of 
'practical import' and applauds 'the interplay of inward self-perfecting 
and social solidarity' and 'the reiterated plea for the harmonious 
expansion of all our powers' (p. 212) among other positive qualities of 
Arnol4ts religious writing. In Robbins' view 'the practical idealism 
of (Arnold's) values can give meaning and purpose to education, which 
too often has neither, and it can be a means of reconciling the persist- 
ing differences of Christian, scientist and humanist' 
(p. 213)- 
Both Krook and Robbins were writing from the point of view of 
Humanism - albeit Christian Humanism; but vhen we come to consider 
changes in theological outlook more directly in dhapter 8 and in atti- 
tudes within religious education in chapter 2, it will be evident that 
on the whole the Zeitgeist has been on Matthew Arnoldts side in these 
matters. This would have pleased Arnold. In The Time-Spirit of Matthew 
Arnoldl RH Super (1970) says of Arnold that this description of himself 
as being in the main stream of modern thought was a fair estimate' (p. 90), 
adding that, lone does not make the stream one floats in, but one may 
choose it'. Super believes that Arnold chose the right current: 
By perceiving what elements of nineteenth-century liberalism gave promise 
for the twentieth century, he became, not only what he called Emersont 
"the friends and aider of those who would live in the spirit", but the 
beat representative, among the Victorians, of the modern spirit. 
(pp. 90-91) 
Fraser Neiman would largely agree with this, although in The Zeitgeist of 
Matthew Arnold, (1959)9 he points out that Arnold is not always consistent 
in his use of the term 'Zeitgeist'. Essentially it is a shorthand term 
for the 'phenomenon of change' and the 'historical process' but ArnoldIs use 
of this concept, and its peculiar significance for the twentieth century 
will be discussed in some detail in chapter 9. Suffice here to mention, 
however, -that Neiman recognizes in Arnold's use of the term Zeitgeist 
in. Literature and Dogma a useful ambivalence which enables him to relate 
the will and purpose of man to that of God. (It is worth mentioning here, 
perhaps, that Arnold's definition of 'God' is also usefully ambivalent, 
facilitating its use today by many Christians and Humanists alike. ) 
Before reviewing more specifically educational material drawn upon 
for this thesis it. is necessary to indicate other works of a general 
nature relating to Arnold which it was found necessary and helpful to 
consult. 
Arnold's Notebooks and other personal evidence 
Clearly the Notebooks of Matthew Arnold (Lowry, 1952) throw valuable 
light on Arnold's thinking in relation to tliteraturel and to 'dogma' 
generally, and in particular to his preoccupations at the time of writing 
Literature and Dogma itself, and related works. The need, for example, 
to resolve the tension between Arnold's conflicting rational and religious 
predispositions is suggested by the juxtaposition of two entries in 
Arnold's notebooks early in 1870: one a quotation from Ernest Renan, 
the other from the rational Comtist, Littr4: 
La somme incomparable de g8ut pour le bien que le Chritianisme a inspirel 
Quand on songe & ce miracle, nulle hyperbole our l1excellence de J4sus 
ne paralt ill4gitime. (Renan) 
En place des anciennes croyances slest el4vee la grande conception des 
lois naturelles qui gouvernent toutes choses, et desquelles on n1obtient 
rien par la priere mais beaucoup par la science et par le travail. 
(Littr4, p. 127) 
The, stark contrast between a religious and a scientific world-view here 
needs no comment, except perhaps to note that Renan's emphasis is on the 
moral rather than the sacerdotal efficacy of Christianity, and his 
'miracle' is a fairly naturalistic one. 'Naturall religion is central 
to the outlook of both Arnold and Renan; and an entry in the Notebook 
shortly before that from Renan hints at Arnold's distrust of dogma: 
'Let out discourse of religion be practical rather than notional or 
disputing' (p. 126) is taken, As are many other quotations dear to Arnold, 
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from Bishop Wilson's. Sacra Privata. Other entries in-the same year 
support this leaning. It seems, for example, to be inherent in some 
words quoted from Thomas h Kempis' De Imitatione: 'Audi verbum meum, et 
non curabis decem millia verba hominuml (P-132 of the Notebooks). Later 
the same year Littre is again quoted apparantly with approval, since 
the view represented is that embodied in Literature and Dolzma. 
De mgme que, dans I'ancienne loi, la crainte du Seigneur est le 
commencement de la sagXesse, de mgme, dans Ilbre modern, ce regret (le regret de erdre en speculations vaines les forces effectives de 
Ilifitelligence5 est le commencement de Is. vraie philosophie., 
(Notebooks, p. 144) 
And the following year, 1871, we even find a quotation from Arnold's 
adversary, Edward Miall (writing in The Times) with which Arnold apparantly 
felt in tune: 
Men of course will have their thoughts and maintain them. I blame 
no man for the religious opinions, he holdst but when his religious 
opinions or convictions are imposed upon the conscience s or even the 
conveniences, of his fellow--meno then I do blame them. (p'160) 
This we know from Arnold's opinion of the University Test Act is precisely 
Arnold's own view of dogmatic assertiveness and compulsion. 
In contrast with his aversion to dogma, the Notebooks at this 
period reflect Arnold's concern with 'conduct' as the basic desideratum 
of. religion. William Beveridge is quoted early in 1870: IPlay no longer 
with religion, as people commonly do, but set upon the practice of it in 
good earnest. As ye profess to believe the Gospel, live according to the 
rule's and precepts of it' (Notebooks, p. 129). And. some words of Goethe 
in the'same strain follow soon afterwards: 'Es ist nicht genug zu wissen, 
man muss auch anwenden; es ist nicht genug zu vollen, man muss auch 
thun' (P-135) This entry, incidentally is underlined. 
Herbert Spencer's (1950) famous question: IWhat knowledge is of 
most worth? ' - always a key educational question - finds echo in an 
entry in Arnold's notebook in 1871:. Ta mihi, Dominop scire quod 
sciendum est' (P-147). This entry from De Imitationi has a slightly 
more pious'ring, but perhaps a deeper intention, than Spencerts question. 
I Iq 
However, we know from the first part of Literature and Dogma now already 
published (Arnold, 1871) that Arnold has already decided that tletterslp 
or 'literature' is of most worthp or at least of more worth than dogma. 
An entry in 1871 quotes Napoleon evidently with approval: 
Napoleon said: J'aime les sciences math4matiques et physiques: chacune 
dielles est une belle application partielle de llesprit bumain; mais les 
lettres, clest Pesprit humain lui-meme, clest lleducation de Výtme. 
(Notebooks, p. 163) 
And in a similar vein the 'religious' potentialities of artistic creation, 
as of 'nature', are implicit in an entry from Micheletts Histoire de France 
oc curring at the beginning of 1873 (contemporaneously with the publication 
of Literature and Domma in book form)t 'Qu'iI y ait dans la nature, dans 
Part (nature humaniage), des 614ments religieux et lee bases de la foi 
profondep clest ce qui ne vient a 1fesprit de personnel. (Notebooks, p. 190) 
An interesting entry fairly early on in 1870 evokes Arnold's concern 
with the conflicting claims for attention - with clear curricular 
implications - of science and religion: 
People ask: What can the Bible teach us about electricity, or the duty 
of votipgv or any of the great elements of modern scientific enquiry? 
It does not undertake to teach those subjects. It implies that 1poral 
elements are the master elements of the human soul; that when they are 
developed and rightly trainedg the whole mass will go rightly; and the 
Bible attempts simply to inspire and guide the moral centres of the 
mind. (Notebooks, P-133) 
Taken from a sermon by HW Beecher, thbee words. echo the pre-eminence given 
to the moral side of religion throughotit Arnold's own writing. 
Other notebook entries of this period show the Humanistic bent of 
Arnoldts Christianity in seeking 'the Kingdom of heaven' on earth 
(p. 141, Edouard Reuss) rather than, as Renan fears all too common 
(Notebooks, p. 141) in the popular conception of a glorious Second Coming; 
his concern for improving the conditions of society and reconciling 
conflicting interests (Notebooks, P-159, George Sand); his belief in 
the cultivation of the spiritual side ol life; in finding happiness 
through cheerful right conduct combined with self-restraint; his search 
for simplicity amidst the multiplicity of formag events and activities 
thronging our lives; his willingness to empathise with alternative 
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points of view to those current (e. g. looking at western Christianity 
through the eyes of an Afghan Muslim)q and so on. 
It is scarcely possible to study Arnold the theological or social 
critic, or Arnold the educationist, without some reference at least to 
Arnold the poet, and here I have found Kenneth Allott's collected 
edition (Arnoldq 1965) particularly helpful. 'The Scholar-Gipsyl, for 
example, based on a story from Joseph Glanvill's The Vanit. X of Dognnatizing, 
throws some light on Arnold's interest. in different kinds of knowledge and 
the relation of these to happiness, although written a score of years 
before-Arnold explored somewhat similar problems in Literature and Dogma. 
'Rugby ChapelIq written in 1857, is relevant to an understanding of the 
relationship between M4thew and his father Thomas Arnold (see ehapterIO). 
And as Super (1970) has shown the I re is considerable consistency between 
Arnold's view of the Zeitgeist in his religious writings and in his major 
poem 'Emp edocles on Etna'. 
Arnold, like many Victoriansp was a fairly prolific letter-writer 
and reference will inevitably be made from time to time in the follow- 
ing pages to his correspondence. The main sources for Arnold's published 
letters are Lowry (1932), Russell (1896) and Whitridge (1923) and 
(unless otherwise stated) references given in this thesis will be to one 
of. these texts. 
Although Arnold expressly requested that no biography should be 
written on himg biographical elements in critical works on Arnold have 
inevitably grown longer and fuller with the passage of time, and a 
number of works, not designedly biographies, provide helpful background 
material on the life of Arnold. Works which, either explicitly or 
implicitly, have been particularly helpful for the present thesis 
include: Stanley (1893), -Jump 
(1965), Bush (19709 Trevor (1973), 
Allott (Ed., 1975)9 and Rowse (1976). A number of other works of this 
kind consulted will be quoted from time to time, and all those which have 
materially influenced this thesis are included in the Bibliography. 
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Criticism of Arnold's educational writinffs 
Turfting now to specifically educational writings on Matthew Arnold 
it is interesting that although references and often extensive ref- 
erences - to Matthew Arnold feature widely in educational literature, 
there are surprisingly few educational studies devoted entirely to him. 
Among the earlier ones is an anthology chosen-by Leonard Huxley (1912): 
Thoughts on Education chosen from the writings of Matthew Arnold. Em- 
boldened no doubt by Marvin's edition of Arnold's Reports (1908) and 
encouraged by a Mr Theodore. Reunert, Leonard Huxley sought 'to collect 
into a single volume the most striking passages on matters educational 
from (Arnold's) published writings and from Blue-books' (P. vii). This 
un-anotatedo though well-indexed, selection includes in its brief preface 
a reference to 'Matthew Arnold's repeated insistence on the value of 
literature and especially poetry as a humanising force in education', 
and in view of this it includes 'several passages of literary criticism 
to show what kind of poetry (Arnold) had in mind as possessing the T ghest 
formative power' (p. viii). The preface itself waxes quite poetical in 
its description of Matthew Arnold: 
In the. public eye he was not the School Inspectort but the man of 
letters, the champion of a high cause; he was equipped not merely with 
educational formulasq but with wide7ranging ideas; armed, too, with 
memorable phrases and stinging epigrams for the knotted cords with 
which to drive -the profane and mere money-changers from the sanctuary 
of the human spirit. (pp. v-vi). 
Typically, three of the most significant educational studies of 
Arnold stem from overseas: Walcott's (1945,1970) from Michigant North 
America, and Connell's (1950) from Melbourne, Australia. Walcott's 
lifelong interest in Arnold's educational significance is evinced by 
his Michigan dissertation in 1945 ('Matthew Arnold and the Growth of 
Democratic Education in England) and his relatively recent work$ ae 
Origins of Culture and Anarchy: Matthew Arnold and Popular Education in 
England published in 1970. Although in the latter study Walcott barely 
mentions Literature and Dolona, he refers frequently to Arnold's concern 
for literature as a prime means of nourishing intelligence, the emotions 
and good taste, and for diffusing 'sweetness and light' (to use ArnoldIs 
term). He comments on 'an aura of regret' discernible in Arnold's 
reports on Schools and Universities 2n the Continent - 'a sadq enduring 
awareness that in England the humanizing power of letters was so little 
understood' (P. 101); and observes elsewhere: 
One is inclined to ponder the persistent faith in the power of letters 
Arnold so steadily maintained as he made the dreary round of the schools, 
for nowhere was the effect to be observed. He spoke as from the promp- 
tingting of an inner voice emerging out of his own experience (pp. 60-61) 
Nevertheless, while tArnold's concernfor the beneficent influence of 
letters should hardly surprise us, ' Walcott adduces evidence to 
remind no that Arnoldvalcultural aim was even broader in scope; it 
embraced the practical and the utilitarian as well as the literary 
studies' (p. 103). Walcott also stresses Mathew Arnold's concern for 
the atmosphere in which the schbolchild's studies are undertaken: 
Temperamentally (he writes) Arnold favoured the kind and generous 
teacher. Rigorismp in its stern, ascetic sense, was foreign to his 
nature. He had a strong antipathy for the disciplinary motive in 
examinations, and he thought that English boys were crammed and 
examined to the point of surfeiture and dullness( (p. 100) 
On the whole Arnold's educational ideas are subjected to closer 
critical scrutiny in WF Connell's The Educational Thought and Influence 
of Matthew Arnold 
(1950)9 probably the most important critical interpreta- 
tion of Arnold's educational work to date. Although Connell occasionally 
'misses the point' where Walcott might apprehend it intuitively, this 
study is generally as sensitive as it is comprehensive. Connell 
regards Arnold as 'not merely a Liberal of the Futureq but an Educational- 
ist of the Future also' (p. 280). In his conclusion he adduces three main 
areas within English education which Arnold had regarded as 'making an 
inadequate response' to the needs of the times: tIt lacked responsible 
organisation, it lacked a due appreciation of its, task as a humanising 
agent, and it lacked a social consci. ousness' 
(p28O). 
In respect of the second of these shortcomingov which is our 
main concern hereq it was the mechanical functioning of 
the Revised Code, 
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with its '-payment by resultal based on the annual examination 
of pupilst 
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that was one of the main targets for Arnold's censure. The routine 
cramming for these examinations-militated against both breadth and 
depth of literary culture in schools. 'I n his treatment of literature, ' 
writes Connell. t Arnold 'showed how a direct application of his concept 
of culture should be made. The pursuit of our total perfection through 
our getting to know the beat which has been thought and said in the 
world should be carried out in school by attention to the best models 
of classical English poetry suitable for the age and attainments of the, 
pupils' (p. 183). Having developed rather more f. ully, some of Arnold's 
exalted views on poetry in schoolt Connell comments wrylyt and not with- 
out some justicel IIn making such assertions Arnold appears to have let 
his enthusiasm for his own craft temporarily master his better judgmentl 
(p. 183). The spread of elementary educational facilities increased with 
the Elementary Education Act of 1870# and Connell reminds us that 'it 
was during these years, that (Arnold) suggested the treatment of the Bible 
as literature and its careful use as a source of elevation and inspirationt 
(P-183). Notice thatj amidst the furious rivalries of theological and 
secular debate, it is the Bible as literature that Arnold recommends. 
Referring in an earlier chapter to Literature and Dogma, Connell writes 
that Arnold 'proceeded to jettison from Christianity all belief in 
miracle and prophecyq all metaphysical speculation, the divinity of 
Christt the trinity, redemption, resurrection, everything in fact that 
pertained to theology' (p. 145). Having isolated and eliminated'by 
literary t. act and criticism all that is Aberjzlaubeý (lextra-belief? or 
superstition) wo find tbat: IWhat we iiced to retaint nnd indeed the only 
1,11111g 1,111fl, flard-Imaded practical arl, imunF; wou](I wish I. n rof, airi in Hie 
Bible is -ehiatever can be sliown tIverifiable in experience' (P-145). 
Here Connell is oversimplifying some-Aiat: while Arnold certainly wished 
to reject the theological speculation which was extraneous to the Bibleý 
he hoped to encourage an adequate literary interpretation and apprehension 
of the scriptures themselves so that what was Aberglaube would be fully 
appreciated as poetry instead of as science. 
Connell saw clearly the reasoning behind Arnold's particular kind 
of balancing of the claims of scientific and literary studies, in which 
while in Arnold's view both were necessary, the humanities should always 
have the edge on 'instrumental' studies. Scientific provision, Connell 
interprets Arnoldq 'must not be made at the expense of the study of 
literature': 
As the claims of technical education, and the voices of the advocates 
of scientific instruction grew more insistent, Arnold foresaw an in- 
creasing pressure to substitute natural science for literature. lt 
was true that the teaching of science appeared to be more immediately 
useful in the improvement of health and living conditions, and for the 
maintainance of England's threatened leadership of the industrial 
world, but without the power that letters exert there would be no 
corresponding development in humanity no growth towards greater human 
understanding and perfection. (p. 202ý 
Similarly, Connell seems to have a deeper understanding of ArnoldIs 
particular approach to democratic and egalitarian principles than a. 
number of other critics. Much nonsense is written about Arnold1s Pon- 
centrating his attention upon education for the middle classes and 
working for an intellectual 41ite to raise and maintain standards. 
Such an interpretation ign6res the practicalities of the situation in 
which-Arnold found himself working. If we take account of the conditions 
of the time we shall see that Arnold was working not for an glite, but 
inevitably through an glite in the first instance. It seemed to Arnold 
that leadership must come from the middle classes but for this to be 
effective state intervention w6uld. be necessary to improve the quality 
of middle-class educationg taking it out of the hands of the Gradgrinds 
and Creakles whose establishments, made notorious by Dickens, lacked 
Iculturelp 'dignity' and 'ideas'. Connellfs common-sense in interpreting 
Arnoldla conception is refreshing: 
3((- 
In the light of later developments it would be a bold thing to say 
(Arnold) was wrong. The middle class of to-day is somewhat differently 
constituted and certainly larger as compared with that of Arnold's 
time. Nor can its upper and lower boundaries be clearly defined. It 
would be extravagant to suggest that the effect of Secondary Education 
For All, imaginatively and consistently carried out, will result in the 
whole nation becoming middle classi That might not be a desirable con- 
sumation. However, 'Arnold's idea of equality is relevanthere. In 
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emphasizing it he was clearly not thinking so much of economic condition 
as of culture, conceiving of a common culture in which all alike gen- 
uinely shared, and to which each, in the measure of his capacity, made 
his contribution. For a social democracy this would not seem to be an 
undesirable ideal and there are signs that we have already made some 
progress towards it* (p. xiv) 
Whereas, Bantock (1952) seeks to use Arnold in support of a hard- 
headed authoritarian and 4litist approach to education against what he 
regards as the pervasive influence of 'comparatively superficial thinkers 
like Dewey19 Connell regards Arnold's 'emphasis upon the progressive 
elevation of society', his linsistence upon "growth"' as in line with 
Dewey's thinking, observing that Arnold 'would have approved of the 
statemeTpt of John Dewey that "the criterion of the value of school 
education is the extent in which it creates the desire effective in 
fact"'. (p. 279)* Walsh (1964) praises Arnold and Watson (1973) condemns 
him for taking an 4litist view of literary culture; but Connell's 
recognition of the 'growth' element in Arnold's approach calls in 
question whether Arnold can be called elitist at all. In my own view, 
which I hope to demonstratep Arnold is not ultimately elitist, and the 
implications of his conception of the relation between literary culture 
and society go well beyond the provision of ammunition for those who 
would seek to promote an education4l4lite. Williams (1961), whose view 
of education would be far from this, believes that 'we shall, if we are 
wise, continue to listen to' Arnold, - affirming that 'we can hardly 
speak better than in his own best spirit': 'For if we centre our 
attention on a tradition of thinking rather than on an isolated man, we 
shall not be disposed to underrate what he did and what he represented, 
or to neglect what he urged us, following him, to do' 
(p. 1ý6) 
The curious diversity of views on Arnold indicated above are 
*Connell's quotation is taken from John Dewey's Democracy and Education 
p. 62. Connell's footnote observes that 'Dewey gave much attention to 
Arnold's work9 and frequently quotes him with approval. ' Among other things 
Dewey 'approved of Arnold's emphasis upon literature, but complained of his 
neglect of scientific method as a leading element in culture! 
36 
partially explained by Leavis (1950 
Arnold ... cannot be summarized. I say this with an eye, ýnot on his 
weaknesses and inconsistencies as a thinker, but on his essential 
strength. And here we have a reason for his being worth special study. 
Ile is not easy to do justice to, and-to attempt it seriously is to 
refine one. 's. understanding of the nature of intelligence... 1 (P-36) 
According to leavist Arnold has suffered from a good deal of unfairness 
because: 
... he has been judged by inappropriate criteriat asif he offered 
vhat be doesn't, and as if a critic who fails of logical rigour and 
strictness of definition is left with no. respectable function of 
intelligence that he might be performing. 
The flexibilityt the sensif., iveness, the constant delicacy of touch 
for the concrete in all its complexity, the intelligence that is 
inseparably one with an alert and fine sense of value -these qualities, 
however-severe the criticism to be brought against him, are exemplified 
by Arnold; and it is the reader of literary critical training who 
should find-them a challenge to appreciation. (P-38) 
But with the observations of Walsliq Watson, Williams and Leavis 
we have, moved into the realms of higher education, and although the 
implications of study in higher education flow into the curriculum of 
the schools, further discussion of this must be postponed in favour of 
brief reference to three relatively recent anthologies of Arnold's 
writings on education: those of Gribble (1967), Smith and Summerfield 
(1969) and Sutherland (1973). 
James Gribble's Matthew Arnold is one of a series aiming to 
present 'the writings of major educational philosophers': its intro- 
duction,, therefore, might well be felt to come within the category of 
critiques in which Arnold is (in Leavis's words) 'judged by inappropriate 
criteria, ' for Arnorld never thought of himself as a philosopher, archly 
confessing himself, in Culture and Anarchy for example, to be 'sadly 
to seek' in 'a philosophy with coherent, interdependent, subordinate, 
and derivative principles' (Super Y-, P-76 Arnold's bonfessiont is 
partly ironic self-defence, but partly a plain statement of fact: 
principles he had; but he eschewed. laystemal and mistrusted 'system- 
makers' (see chapter 10). Gribble, while aware that Arnold was 
principally an educational propagandist for -necessary reforms and 
37 
improvements, seems curiously unable to take accowt of Arnold's sense of 
audience. One of the principal reasons for Arnold's notorious 
ýinconsis- 
tencies', it seems to me, is that in order to away his audience of the 
moment towards a particular measuret or point of viewp he had to carry 
them along with him in other areas of his discourse. No one is won to a 
new point of view by total opposition, and so Arnold was obliged to 
tailor his presentation to include sufficient of hisýaudiencels outlook 
in order for them to accept the new or controversial element. Since 
he addressed a wide variety of audiences his lectures and writings 
therefore embody traces of a wide variety of viewpoints. This doesn't 
render his writings less useful; but it makes their interpretation more 
complex. Each must be read with a sense of its specific intention, and 
with an awareness of the Zeitgeist. Gribble apparP-ntly knew thisy 
stating exPlicitly that 'there is a certain unfairness in picking 
inconsistencies in Arnold's workq written as it was over a number of years 
'with differing polemical purposes in mind' - yet he tends to blunder through 
Arnold's ideas with a kind of humourless puritan obduracy. 
-4 Certainly Gribble does a service to educatiorýthought in laying 
baresome of Arnold's grosser shortcomings: his tendency to overstate 
the case for literature in schools in order to ensure its survival 
amidst the dominance of the fact-mongers; his some-what fixed notions 
about 'the consAitution-of human nature' in respect to predilections 
for literary versu scientific studies; his adherence to the then 
current 'transfer of training' theories; and his somewhat embarassing 
objections to 'Americanizationt - although the sustained interest in 
Arnold In America suggests that Americans know what he meant) Gribble's 
objection to Arnold's concern for middle class secondary education 
to 
be assumed by the state without a similar drive for working class see- 
ondary education seems to ignore the realities of the situation: 
Arnold, 
working within a strict class system and severe economic restrictions 
on government spending wanted results; and the fact 
that we can with 
hindsight look back in judgment on the Victorians from a relatively 
democratic situation is a tribute to those, including Arnold, who did 
work pragmatically for, results. Gribble's use of terms like 'vagueness' 
and lambivalencel is critically )ustifiable, while at the same time 
as has been suggested) explicable in terms of Arnold's intentions; 
but terms also used such as 1two-faced? and 'fraudulentl seem 
unnecessarily emotive and unjustifiable. When Arnold writes that 'the 
highly instructed few, and not the scantily-instructed many, will 
ever be the organ to the human race of. knowledge and truth' in any 
depth, Gribble concludes that for Arnold 'the distinction between the 
11superior man" and the "general public" must be maintained' (p. 22). 
Bat Arnold was not expressing a desideratum but a fact of life; and a 
fact of life which within all possible limits, as we shall sG4 he was 
desirous to change. He was not eager to limit instruction to the few 
and deny it to the many (as Gribble seems to imply), but to widen its 
reach and scope by steadyp successive development. 'The "man of culture" 
is not necessarily a specialist in Arnold's viewp Gribble reminds-usp - 
'rather, he labours. 11to divest knowledge of all that was harsh, uncouth, 
difficult, abstract, professional, exclusive"' (p. 22). To which 
Gribble adds, 'An odd mixture of adjectives, this: but rather than 
tilt at words, let us examine what Arnold did in the role of literary 
critic... I (ibid). It seems to me that a closer examination of the words, # 
-however 'odd' they may seem at first eight would have proved instructive; 
but. such an examination would not have advancedGribble's argument and so 
it was laid aside. This point, however, will be taken up again in 
chapter 6 (p. 1ill-) of this thesis. 
Again, Gribble is critical of ? tensions' in Arnold's thinking 
(e. g. Gribble, pp24-25) as though there is something reprehensible 
in seeing two points of view at once, and recognizing the complexity 
. 
of life. This, it seems to me is one of Arnold's strong points: one 
of the arguments in favour of literary study at 411. It will be discussed 
in chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. 
Gribble's anthology is thoughtfully selected and his introduction 
is probably more vigorous and challenging than the somewhat blander 
introduction. of Smith and Summerfield's Matthew Arnold and the 
Education of the New Order (1969) and Gillian Sutherland's anthology 
Matthew Arnold on Education (1973): but Gribble's stance is philosophi- 
cal and the two later anthologies historical, and so more sensitive 
to the Zeitgeist and to Arnold's intentions. 
The introduction to Gillian Sutherland's anthology Matthew Arnold on 
Education (1973) concentrates on setting ArnoldIs work securely in 
its h. istorical perspective. We are told that 'the interest of Arnold's 
writing on education lies in his development of a powerful elitist 
argument from an essentially class-structured view of English society' 
(p. 9): but the careful delineation we are given of the circumstances 
makes it clear that Arnold is not adopting this position ex nihilo but 
. these are essentially the conditions of any educational enterprise 
at that time. 'He saw the decay of the old aristocratic leadership 
as an inevitable concomitant of democracy; the filling of the vacuum-, 
the creation of a middle class fit to lead, not only in a political 
sense but in a cultural and moral sense also, was thus the central 
problem for a would-be democratic society. ' (P. 15) Sutherland also 
recognizes that 'Arnold's development as a poet and literary critic' is 
a 'factor of I importance in understanding the development of Matthew 
Arnold's thinking on education' (p. 16) Culture and Anarchy is printed, 
in full in this anthology since it includes, as well as an analysis 
of society, somthing of Arnold's exploration of the significance of 
literary culture. Finally Sutherland concludes: 
(Arnold's) analysis of the existing situation in England was a 
sophisticated one; and the peculiar interest anýimportance of his social 
criticism lies in the interplay between his vision and this analysis... 
It is the combination of this analysis with the absolute nature, of'his 
vision of culture that makes his plea for the creation of a national 
system of education, týorm and direct the new eliteg so powerful 
(p. 17) 
Smith and Summerfield, like Sut4erlandq stress Arnold's dissatis- 
faction with the status quo O"We shall die in the wilderness, " he 
wrotep "but to have desired to enter... (the Promised Land), to have 
saluted it from afar, is already, perhapsv the best distinction among 
contemporaries"# (p. 29)); his readiness in his delicate post as Inspector 
to take risks for what he believed in (11If"q he wrote to his wife on 
28 March 1862,01thrown on the world I daresay we should be on our legs 
again before long. Anyway, I think I owed as much as this to a cause in 
which I have now a deep interest, and always shall havep even if I cease 
to serve it officially. "' (pp-34-35)); his concern to improve the life 
of the 'working class through the agency of A transformed middle class, 
employing them against the entrenched power of the aristocracy as 
"'a moving force against an inert and unprogressive force, a force of 
ideas against the less spiritual forces of established power, antiquity, 
prestige and social refinement'll (p. 10). 
Smith and &1 erfield see a anity. in Arnold's work: 'His social 
and, indeed, his literary criticism, and his education writings are 
interdependent, are mutually illuminatingg and both form part of a body 
of thought the terms of which are not always capable of exact definition, 
but which neverthe less possesses a-real coherence' 
(p. 1). In particular 
the y acknowledge ArnoldIs desire to attack rigidity and dogma through 
the medium of imaginative new ideas and the power of literary culture, 
quoting from Arnold's essay on Heine (Super III, pp-107-132): 
Modern times find themselves with an immense system of institutions, 
established factog accredited dogmas, customs, rulesq which have come 
to them from times not modern. In this system their life has to be 
carried forwad; yet they have a sense that this system is not of 
their own creationt that it by no means corresponds exactly with the 
wants of their actual life, that, for them, it is customary, not 
rational ... To remove this want of correspondence is beginning 
to be 
the settled endeavOUr of most persons of good sense. Dissolvents. of 
the old European system of dominant ideas and facts we must all be, 
all of us who have any power of working; what we have to study is that 
we may not be acrid dissolvents of it. (Smith and Summerfieldq p. 4) 
In quoting this passage from Arnold, Smith and S), mmerfield have alighted 
on the central concern of all Arnol d's later criticism; and certainly 
(f, I 
the prime issue in Literature and Dogma. 
In the foregoing necessarily condensed survey of criticism relating 
to the background and reception of Literature and Dogma; of sources 
of general material necessary for any study of Matthew Arnold; and of 
Aýnoldian criticism specifically within the field of education I have 
tried to bring together the main issues with which this thesis will be 
concerned. First, Arnold's recognition that the Time Spirit (or 
Zeitgeist) was changing the world-view (Weltanschauung of Western 
Europe at a faster rate than many of his contemporaries could appreciate., 
Secondly, that it was important to ease-in the inevitable and desirable 
era of democracy without undermining the principle of authority necessary 
to maintain order and a degree of harmony in society, and without destroy- 
ing whatever was worthy of preservation of our inheritance from the past. 
Thirdly, ArnoldIs faith. that culture, with literature as its main 
ingredient, was the best non-acrid dissolvent of outworn rigidities and 
dogmas impeding social progress. Fourthly that religiong morality and 
science are all important constttuents of human life, and that literary 
criticism associated with breadth of culture, could be a means towards 
reconciling Christian, scientific and Humanistic points of view and 
creating a liberal, tolerant and progressive society. And fifthly, that 
education for all (but spearheaded by secondary education to Itransforml 
the middle classes) was a vital means of'promoting the necessary culture. 
It is clear that these areas of Arnold's concern are all closely, 
interlinked. The fast changing world-view was the result of a growing 
scientific outlook dependent upon objective verification of data; and 
this extended demand for verification entailed a weakening of submission 
to authority, facilitated the growth of a democratic spirit, reduced 
susceptibility to superstition and questioned established dogma. 
The 
questioning of orthodoxies threaten . ed to undermine the social fabric - 
thus making demands on education - and culture - to renew 'or replace 
challenged values and their sanctions. 
ý-q It now remains to consider uliether this state of affairs still 
pertains in any respects, and if so to. sketch out those areas of current 
educational concern within which a fullerr critical discussion of 
Arnold's outlook can be of service. 
ý-3 
CHAPTER TWO 
MORAL AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN A SCIENTIFIC AGE: 
ME CONTEMPORARY SCENE, 
Men who are, the carriers of vastly different cultural traditions are 
entering the'present age at the same point in time .... We must create 
new models for adults who can teach their children not what to learn 
but-how to learn and not what they should be committed to, but the 
value of commitment. 
Margaret Mead: Culture and Commitment (1970) 
What we need to recognise is that open-ended conditions of debate (in 
which the tutor can exercise no pressure open or covert, and into -which 
it is desirable that he should introduce "some element of-satire or 
irony... to prick any incipientself-inflation") offer the best hope of 
future moral growth in a society without agreed values.. 
Christian Commitment in Education 
Methodist Conference Commission 
on Education, (1970) 
The challenge of change for education, 
A survey of relevant educational literature suggests'that the 
conditions indicated at the conclusion of the previous chapter, which 
. perturbed 
Arnold, not only persist today, but that their magnitude and 
pace have markedly increased. In Child of Our Times (1959) WD Wall 
took it as-his central thesis that: 'not merely was the whole psycho- 
logical atmosphere changed after the first World War but that, in the 
last half-centuryp Western man has been called upon to digest alterations 
in the structure of his daily life of a magnitude to which we can find no 
parallel in the past and at a speed which seems to be accelerating' (P-17). 
In the same year the Crowther Report (Ministry of Education, 1959) spoke 
of 'the impact of technology on general education' and of 'the emphasis 
that it places on the rapidity, of change1q pointing out that if a boy 
enters industry 'the job he will hold when he becomes a grandfather may 
not exist at all today; it will be concerned with processes not yet 
invented, using machines still to be designed... "(para-79). Four 
years later the Newsom Report (Ministry of Education, 1963)ý emphasizing 
the pressures exerted upon youth by such changes, added that 'the 
mysteries of one generation become the commonplaces of life to their 
grandchildrenI (P-5). Moreover there is a growth of cynicism among the 
young (particularly those tof poor academic abilityt) brought about 
by the intensive barrage of propaganda to 'which they are subjected: 
They feel that they are being got at, that they are not being told the 
truth, or at'least only carefully doctored truth. They develop a 
protective cynicism which leads them to disbelieve everything... (para 508) 
The Report recommends that 'an elementary training in eyidence and bow 
to handle W would provide some defence against this. 
The Plowden Report (DES, 1967)t three years later, indicates two 
contrary aspects of the rapid changes occurring: 
Future society will be... marked by rapid and far reaching economic and 
social change ... likbly to be richer than now, with even more choice of 
goods, with tastes dominated by majorities and with more leisure for 
all... (but)... We can fear that it will be much engrossed with the 
pursuit of material wealth, too hostile to minorities, too dominated 
by mass opinion and too uncertain of its values. (P-1115) 
A similarly ambivalent view is taken by Wall (1977) in his Constructive 
Education for Adolescents where he speaks of 'the old structures of I 
guidance and indoctrination present in more simple and more coherent 
societies' having broken down: 
This is perhaps fortunate, in that the possibilities exist for much more 
subtle and much more autonomous forms of human personality. But the 
absence of clear guidance or norms makes development a much more indiv'i- 
dual matter and it is beset by many hazardst. (P-59)- 
Earlier in Adolescents in School and Society (1968) Wall had written-of 
society's perplexity as to what standards to set, and of the effect of 
this on young people: 'For many, if not most adolescents, there is 
considerable insecurity and anxiety produced by societyls uncertainty about 
t, 0 
jywýandle the youngo and the role to whic Ih they should be assigned, the 
confusion of values, behavior patterns, etbical and religious beliefs' 
(p. 68). But in any case 
(if 
we revert to the Crowther Report (1959)) 
? whatever the reasons, neither adults nor teenagers are willing nowadays 
to take very much on authority that is to say as far as their conscious 
minds are concerned' (para. 65, pp. 42-43). 
In The Redemption of the Robot (1970)9 Herbert Read develops this 
theme in its historical context in a passage whiclip for a nwuber of 
r C- 
reasons pertinent to this -thesis, it seems worth quoting at length: 
Within the Christian Weltanschauung, a development of the whole man was 
possible. But in the course of timeg with the growth of scientific. 
humanism and secularism, the church relinquished its control over, 
intellectual educationt retaining only the sphere of moral education... During the nineteenth century,, and at an increasing pace during our 
own centurys, 'the Christian church lost its authority within the States 
of Europet and*as a consequence it relinquished its essential function in society, 'the moral education of children. For all practical purposes 
moral education, in all but a few isolated communitiesq has entirely 
disappeared from our modern civilization... (p. 215)- 
With moral education relinquished by the church and largely discarded 
by the 'civilized' commmity at large: 
in our present state of moral indecision, or moral atrophy as it 
should be calledq no universal (i. e. politically effective) recognition 
is giverL to any moral values; or such recognition as is given is of a 
purely intellectual character, and has no emotional 'sanctiont (p. 223). 
In other words there is now neither authoritynor. emotional motivation 
to support moral education, even where. such exists. For Herbert Read 
the 'Robot' (twentieth century man) will only be tredeemedl'by 
creativity - the aesthetic and imaginative ordering of experience, a 
point which will be taken up later (see chapters 7 and 11). For WD Wall 
(1975), toqcreativity - but in terms of 'dynamic adjustabilityl - pro- 
vides a 'compass' for. a chartless future: 
We can no longer provide children in our schools with a map - moral 
philosophicalt religious or cognitive - by which they can guide them- 
selves into a known future; we have in fact to equip them with a 
compass and the ability and confidence to use it to find their own way 
in a world the nature of which we cannot predict' (P-322). 
The authority of science and scientific education 
The future is chartless because 'Science', which must be open to 
constant revision, is enthroned as the ultimate authority to which we 
now appeal for judgment. Where Copernicus and Galileo could be judged 
and dismissed by an appeal to theology; theology is now more often than 
not judged by an appeal to ISciencel. To put it crudely, the boot is 
now on the other foot. As CA Coulson (1960) has observed in Science and 
Christian belief, 'Science becomes the cohesive force in modern society, 
the ground on which may be built a secure way of life for man and for 
communities' (p. 20), And therefore, 'If we are to restore faith to men, 
q-6 it will be through science' (p. 21). Sometimes (though never with Coulson) 
this attempt assumes a crude and naive form, as for example if a funda- 
mentalist seeks to. 1provel the story. of Noah's Ark and the animals by 
reference to. Sir Leonard Woolley Is painstaking archaeological excavations 
of the Flood site at Ur. More often the association is more complex. 
Alan Richardson (1950) for example, writes: 
The Christian religion itself has been studied intensively by means of 
modern scientific method in the theological faculties of our universities 
and in our theological collegesp and Christian theology is as 'scientific, 
in its method as is the study of chemistry or biology today? (p. 23) 
A somewhat similar appeal to science, though now as an indirect arbiter, 
occurs Vhen EL Mascall (1967) affirms that IDr WH Thorpe has recorded 
his judgment that 0a far higher proportion than formerly of practising 
biologists areq at least in this country, active and concerned members 
of various Christian communities and communions" and this is, I think, 
true no less of physical than of biological scientists' 
(P-193)- 
Sometimes, as in the writings of Sir Oliver Lodge (1911), 'science' 
is, so to speak transposed into 'religion': 
For consider what is involved in the astounding idea of Evolution and 
Progress as applied to the whole universe. Either it is a fact or it 
is a dream. If it be a fact, what an illuminating fact it isl God is 
one; the universe is an aspect and a revelation of God. The universe is 
struggling upward to a perfection not yet attained. I see in the mighty 
process of evolution an eternal, struggle towards more and more self- 
perception, and fuller and more all-embracing Existence - not only on 
the part. of what is customarily spoken of as Creation - butt in so far 
as Nature is an aspect and revelation of God, and in so far as Time has 
any, ultimate meaning or significance, we must dare to extend the thought 
of growth and progress and development even(up to the height of all 
that we can realize of the Supernal 1ýeingl pp. 187-88)9 
The paradox is that the new authority, 'Science', must by its very 
nature deny authority; hence the banishment of any absolute charts for 
the future. Coulson (1960) quotes TH Huxley on this point: 
Me improver of natural knowledge absolutely refuses to acknowledge 
authority as such. For him scepticism is the highest of duties; 
blind faith the unpardonable sin. And it cannot be otherwisep for every 
great advance in natural knowledge has involved the absolute rejection 
of authority, the cherishing of the keenest scepticisms the annihilation 
of the spirit of blind faith# (p. 60). 
'Sciencelt of courset is not one thing: the innumerable 
branches of 
science are subdividing daily into new specialist disciplines. But 
there is a relatively homogeneous scientific. attitude, and if we are 
considering, scientists qua scientistaq as it were in the process of 
experimentat*ont then Huxley's words above expressthat attitude well. 
Howevert scientists are also peopleg and we shall shortly have to con- 
eider the implications of this. Though not quite at this point. 
The aims of scientific education in school are primarily intended to 
foster a good scientific attitude. The Spens Report (Board of Education, 
1938) listed three main aims for secondary school science: 
(1) It should give pupils some knowledge of the natural laws which 
operate in the universe and of their application. This is an 
appeal to wonder and to interest, as well as to utility. 
(2 As a, complement to historical studiest it should reveal the 
influences of scientific thought and achievement in the evolution 
of our present-day civilisation and perhaps even more important, 
it should indicate its possibilities, for good and evil alike, 
in the future of the human race. The appeal here is to social 
interest and social utility. 
(3) It should give children an introduction into scientific methods of 
thought and investigation. This appeal is essentially one to the 
intellect and, in so far as it i 19 achieved, Science takes the 
place of the mediaeval study of logic. (p. 245) 
These, aims (even taking account of their concern with 'appeal! ) were 
largely conceived of in terms of teaching. The Plowden Report (DESO 1967), 
being designed later for the more 'progressive' primary schools, couches 
its aims for science education more in terms of the learner: 
If children leave their primary schools with their natural curiosity not 
only unimpared but sharpened, with experience of first-hand discovery in 
several different fields, with some idea of what questions to ask and how 
to find the answersp they will be well equipped to proceed with a 
scientific education. We believe that many secondary school teachers of 
science welcome this already and we hope that soon all of them will do so. 
(p. 244) 
We may doubt vhether all secondary schools Ivelcomedl these inquisi- 
tive budding young scientists with equal enthusiacm; but by the time-of 
the Schools Council project Science 5-13 (1972) a similarly1child- 
centred' approach was adopted, but this time coupled with clearly 
defined objectives based on the application of Benjamin BloomIs 
(1956) 
taxonomical principles. Learning stages were based on the Piagetian 
developmental pattern - from 
'inttA . i-tionall, through Iconcrete 
operational' to tabstractl thinking; beginning with simple awareness 
and recognition of natural phenomena and simple changesp moving through 
elementary prediction, grouping and the recognition of subtler 
distinctions, to the capacity to formulate hypotheses and 'distinguish 
a logically sound proof from others less sound. ' The project was con- 
cerned. to elicit childrents feelings and interests as well as their 
knowledge and skills. This concern with the children's interest is 
important-since, despite the esteem in vhich. science appears to be held, 
and the degree to which it permeates and governs our livest the results 
of a number of researches enumerated by Butcher and Pont (1970) led to 
the conclusion that la science career is unattractive to the majority 
of young peoplet (p. 158). 
The Science/Arts dichotomv 
Attem pts to discover the reasons for this have led to some interes- 
ting speculations. It seems, from experiments by Roe (1953)p Terman 
(1965), and Tyler (1964), for ekample, that there is a strnng tendency 
for scien. tists to be oriented towards things and arts students to be 
people-oriented. Smithers, investigating student expectations from 
their future careers, found that 'when the values were classified as 
extrinsic (rewards for work, e. g. money) and intrinsic (relating to the 
performance of the work itself)*. *scientists were concerned with both 
rewards, while non-scientists were less concerned with extrinsic rewards 
and were m ore people-oriented' (quoted in Datcher and Pont, p. 161). It 
was found for'example, that among a variety of items on a questionnaire 
relating to career-choice, the item 'Good chance to earn money, was 
'rated of. high importance by 33 per cent of the arts/social science 
, group and 
by 64 per cent of the applied scientists', and 10pportunity to 
work with people rather than things' was 'rated by 60 per cent and 21 
per cent of arts and science groups respectively' (ibid. ). The ten- 
dency, from the evidence of such studies, seems to be towards materialism 
among the. scientifically minded. There also seems to be a tendency for 
scientists to be convergent rather than divergent thinkers. (niis was 
the conclusion of Hudson (1966) in Contrary ImaginationE, a study of arts 
and science students in relation to a divergence-convergence continuum. ) 
Convergers are defined as ItIhose who are substantially better at 
intelligence tests ... than open-ended tests (Uses of objectsp Meanings of 
words), and divergers are defined as the reverse of this. As reported in 
Butcher and Pont (1970): 
The central finding was that arts specialists were, on the whole, 
divergers and physical scientists convergers. Only about one in four 
divergers was likely to be doing physical science, and similarly about 
one in four convergers was likely to be found in subjects such as 
&glish literature, modern languages or history' (p. 170) 
Developing his study and moving on from cognition to personality charac- 
teristics, Hudson postulated that cognitive divergers would be 'more 
likely to-have liberal and non-authoritarian views' than convergers. 
Butcher and Pont record his findings as follows: 
be 
Using a test of 'controversial statements' he found this to, kmarginally 
true; three out of five lauthoritariant people were convergers. He 
postulated a tension between the need to innovate and the established 
weight of knowledgev and suggested that convergers and divergers react 
differently to this tension. The former seek out those subjects with 
the greatest weight of authority, hoping for exactitude with the ex- 
clusion of doubt; divergers seek out ambiguity' (PP-171-172). 
We must be careful to remember that statistical evidence of this kind 
gives us 'average' behavior and not the behavior of individuals; but 
even so the conjunction of the two findings indicated above suggests 
a tendency with important, and possibly disturbing, social and educa- 
tional implications. If the scientifically minded tend to be oriented 
towards things (rather than people) and also tend to be convergent and 
authoritarian in outlook there would seem to be a danger in overdeveloping 
this tendency by an unbalanced, qverspecialized curriculum. Some important 
experiments by the American researchert Milgram (1963), have demonstrated 
the willingness of the average human being to inflict suffe ring on others 
under orders from 'authority' figure s; this willingness might conceivably 
be exacerbated among subjects whose orientation was both above-averagely 
authoritarian and below-averagely interested in people. 
Not unconnected perhaps is the scale of experiinentation by scientists 
with living creatures other than hum I an beings, which is beginning to be 
questioned. In United Kingdom psychology alone some 43tOOO animals a 
year are subjected to experimentation often involving vivisection of a 
bizarre or inhumane nature. An article 'Brainwashing and Vivisection't 
reporting a survey conducted by a Working Party on Animal Experimentation 
set up in 1976 by the Psychological Society quotes the concerti of 
Dr Alice Heim: 
She referred to the case-hardened attitudes that the behavioral approach 
induced in young students. She herself, she said, 'Had been brainwashed 
for some years into thinking that the endless maze-running of starved, 
parched-or mutilated rats served some justifiable scientific purpose' 
The Observer,, 4 March, 1979 (p. 2) 
The report of the Working Party suggests that 'repeated references to 
animal experiments "without comment" are likely to desensitise psych- 
ology students to the ethical issues at stake?. It is worth reminding 
ourselves of the danger of desensitisation in respect of people. 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn (1963,1971) and George Steiner (1969) both 
(though from different points of view) provide evidence of this in 
societies devoted to technological development. - Soviet Russia and Nazi 
Germany; one making a religion of scientific materialism, the other 
struggling from economic chaos to moral chaos by means of accelerated 
technological advance under charismatic authoritarian leadership. 
According to EF Schumacher (1974) the problem is wider than this, 
and has worldwide implications: 
... the modern world has been shaped by technology (he writes). It 
tumbles from crisis to crisis - on all sides there are prophecies of 
disaster and indeed, visible signs of breakdown. 
If that which has been shaped by technology, and continues to be so shaped, 
looks sick, it might be wise to have a look at technology itself. If 
technology is felt to be becoming more and more inhuming we might do well 
to consider whether it is -a technology 
with a human face. (P. 1.2)possible 
to have s'omething better 
I 
Schumacher sees the answer to desensitization in transformed economics; 
Victor White (1952), writing as a psychologist, sees it in a recognition 
of spiritual need and of the psychic demands of the human mind., Referring 
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to the Second World War, he writes: 
What shocked and astounded us at Belsen and Duchenwald was less their 
shaming inhumanity, than their manifestation of stark, ruthless, 
primitive devilry. They were inexplicable merely in terms of cynical, 
utilitarian power-politics. There was no use, no reason, not even a 
bad reason, in keeping thousands of people just alive, when they could 
have been s6 easily slain or just left to die, merely for their torture 
and affliction.,. Could it be that gods and demons, heavens and hells, 
are ineradicable from the nooks and crannies of the human mind, and 
that if the human mind is deprived of its heaven above and its hell 
beneath, then it must make its heaven and corresponding bell on earth? 
(p. 42) 
If these apoceilyptic voices sound a little shrill from the security of 
our studies and classrooms, it is worth recalling that Victor White's 
observations on the demoniac characteristics of the Second World War 
might equally have, been applied to Vietnam or Uganda or to any of the 
one-hundred-and-thirty or so sites of war on this planet since 1945. 
Throughout this period 'Science. ' and technology have made their mark 
with a vigour unimaginable in former periods. They are themselvesy 
of coursev ethically neutral, but they magnify immeasurably the range 
and impact of the moral decisions of mankind. 
Any study concerned with science, ethics and education ought to 
take some account of the implications of nuclear warfare and the arms 
race; in fact in this discussion of the relationship between sclenc Ie 
and authority it could be said that the H-Bomb has pride of place: 
it virtually symbolizes the enthronement of 'Sciencet in the vacuum left 
by the retreating gods. It is the all-powerful Answer hovering in the 
background of human disputes, combining the attributes of the primal 
Sol (but "Brighter than a Thousand Suns" as Robert Jurlkput it)v Jove, 
Mars and the God of Judgment. In lacking the attributes of Venus (or 
the Hindu 'Creator' or Christian IloveQ'it ignores the one potentially 
redeeming area of the displaced pantheon. It is scarcely surprising 
that many young peoplev while acknowledging perforce the self-evident 
power and authority of Sciencep reject the authority of the generation 
which has finally enthroned the new god, taking refuge from the powerful 
shadow that hangs over their lives and futures in hedonism or cynicism. 
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'Science' wrote Herbert Spencer in Education 'is organized knowledge#; 
but its efficacy, we should addq depends upon organized humanity. 
Whether its organiation is to be achieved on authoritarian or autonomous 
principles is a question for societyO but with strong implications for 
the curriculum. 
Moral education 
The area of curriculum most concerned with the development of 
autonomy is that of moral education. In this relatively new, but fast- 
growing field, John Wilson has played a prominent part as Director first 
of the Farmington Trust and then of the Warborough Trust Research Units. 
In A Teacher's Guide to Moral Education (1973) he points out that the 
first task of moral education is to learn to bring thought to bear in 
a region where feeling an&fantasy alone so often predominate. 
But to introduce a sane and sensible set of procedures for morality 
and religion is far more difficult. Even under the threat of global 
war and self-extermination, to say nothing of crimel delinquency, mental 
illnesst anarchy and other such, people will still cling to their 
objects and simple pictures. The most we can hope for$ short of very 
radical methods of changing human psycholo . is that people will learn 
to recognise, when they are doing this. (P-7ý 
He postulates four main Imoral componentst as the basis of all effective 
moral learning: 
1. Treating others as equals... : that is, giving the same weight to 
the wants and needs of other people as to one's own. 
2. Awareness of one's own and other people's emotions. 
3. Awareness of the 'hard' facts relevant to moral decisions. 
4. Bringing the above to bear on particular situations, so as 
to decide and act in accordance with them. (p. 28) 
In the same publication Wilson makes the important distinction between 
authoritarianism (of which he is critical) and legitimized authority 
(which he regards as an essential prerequisite of healthy interaction 
in school or society). He also includes what is equally relevant'to the 
present thesis, a substantial section on the contribution of literature 
to moral education, making the pertinent comment (in a discussion of 
William Golding's novel Lord of the Flies) that by concrete exposition 
'the bookv like all literature, shows us how things are' (p. 116)0 a 
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point to be developed in chapters 7 and 11 of this thesis., 
Subsequently, Wilson makes the important point, quoting Richard 
Peters, that in providing moral education for people, as in education 
generally, our concern should be ITo initiate them into various forms 
of understanding, llcognitiveýawarenessll and knowledge: and to care for 
such un4erstandingf, and this must be clearly distinguished from Itrain- 
ingg indoctrinating, conditioning, forcing, browbeating, and so on' (p. 14). ' 
He continues: 
It is an essential part of the notion of education that the pupil comes 
to care for understanding. In moral education especially, where the 
laffectivel or 'motivational' side is unusually important, we must not 
undervalue those non-cognitive processes which are essential for the 
acquisition of attitudes and dispositions. At the same time, we have to 
give the cognitive or conceptual side its due weight -a point sometimes 
missed by empirical wor , 
kers, particularly in the behavioristic tradition 
of psychology. (Collier et al, 19749 P-14) 
While I agree with this balance in principle, I am inclined to think that 
Wilson-elsewhere, in fact, like many professional philosphers and logicians, 
takes an oversanguine view of the capacity of the average person for 
ratiocination. His exposition of the desuetude of religion and the 
redundancy of the term IGodl in Education in Religion and the Bnotions 
(1971) for example, is as complex an exercise in logical gymnastics as 
'Was formerly indulged in by theologians establishing the validity of the 
term. Many people, recognizing the essentially private meaning of the 
term IGodl to each individual, will simply go on using it without refer- 
ence to either theologians or philosophers. However, in justice to 
Wilson, it must be added that (in'his Introduction to Moral. Education, 
1959) he recognizes that 'rationality itself is not the only good thing 
in life, and cannoC be treated as a sacred cowl (p. 162). Moreover, 
Wilson's belief in pursuing the enlargement of rationality in moral 
education (however short we may fall in our degree of success) is com- 
pletely in line with a main contention of this thesis, which can indeed 
be expressed in his own words . 'that we should help children and adolescents 
make up their own minds about religion, rather than forcibly condition 
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or indoctrinate them into one particular creed' (p. 181). A point which 
I would wish to make in connection with any ideology or dogmatic system. 
Furthermore, Wilson recognizes the potential efficacy of 'psychological 
insights contained in ... myths, stories, 
(and) parables' (p. 181), which 
is the realm of literature, the element in the present thesis that is 
opposed to dogma. 
The question of the contribution that literature can make to moral 
education is admirably posed by Gabriel Chanan (Collier et al, 1974). 
An important note of caution is sounded in Chanan's observation that, 
'it seems unlikely that we could ever prove that literature necessarily 
has a moral effect, or if it does, that it has an effect predictable 
from its intrinsic qualities' (P-107). In any case, moreover, 'by no 
means all great literature and art is unequivocally humanitarian in 
tendencyi kibid. ). Furthermore, since individual readers (who may 
testify to the moral value of literary study) 'are nevertheless aware 
of getting slightly different things out of the same works, just as we 
take away different impressions of the same peoplet it is virtually 
, 
impossible to define the function or the moral influence of literature, 
(p. 106). Howeverv in the presenting of character and tthe explicit 
'depicting of moral dilemmas' literaturet wisely used, provides the raw 
materials for developing empathy and provoking meaningful discussion of 
ethical issues: 'any observation we may make about characters in 
literature can be regarded as at least sensitising us to the problems 
of understanding human beingst (p. 110); and 'we are likely to find... 
that since literature contains'the most sensitive explorations of moral 
problems ever recorded, some of our explicit moral discussions around 
works of literature may (even) be unequal to the subtleties of the 
: illustration# (p. 110). Ambiguity and scepticism are inherent in lit- 
erature, contributing to its value in encouraging open-mindedness; 
'We should recognise that doubt of the correctness of one's moral 
judgment is a sign of moral seriousness, though no guarantee of finding 
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eventual certaintyf (p. 112). Some of the implications of Chanants 
discussion will be developed in chapter 11, but for the present purpose 
it must suffice to add his observation that the 'specificity of 
description, common to good narrative is a particularly good reason for 
making sure that any programme of moral development does include an 
encounter with literature' (p. 111). 
The bibliography on Moral Education (1976) compiled for the Social 
Morality Council takes account of the importance of literature in moral 
education: 'For children as for adults, literature offers rich opportuni- 
ties foý deepening insight and exploring human situations' (p. 35); and 
several valuable source books are recommended in its bibliography. 
It is interesting to note the way in which Istoriest (the primal 
base material of literature) are often used in psychological studies of 
moral development and moral attitudes. For example, Wright (1971) 
quotes an experiment by Adorno which depended upon the use of a story 
presenting an 'eternal triangle' situation to elicit judgments on the 
behavior of various characters involved, in order to establish the 
lauthoritariant or Inon-authoritarian' attitudes of the subjects 
(pp. 188- 
189). Similarly, Kohlberg (see Ing, 1978) makes use of simple stories 
involving moral problems in order to study the responses of children and 
adolescents to the situation presented and so construct a typological 
scheme showing the developmental stages of moral thought (pp. 90 94). 
From the time of the 1944 Education Act up until the Newsom Report 
(1964) it seems to have been generally conceded, in official circles 
at least, that the compulsory legal requirement of religious education 
would by and large take care of the need for moral education in schools. 
With the advent of the Plowden Report in 1967 the first major rumbles 
of anxiety from officialdom are expressed: 'A special difficulty 
is 
raised by the third aim mentioned by our vitnesses, that of the religious 
and moral development of the child... 1 ýp. 186). And againg IThe Council 
is divided in its views on religious education because of the personal 
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beliefs of its members. The fundamental difference between the theists 
and the non-theists is not one we can try to resolve. A minority of 
members believe that religious education should not figure in the 
curriculum at all. Other members believe that religious education and 
the Act of Worship should influence the entire'eurriculum and set the 
tone of living and learning for the whole school comiminity. The views 
of the remaining members of the Council range between these two extremes' 
(p. 203). 
The Minority Report on religious education sulmnitted by six members 
of the Plowden ]Report committee, including Professor AJ Ayer, is 
particularly significant for this thesis in that a number of the views 
expressed equate very closely with those of Matthew Arnold in Literature 
Do (see chapter 4 of this thesis). These views include the 
recognition that #the Bible ought to be studied as literature 
(my italics), 
both on its own account and on account of the literature and art -which it 
has inspired' (p. 490); the affirmation 'that the moral element should 
predominate over the theological' and that texamples given should not 
be exclusively Christian. They should be drawn also from the lives and 
teaching of other religious teachereq like Buddha, and of outstandingly 
good men from Socrates onwards' (P. 492); that our ignorance of meta- 
physical matters should be acknowledged 'honestly and undogmatically' 
(ibid. ); that moral identification with Christ is more likely to occur 
if Christ is represented 'as an exceptional human beingi rather than as 
an incarnate deityl; and finally that 'even though it may be difficult, 
the attempt should surely be made to determine precisely what it 
is 
that we wish our children to learn of ethics in a society which is 
increasingly rejecting the sanction of supernatural revelationt 
(P-493)., 
The one area where this Minority submission parts company significantly 
with Arnold's view is in doubting the value of linking religious and 
moral education at all. For Arndld, morality is practically the raison 
dletre of Christianity. Arnold would heartily agree, however, with 
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the submission's objection to Christianity being used to 'enforce 
compliance with a moral code' or to employ as a sanction Ithe motive 
of fearl - notions which were quite foreign to his understanding of, 
Christianity. He would not at all have approved the Conclusion reached 
, 
in the Minority Report: 'As we see it, the balance of argument strongly 
favours the conclusion that religious instruction is not a suitable 
subject to be taken in primary schools. We therefore wish to see 
legislation enacted by which it would cease to be an obligatory part of 
the curiiauluml (p. 492). 
This view, however, has found increasing favour among educational- 
istsi. Lawton (1973), for example, affirms that 'it is generally agreed 
by educationalistsv Christians and non-Christians alikeg that not only 
are the present arrangements for religious education in schools unsatis- 
factory as a means of teaching about religion and Christianity, but they 
are even less eatisfactory as a means of teaching moral education' 
G-134). 
He goes furtherl adding that 'for a society which is non-Christian and 
non-religious to rely on religiou s doctrines as a basis for moral behavior 
is positively dangerous' (p. 135). He concludes that the alternative is 
tthe introduction of moral education in schoolst in its own right. 
Before leaving the question of moral education it is worth 
mentioning the importance attached to the need for children to encounter 
a diversity of viewpoints. In a paper on Religious and Moral Education 
published by Howard Marratt (1965) 'for a group of Christians and 
Humanists' the point is made: -'Wherever possible the course should 
draw on teachers with a variety of beliefs and standpoints working in 
an integrated team, and all alike should feel free to express their own 
beliefs, as personal beliefol (P-7). Again in Stenhouse 
(1975): 'In 
Britain this problem of value conflic . ts often expresses itself as 
ambivalence between desire for consensus and desire for diversity. 
If 
diversity is to have real meaning, it must imply diversity of valuesp 
yet there is habitual pressure towards consensus. In a decentralized 
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system it is presumably desirable to have value divergence within each 
schooll (p. 213). 
To sum up this discussion of the state of moral education some 
words of Gordon and Lawton (1978) seem apposite: 
The current debate on moral education in schools reflects the problems 
of a changing society. For examplev the multi-cultural nature of the 
achool, community and the lack of value consensus preclude a 'correct' 
set of responses to problem situations. In the light of such changes, 
a redefinition of the working relationships between religious and moral 
education is being sought' (p. 106). 
Relizious Education: 
confidence 
A complete survey here of publications and deNdopments in religious 
education over the last two or three decades would be both impractical 
and unhelpful. According to A Bibliographical Review (Hogbin, 1973) 
published by the Christian Education Movement: 'in the United Kingdom 
more has been written about Religious and Moral Education in the last 
dozenyears since 1960 than in the preceding twentyl, and the flood shows 
no signs of drying up as yet. For the present purpose items will be 
selected for the light they throw on developments in attitudes in 
religious education relating to 'literature' and to 'dogma#, and to 
the relation of these to moral education and to current social changes in 
the direction of cultural pluralism and of the rejection of authority. 
A year before the outbreak of the Second World War, and six years 
before the Education Act of 1944, the Elpens Report (Board of Education, 
1938) was optimistic in its assessment of the public temper in regard to 
the teaching of Scripture: 
We believe that there is a wide and genuine recognition of the value 
and importance of. religious instruction and the teaching of Scripture 
in schools, and that the time is favourable for a fresh consideration of 
the place that they should occu y in the education of boys and girls 
of secondary school age' (p. 206ý. 
It was felt thatj while 'teachers may differ widely in their personal 
convictions', the main educational issues were 'no longer obscured by 
past controversy'. The shadow of the rise of Naziism in Jkrope was 
perhaps responsible for the concern expressed to raise issues ! relating 
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-to the meaning of life and to hut"art destiny wbicll in the world outside 
the school are the subject of profound disagreement' (ibid. ). The Bible 
was to be studied partly for its literary value - 'The English Bible is 
one of the glories of the literaryheritage bequeathed to the English- 
speaking peoples (and) ... for that reason there is much to be said in 
favour of the inclusion of portions of the Bible in the syllabus of 
English Literature'. However, 
r 
it can neither be treated merely as a 
part of English Literature nor can it be merged in the general study of 
history.. 
ýsince 
it also is a(classic. book of Christianityq and forms the 
basis of the structure of Christian faith and worshipl. It therefore has 
doctrinal value. Nevertheless in the Report's final justification of the 
use of the Bible in schools the emphasis is on an open-ended approach: 
? No boy or girl can be counted as properly educated unless he or she has 
been made aware of the fact of the existence of a religious interpretation 
of life' (ibid. ). 
The Education Act of 1944 made the teaching of religious instruction 
the only compulsory subject on the curriculum and required each school 
to hold a daily act of worship - subject in both cases to a conscience 
clause allowing the right of withdrawal. The spirit of the Cowper-Temple 
Clause was also invoked in that religious instruction in state schools 
was not expected to include any 'religious catechisms or religious 
formulary which is distinctive of any particular denomination'. The 
curriculum was to prom6te all-round educationp contributing 'towards 
the spirituall moralt mental and physical development of the community, 
a community which was at that time not only fairly homogeneous in terms 
of avowed Christian beliefp but also. closely united in the closing stages 
of a profound idý-alistic struggle. 
ReliLrious Education 
(ii) doubts and questionings 
By the time of the Crowther Report (Ministry of Diucation, 1959), 
the ideological situation was less clear: 'The serious decline of 
the 
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religious attitude to and the explanation of life has left a vacuum' 
saidthe Report; 'That vacuum has yet to be satisfactorily filled and 
Europe still seeks to formulate its own distinctive ideas' (p. 503). 
The problem was to provide a 'liberal education in a technical age'. 
'Art', 'letters', 'citizenship'. Isport'r and 'religious instruction, are 
'variously offered as correctives to the alleged "narrowness" of technical 
in'struciiont (ibid. ). The Report was ambiguous as to which of these 
t. w A, Uftq; IeA K-; Wcv-, h4- 
lcorrectiveslýwas expressed in the following open-ended plea: 
The teenragers with whom we are concerned need, perhaps before all else, 
to find a faith to live by. They will not all find precisely the same 
faith and some will not find any. Education can and should play some 
part in'their search. It can assure them that there is something to 
search for and it can show them where to look and what other men have 
found. (p. 44) 
The Newsom Report (1963) stressed the need for schools to be 
concerned with 'spiritual and moral development', but in the contempor- 
ary climate the teacher of religious instruction was put on his mettle: 
'Hemust know his Bible and its teaching, he must have thought about the 
relation of religion, and religious knowledge, to other fields of human 
activity and ways of knowing' (para. 169, pp. 56-57). The last phrase is 
significant, acknowledging implicitly that there are different wavs of 
knowing, and recognizing the, epistemological problems involved in 
presenting a world view in which spiritual, moral and scientific 
understanding are to be harmonized. The problem is epitomized in the 
following words of a fourteen-year-old boy quoted in the Report: 
I have many times thought about religion. I have gone to many Churches 
and gone to many meetings to find out the truth about God. I think 
there is a God but I do not think he his in heaven because men have 
studied science and found out the moon his far away it his cold and 
dead and the sun his burning and the stars are billions of years away and 
the sky is just space so where can God be. (para. 82, p. 28) 
No cut-and-dried answer is given to this problem but the teacher is 
adjured to be both 'adequately equipped with up"to-date scholarship' 
(P-57) and 'imagination' in coping with the real problems facing 
students, guiding them towards responsible living by tdeveloping 
conscience from the stage of taboo to the level of insight' 
(p. 115). 
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If Itabool is taken as the-correlative of 'dogma' this recommendation 
is open-ended and anti-dogmatic in essence. 
While the Newsom Report was concerned with secondary school 
pupils 'of average and less than average' ability, a near-contemporary 
enquiry had been undertaken by Daines (1962) into 'the methods and 
effects of religious education in the sixth forms19 students (at that 
time) generally of above average ability. In his conclusiops Daines 
testified to a Ispiritual hunger' which was generallylunsatisfied' by 
the current methods of religious education. There was no objection 
expressed by the pupils to the subject as suchq but examples of bigotted 
teaching were resented. Students wanted 'deeper understanding' and a 
'wider perspective'; their real and pressing personal problems were all 
too oftenignored in favour of examinable 'religious knowledge'. 
Religious Instruction was 'still being conducted in far too many cases 
on the basis of the impartation of a body of knowledge rather than a 
sharing of religious experience' (p. 24). The findings seemed to Daines 
to confirm the need for open-endedneas recommended in the Crowther Report: 
'The adolescent needs help to see where he stands, but it must be given 
with discretion and restraint. He does not want to be 'told', but he 
wants a guide, and a guide who will be honest in not overstating a case' 
(quoted in Daines, P-3)- 
Three other significant pieces of research of this period must be 
mentioned: the Sheffield Report (1961), and the work of Loukes (1961) 
and of Goldman (1964). The first of these researches, carried out by 
the University of Sheffield Institute of Education was concerned to 
establish the quality and success or otherwise of religious education 
in the secondary school. Systematic testing of 1,233 Pupils in 15 
schools resulted in the conclusion-that despite the provisions of'the 
1944 Education Act 'there is something wrong with the religious education 
given in schoolst (P-45). Although the majority of pupils in the investi- 
gation thought school prayers important, and over half suggested that 
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their religious education lessons held some value for them in their 
future, the tests showed that these young people 'remained ignorant of 
simple religious facts': 'One significant result of the survey'vas to 
supply evidence that for many children there was little correlation 
I 
between the factual knowledge gained through religious education and a 
faith by which to live' (p. 43). It is certainly surprising that 127 
children did'not know why we keep Christmas Dayl, but the fact that 
'nearly one-quarter of all the pupils - 316 out of 1,233 - were unable to 
assign a meaning to Ascension Day' (P-36) does not seem to me to be 
particularly alarming; nor the fact that nearly three-quarters were 
ignorant of 'why we celebrate Whitsuntide'. Both these items relate to 
the dogmatic realm of Christianity; both are outside the life of Jesus 
and histeaching; and both are. the kind of miraculous events (at least 
in the way they are usually taught) which seem incredible to a mind 
healthily adjusted to a twentieth-century world view. The report 
I rightly recommends 
Ikeenstudy with an open and inquiring mindig but 
in seeking for pupils a grasp of 'the essentials of a faith the more 
firmly held because reason and intellect have had a full share in its 
development' (P-53)9 it seems to be moving from open-mindedness to 
proselytising. 
This danger is avoided by Harold Loukes, whose study of Teenage 
Religion seems to be based on other premises: 
The defence of Christian education must be made to rest on the same open 
ground as that of all our education: it must seek to perform some tusk 
'which would be accepted as healthy, contributing to wboleness of the 
personality, and would not be judged by the conscientious agnostic to 
be limiting or hampering. - (p. 96) 
'Faith' for Loukes (as for Dean Inge) is 'the resolution to stand or 
fall by the noblest hypothesis' not trying to believe 'what you, know 
isn't true'. ' 'The "open" defence of the presentation of the Christian 
world view is not that it is "true" 
(which merely means that Christians 
say it is true, and is therefore in an open society tautological) but that 
it is "larger" than any other view' (p. 96). And this is for the pupils 
91 
to judge. The 'conscientious agiiostict has every right to say that 
young children 'should not be indoctrinated in such a way as to reduce 
their powers of judgment in the years to comet (P-97). Loukes there- 
fore recominends a 'child centred' approach, starting with the actual 
problems of the pupils in relation to authorityl personal responsibility, 
sex and friendship, and questions of the ultimate meaning of life; and 
exploring these against a Christian frame of reference elements of which 
the pupils are free to accept or reject at will. 
Goldman's research - an account, of vhich first appeared in cyclo- 
styled form (Goldman, 1962) - was based primarily on the Piagetian theory 
of conceptu al development among children. It was also informed by a 
recognition (akin to that of Ian Hamsey, 1963) that the language of the 
Bible is essentially poetical or metaphorical, rather than literal - of 
a kind which Idiscloseel its meaning to the sensitive and mature mind. 
'In the last resort religion is a mystery and speaks of matters and 
experiences which are incominuni cable I, he writes, 'Nevertheless the 
teacherts major task is to communicate truths on an intellectual plane' 
(P-3). Is there such a thing, he asks, as 'religious readiness' and 
'Can ... a syllabus be devised which is suitable to patterns of 
intellectual development' (ibid. ). A main problem is that 'religious 
precepts and concepts are not based upon direct sensory data, but are 
formed from other perceptions and conceptions of experience' (p. 4). How 
can such second order concepts be explored without the process degenerating 
into mere dogmatic verbalism? Goldmants conclusion, based on close study 
of children's responses to religious stories and pictures, Is that this 
is largely a matter of presenting material in a correct conceptual 
SO(IlLeFice, postponing more abstract concepts uirtil mid-adolescelice, or af, 
least until the attainment of an appropriate mental and emotional age. 
Otherwise concepts become fixed at a crude, concretistic, anthropomorphic 
level, or remain perwanently contaminated by a confused mixture of 
magical and miraculous elements (p. 22). tMost pupils until mid-secondary 
schools tend to think only in terms of verbal or historical truth, and 
only laters if at allp appear to recognize parabolic-poetic or spiritual 
truth as valid' (p. 28). Since this is the kind of truth in which the 
Bible abounds, four limited findings lend support to the view. that "the 
Bible is not a children's book"' (p. 49). At least, children should be 
'weaned towards a more critical view of the Bible' (p. 51); they should 
also be helped to reconcile their theological framewor k with science, 
and guided away from the view of the Bible as somehow 'isolated in timet 
a special 'holy place, with holy people at a holy period of history' - 
irkelevant. to the modern world. An important by-product oT Goldman's 
research which has often been overlooked is his subtly-induced questioning 
of the 'maturity' of religious ideas held by many adults. On the scale 
mapped out by Goldman and his colleagues the thinking of a large number 
of adults would be classified as 'regressive'. His research was there- 
fore a major challenge to fixed and rigid dogmatic teaching and a reminder 
of the essentially literary and poetic nature of scriptual material. 
At the same time his influence was to discourage the direct use of biblical 
material until the upper junior and the secondary stages of learning. 
Religious Education 
(iii) imagination versus dogma 
From a somewhat different psychological positionp RS Lee (1965) 
tended to advocate the use of biblical stories with young children, but 
not, he was careful to stress, in any moralistic or doctrinally-oriented 
way: 
In selecting the stories, it is a mistake to choose them according to 
what adults think will be 'good' for the children, that is, edifying 
and leading to a nice moral lesson, or some nice religious sentiment, 
such as beingkind. Children may be left to develop their o-wn judgments, 
and that will come gradually. (p. 144) 
Childrenp he seems to imply (I think correctly)v have an intuitive 
sense of 'story' - when they want to distinguish between fact and 
fiction they ask Us it true? 1. Lee opposes the dogmatic teachinglof 
those who implicitly or explicitly take the attitude that religion is 
something that has to be imposed or grafted upon the growing personality' 
6S, 
4183). Maturity can only be-attainedg moreover, in an atmosphere of 
'spiritual freedom, made possible by the support and encouragement of a 
society of free personal who trust the adolescent, and -ýhom he in turn 
can trust. (p. 187) 
Hubery (1965), in Teaching th2, Christian Faith Today, stresses the 
importance of bringing religious education up-to-date. Matthew Arnold 
would have appreciated the subtitle of his book: 'from experience to 
experience through experiencel. Like Goldman, Hubery wants to repair the 
rift between scientific and religious thought. 
Quite apart from recent research it is necessary to remind ourselves 
that the unhappy controversies between scientists and Bible scholars 
of the past, has left a legacy of general mistrust in Bible truth. It 
is popularry_ regarded as antiquated and unreliable, full of childish 
stories unrelated to life, and in any case even when objectively true con- 
cerned only with simple folk belongin to a pastoral community and environ- 
ment totally different from our own. 
fp 
4.6 ) 
The literary-poetic nature of Jesus's teaching is stressed by Hubery. 
In his parablesp 'we find Jesus is using almost without exception the 
method of imagined experience. Pictures are conjured up in vivid 
language -which stirs the imagination, and those who heard him could not 
fail to be caught up in the experiences of life as they recognised the 
characters and situations described' (p88). Again, 'scholars have been 
quick to point out that Jesus uses the poetic forms of language most 
likely to appeal to those who were able to hear him' (p. 89). This 
teaching through the imagination is itself an open-ended approach 
encouraging questioning and challenging dogma. Hubery looks to this for 
support: 'the teaching methods of Jesus confirm what I have tried to 
say about the dangers of indoctrination and the need for mature teachers 
who do not violate the integrity of individual personality' (p. 90) 
Cox (1967)*, investigating 2,276 second-year sixth form pupils in 
English grammar schoolop found that uhile 'Bible teaching was more 
*Cox summarizes his own research in his chapter on 1Wligious Education' 
(PP-107-119) in Butcher and Pont (1970). Asterisked page references 
above are to his sit ary; non-asterisked referencesto the original 
report. 
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appreciated in the lower forms-discussion of modern social, moral, 
and religious problems was preferred in the sixth form' (p. 115*). On 
the whole, the subjects favoured c, ompulsory religious instruction in 
principle while querying its quality in practice. In particular 'there 
was considerable resentment of teaching that seemed over-dogmatic or 
morali. zing, and a demand for more pupil involvement and for less Bible 
teaching in favour of learning of other religions' (ibid*). Cox 
distinguishes two kinds of thinking between which students tend to 
vacillatet 'empirical' (broadly speaking, factual) thinking and 
Iteleologicall thinking (concerned with value judgments). 'These two 
modes of thinking, however, do not have equal esteem in their minds' 
(P. 175). Consequently: 
Their experience of the logico-scientific view of the world seemed to 
be causing them to reject the traditional forms of Christian beliefs; 
while retaining the beliefs themselves in an amorphous form; and this 
situation precluded both accurate thinking and the ability to relate 
religious beliefs to the world of experience. (p. lll*) 
Asked about their 'beliefs about God, the divinity of Jesus, life after 
death, and the inspiration of the Bible, the results showed a fairly 
high incidence of belief in all these doctrines, but widespread uncertainty 
of their precise nature' (ibid. ). I find this puzzling. To be accurate 
about 'the precise nature' ofilife after death' (which can for mortals be 
at most a 'noble hypothesis') or about 'God' or fthe inspiration of 
the Bible', for that matter, would be asking a lot of an octogenarian 
theologian let alone a school student. Surely if 'precise' responses 
are wanted they could only come in the form of dogma (which the report 
rejects); and #amorphous' forms of answer would seem more intellectually 
honest in the face of the unknowable; and not something which a genuine 
open-ended searc4'should be ashamed of. Cox recognizes elsewhere the 
importance of understanding the imaginative and symbolic, non-literal 
nature of religious expression, and expresses anxiety that 'many young 
people are abandoning the metaphors by which theological thought has 
expressed itself in the past, and are left without any of the mental 
tools that make a religious explanation of life coherent and vivid' 
(P. '176). It may well be, however, that new metaphors are needed to 
make sense of the twentieth century. 
Religious Education 
restatement - openness-and experience v. authoritarianism 
A Schools Council project, An Approach Through Religious Education 
(1969), gives a cautious welcome to attempts to restate Christianity 
linterms that are intelligible to modern thinking': 'The utterances 
of the New Theology, although at their worst unhelpfully opaque, at their 
beat invite a fruitful penetration through the language of ecclesiastical 
theology. to a rediscovery of New Testament experience and insight' (p. 7). 
This project, seeking a measure of reconciliation between Old and New 
Theology and between Christians and Secular Humanists, adopts, an open- 
minded model of religious education which goes beyond the reproduction 
of time-sanctioned metaphors: 
To be religiously educated is to ha: ve grown in trust and love, to have 
turned outwards in compassion, to have discovered an inner strength that 
can somehow stand under attack, to have found life meaningful and 
authentic, to have said 'Yest to life in its being and hope. 1 (p. 12) 
An examination of the nature of 'belief' is encouraged by a five- 
part scheme of categorization moving from sense-verification through the 
evidence of 'experts' to belief by persuasion. An understanding of the 
nature of belief and of authority, it is proposed, will give pupils 
more security than the Ikind of inoculatory propaganda# that has often, 
been designed by various orthodoxies for this purpose: 
Organized beliefs, expressed in the great religions, have always been 
examined by the few and accepted on authority by the many. Bat now there 
is among the few a conflict of belief of'such a radical nature that the 
many have no obvious authority to follow. But when we talk of 'man coming 
of age', or, less radically, of universal education, we express a hope 
that everybody will develop such intellectual autonomy as will enable 
him at least to choose his authorities, to see for himself something of 
what they are talking about, and develop some insight into the way 
beliefs work in human life. There is, it must be admitted, no ground 
for certainty that this can be done; but equally no grounds for 
believing that a return to authority is possible, even if it is thought 
desirable... The sense of the urgency of this comes not only from religious 
believers but from humanists and concerned agnostics. What we aim at here 
in not. the acceptance of a particular orthodoxy but the readiness to 
examine arguments and persuasions on some rationally justifiable grounds, 
and the development of a certain personal coherence of belief which will 
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enable our pupils to stand u as men and women under the propaganda to 
'which they will be exposed. 
4-50) 
Understood this way religious education 'is a process whereby ultimate 
questions are kept openg not a process of trying to close them' (P-32). 
On. the question of the relation between moral education and religious 
education this Schools Council report suggests that they should not be 
regarded as interdependent: 'Whatever view is held on this issue, it 
must be agreed that it is-unwise to tie ethical propositions too closely 
to religious propositions, lest a later rejection of religion may carry 
with it a rejection of moral responsibility' (pll). 
Th6*research conducted by Colin Alves (1968) under the auspices 
of the British Council of Churches and financed by the Gulbenkian 
Foundation is a major document on religion and the secondary school. 
It is easier to admire its thoroughness and integrity than to summarize 
its implications even for the limited purposes of this thesis. Its 
. 
'openness' of approach is based on the recognition that many of our 
generation fare beginning to discover the true cross-fertilization of 
"religious" and "secular" study' (p. 160). Religious education must 
therefore "be set firmly within. the realm of present-day scientific 
studies': Christian educationp instead of being separated from the 
sciences, mu, . st somehow be refreshed and reformulated within their 
-context. Especially Is this the case with the biological and psycho- 
logical sciences" (P-154). It must -start from the felt experience of 
pupils since 'meaning always begins to. take shape or, to put it another. 
way, gains its initial impetus out of the experiences of'the immediate 
present, or out of the phenomena which are immediately apprehensible. 
In other words we cannot begin with events of a remote past and expect 
to find meaning in them by themselves' (P-158). Moreover, while 'example' 
is obviousl y an important element in the acquisition of valuest we 'should 
try to secure that decisions are made in as much of the light of reason 
as possible' (P-15). Thus tsc*encelp-lexperiencel and 'reason' are 
---, I 
stressed; and la vague belief in a supernatural "something" which is 
little better than, superstitiont (p. 166) is rejected. 'Religious 
education ... is justified: not because of any supernatural moral 
sanction with which our pupils must be confronted, but because of the need 
to establish a pers pective on life, in the light of which one can fa6eý 
the moral perplexities and challenges of livingl (P-150). 
The report regrets that the evidence from the sample suggested a 
tendency for 'pro-Christian attitudes and authoritarian judgmental to 
be 'found in association with each other' among (some) school leavers 
(p. 121); This was true of girls in particular (though they were also 
'more discriminatingt) (P-139-140)., Although it was found'that discussion 
techniques were sometimes associated 'with lower test scarest the report 
favoured such an approach: 'One must surely ask, what do we want - 
orthodoxy at all costs, or an honest expression and examination of basic 
community attitudes' (p. 209). An open-ended approach should reduce the 
need for the exercise of the 'rights of withdrawal' from religious 
education; but these rights must he maintained to protect the individual 
conscience (p. 188). However, the report adds an interesting observation, 
which is usually overlooked, in this respect: 
It seems strange that a Marxist has the right to withdraw his children 
from lessons about the life of Jesus or the work of the Christian 
Church, whereas a Christian parent has no right (short of changing 
schools) of withdrawing his children from history lessons which are 
subtly (or overtly) tinged with Marxist dogma, or from literature 
lessons which 'commend# to the children standards and values that are 
far from Christian. ' (P-187) 
This is raised simply to point out an anomoly; not with a view to. 
increasingly the incidence of 'withdrawals', but to encourage the 
reduction of the need, for these by improving the quality of openness 
in discussion in all areas of the curriculum. 
In its pursuit of openness the report sheds no tears over 'the 
underm - ining of old certainties' (p. 159) or #the breakdown of traditional 
conventions and inhibitions' (ibid. ), since these find a parallel in the 
45 
spiritual revolution experiencei by the early church: 
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And in the sphere of religion itself many of our generation have found 
this same liberating experience through the explosive effects which the 
temper of radical questioning has produced. For them the very fact that 
no theological statements and claims can any longer be regarded as immune 
from questioning has transformed the whole business from the acceptance - 
or more probably the rejection - of Idead ideas' into a living experience 
of enquiry and discovery. (p. 160) 
I 
Many of the Agreed Syllabusest it is felt, are out-of-date and out-of- 
touch;, and. so is a good deal of religious education teaching: 'Bad 
Bible-based teaching, it can be argued, is worse than no teaching at all' 
(p. 167), and IWheq to incompetence we add the dreary repetitiveness that 
has characteriBed much Bible-based teaching we have an effective weapon 
for the destruction of a child's emergent faithl, (ibid. ). Untrained or 
over-theologically trained teachers seem to come off less well than those 
professionally trained in religious education. On balance traoicall is 
preferred to ttraditionall teaching, but a Idiversity of approach' has 
much to recommend it: 'So long as the two schools of thought recognize 
each other's integrityp and make it plain in their teaching that they do 
so, the effect of diversity on the mental and spiritual growth of their 
pupils can mean gain rather than lose' (p. 164). Finally, on the question 
of openness the report opposes dogmatic teaching by an unequivocal 
affirmation of intent: 
We are aware that a good many teachers and older pupils regard religious 
education with some suspicion and contempt as a kind of admittedly 
ineffective brain-washing. Our desire is to make it at once more effec- 
tive and less suspect. This involves first of all an topen' approach in 
the classroom much as pupils expect in other subjects. By this we mean 
that pupils should not feel inhibited fro. 4 expressing any opinions they 
may honestly hold or asking any questions which seem to them important. 
We mean, too, that teachers must be seen to address themselves scrupu- 
lously to the whole of the evidence, following where the arguments leads. 
Success also involves such an integration with the teaching of other 
subjects as to make cross-reference easy and effective. (p. 18) 
The report quotes evidence of considerable parental support for 
religious education (pP. 150-151) and found evidence in the majority of 
the pupils sampled of 'fairly favourablet attitudes (p. 59) to the subject, 
although within it 'the image of the Church' it was found, 'is considerably 
tarnished, far more so than the image of Jesus' (P-55)- 
The Alves report says little about non-b; blical literature except 
to recommend the use, in assemblies for exampleg of material culled 'from 
the masters of the spiritual life, from great literature$ biographyq 
poetry, and music' bringing 'fresh insights and incentives' (p. 197)t 
and to suggest that 'the study of history and literature raises a number 
of. o. queations. What are the influences which shape the direction of 
human advance? Is it possible to discern the working of something like 
a law of moral cause and effect? 'etc. (p. 161). The metaphorical nature 
of much religious discourse is also recognized, since the report applauds 
the shift in theological metaphor from a static to a dynamic emphasis. 
A brief recognition of the importance of cateringfor 'the presence 
among our fellow citizens of an increasing number of followers of other 
faiths' (P-15) is expressed, but the means of meeting this challenge 
(in terms of literature, etcetera) is not discussed, except in terms 
0f the general openness advocated and the acknowledgement of the 
reciprocal value of shared insights. 
Two years after the Alves Report came a remarkable document 
from the Methodist Conference Commission on Education: Christian 
Commitment in Education (1970). A main feature of this report i, s an 
examinationof the nature of 'authority' which ppetulates, six basic 
kinds of authority: 
(1) Authority of function, (e. g. by appointment or election to a 
clearly defined role); (2) authority of skill (which is reltvant to 
that skill or knowledge alone); (3) authority of experience or under- 
standing (e. g. of coping with certain kinds of situations or predica- 
ments); (4) authority of personal conviction or commitment 
(where 
willingness to sufferjor the conviction Icarries within itself its own 
authority'); (5) authority-of inwardness (of evident integrity and 
compatability between words and actions); and 
(6) 
-authority 
of valner- 
ability or openness (where the defences of esoteric or physical remoteness 
are abandoned in favour of an open, egalitarian search for truth) 
(PP43-45). 
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In discussing the link between authority and power, 'coercive' and 
'remunerative' power are relegated a lower status than 'normative' 
power which is based on an 'identity of values and attitudes between 
those who wield the powe r and those under it; it is linked with "moral" 
involvement' (P-50). The lack of 'consensus opinion? in modern society 
makes clear-cut judgments of 'good' and 'bad' difficult, and the adop- 
tion of 'procedural neutrality' in discussion may sometimes help to 
allow issues to come into focus naturally. However, 
What we need to recognise is that open-ended conditions of debate (in 
-which the tutor can exercise no pressure open or covert, and into which 
it is desirable that he should introduce "some element of satire or , irony.. ýto prick any incipient self-inflation") offer the best hope of 
future moral growth in a society without agreed values. (p5l) 
This approach harmonizes in some resp . ects with that of Arnold (see 
chapter 6). On the question of student protest In higher education 
the report urges more Idemocratisationt and recognized the legitimacy 
of certain of the issues, particularly issues of consciencey raised by 
students. In such cases: 
Far from being either impatient ox- pharisaic about this, the Church must 
not even merely watch it sympathetically - she must identify herself with 
the impulses leading to such ferment, throw in her efforts towards the 
righting of wrong, and add her own endeavours to curbthose diseases 
which are deep in our present culture. (p. 54) 
The report finds 'a good deal of common ground... between Humanists 
and Christians'; recognizes the importance of acknowledging the 
integrity of other faiths; and looks for a wider range of reference 
and the sensitive use of 'dance, poetry, drama (and) the visual arts' 
(P. 79). Suitable parts of the Koran and William Golding's novel Lord 
of the Fliejs are specifically mentioned in this respect. All in all this 
Methodist report adopts a positive and dynamic stance: 
Normative influence depends, in our contemporary situationt not so 
much on the existence of a consensus of opinion about values, ideals and 
objectives, as upon what values are communicated by the energy and methods 
by which the co-operative search for a consensus, both among staff and 
students, is pursued. (p. 51) 
Reliaious Education 
(v) cautious retrenchment, 
PuHication of the Methodist report in 1970 coincided with that of 
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the Church of England Board of Education and the National Society 
(1970) entitled The Fourth R, a report of the Commission oIa religious 
education under the chairmanship of Dr Ian Ramsey, Bishop of Durham. - 
If MethodismAs traditionally associated with dissent and the Church of 
England with the establishment these two reports to some extent reflect 
this distinction of outlook. The sheer weight of the Church of England 
Commission's report suggests stability compared with the slighter volume 
of the Methodists. But despite the weight there are signs of movement in 
its pages: 'the term "religious instruction" should be replaced forthwith 
by the term "religious education'll(p. 277); 'the statutory provisons 
relating to religious instruction and school worship in the 1944 
Education Act should not be continued in their present form in any 
forthcoming legislationt (ibid. ); 'the existing machinery forthe drawing 
up and adoption of an Agreed Syllabus. by an L. E. A. should be abandoned, 
(p. 278); $the religious education'of immigrant children raises a wide 
variety of complex issues... (and) we recommend'that this problem should 
be approached with care and sensitivity and decisions taken in the light 
of the particular needs of local areast (p. 279);, and 'We recognize the 
educational value of the discussion of moral questions by members of 
staff who hold different viewpoint's and expound them with concern for 
responsible moral decision' (p. 280ý The genuine advances towards 
openness made here are somewhat mated by cautious safeguards built in 
to the proposals. The Commission would prefer a modified and broadened 
version of the 1944-, wording of the Act, laying down that fall pupils 
in county and voluntary schools shall be providedg according totheir 
ages, abilities and aptitudes, with education in the arts and sciences, 
in religion and moralsp and in physical and practical skills' (p. 276) - 
a sort of precursor of the concept of a 'core curriculum', with religious 
education placed on equal terms with other subject areas and so released 
from embarraging uniqueness as the one compulsory subject of the curriculum. 
In place of the Agreed Syllabuses the Commission would favour the regular 
---w 
publication of up-to-date 'books, pamphlets and other advisory material... 
under the auspices of the D. E. S. and the Schools. Councill (p. 278), 
local education authorities simply producing and regularly revisingo a 
handbook of suggestions for teachers in their area. 
, 
Whereas the Schools Council Report referred to above (ppý67-9) feared 
the interdependence of religious and moral education, The fourth R believes 
that they could not, nor should not, tproceed entirely independently of 
one another' (P-85). However, it favours 'openness' in both religious 
and moral education, defined as Iýnot being doctrinaire, encouraging 
people to think for themselves, being ready to consider arguments against 
one's own position" (p8O), adding that 'As such it is compatible with 
having and communicating a definite position which one is prepared to 
defend' (ibid. ). The report be lieves that, taught in these terms, 
Christianity can provide a support for moral education because reason 
alone, it believes, is an inadequate stay for most of us - pupils and 
teachers alike - and "We shall need in practice, and perhaps also in 
theory, ' some conception of what a good man is like' (p. 79). Howevert 
it is not the task of teachers in county schools 'to press for any 
conversion' into 'a particular faith or belief system1p although they have 
a duty to discourage 'a shallow and unreflective attitude to life, (p. 107). 
The aim of religious education is expressed by the Commission in terms 
of cautious openness, as follows: 
The aim of religious education should be to explore the place and 
significance of religion in human life and so to make a distinctive 
. contribution 
to each pupil's search for a faith by which to live. 
To achieve this aim, the teacher will seek to introduce most pupils to 
that biblical, historical, and theological knowledge which forms the 
basis of the Christian faith. This will be done with careful reference 
to the ages, interests, and degrees of comprehension of the pupils. 
The teacher will also seek to show his pupils the insights provided by 
Christian faith and experience into a wide range, of personal, sociulp and 
ethical problems. Moreoverg he will aecl( to discuss with his pupils 
the various answers and approaches provided by this faith to those 
basic questions of life and existe-nqe which perplex all thoughtful men. 
Where appropriate, he will also study other religious and belief 
systems* The teacher is thus seeking rather toiaitiate his pupils into 
knowledge which he encourages them to explore and appreciate, than into 
a system of belief which he requires them to accept. (p. 103) 
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Religious Education 
(v) radical revieý-Jmportance of feeling. imagination and symbolic language 
A rather broader view is taken by the Department of Education and 
Science (1971) a year later in ProsBects and Problems for Religious 
Education; 
Our society is a multicultural, multiracial one, and the curriculum 
should reflect a sympathetic understanding of the different cultures 
and races that now make up our society. We also live in a complex 
interdependent worldv and many of our problems in Britain require 
international solutions (para. 10.11) 
It is not only schools in multicultural areas that need to take account 
of other faults and other world-views: 
the fact that children are growing up in a world which is steadily 
becoming smaller and more interdependent means that religious 
education should be set against a cosmic and not just a British back- 
ground. This means, for instance, that at appropriate stages, there 
should be teaching about other religions as well as about Christianityv 
even apart from the presence of representatives of these religions in 
school. (FL57) 
The religious education clause of the 1944 Education Act is regarded as 
an 'authoritarian imposition ... out of place in the modern education 
scene, (P-56) where 'in some c olleges of education 9CP/v of students opt 
out of religious education curriculum courses by the end' (P-34)- 
Paradoxically, however, the evidence has shown that 'most parents seem 
to want some form of religious education for their children' (P, 5). 
What is needed, thereforeq is 'to show young people that a religious 
faith is not incompatible with scientific theory and vith-the world 
as they see it' (ibid. p*. 35)- and also to help them 'to gain a sense 
of wonder and of the numinous' (P-34) - which the report regards as an 
important part of religious education. Also important is the education 
of the emotions - 'too many teachers appear to be afraid of the vez7 
word "emotion"' (p. 11). 
Children need above all to find an identity for themselvesp to feel 
that they matter and to establish relationships with others, which they 
cannot do without some measure of understanding of person relationships. 
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Role playsq fiteratureq history and sensitivity to the life and teaching 
of Jesus Christ all contribute valuably towards this. (p. 11). 
Religious education therefore has a part to play inemotional education. 
It can also contribute valuably to moral education since 'what appears 
to be missing from much secular thought is the element of idealism which 
is needed as an inspiration and as a touchstone. Compassion can hardly 
-be taught unless we have a compassionate ideal ', (P. lo), This, as 
will be seen, is one of the key ideas of Arnold's thesis. The D. E. So paper 
is also in tune with Arnold's approach to religious language: 
We have hardly begun to understand the problems of religious language 
or the ways in which adolescents can be helped to slough off 
some of-their immature. religious concepts, replace them with more 
sophisticated ideas, and relate them to their scientific experience. (p. 26) 
These two issues, 'imagination' and lan understanding of religious 
language' have come more to the fore in recent thinking about religious 
education, being reflected for example in the Birmingham syllabus and 
the Cheshire syllabus of religious education. They are the subje6t of 
a recent slim but significant pamphlet published by the British Council 
of Churches: The Place of Imagination in Religious Education by John 
Prickett (1978). The a uthor makes a plea for the development of aldis- 
ciplined imaginationt (P-3). Imagination, he affirmsq is needed not only 
to apprehend one's own religion or world-view but to view the religions 
of others with sympathetic understanding: 
If religious communities, previously somewhat isolated from each other, 
are now being brought into a closer contact in pluralistic societies 
throughout the world, certain qualities are required of religious people 
if they are to live together peacefully... They have to do with aware- 
nose of and respect for the beliefs and social practices of others, with 
an openness of mind which, though not uncritical, is'ready to learn from 
others and to welcome the new insights which learning brings, and with 
a readiness to welcome change and growth in spite of the pain which inevi- 
tably accompanies them. (P-7) 
Imagination is the key to flexibility: 11he child who is being taught, in 
such a way as to imply that there is only one viewpoint from wbich the 
truth can be seen is certainly not being prepared to live creatively 
in a pluralistic society' (P-7); and to moral insight: lEvery ethical 
problem is a challenge to the imagination' (p. 13). It is also the key 
to motivation: '("Men are moved to act", says John Coulsong Pnot by notions 
but by what seizes their imagination")$ (ibid. ). A conceptual framework 
is necessary to the study of religion, but it is not enough: 
What is needed is not so much the somewhat sterile approach of analytic 
philosophy oi epistemology (though these have their own disciplinary 
value), as the stimulation of a disciplined religious imagination from 
which there may emerge a cosmology enabling pupils to find meaning in 
their life. (p. 12) 
Pricket sees literaturep and stories generally, as important in'developing 
, 
imagination. A significant change. in the Birmingham syllabus is approved: 
'in the past attention was concentrated on doctrine whereas now histdry, 
mythology, ethics, liturgy, inner experience, artistic and social 
expression are all. included' (p. 2). Similarly in the Cheshire syllabus: 
'There is a far greater emphasis at all levels on the significance of 
religious language, especially in myths, legends, allegories, poems, 
metaphors in prose and poetry; (and) on the importance of symbolism in 
religion and on the use of various art forms in the expression of 
religious feelings and insights' (p. 5). The author replies to those who 
would reject the use of stories: 
I have sometimes heard those whose approach is mainly intellectual 
criticise the use of primitive stories (sometimes called myth) at an 
early age on the grounds that it is important that children should not 
learn at an early age what they will later have-to unlearn. Such an arid, 
literalist view of such stories reveals precisely that lack of imagination 
'Which inhibits religious unders tanding.. I should rather criticise the 
assumption that stories are only food for infants and suggest that we need 
a much wider use of them at all stages not least among adults. (p. 4) 
The capacity for critical evaluation is important, but total 'objectivity, 
is impossible, in Prickett's view, and undesirable in situations where 
empathy is more appropriate; and similarly 'procedural neutrality' (as 
distinct from a certain reticence') in discussion can lead to indoctrin- 
ation through 'unconscious bias' whereas the expression of 'a viewpoint 
adopted consciously' may be less insidious and more natural. Once again 
Bishop Ian Ramsey is quoted, in support of a symbolic, literary under- 
standing of theological matters: 
The basic content is the visiong about which, in our sta ering human 
ay, 
ell 
such qfforto tp. ttemVt, to spe andfelgh totreasop. A w wTate 
ai ion arahke oe na ure o poe ry ... and imagination ar cu 
77 
is 'that quality of mind which enables us to partake of the symbolic 
method of. poetry and of that greatest of all poetry the Scriptures. 7(p. 11) 
All tbis, as will be seen (see chapter 4) was prefigured by Matthew 
Arnold a century ago; and the following words of Prickett's could 
virtually have been Arnoldis: Ut goes without saying that the word 
"poetic" is used with the implication of heightening rather than dimin- 
ishing. the significance of what such language conveys. It is the 
literalist who diminishes' (p. 12). 
'7F 
CHAPTER THREE 
MORAL EDUCATION: DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE SPIMIE OF ENGLISH TEACHING 
NoV what I want is Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are wanted in life. ' Plant nothing else, and root out every- 
thing else. You can only form the minds of reasoning animals upon facts: 
Nothing else'will ever be of any service to them ... Stick to Facts, Sirl 
Thomas Gradgrind, in 
Charles Dickens' Hard Times, t(1854) 
Changes are taking place which, we thinkv are paving the way for further 
modification of the older conception of school subjects and school, 
methods, and for the introduction of English Literature as a really 
vital part of the curriculum. 
The Newbolt Report: The Teaching of English 
in England (1921) 
Idealism: the Newbolt Report 
Developments in moral education (strictly so called) and in religious 
education have been considered; it now remains to examine what claims 
have been made within the field of English teaching as to the ethical 
contribution that can be made by the study of literature. The Newbolt 
Report (1921) occupies a midway position between Arnoldle. Literature and 
Dogma and the present time. It is necessary to quote from this document 
at some length because it is a significant statement of principles rel- 
evant to the present theme, but its effectiveness in terms of classroom 
implementation mast be judged against the stringent financial circumstances 
prevailing at the time of its appearance, coming as it did between the 
Cabinet decision of 8th December 1920 to #reduce the money spent on the 
education system' and the notorious 'Geddes Axel of 1922 implementing 
the education cuts demanded (Bernbaum, 1967). 
The terms of reference of the Newbolt Report were: 
To inquire into the position held by English (Language and Literature) 
in the educational system of England, and to advise how its study may 
best be promoted in schools of all types, including Continuing Schools, 
and in Universities and other Institutions of Higher Education, regard being 
had to 
1) -the requirements of a liberal education; 
P the needs of business, the professionsq and public services, and 
3ý the relation of English to other studies. (p. l. ) 
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One of the functions of the Newbolt Report was to justify the teaching 
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of English in-place of Ithe grand old-fortifying classical curriculum'., 
Another was to present English literature as 'a source of delight? as 
'Well as 'an equipment for the understanding of lifel (p. 19). The high 
estimation afforded to literature by the report accords well with 
Matthew Arnold's ideas on the subject. For example '... no personality 
can be pomplete, can see life steadily and see it whole, without that 
unifying influence, that purifying of the emotions, which art and litera- 
ture can alone bestow' (P. 257). And Matthew Arnold is quoted directly a 
number of times in the Report, for example on the value of poetry: 
Good poetry... does undoubtedly tend to form the soul and character; 
it tends*to beget a love of beauty and of truth in alliance together, 
it suggests, however indirectlyt high and noble principles of action, 
and it inspires the emotion so helpful in making principles operative. 
Hence its extreme importance to all of us; but in our elementary schools 
its importance seems to me to be at present quite extraordinary... 1 (P. 49) 
Of literature in general the Newbolt Report holds a similarly high opinion. 
It is 'the direct and lasting communication of experience of man to men'; 
it must 'never be thought of as an ornament ... a mere pastime or ... a mental 
exercise remote from ordinary life' (p. 9): 
The sphere of morals in school life-is limited by practical considerations 
with which we cannot here dealo but it is evident that if science and 
literature can be ably and enthusiastically taught, the child's natural 
love of goodness will be strongly encouraged and great progress may be 
made in the strengthening of the will. The vast importance to a nation 
of moral training would alone make it imperative that education shall 
be regarded as experience and shall be kept in the closest contact with 
life and personal relations. (p. 9) 
It is also recognized, howevert that 'literature is written primarily for 
enjoymento and unless it be welcomed with that initial enjoyment its 
influence will be sterile' (p. 149). Given this pleasurable interaction 
we learn unconsciously from literature: row innuences in life are so 
subtle or so powerful as the invisible power of literature - what may be 
called th e undertones of the printed voice' (p. 337). Howevert 'it is 
very generadly recognized that reading may be harmful as well as bene- 
ficial - that while good literature may be good for the youngo bad 
literature may have a "demoralising" effect' (P-335). On the whole the 
Report adopts a bold response to this danger in line with the biblical 
exhortation 'prove all things, hold fast that which is good': 
Prohibition ... is both futile and undesirable: but it does notýfollow that there is no remedy against the debilitating effect of vulgarity in print. Mental, like physicalp contagion is best avoided by maintain- 
ing a vigorous health. (P-338) 
Given a healthy diet of worthwhile literature, 'the fear that the 
children of to-day are being demoralised or exposed to evil suggestion 
by the penny stories and penny magazines which they devour in such large 
quantities' (P-339) can be rejected. Good literature can provide both 
preventative and curative medicine for the mind: I ... poets, philosophers, 
andhistorians have the Power of revealing new values, relations of thought, 
feeling, -and act, by which the full and superficial sight of the multitude 
is illuminated and helped to penetrate in the direction of reality, (P-17). 
A firmer grasp of reality brings with it a measure of release from the 
hold of artificial rigidities - Ifreedom from tradition ... intolerance of 
vested interests and... contempt for distinction based on birth rather 
than on worth' (P-17): 
Among the best things which education can give are certainly freedom 
and independence of thought, a wide outlook on life, and a strong sense 
of the difference between convention and reality ... Literature, which is 
untramelled, as well as wider and more penetrating, will give them to 
the children of this country. (P-17) 
The Newbolt Report regards the liberating effect of literature not as 
revolutionary and divisive but as uniting in its effect, contributing to 
a sense of shared common values in society: Ia feeling for our own 
native, language would be a bond of union between classes, and would 
beget the right kind-of national pride. Even more certainly should pride 
and joy in the national literature serve as a bondt (p. 22). Literature 
shows that Ithrough all social differences liuman nature and its strongest 
affections are fundamentally the same' (p. 23) 
Although affirming that 'education is a preparation for life, not 
in the first place, for livlihood... t. he development of the whole man, 
and not the mere training of a factory hand' (p. 60) the Newbolt coimnif, tee 
were pleased to have received evidence from the business world to the 
?I 
effect that literature was regarded by many employers as a better prepa- 
ration for employment-than humdrum exercises in grammar and punctuation: 
'..,. many firms criticised the schools on the ground that too little 
attention -was. given to literature and guidance in reading' (P. 130)- 
And again, fit was refreshing to find the teaching of literature advoca- 
ted as on essential preparation for a business career' (ibid. ). "'We think 
(wrote one employer) that a great deal of time spent in grammar, spelling, 
punctuation would be far better used in the study of English literature in 
its broader aspects.., "' (ibid. ). Similarlyin the field of. technology, 
the Report applauds 'the introduction of a training in English into every 
technical course ... a training carefully planned so as to be ... an integral 
part of the course and to have a close and obvious connection with the 
profession or craft for which the students were preparing themselves' so 
as to Igive technology the soul, which it now lacks and, in the end, 
perhaps bring a new spirit into business at large' (p. 153). This pre- 
figures, e., ------->the words of Dr EF Schumacher (see page 50 
of this thesis) half a century later. 
Although literature needs to be brought into relation with the 
business and technological world it remains an art, and not a science 
(p. 206). In this resides its value and its difficulty: 'literature, 
not being a knowledge subject, cannot and should not be taught. It is 
to be communicated to the students in such a way that they will experience 
it rightly, that right experience being the sole aim of literary work. 
Now this makes literature awkward material for classroom. purposes' (P150). 
All too often, the Report confesses, "the schoolmaster devitalizes 
literature" (p. 122), and evidence from the headmasters of public schoois 
suggested that they were loath to introduce English literature into the 
classroom (in place, of the classics) for that very reason: 
22- 
The feeling for literature uhey regard as a delicate plant wrtich might not 
survive in the atmosphere of the classroom. Thus the Headmaster of 
Sherborne appealed to ail in authority not to kill the enjoyment of English 
Literature and English Composition by drawing them into the maelstrom of 
competing "subjects" (p. jL21) 
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The answer to this problem proposed in the Report is 1.11hat if literature 
is to be enjoyed 6y the children it must be entrusted to teachers with a 
love of itt (P-348). Such teachers can preserve the vitality of litera- 
ture by making it obvious from the. outset 'that literature is alive, that 
it isthe sublimation of human thought, passion, feeling, that it is 
concierned with issues which are of universal interest, that in short it 
is flesh and blood and not stucco ornamentation' (p. 276). If it is 
'flesh and blood' it is also 'the record. and rekindling of spiritual 
experiences' (p. 21). And this brings us to the Newbolt Report's views on 
the place of the Bible within the study of English literature. 
Two feelings have ... been prevalent concerning the Bible as a means of 
education. On the one hand, it has been held too sacred incharacter 
to be lawfully treated as "mere literature"; on the other hand, it 
has been regarded as a canon of revealed truth, requiring an inter- 
pretation which has been the subject of dispute and division between 
religious sects. (P-341) 
One of the members of the Newbolt committee, Sir Arthur Quiller-Couchp 
had described the Bible as 'a literary achievement one of the greatest 
in our language' and again as 'the most majestic thing in our literature 
and the most spiritually living thing we inherit' (P-341). The committee 
therefore regarded the Bible as an important part of a liberal education 
if studied in a 'free and impartial' spirit: 'If we set aside, as we 
do with any other classic, all consideration of its bearing upon dogmatic 
religion, there can be no division of opinion as to its historical 
position and effect in this country' (pp. 342-343). Therefore, 'we desire 
that in all the schools of the country, Elementary as well as Secondary, 
the reading of the Bible should not be confined to the time set apart for 
religious instruction, but that its claim upon the time devoted to English 
studies should also be recognizedlo for example in the form of 'books 
of literary e-Aracts in which selected passages from the Bible'find a 
place beside other examples of great. literaturel (P-347)- 
Literature is seen, then, by the writers of the Newbolt Report to 
contribute to the spiritualq mental and emotional development of the 
schoolchild and to be deeply relevant to the life and experience of the 
4- 
individual and the community. However, literary study is not 
sociology: 
"the social problem" is not directly the business of literature, and... 
those -who conceive it to be so have failed to appreciate the true function 
of literature. On the other hand we believe that, if rightly presented, 
poetry will be recognised by the most ardent social reformers as of value, 
because while it contributes no specific solution of the, social problem 
it endows the mind with power and sanity; because, in a word, it enriches 
personality. (p. 255) 
Reaffirmation: From Spens to Plowden 
The Spens Report (1938) echoes in its section on English Literature 
and Language a number of the preoccupations of the Newbolt Report. Me 
centrality, of English in the school curriculum had been epitomised in 
the earlier report in the well-known dictum 'every teacher is a teacher 
of English, because every teacher is a teacher in English'; similarly, 
the Sp ens Report asserts thatv 'for the majority of pupils we think that 
the school itself should adopt a unifying principle in its curriculum, 
and-we recommend that it be found in the teaching of English and that 
assembly of subjects which are often loosely spoken of as the English 
subjects' (P-173), literature of course being one of these areas. 
Like the Newbolt Report the Spens Report fears the effects on literary 
appreciation of the classroom ethos and the examination system: 'In 
regard to the study of English literature we are recommending that set 
books should not be prepared forexamination. We believe that the form 
of study which these involve does real harm to the growth of an interest 
in literature... I (p. xxiv). How far the, appreciation of literature 'can 
be taught at all'is still a matter for argument', says the Report: 
But there is a general agreement that no course in English is complete 
which does not introduce pupils to the richness and beauty of the 
literature which is our proudest heritage. Love of reading, joy in the 
discovery of literary beautyl enlargement of imaginative experience, 
these are among the most treasured fruits of a sound English education. 
(p. 219). 
The arguments adduced in favour of literary studies include preparation 
for the increase in favailable leisure time', building up 'a national 
consciousness' and safeguarding 'literary standards' said to be 'threatetied 
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on every side' (p. 226). The importance of the personality, the sympathy 
and receptiveness of the teacher is stressed in the Spens Repbr-U; no 
training can supply the vital quality required 'for the right teaching 
of literaturel: 
This quality is sincerity; a belief in the va. Lue. of English literature 
for its own sake, and a real love of its finesz manifestations. This 
belief and this love can, like religion, be "caught but not taught". They 
are revealed not by easy raptures or didactic exhortation or fervent or 
extravagant expression, but by a kind of inward glow which warms all those 
wno come in contact with it . .. 
(pp. 227-228). 
The Newsom Reportv twenty-five years later, aods little to this 
except to encourage the, study of literature in combination with other 
humanities subjects in project work and 'to take account of television 
as a social force' with obvious implications for the 'enjoyment of the 
artst (P-74). For the Newsom Report the main value of literature is its 
insight into human relations: 
In whatever jobv and at whatever level of skill, the pupils may subsequently 
be working, they will all need to enter into effective relations with 
other people if they are to work efficiently and happily. What they take 
wiih them from school in improved powers of speech and in sympathetic 
insight into human relationships gained through literature, will be of 
, great value 
to them here. (p. 159) 
The pupils' academic ability is irrelevant, says the reportq in caicul- 
ating the potential value of literature: 'All pupils, incluaing those of 
very limited attainments, need the civilizing experience of contact with 
great literature and can respond to its universality' (p. 155). 
The next official pronouncement'relating to literature in schools 
came two years after the Newsom Report in the Schools Council Working 
Paper Number Three on English -a paper which sets out"a programme for 
research and development in English Teaching'. Literature in this paper 
is chiefly valued for its help in developing empathy and a sense of 
buman solidarity: 
If pupils can be led by degrees to meet these writings receptively, 
sensing the common humanity that links writer and reader, and responding 
to his imaginative interpretation of the world they can gain a great 
deal. Unfamiiiar aspects of life will become known and understood; and 
some of the. familiar wili be met in a different context, which helps 
adolescents to feel themselves a part of the community and not an oddity 
within it. The child who has read The Silver Sword knows something of 
0% 
what it means to be a refugee; the older pupil learns the meaning of defeat from The Trojan Women. Someone entering wholly, for oncet into the feelings of others can be helped to sense what it is like to be a 
coloured man in a 'white supremacy' area ... or to encounter the death of someone very close. This is to become less vulnerable. while gaining 
rather than losing sensitivity. (my italics) (p. 4). 
I have emphadized the final sentence of the extract above because it seems 
to me to present in a balanced yet profound way a highly significant 
function of literature. The Working Paper seeks to encourage close 
attention to the literary text, and for older children particularly, ' 
reading with 'selectivity and an-intelligently critical attitude' (p. 5), 
while recognizing the essential relation between literature and life: 
'prose atrd poetry are nothing to most people unless they are relevant to 
the human condition' (P-5). 
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In seeking to delineate the field for future research in English 
the paper recognizes that 'some problems do not lend themselves easily 
to systematic break-down; the teaching of ]Literature, in particular, 
can never be too organised a process' (p. 11). Nevertheless, some useful 
suggestions are given for researchers, notably in the proposal: 
to analyse the purposes reading serves, both in school and in leisure 
time, and in adult life; ý and to decide which of the various aims that have been set down to justify the teaching of literature should be 
emphasized at different stages of education; and which, I)ooks, at 
different stages, will best fulfil these aims: 
i) extension of experience 
ii) extension of knowledge 
iii) sharpening of sensitivity 
iv) preparation for what has to be met in life 
V) release from tension 
vi) acquisition of sound attitudes and values 
vii) knowledge of the literary heritage 
ý viii), understanding of the role of man'in the world 
ix) education of the aesthetic response (p. 13) 
These aims inevitably overlap and interact with one another, but provided 
this is recognized the-breakdown seems a helpful one. 
A good deal is said about books in the Plowden Report, (1967), where 
literature is treated alongside information books in use in the primary 
school. Discussing poetry, the Report makes a gentle sideswipe at Matthew 
Arnold: 'It is doubtful whether poetry has ever been well treated in the 
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majority of schools. Matthew Arnold recommended Mrs Ile-man's poems, 
admittedly with some reservations' (p. 216)j However, the Report 
acknowledges that the range of choice is considerably greater now than 
it was in Arnold's time: 'There is now a wide range of children's books, 
notably enriched by translations of the better books written abroad' (p. 214), 
althought 'probably teachers are not sufficiently informed about the 
excellence of many contemporary children's stories or of thýir availability' 
in cheap editions' (pp. 215-216), and 'there is still an insufficient supply 
of good light literature for the less able children' (p. 215). The Plowden 
Report recognizes the importance of stories: 
We are convinced of the value of stories for children, stories told to 
them, stories read to them and the stories they read for themselves. It 
is through story as well as through drama and other forms of creative 
work that children grope for the meaning of the experiences that have 
already overtake ' n'them, 
savour again their pleasures and reconcile 
themselves to their own inconsistencies and those of others. (p. 216) 
Stories are seen as an aspect of 'playl impregnated with value: 
As they #try on' first one story book characterv then another, imagina- 
tion and sympathyp the power to enter into another personality and 
situation which is a characteristic of childhood and a fundamental 
condition for good social relationshiph, is preserted and nurtured. It 
is also thr3ugh literature that children feel forward to the experiences, 
the hopes, and fears that await them in adult life. It is almost certainly 
in childhood that children are most susceptible, both to living example 
and to the examples they find in books. As children listen to stories, as 
they take down the books from the library shelves, they may, as Graham 
Greene suggests in "The Lost Childhood", be choosing their future and the 
values that will dominate it. (p. 216) 
Cautious confidence: the Bullock Report 
In 1975, half a century'after the Newbolt Report, the Bullock R,. port, 
A Lanp-uage for Life is the-next full-scale survey of the aims, scope, 
achievements and shortcomings of the teaching of English language and 
literature in Ekigland. Like the Newbolt Reportg it recognizes the claims 
that literature can help to 'shape the personality, sharpen the critical 
intelligence; (and act as) ... a powerful instrument for empathyp a medium 
through which the child can acquire his values' (p. 124). However, in the 
later report this recognition is severely qualified: 
In recent years it has been questioned whether literature does in fact make 
the reader a better and more sensitive human being. What was a matter of 
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self-evident truth in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is no longer 
exempt from question. Few would subscribe to the simple view that it 
offers models for living which the reader lifts from the pages. (p. 124) 
An American educationist is quoted as saying that 'there is no evidence 
that the reading of literature in schools produces in any way the social 
or emotional effects claimed for it' (ibid. ). Nevertheless, tin Britain 
the tradition of literature teaching is one which aims at personal and 
moral growth. It is a soundly based tradition, and properly interpreted 
is a powerful force in English teaching' (p. 125)- Perhaps in view of the 
apparent contradiction here the emphasis should be on the words 'aims at, ' 
above. Among the reasons for pursuing these aims (despite the lack of 
availability of evidence as to their success) the Bullock Report speaks of 
the way in which Uiterature brings the child into an encounter with 
language in its most complex formal. by means of which tit provides 
imaginative insight into what another person is feeling' and 'confronts 
the reader with problems similar to his ownt. Thus #books compensate 
for the difficulties of growing up' (p. 125). Like the Newbolt Report, 
the Bullock Report affirms the relation between literature and life: 
IThe child gets most enjoyment from those stories which say something 
to his conditi on and help him to resolve ... inner conflicts' 
(ibid. ). On 
the other hand, #books may offer vicarious satisfaction and little else... 
and the sympathies they engage and the antipathies they arouse may be far 
from-what -we would hope' (p. 126). The eliciting of a genuine response 
to books which present 'a complexity of relationships' and enlarge the 
*understanding of the range of human possibilities'... 'presents the teacher 
with one of his most delicate areas of operation, and one where his skiIII 
and knowledge play an extremely important part' (p. 126). 
Narrative material 1provided for children of all ages by far the 
strongest motivation towards the reaaing of books' (p. 129) yet Ithe 
indications are that narrative books are substantially outnumbered by 
non-fiction in most primary schools! (p. 127). The report's recommendation 
that 'fantasy,, rairy tale and folk-tale should uake their place 
(In 
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in the repertoire in the earliest stages of reading' seems to be made 
partly on the basis of encouraging interest in reading generaliy and 
partly for their intrinsic worth: 'We believe that true relevance lies 
in the way a piece of fictiorf. engages with the reader's emotional concerns' 
(p129). 
The examination system once again hovers like a depressing cloud 
obscuring the bright prospects potentially available to literary apprecia- 
tion;. IThere is no doubt that many secondary school pupils develop 
unsympathetic attitudes to literature as a result of their experience in 
preparing for an examination' (P-131); 
The explanations and the summaries have expanded to take-over point; 
the literature has receded. We must seriously question -what is being 
achieved vhen pupils are producing chapter su aries in sequence, taking 
e. ndless notes to prepare model answers and writind stereotyped commentaries 
which carry no hint of a felt response. (P-131) 
It would seem from the evidence in the Bullock Report that a course of 
t0l or 'At level literature was the surest inoculation against an attack 
of poetry in the future: 
Of lpOOO 11011 level and "All level students only 170 said they would read 
any more poetry after leaving school; 96 ou? of the 800 11011 level 
students, 74 of the 200 "A" level students. (And) ... equally revealing was their. attitude towards particular texts. The four 11011 level poetry 
anthologies ; vere conspicuously disliked, while at "All level Milton's 
poetry, and particularly "Paradise Lost"t was notably unpopular. (P-135) 
This appears to be--partly due to the choice of subject-matterl and partly 
due to mechanical examination-oriented teaching. In response to the first 
difficulty the report recommends a more enlightened approac h, less 'precious 
and arcanelp with ý)oetry of this century and of earlier centuries. e. read 
side by side, to the mutual illumination of both' (p. 137). As regards 
the teaching of poetry, a less dogmatieg more open-minded approach is 
recommended: 'A child derives value from a work of literature in direct 
proportion to the genuineness of the response he is able to make to it. 
The teacher's skill lies in developing the subtlety and complexity of this 
response without catechism or a one-way traffic in apodictic judgmental (p. 134). 
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While recognizing the importance of encouraging th+lection of literature 
of a good qualityt and of paying close attention to the text, the Bullock 
Report suggests that 
the main emphasis should be on extending the range of the pupil's reading* 
True discermfient can come only from a breadth of experience. Learning how 
to appreciate with enthusiasm is more important than learning how to 
reject. (P-132) 
Childrens' reading habits: The Schools Council Survey 
That the range of children's reading can prove wider than we may 
anticipate is evident from Frank Whiteheadis important research, 
Children and their Books, (1977). This is the final r eport of a Schools 
Council fesearch project on children's reading habits and presents the 
findings and implications of a full-scale national survey. It is 
therefore not easy to summarise in brief. However, some of its more 
significant features and conclusions must be mentioned here since they 
bear on both the incidence of reading and the scope of literature as a 
source of moral enlightenment. In broad terms it seems that the average 
eleven-year-old child tends to read from choice approximately three books 
in a moniho the thirteen-year-old two and a half books and the fifteen- 
year-old approximately two books. bf these some 85fo are narrative books 
(mostly fiction, but also including some biographies, autobiographies and 
memoirs)9 the remaining 1% being non-fiction. The percentage of non- 
fiction read by boys, however, is about three times that of girls W-ien 
this average is analysed out. An extraordinary range of individual choice 
in illustrated by the fact that: 
the 5846 children who named one or more books which they bad read during 
the previous month, mentioned in all no fewer than 7557 separate and 
distinct titles. 246. if these titles had been mentioned by ten or more 
children ... and accounted for a little under 31% of the total book-mentions by the sample. ' The remaining 7311 titles were each read by only a few 
children', often indeed only by A single child, (p. 279) 
This finding suggests one reason why the book has managed to hold out 
despite the advent of the ubiquitous television: television necessarily 
serves Mr Averaget- the book offers an almost infinite choice to the 
individual. The books recorded in the survey were categorized as 
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Ichildrens narrative' and ladult narrative' and further sub-divided 
into 'quality' and Ifion-qualityl nai7rative; the'non-qualityl books being 
'those in which the involvement of the writer with his subject matter 
and his audience has been such as to generate a texture of imaginative 
, experience -which rises above the mer6ly routine and derivative, (p. 112). 
It appears that at the juvenile stage non-quality narrative outnumbered 
quality narrative approximately 2: 1 (33-4% to 17%) but the 'adult ndrrativei 
read was more. ev6nly balanced: 11.4% Iqualityl material and 12.1% Inon- 
quality' material. 
Examinations once again come in for criticism in the Whitehead 
survey: 
It was disappointing (though not unexpectedly so) to find that the O-level 
English 
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literature syllabus, vith-its traditional set of three books to 
be studied in detail, bore scant relationship to these pupils' own reading 
enthusiasm and seemed indeed to have exercised little influence upon their 
private reading except to inhibit it. (P-193) 
Evidence from interviewing pupils in the 14+ range-indicated that for 
the most part those who continued to read books despite the pressing 
demands of school work and social life saw books 'mainly as a means of 
relaxation and distraction, a way of escaping for the time being from 
the tensions associated with this examination year' (ibid. ). 
However, despite the uneven quality of the fiction read and the 
debatable contribution of examination-literaturet it seems that the 
sit nation is not entirely gloomyv and that young people are deriving 
much emotional satisfaction and a certain degree of intellectual stim- 
ulation and insight from their reading. Previous studies which had stressed 
Ithe child's quest for instinctual satisfactions in his reading, - particularly 
those related to the emotional conflicts and problems which are uppermost 
at his, particular stage of development' spoke in terms of 'empathy, 
identification, and disguised or substitute gratification of unconscious 
wishes... (the), vicarious imaginative 'satisfaction of a wish-fulfilment 
kind... ' (p. 283) Other writers, 'more recently' had stressed #the 
continuity between the reading of, fiction and the spectator role which we 
adopt when we are engaged in a detached evaluativeresponse to events in 
'which we are not actively participatingf; recognizing what is lonly 
a story?, the interested onlooker 'sees the fi-etional happenings through 
the authorls eyes and either takes over or rejects his evaluative judgments 
on-the event; described. ' In this case 'the implication would seem to be 
that it is these evaluative judgments which affect us particularly power- 
fully as ve reado and which form the'important residue left in our minds 
from the reading of narrative' (p. 283) Whitehead continues., 
In our own detailed discussion of some of the most popular books in 
our lists, ranging from Black Beauty and Five on a Treasure Island to 
The Day of the Triffids and Jane. Eyre we formed the impression that these 
two linea of thought are not only both of them relevant but also indeed 
mutually supporting. In all the 'preferred' books we have. examined there 
is at least one character with vhom the young reader could be expected 
to associate himself emotionally, and this sharing of a particular 
character's experience normally goes hand in haud with that kind of 
transposition of the world 'according to an arrangement which is more 
to his liking' which-Freud described as characteristic of both the 
playing child and the poet.. 40n the other hand it is no less important 
to recognize that these identificatory and wish-fulfilment elements are 
normally closely intertwined with the evaluative judgments which the 
reader is invited to take over from the author; thei%ality of these 
evaluative responses and their likely impact upon the child reader at his 
9wn sta e of d v-1----4 are issues which we need to keep equally clearly in 
mind as we attempt to guide the young reader towards experiences, which (in 
the words of the Bullock Report) 'enlarge his understanding of the range-of 
human possibilities. ' (p0284) 
This somewhat lengthly quotation gives the gist of a much more lengthy 
discussion of the relationship between identification, empathy, wish 
fulfilment and the 'spectator role' in which the authors examine and compare 
the theories of Friedlaeuder (1942), Bettleheim (1949), DW Harding (1937,1962) 
Lesser (ig6o), Sachs (1942) and Wolfenstein (1946) 
Pending discussion of the implications of certain of theie arguments" 
in chapter 11, one or two additional points may be appropriate at this 
stage.. Whitehead draws attention to Hardingla dissatisfaction with the 
vagueness of the term 'identification' and his preference that we should 
speak 'explicitly of empathy, imitation, admiration or recognition of 
similarities' (quoted p. 218) according-to -which aspect of identification 
we mean. (Such a rule helps us to deal for example with problems of 
speaking of Black B. eauty: the at I ory of a Igoodl horse among largely 'bad' 
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peopiel) Whitehead noteav however, a certain degree of 'identification' 
in the popular sense in the tendency for a number of stories with male 
heroes to be among boys' favourites and for certain female heroines to 
be admired almost entirely by girls. Two explanations are offered for 
the reader's frequent willing 'identification' with a charaeter under- 
going arduous or harrowing experiences. One$ that we sense the need to 
undergo some necessary tribulation in order to enjoy the emergence to 
a 'happy ending'. The other, that such vicarious suffering enables us 
to find relief for some of our feelings of guilt through a sort of 
emotional masoehism. A third and simplbir explanation that would apply to 
some degreeg is not mentioned. That is, that in. reading of heroic suffering 
from the safety of our own desk or armchair we are at the same time, 
fully aware intellectually that ve are not ourselves actually undergoing 
it. However selfish this may seem, it must surely be a cause of some 
satisfaction, or at least reliefq to the reader, The piausilbility of this 
explanation is the more liKely if we accept the 'spectator role' principle 
of DW Harding. Another value of this principle of what one might c all 
'detached involvement' is that it helps to explain how the reader can 
shift his evaluative perspective from the author's to the characters' 
points of view in assessing the moral implications of actions and events 
involved in the narrative. 
A. disturbing feature of Whitehead's findings is the presence among 
many worthwhile and many relatively harmless books read by 11-15 year-olds 
of one or'two highly popular books. of profoundly questionable moral 
orientar, ion, notably Richard AllenIs Skinhead. read by about a hundred of 
the pupils surveyed and rated highly in the 'preferred' category by them. 
The callous treatment of sex, race and violence, judging from example3 
quot I edkto. warrant Whitehead's d2scription of it as 'militantly and, 
miserably intent( albeit incoherently, without even a show of logic or 
purpose) on destroying value and instilling brutal and cynical attitudes 
in(the author's) readers' (p. 246). The degree to which such material has 
a therapeutic 'cathartic' value or a suggestive influence is open to debate, 
but its use (pending further understanding of this) by teachers, however 
few in number, in the meantime seems particularly unwise. 
An interesting finding by Whitehead is 'the evidence that children 
'whose reading is confined to non-quality narrative are more likely to 
discard, the reading habit at later ages than those whose book reading has 
been more wide ranging' (p. 288). The exclusion of Inon-qualityl material, 
however, is not recommended; the authors preferring to recommend careful 
guidance and encouragement in book selection by teachers knowledgeable 
about a wide range of books and about the individual children themselves. 
In the process of classifying the books read by the children 
sampled, the authors found 'that there remained one group of narrative 
books which could-not be classified under either the juvenile/adult or 
the qualitY/non-quality dichotomy. These were what we had to call 
"fairy tales, myths and legends"' (p. 280). These books constituted tquite 
69mall group, and account for only 3.1% of all book mentions's Baried 
amidst this small group alongside Brer Rabbit, Snow White, and Cinderellat 
etc. is the Bible. It is ironical,. perhaps that despite the compulsory 
provision of religious education in the 1944 Education Act'and the 
exhortations of the Newbolt Report, voluntary reading of the Bible is 
negligible while Enid Blyton, for example, proscribed by many libraries 
and discouraged by many teachers, turn's out to be the favourite author 
among both boys and girls at all stages from 10+ to 14+, way above 
Stevenson, Dickens, and Agatha Christie and accounting for just over-half 
the girl readers at 10+. Compulsory education seems to have curious 
consequences. 
A dissoviant voice: Neil Postmatt 
The foregoing discussion of literature in relation to value acquisition 
has concentrated on official or semi-official publications. On the vhole, 
the study of literature in schools is regarded in these publications as 
intrinsically 'a good thing'. It seems worthwh: ýlet therefore, before 
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leaving this brief survey to mention one paper representative of an 
oppo site view, and Neil Postmants"The Politics of Readinihas been. 
selected. The main tenor of Postman's argument is that education for 
literacy is a, kind of conspiracy of the powerful to keep the disadvantaged 
in society in check. He contends that 'the idea that literacy in the 
richest. source of aesthetic experiences is belied by 'the fact that kids 
are spending a billion dollars a year to buy LP records and see films', 
and the reason 'schools are promoting the idea that the main source of 
wisdom is to be found in libraries' - difficult of access for the non-' 
literate is that 'hierarchies derive their authority from the notion 
of unequal access to information# (pp250-251), and are thus enabled to 
maintain the status quo. Therefore, Iteachers of reading comprise a 
most sinister'political group, whose presence and strength are more a cause 
for alarm than celebration' (p. 244). They are working to promote a particular 
'political ideology' persuading their charges 'what they ought to value' 
and show they should behave' (p. 245). 
Some teachers dubiously justify literacy-iraining on a vocational 
basis, but most would probably argue from a higher ground land insist that 
the basic purpose of reading instruction is to open the student's mind. to 
the wonders'and riches of the written word, to give him access to great 
fiction and poetry, to permit him. to function as an informed citizent to 
have him experience the sheer pleasure of reading' (p. 246). But all this, 
says Postman, 'is almost totally untrue'. Literacy is encouragedv he 
says, because 'if yon cannot read, you will be a relatively poor market' 
and tin order to be a good and loyal citizen, it is also necessary 
for you to believe in the myths and superstitions of your society, 
(p. 246). 
Worst of all, the schools are using these ideas to keep non-conforming 
youth - blacks, tire politically 
disaffected, arid tire economically dis- 
advantaged, among othen - in their place. By this tack, the schools 
have become a major force for political conservatism at a time when 
everything, olse in the culture screams for rapid change. 
(p. 250) 
Print, once a revolutionary innovation, is now oldt and 'old 
technologies do not generate new patterns of behavior' once we have Iroutined 
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and ritualized our responses! to them(p. 249. IWhat would happen' 
he asks, lif our schools took the drastic political step of trying 
to make the new technology the keystone of education? ' (p. 250). He 
suggests in answer that in an atmosphere of I'multi-media literacy" 
teachers would come down from their pedestals and work alongside 
children so that school would become 'problem-centered, future-centeredo 
and change-centered; and, as such, would be an instrument of cultural 
and political radicalismil (p. 251). The teachers would also have to 
'find something useful to do, like for instance, helping young people 
to resolve so me of their more wrenching emotional problems? (p. 251). 
The quest for literacy, therefore, in Postman's viewp is a re- 
dundant sham creating casualties all along the route to an unattainable 
utopia: 
To put it bluntly, among every'100 students who learn to read, my guess 
is that no more than-one will employ the process toward-any of the lofty 
goals which are customarily held before us. The rest will use the process 
to increase their knowledge of trivia, to maintain themselves at a 
relatively low level of emotional maturity, and to keep themselves 
simpli 8 tically uninformed about the social and political turmoil around 
them. (p. 247) 
Some of Postman's arguments are countered by Whitehead's study of 
children's reading, for instance where 'adult quality narrative' is shown 
to be read in almost equal proportion to Inon-qualityl narrative material, 
and in the diversity of reading choices found as compared with the limited 
diet of nourishment offered by television. (The mass media, on this basis, 
would seem to be potentially more sinister without literacy than with it. ) 
Nevertheless, Postmants paper (although of little use to illiterates) is 
both ingenious and challenging in its implications for educationalists. 
Whereas nineteenth century argkuments against literacy were from the 
upper and middle classes in fear of the 'masses', thi 9 twentieth century 
argument against literacy sides, with the 'masses' (workers and disadvantaged) 
against the classes entrenched above them.. Postman's final question 
'the ultimate political question of all, "Whose side am I on? "' - seems 
somewhat simplistic; but he poses other questions which merit careful 
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attention: 'What is reading for? What is it better or worse than? 
What are my motives in promoting it? l (p. 252). This tbesis is concerned 
with all three. 
Literature within a tore curriculum 
All the indications are that at the time of writing, 19799 the 
curriculum is, in the melting pot and literacy, moral education and, 
religious education are among the ingredients jostling with numeracy, 
science, technology, the other humanities, arts and sport. A Department 
of Education and science 'consultative documentI. Education in Schools (1977) 
speaks of an loverloadedcurriculum, of the danger that the curriculum 'is 
not sufficiently matched to life in a modern industrial society' and of 
a 'need to investigate the part which might be played by a "protected" or 
"core" element of the curriculum common to all schools' (p. 11). It is 
said that 'existing practice needs to be reviewed as a preliminary to 
defining a new framework' (p. 4b). In view of this it is essential that we 
understand what we mean by 'literacy' and that we understand its relation- 
ship to the other areas of the curriculum before any new pattern is allowed 
to 'set' into a rijid edifice of curricular expectations. It may be 
indeed that a proper understanding of the nature of literacy may help to 
preserve an element of flexibility in whatever emerges from the debate 
on the curriculum. While it can be justifiably argued that teachers in 
the United Kingdom need the security of more central guidance than they 
have been accustomed to receive ip-the past, it is equally true that the 
Zietgeist will not tolerate dogmatic inflexibility in the curriculum. 
Fortunately the 'consultative document' recognizes that in some parts of 
the curriculum 'where teachers are planning to develop their pupils, 
imagination and social awareness, it may not be possible to be... precise, 
(p. 8) in establishing levels of achievementand setting 'a series of 
targets for the pupils according to a logical sequence of, difficultyl 
(ibid. ). The problems of examinations in literature have been indicated 
in our discussion already. It is important that theme problems should 
continue to be recognized. Flexibility in religious and moral education 
ýk 
-would seem to be equally important, and again the consultative document 
recognizes that four society is a multicultural, mutiracial one, and the 
curriculum should reflect a sympathetic understanding of the different 
cultures and races that now make up our society' (p. 41). 
There*is considerable recognition of the need for flexibility in 
a recent working paper produced by HM Inspectoratet Curriculum 11-16 
(1977): 
Adults of the future need to be equipped to make their own response to 
change. Schools have therefore both to encourage flexibility of mind 
and adaptabil 
* 
ity of skills, and yet maintain consistent values. The 
contribution of the curriculum to the moral, ethical and spiritual areas 
of experience remains of prime importance. (p1l). 
Even although it cannot propose an answer, it is reassuring that this 
working paper asks the question: 'How can a school ensure that preparation 
for examinations does not stunt the development of qualities of curiosity, 
inventiveness and imagination? ' (p. 11) - qualities which 'enrich-personal 
living... beyond the formal limits of education'. In its approach 'towards 
a common curriculuml this paper sees its construction in terms of 'areas 
of experience' rather than in the form of traditional rigid 'subjects', 
although it'is recognized that it will probably be through the convention- 
al subject fields that these 'areas of experience' will be reflected. A 
checklist of these areas includes: Ithe aesthethic and creative; the ethical.; 
the linguistic; the mathematical; the physical; the scientific; the 
social and political; and the spiritual' (p. 6) Broadly speaking the 
field of #literature', with which this thesis concerned, relates closely to 
the first three and the last-named of these areas; and it should be seen 
as complementary to, rather than in opposition to, the other areas listed. 
This brings us to the question of specialisation versus breadth of 
studies. The Spena Report (1938) saw 'a general liberal culture, (p. 411) 
as the object of secondary education, believing that from 13+ 'or as soon 
as special interests or aptitudes become evident a pupil should concentrate 
on a smaller range of subjects, so long as these include English, a language 
and Science or Mathematics 
(p. xxiii). This meant that although a smaller 
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number of subjects was to be studied at that stage a certain range of 
experience was to be maintained. Mattbew Arnold vas quoted in support 
of this: 
The ideal of a general liberal training is, to carry us to a knowledge 
of ourselves and the worid. We are called to this knowledge by special 
aptitudes which are born with us; the grand thing in teaching is to have 
faith that some aptitudes of this kind everyone has. This one's special 
aptitudes are for knowing men - the study of the humanities; that one's 
special aptitudes are for knowing the world - the study of nature. The 
circle of knowledge comprehends both, and we should all have some notions, 
atmy rate, of the whole circle of knowledge... (quoted, p. 410-11) 
Without getting involved in the dubious 'special aptitudes' debate, it is 
clear that the aim here is for a certain breadth of studies. This broad 
view seems to have been diminished, despite protestations to the contrary, 
by the orientation of the Crowther Report (1959). Its discussion of 
'complementary elements' seems to have been overweighed by its essential 
ehdorsement of 'the English principle of specialisation, or intensive 
study' (p. 261) with the object of 'educating an glite, an intellectual 
aristocracy on vhom the most stringent academic demands can be made' (p. 259). 
Within a decade of the Crowther Report its divisive effects were being felt. 
In WD Wallfs (1968) words: 
Whatever might be the origin and extent of 'subject-mindedneast there 
is fairly general agreement that the present patterns of specialization 
have unfortunate consequences. To invite pupils to choose between, 
virtually, a wholly scientific education and one which excludes science 
altogether, is not the happiest-preparation for life in a technological 
e9ciety. (P-ý5) 
- 
Ten years further on the problem still remains. Fortunately, perhapso 
increased recognition of the importance of language and its various forms 
and uses in different disciplines and modes of thought may help educators 
to surmount this difficulty. This was one of the con cerns in vhich 
Matthew Arnold, particularly in Literature and Dogma was ahead of his 
timep and one of the reasons vhich makes a re-examination of his work 
refreshing and relevant at the present time. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
'LITERATURE AND DOGHA: A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
I have always thought ... that merely to destroy the illusions of 
popular Christianity was indefensible. Timev besides, was sure to 
do it; but when it is done, the whole work of again cementing the 
alliance between the imagination and conduct remains to be effected. 
Matthew Arnoldq God and the Bible, (187S') 
The question raised by the (Forster Education) bill van whether 
religious instruction in tax-supported schools should be secular or 
sectarian - whether, in Arnold's terms, it should be literary or 
dogma, tic. 
James Livingston, ed. Literature and Do 
(1970) 
This chapter in essentially a straightforward exposition of Matthew 
Arnold's Literature and Dogma (1873). It is immediately followed by a 
chapter dealing with contemporary and some subsequent criticism and 
evaluation of the work. My own criticism in reserved for inclusion in 
later chapteraq wherever it seems to me most appropriate. 
Arnold's aims in Literature and Dogma 
In the Preface to the Popular Edition of 1883y Arnold states his 
main reasons for writing Literature and Dogma, as follows: 
The object of Literature and Dogma in to re-assure those who feel 
attachment to Christianityp to the Bible, but who recognise the growing 
discredit befalling miracles and the supernatural. Such persons are 
to be re-assured, not by disguising or extenuating the discredit which 
has befallen miracles and the on atural, but by insisting on the 
natural truth of Christianity. 
rSTýr 
VI, ppl42-3) 
Bat in fact the book goes beyond this stated aimt and includes a 
thorough-going criticism of the contemporary 'pseudo-science of theolo&; 
an examination of the grounds upon which modern Chrintiansp or would-be 
Christians, can be expected to come to terms with ancient scriptural 
writing; and an insistence on the practicalp ethical nature of Christ- 
ianity as opposed to an airy-fairy, other-worldly interpretation founded 
upon unverified and unverifiable verbalism. This part of his object 
finds expression in the Preface to the original edition of 1873: 
... the aim of the following essay 
(is) to show thatv when we come to 
put the right construction on the Bible we give to the Bible a real 
1(22- 
experimental basis, and keep on tbis basis throughout; instead of ally 
basis of unverifiable assumptions to start with, followed by a string of 
other unverifiable a: sumýtions of the like kind, such as the received 
theology necessitate . Super VI, p-151) 
Arnold seeks, then to give to the Bible an interpretation which frees 
Christianity'from reliance on miracles and the supernaturalt and puts it 
on an experimental basisg since only verifiable facts open to. critical 
examination would satisfy the demands of increasingly. sceptical scientilfic 
consciousness which vas already steadily sapping away the credibility of 
traditional interpretations. 
He believed thatv without the encumbrance of miracles and the 
supernatural, Christianity would Atand 'by its natural truth'. This 
revolution in the interpretation of the Bible, Arnold was convinced, was 
inevitable. Authority and absolutism were slowly but surely giving way 
to democracy and relativism: the 'masses' were rejecting the Bible 
however much their spiritual mentors and leaders decried their apostasy; 
and religious dogma could no longer be taken on trust: 
Our truth on these matters, and likewise the error of others, is some- 
thing so relative, that the good or harm likely to be done by speaking 
ought always to be taken into account. (Super V10 p. 147) 
But the time had clearly come to speak out: if the 'lapsed massest were 
to receive the Bible in any meaningful form, 
... we must find for the 
Bible some other basis than that which the 
churches assign to it, a verifiable basis and not an assumption. 
(Super VII p. 150) 
Arnold's way of approaching the Bible in order to find a suitable basis 
was to re-examine the way irt which scriptural language in used. This 
meant employing the resources of culture', in particular literary culture, 
basing our reading on a knowledge, as far as we can achieve it, of *the 
best that has been thought and known in the world. ' A truly cultured 
(as opposed to a doctrinaire) reading of the Bible enables us 'to estimate 
the proportion and relation in what we read. 1 By this means we discover 
the essential difference between biblical and scientific language. 
To. understand that the language of the Bible is fluid, passing, and 
literary, not rigid, fixedo and scientific, is the first step towards a 
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right understanding of the Bible. But to take this very first step, 
some experience of how men have thought and expressed themselves, and 
some flexibility of spirit, are necessary; and this is culture. ' (Super VI9 p. 152) 
This notion of 'culture' presented in the Preface, Arnold 
develops in the Introduction where IliteratuTel (the essence, for 
Arnold, of culture) is firmly opposed to 'dogma'. Dogmatic theology 
is created by the exercise of logic and 1correct reasoning' on the data 
of religion, primarily the scriptures; but unfortunately the scriptures 
are essentially couched in the language of poetry and consequently all 
the logic in the world will not create verifiable 'truth' from this data, 
in the sense that scientific truth is verifiable. The kinds of truth 
embodied in scripture are however amenable to a more 'literary' form of 
apprehension and criticism. The kind of judgment 'which forms itself 
insensibly in a fair mind' as a 'result of wide reading enables us to 
'sense moral and spiritual truths which no amount of argument and 'abstruse 
reasoning' will extract from the Bible. And this judgment 'comes almost 
of itself ... easily and naturally, and without any turmoil of controversial 
reasonings. ' 
In other words, the Bible being literary material, literary criticism 
is appropriate for its exegesis; science being concerned with Material 
facts, logic and reasoning are the appropriate means of interpreting and 
systematising its data. For 'abstruse reasoning' (i. e. logical, Ipseudo- 
scientific' expansion and systematisation of rion-verifiable, because 
essentially poeticalp expression) there is no appropriate use at all. 
Theologians - 'the athletes of logic' - by their excessive preoccupation 
with this have created for the modern mind a barrier rather than a bridge 
to religious understanding; and Christianity in consequence must be 
Ire-castf if it is to survive, and recast with its emphasis on conduct 
rather than on adherence to verbal formulations of orthodoxy. 
Arnold develops this theme in twelve chapters. He shows how the 
ethical religion adopted by the Hebrews (Chapter One) is invaded by 
loý- 
superstition ('Aberglaubel) during a period of extreme trial (Chapter 
Two); a new practical and intuitive emphasis however is established 
by Jesus (Chapter Three) only to be obscured by appeals, for the sanctions 
of Christianity to proofs from prophecy (Chapter Four) and miracles 
(Chapter Five). In Chapter Six, Arnold insists. that Jesus. is not to be 
confused with his reporters; but despite their shortcomings the avail- 
able records yield valuable testimony of Jesus to himself (Chapter Seven) 
upon which Christian faith. cAn be based (Chapter Eight). The Creeds 
embodied a second invasion of superstition centering this time on the 
New Testament (Chapter Nine); and as a result of this it is scarcely 
surprising that the orthodox conception of God and the Bible is untenable 
to the contemporary Imassest (Chapter Ten). The true greatness of the 
Old Testament (Chapter'Eleven) and of the New Testament (Chapter Twelve) 
lies not in speculative metaphysics, but in ethical aspiration, and the 
persuasive life and teaching of Jesus, respectively. The two key words 
in Arnold's thesis are 1conduct' and ? culture'. Culture is necessary 
for us in forming an adequate conception of God and the Christian religion; 
but it is in conduct ('three-fourths of life') that the living, experi- 
mental proof, for Arnoldv of the validity of Christianity can be found. 
It is now necessary to examine this argument in somewhat greater 
detail. This task has been considerably simplified (although by no means 
governed) by reference to James Livingston's (1970) edition of Literature 
and Dogma, skilfully abridged to present the main arguments of the book 
without the repetitiveness characteristic of Arnold's somewhat leisurely 
approach. 
'Religion given': Language. Theology and Science 
Chapter One, 'Religion Given', by far the longest chapter in the 
bookf establishes the main line of Arnold's argument, which is to trace 
the effect of religion 'on the language of the men from whom we get the 
Bible' and to examine the implications of inherited religious language 
for the contemporary debate between Christians and scientists, or rather 
(05- 
between the outlooks characteristic of theologically and scientifically 
orientated disciplines. 
Because theologians employ literary terms as if they were scientific 
terms, religious discourse abounds in ambiguity. ' In particular, says 
Aii iold, the word 'God' (Ithat supreme term with which religion is filled, ) 
creates endless confusion because it is used 'as if it stood for a perfectly 
definite and ascertained idea, from which we might without more ado, 
extract propositions and draw inferences, just as we should from any other 
definite and ascertained ideal (Super VI, p-170); but it is in fact 
" term of poetry and eloquence, a tern thrown out, so to speako at 
" not fully grasped object of the speaker's consciousness, a literary 
term, in short; and mankind mean different things by it as their 
consciousness differs. (Super V1, p. 170 
Behind the individual variations in the use of the term, howeverv there 
must lie a 'common substratum' of meaning upon which they all rest; and 
(wisely ignoring the implications of a brief, dubious excursion into 
etymology) Arnold affirms for the time being as its 'real meaning' what 
he takes to be Luther's understanding of the word lGodl: 'good' or 'the 
beat that man knows or can know' (ibid. ). 
His next concern is to demonstrate, by reference in particular 
to Old and New Testament writers, that religion has nothing to do with 
metaphysics, but is essentially a matter of conduct: but people have 
on the whole preferred to give their energies in seeking to lunderstandl 
it than in the doing of it, since the latter is a much harder option if 
seriously undertaken. Arnold argues that since conduct constitutes 'some 
thr6e-fourthe of life', this aspect of religion is highly important. 
Theologians have tended to dodge the practical implications of Christianity 
by their distinction between 'religion' and lethicst. But, 
... the antithesis between ethical and religious is... quite a 
false 
one. Ethical means practical, it rela tes to practice or conduct 
passing into habit or disposition. Religion also means practicall but 
practical in a still higher degree; and the right antithesis to both 
ethical and religiousis the same as the right antithesis to practical, 
namely, theoretical. (Super VI, p. 176) 
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The difference between religion atitl morality is therefore simply one of 
degree. 'And the true meaning of religion is thus, not simply morality, 
but morality touched by emotionl (Super VI, p. 176). The cultivation of 
due feeling for morality is achieved in the same way as our emotions 
for other matters are nourishedv #by dwelling upon it, by staying our 
thoughts upon it, by having it perpetually in our mindl (Super VI, P-178), 
and in this matter the biblical writers were pre-eminent. They rec6gnized, 
among other things, that our powers of achievement in the sphere of 
eqnduct are uneven, and often largely dependent upon forces beyond our- 
selves. These forces insofar as they are be nificent and creative can be 
sil ed up under one head as 'the stream of tendency by which 611 things 
seek to fulfil the law of their being' (Super'VI, p. 189). This is the 
second definition of 'Godl given by Arnold. Because this 'stream of 
tendency' extends beyond the lives of individual men and women - it is 
there before their arrival in the world and remains afterwards - Israel 
named it The Eternal. 
This was what they intended in that name, which we wrongly convey, either 
without translation, by Jehovahq which gives us the notion of a mere 
metaphysical deity, or by a wrong translation, Lord, which gives us the 
notion of a magnified and non-natural man. (Super VI, p. 182) 
Cooperating with Ithe stream of tendency' (which underlines and per- 
petually patterns out creation) leads to fulfilment; opposing it leads 
to frustration and unhappiness. Thus the concept of The Eternal is 
based on experience and not on metaphysical speculation as are the 
terms such as Ithe self-existent' and 'the absolute' beloved of 
theologians. 
Inevitably Israel* personified this power for he was Istrongly I 
moved' in support of itp and in recognition of its constant support for 
his own'strivings towards right conduct. In this connection 
Arnold 
quotes with respect some words of Goethe which are to recur from time to 
time as qne of the many leitmotifs of Literature and Dogma! 
'Man never 
*Incidentally, Arnold continually personifies the Hebrew race by his 
constant use of the term 'Israel' as though of an 
individual. 
knows how anthropomor . phic he is'. 'In poetry and eloquence', lie avers, 
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man's natural tendency to anthropomorphism is appropriate and seemly, 
'but in science it often leads him astray. ' 
In due course the same poetic and oratorical tendency leads the 
llebrew religionist to use the term 'Father' for 'God' .7 'because the 
power in and around us, which makes for righteousness is indeed best 
de. scribed by the name of this authoritative but yet tender and protect- 
ing relation. ' (Super VI, p. 185) This use of personification, of concrete 
rather than abstract terms, is approved by Arnold who finds in it a 
propriety 'which contrasts strongly with the licence of affirmation in 
our Western theology. ' He prefers, for example, the Old Testament phrase, 
'The high and holy One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is holy' 
(Psalm Ivii, 15) to the more modern Western theologians' 'the moral and 
intelligent governor of the universe', not despite, but because of# its 
more modest mprecision. 
.L 
Evidently, if the object be one not fully to be grasped, and one to 
inspire emotiong the language of figure and feeling will satisfy us 
betterabout it, will cover more of what we seek to express, than the 
language of literal fact and science. The language of science about 
it -will be below what we feel to be the truth. ' (Super VI, p. 189) 
Scientific language, used in this region, 'attempts too much'; if we 
want in our religion 'to have what is admittedly certain and verifiable, 
'we must content ourselves with very little. ' (Super VI, p. 190) 
Next Arnold turns. to the concept of 'revealed religion', and just 
as he disputes the conmon antithesis between 'ethical' and 'religious' 
he objects to the notion of an antithesis between natural and revealed 
religion. It is false, he says, 
For that in us which is really natural is, in trutho revealed. We awake 
to the consciousness of itt we are aware of it coming forth in our 
mind; but we feel that we did not make it, that it is discovered to 
us, that it is what it is whether we will or no. If we are little 
concerned about it, we say it is natural; if much, we say it is 
revealed. But the difference between the two is not one of kind, only 
of degree. The real antithesis, to natural and revealed alike, is 
invented. artificialel (Super VI, PP-194-5) 
It is the 'system of theological notions about personalityq essence, 
/Ow 
existencev consubstantialityl which is artificial religiong since it does 
not arise naturally in our consciousness but is finvented by theologians, 
- able men with uncommon talents for abstruse reasoning. ' The essential 
thing about the religion of the Bible, for Arnold, is that it demonstrates 
'with incomparable force and efficacy' 'the great natural. trutht that 
"righteousness tendeth to life". 1 - that happiness belongs to just and 
wise conduct; furthermore this truth is experimentally verifiable for 
those who care to assay it. It is in this sense that Arnold regards 
the religion of the Bible as revealed, and not its a consequence of any 
theory of divine authorship or even divine inspiration; it is, for 
Arnold, both natural and revealed religion at one and the same time. 
Finall y, Arnold attempts a third definition of 'God', or the 
'Eternal': 'the enduring power. not ourselves. which makes for 
righteousness. ' (Super VI, p. 200) By means of this definition he seeks 
to avoid dependenc e on any notions of special 'revelation'; to stand 
religion firmly upon an ethical foundation; and to make no more 
assertions about God than can be verified from the experience of those 
adopting the religious hypothesis. He does not mean to imply by this 
definition that ? everything is for-the best in the best of all possible 
worldst (in the manner of Leibnitz), although Arnold's outlook is 
ultimately optimistic;, but simply that right conduct will find power 
available for its execution to all appearances beyond the forces 
immediately available to. the agent. 
It is the special distinction of the Hebrews (Arnold concludes 
the chapter) to have presented the world with a powerful, monotheistic 
and ethical concept expressed in vital and vibrant language, 
And as long as the world lastsq all who want to make progress in 
righteousness will come to Israel for inspiration, as to the people who 
have had the sense for righteousness most glowing and strongest; and 
in hearing and reading-the words Israel has uttered for us, carers for 
conduct will find a glow and a force they could find nowhere else. 
(Super VI, p. 199) 
to? 
'Aberblaube Invading': Ethics undermined ky superstition 
In his second Chapter Arnold seeks to show how and why superstition 
(or 'Aberglaubel, as he prefers to call it) invaded and undermined the 
pure, ethical. religion of Israel. But first be substantiates his 
contention that the leading idea of the Old Testament was originally 
lConduct brings happiness' orýRighteousness tendeth to life, by innerable 
quotations from the book of Psalms, and from Proverbst Job, Jeremiah, 
Zechariah, Chronicles and Isaiah. For example, 'Blessed is the man-whose 
delight is in the law of the Eternal; his leaf shall not wither, and 
whatsoever he doeth it shall prosper' (Psalm i, 1.2,3); 'Thou wilt 
show me the path of life, in thy presence is the fulness of joy, at thy 
right hand there are pleasures for evermore' (Psalm xvi, 11); and so on. 
This early confidencep-however, he shows to have been undermined by the 
passage of events. Defeat and degradation, the Exile and subjection to 
a succession of conquering powers. posed a question against the confident 
assertions of just reward for virtue in earlier days. Against the ring 
of assurance in the early psalms attributed to David about a thousand 
years before Christ, we find in the last few centuries approaching the 
Christian era '. The two perceptionstighteousness tendeth to life"and "The 
ungodly prosper in the world" are left confronting one another like 
Kantian antin, omies. 1 (Super, VI, p. 207) 
Under the stifling influence of oppression there were no doubt 
many, says Arnold, 
... who had lost all living sense that the promises were made to 
righteousness; who took them mechanically, as made to them and 
assured to them because they were the seed of Abraham ... These people 
were perplexed and indignant when the privileged seed became un- 
prosperous; and they looked for some great change to be wrought in 
the fallen fortunes of Israell wrought miraculously and materially. ' (Super VIq p. 208) 
Hence arose, by the time of the Maccabees, tthe set doctrine of the 
immortality of the soul' coupled with 'the notion of a resurrection of 
the dead to take-their trial for acceptance or rejection in the Most 
Ito 
High's judgment and kingdom. ' (Super VI, p. 211) The austere spirit 
of Israel mingling with Ithe phantasmagories of more prodigal and wild 
imagination' 4 neighbouring and conquering peoples brought in the 
lofty Messianic idea of 'the great and notable day of the Eternal', 
'the consolation of Israell and the 'restitution of all things. 1 For 
Arnold, Ahis notion id a Imagnificant. flightt of the imagination, enabling 
Israel to cope spiritually with the crushing and baffling series of events 
to which they were subjected. But it remains, nevertheless, 
p.. a kind of fairy-talej which a man tells himself, which no one, 
we grant, can prove impossible to turn out true, but which no one 
also can prove certain to turn out true. It is exactly what is 
expressed by the German word lAberglaube, ' extra-belief, belief beyond 
what is certain and verifiable. Our word 'superstition' had by its 
derivation this same meaning, but it has come to be used in a merely 
bad sense, and to mean a childish and craven religiosity. With the 
German word it is not so ... Extra-belief., that which we hope, augqrl imagine, is the poetry of life, and has the rights of poetry. But it is 
not science; and yet it tends always to imagine itself sciencep to 
substitute itself for science, to make itself the ground of the very 
science out of which it has grown. (Super VI, pp. 212-3) 
lReligion New-Given. --invardness reasserted 
The coming of Christianity is the theme of the third chapter, 
fReligion New-Given'. If the 'Aberglaubel of a violent and catacylemic 
messianic restitution had served to save the faith of Israel from 
destruction; the advent of Jesus, adopting (or being allotted) this 
mantle, served to restore the stream of Israel's religion to a proper 
basis. 'Jesus Christ was undoubtedly the very last sort of Messiah 
that the Jews expected' whatever theologians may say about Ithe characters 
of humilityp obscureness and depressiont being commonly attributed to the 
Jewish Messiah. (Super VI, p. 214) 
oeeand yet Chrieftyk1em with perfect justice has made him -the Messiah, 
because he'alone tookq when his nation was on another and a false tack, 
a way obscurely indicated in the Old Testament, and thýone only possible 
and successful way, for the accomplishment of the Messiah's function: - 
to bring in everlasting righteousness. (Super VI, p. 214) 
And the essential modification which. Jegus brought to the direction of 
religion was to substitute for an increasingly external observance of 
ritual and mechanical duty 'in which the heart had no share' a new 
inwardness. For Jesus religion was a personal and individual matter 
involving the individual's emotions and thus restoring the sense of 
well-being, of joyous fulfilment, or happiness to the business of conduct. 
His teaching was firresistably prepossessing': 
He put things in such a way that his hearer was led to take each rule 
or fact of conduct by its in-ward side, its effect on the heart and 
character; then the reason of the thing, the meaning of what had been 
mere matter of blind rule, flashed upon him. ' (Siiper VIt p. 219) 
In other words, although Arnold does not explicitly point it out at this 
stage, Jesus put things in a 'literary' rather than in a 'dogmatic, way; 
and to interpret his teaching an intuitive response is. demanded. Men 
must make-la return upon themselves' (a favourite phrase of Arnold's) 
in order to understand and respond to Jesus' largely parabolic teaching; 
and the self-knowledge acquired by this return would provide a securer 
basis for conduct and restore the 'clearnessv spirit, energy and 
happinesst in association with 'right action' that the blind pursuit of 
mechanical formulae had denied them. 
Self examination, self-renouncement, and mildness9 were ... the great 
means by which Jesus Christ renewed righteousness and religion. 
(Super VI, pp. 220-221) 
By yoking 'mildness' with 'self-examination' and 'self-renouncement, 
Arnold rejects, the fiercer, Calvinistic brands of self-reproach and 
humiliation; he speaks rather of the fardent affection and gratitude, 
associated with a 'personaldevotion to Christ' as providing the motive 
springs for the kinds of right action that issue in human happiness. 
At the, same time Arnold's emphasis on 'inwardness' shifts the focus 
of human behavior from mechanical attention to surface conduct, to 
a deeper attention to ? the feelings and dispositions whence conduct 
-proceeds'. 
(Super VI, p. 221) 
The advent of Jesus, however, could not dispel manIs propensity 
for Aberalaube. Inevitably he was seen by many as a Messiah who was to 
restore all things to Israel. After 'long days of darkness and ruin': 
The kingdom of David and Solomon was to be restored on a grander 
scale, the enemies of Israel were to lick the dust, kings were to bring 
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gifts; there was to be the Son of Man coming in the cloudsp judgment 
given to the saints of the Most High, and an eternal reign of the saints 
afterwards. (Super VI, p. 229) 
Arnold recognizes the 'poetical *aluel of expressions and anticipations 
of this kind, and concedes that they may even have some moral value - 
at least as la testimony to the strength of Israel's idea of righteousness': 
But none of it has it scientific valuep a certitude arising from proof and 
experience. And indeed it cannot have this, for it professes to be an 
anticipation of a state of things not yet actually experienced. But human nature is such, that the mind easily dwells on an anticipation 
of this kind until we come to forget the order in which it arose, place it first when it is by rights second, and make it support that by which it is in truth supported. (Super VI, p. 230) 
Thus Jesusp despite his teaching, and its influence on his immediate 
disciples, is before long saddled with an Aberglaube exulting in a 
'phantasmagory of outward grandeur and self -assertion1p a new super- 
stition glorifying in a future a4vent of Christ with ta resurrection and 
judgment' after which Christ's 'rejectors are punished everlastingly, ' 
(Super V1, p. 231). and prophecy and miracle usurp the attention due to 
teaching and example. ý 
&je4ion of prophecy 2nd miracle 
In Chapters Four and Five of Literature and Dogma, Arnold examines 
and rejects attempts to validate Christianity by proofs from prophecy 
and miracle in turn. 
Since 'Aberglaube, is the poetry of life', Arnold is inclined to 
view with sympathy the ardent spirits who use their imagination to 
'take short cuts' to envisage the triumph of their desire. There is 
nothing blameable, he says, in the fact that men 'should tell tehmselves 
fairy-talest, or even that they 'should make these fairy-tales the basis 
for what is far more sure and solid than the fairy-talesq the desire 
itself' (Super VI, p. 232). This is natural, perhaps: 
And yet there is always a drawback to a man's advantage in thus treating, 
when he deals with religion and conduct, what ia extra-belief and not 
certain as if it were matter of certainty, and in making it his ground 
of action. He pays for it. The time comes when he discovers that it is 
not certain; and then the whole certainty of religion seems discredited, 
and the basis of conduct gone. This danger attends the reliance on 
prediction and miracle as evidence of Christianity. (Super VI, p. 232) 
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Man may gain temporary encouragement from signs alleged to demonstrate 
divine prescience and intervention; but #an exhibition of supernatural, 
prescience proves nothing for or against the truth and necessity of 
conduct and righte'ousnesel (Super VI, p. 233). Moreover, while hind- 
Big ht may suggest that words of Jeremiah or Isaiah prefigure the coming of 
Jesus, an interpretation of such utterances in their context inevitably 
denies them this specific significance. 
True prophecy is a quality of insight (IThe great prophecies of 
Isaiah and Jeremiah arev critics can easily see, not strictly predictions 
at all' (Super VI, p. 236p; the notion of 'supernatural presciencelp, on 
the other hand, is a species of miracle -which will not stand up to 
criticism any more than will other alleged miracles in the modern age: 
The 'Zeit-Geist'. and the mere spread of what is called enlip_htenmeutv 
superficial and barren as this often isp will*inevitably, before long, 
make this conviction of criticism a popular opinionv held far and wide. 
And then, what will be their case, who have been so long and sedulously 
taught to rely on supernatural predictions as a mainstay? ' (Super VI, p. 236) 
Moving on, in Chapter Five, to a closer examination of miracles, 
Arnold avers that while 'it is almost impossible to exaggerate the prone- 
ness of the human mind to take miracles as evidence, and to seek for 
miracles as evidencel (Super VI, p. Ll+r) in religious matters, 
the human mind is assuredly passing away, however. slowly, from this hold 
of reliance also; and those who make it their stay will more and more 
find it fail them, will more and more feel themselves disturbed, shaken, 
distressed and bewildered. (Super VI, p. 245) 
It makes no difference whether we attack or defend themv the Time-Spirit, 
the Zeit-Geint, 'is sapping the proof from miracles'. The human mind is 
turning away from them because 'it sees. as it experience widens. how. 
they arise. ' (Super VIt p. 246) 
'Under certain circumstancest wherever men are foundiv their 
thirst for signs and wonders is such, says Arnold 
(agreeing with 
Shakespeare) that: 
No natural exhalation in the sky, 
No scape of naturev no distemperld day 
No common windq no customed event, 
ýBut they will pluck away his natural cause 
And call them meteors, prodigies, and signs 
Abortives, presagest and tongues of heaven 
Shakespeare, jLi: Mg_ALQbjLf 
(quoted Super VI, p. 246) 
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IMiracles' arise 'honestly and naturally' in men's minds, in answer to 
transitory but nonetheless deepfelt psychological needs; but in retro- 
spect, with Shakespeare, 'we can see how they create them'. By juxtaposing 
examples of miracles sacred to Catholics but denied by Protestants with 
miracles held by Protestants but rejected by Catholics, Arnold demonstrates 
the lack of any adequate criteria to allow some as genuine and reject 
others as impostures. 
One of two things must be made out in order to place either the Bible- 
miraeles alone, or, the Bible-miracles and the miracles of the Catholic 
Church with them, in a class. by themselves. Either they must be shown 
to have arisen in a time eminently unfavourable to such a process as 
Shakespeare describes,, to amplification and the production of legend; 
or they must be shown to be recorded in documents of an eminently 
historical mode of birth and publication. But surely it is manifest 
that the Bible-miracles fulfil neither of these conditions. ' (Super VI, p. 247) 
Arnold reinforces his point by comparing Christian (Catholic and Protestant 
held) 'miracles' with non-Christian 'miracles' recorded. in Greek and other 
sources, and reaches the following conclusion: 
Experience of the history of the human. mind, and of men's habits of 
seeing, sifting, and relating, convinces us that the miraculous stories 
of Heredotus or Plutarch do grow out of the process described by 
Shakespeare. But we shall find ourselves inevitably led, sooner or later, 
to extend the same rule 
, 
to all miraculous stories; nay, the considerations 
which apply in other cases, apply, we shall most surely discover, with 
even greater force in the case of Bible-miracles .I 
(Super VI, p. 248) 
In view of the increasing weakness of reliance on miracle and the 
need to come to terms directly with the teaching of Jesusp unencumbered 
by their dubious testimony, a prerequisite of a proper understanding of 
the New Testament is paradoxically 'to convince oneself of the liability 
to mistake in the Bible-writers' (Super VI, p. 249): all Jesus' reporters 
being human, they must be recognized to be (without any implied disparage- 
ment of their sincerity): 
full of the influences of their time and condition, partakers of 
some of its simple or learned ignorancep -inevitablyp in finet expecting 
miracles and demanding them. (Super VI, p. 250) 
Aspects of Jesus: message and misconstructions 
In Chapter Six, Arnold develops this theme of the fallibility of 
Jesus's reporters. He begins by reminding his readers that Jesus himself was 
not a writer of the New Testament but 'the object of description and comment 
Its- 
by others'. In a curious wayp moreoverg recognition of the fallibility 
of his reporters should enhance our apprehension of Jesus,, since he 
becomes findependent of the mistakes they made': 
The depth of their misunderstanding of him is really a kind of measure 
ofthe height of his superiority. And this superiority is what interests 
us in the records of the New Testament; for the New Testament exists 
to reveal Jesus Christ, not to establish the immunity of its writers 
from error. (Super VI, p. 258) 
Arnold quotes sayings from the New Testament recording Jesus' own 
disapproval of reliance on miracle, and points out that Jesus's rejection 
of the evidence of. miracles must have been powerful indeed in order to 
convince reporters, vho set great store by such things, that his objections 
should be recorded. 
To convey at all to such hearers of him that there was any objection to 
miracles, his own sense of the objection must have been profound; and 
to get them, who neither shared nor understood it, to repeat it a few times, 
he must have repeated it many times. (Super VI, p. 262) 
Central to Jesusts message, Arnold insists, was the doctrine of inwardness, 
of personals individual attachment to the spirit of the Eternal, through 
right conduct; and this brings with it a sense of well-being which is 
the genuine evidence of first-hand experience as to the rightness or 
wrongness of the quality of a persod's life, quite independent of third- 
hand reports of wonderful or unnatural events. For 'after all's Arnold 
writes, 'there is no necessary connexion between walking on the sea and 
proceeding from the Eternal that loveth righteousness. ' (SupervI, p. 264) 
It is the function of criticismp not to join in with orthodox 
theologians in the justification of this or that bit of Aberglaube, for 
this kind of criticism is the result of van immense literary misapprehen- 
siont; but to extract from his reporters, despite their errors and 
shortcomings, the truest possible conception of the life and teaching 
of Jesus. An exact picture can never, by the nature of things, be 
achieved; but the best possible approximation can only be achieved by, 
the exercise of the difficult art of true literary criticism, which 
... calls into play the highest requisites for the study of 
letters; 
great and wide acquaintance with the history of the human mind, knowledge 
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of the manner in which men have thought, of their way of using words 
and of 'What they mean by them, delicacy of perception and quick tacto 
and besides all these, a favourable moment and the 'Zeit-Geist. 1 (Super VI, p. 276) 
In Chapter Sevenp 'which explores the testimony of Jesus to himself 
within the eVidence provided by the Gospels, Arnold claims that the main 
burden of the teaching of Jesus relates to the 'restoration of the 
intuition' by transforming the idea of righteousness from a mechanical 
adherence to tradition to-a new inwardness of response, based on what 
Arnold calls the method of ? repentance' and the secret of 'peace'. Christ's 
'method' demands an 'unceasing inward movement of attention and verifi- 
cation' primarily of motivep for conduct in this sense means 'to have the 
heart and thoughts in order as to certain matters. ' (Super VI, p. 283) 
The 'secret' of peace is achieved by necrosis - dying to the insistent 
demands of one's lower and transient self, and living in the freedom of 
the peace achievable by conformity with onets 'higher and permanent self'. 
Arnold asserts that the success of Jesus's 'secret' can be confirmed by 
experience: 
Now the value of this rule that one should die to one's apparent self, live to one's real self, depends upon whether it is true. And true 
it certainly is; -a profound truth of what our scientific friendso 
who have a systematic philosophy and a nomenclature to match, and who 
talk of Egoism and AltruisM9 would call, perhaps, psycho-physiology. I (Super VI,. p. 294) 
Employing the terms Arnold introduces here, legoism' is self- 
destructive (presumably because of its almost inevitable thwarting by the 
egoism of others), while 'altruism' despite an element of suffering (through 
self-denial) at Its surface, leads essentially to 'peace, joy and life' 
according to the teaching of Jesus. Finally, in this chapterp Arnold 
draws attention to -what he calls the 'sweet reasonableness' of Jesus, 
his mildness, and contrasts tfic gentle but balance(I outlook of Jesus 
with the fierce puritan masochism of certain Christians whose excessive* 
and misplaced manner of self-denial brought peace neither to themselves 
nor to others. Arnold is anxious to distinguish self-chastisement from 
the genuine inwardness of self-renouncement which properly developed 
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brings with it lepeiekeial and a. manner of life 'full of grace and 
truth'. 
In Chapter Eight, entitled 'Faith in Christ'. Arnold makes two main 
points: (1) he draws attention to Jesuel own avoidance of theological 
speculation, and (2) he asserts the inevitability of Jesus' words being 
misconstrued by his reporters and followers. 
It was John, for example, not Jesus, who used the speculative term 
Ilogost to designate Christ; it was St. Paul, not Jesus, who sought to 
prove 'salvation to be by Christ alone, from seed, in the promise of 
Abraham being in the singular not the plural'; and if the evangelists 
haggled about the family and theological relationship between Abraham, 
David, Jesus and God, this was not the concern of Jesus himself, 
(Super VI, chapter 8# passim). 
True, Jesus clearly took upon himself the mantle of the awaited 
Jewish Messiah; but his purpose was 'to change their dangerous and mis- 
leading ideal of God's Messiaht from a vengeful restorer of Israel's material 
prosperity to an ideal in which their former tintuiýtion of dod as the 
Eternal that loveth righteousness' was restored. (Super V19 P-305) 
If Jesus hi mself actually used the Messianic terms attributed to him in 
the Gospels - 'Meisiah, Christ, Godts Chosen or Beloved or Consecrated 
or Glorified One, the Son of Godt the Son of Man' (and this is, of course 
debatable), 'his concern ... was with his countryman's idea of salvation, 
not with their terms for designAting the bringer of it. ' (Super VIO P-308) 
In any case, Jesus seems to have preferred the term 'Son of Man, to the 
others and to have baffled his c6untrymen's genealogical theosophising 
with the enigmatic dictim 'Before Abraham was, I am. ' (Supe-r VI, P-309) 
Theological speculation was avoided by Jesus in fayour of his 
emphasis on inwardness: 'The Kingdom of God is within you', and on 
conduct: 'Renounce thyself and follow me. ' But inevitably these empkages 
'Were to be obscured and befogged by well-meaning traus-Aitters of the new 
religion as Jesus's teachings were elaborated and reinterpreted. In 
113 
Jesus's words 'Yet a little while is the light with you: walk while ye 
have the light. lest the darkness overtakes you unavarest there was 'far 
wider application than the reporter imagined. ' (Super VI, P-322) 
It was as if Jesus foresaw the want of his sweet reasonablenessp which he 
could not leýve, to help his method and his secretv which he could leave: 
as if he foresaw his words misconstruedv his rising to eternal life 
turned into a physical miraclev the advent of the Spirit of truth 
turned into a scene of thaumaturgy, Peter proving his Masterts 
Messiahship from a Psalm that does not prove itp the great Apostle of 
the Gentiles word-splitting like a pedantic ]Rabbiv the most beautiful 
soul among his own reporters saddling him with metaphysics; - foresaw the growth of creeds, the growth of dogma, and so through all the confusion 
worse confounded of councils, schoolmeng and confessions of faithl down 
to our own two bishops bent on 'doing somethingl for the honour of the 
Godhead of the Eternal Soni (Super VI# pp-322-3) 
Superstiiion. science and the lapsed masses 
Chapter Nine, Aberglaube Reinvading, deals primarily -with the 
creeds of Christendom. Arnold argues that 'our three creeds, and with 
them the -whole of our so-called orthodox theology, are founded upon 
words which Jesus in all probability never uttered'. (Super VIPP-344) 
And having adduced evidence to substantiate this premise, he proceeds to 
discuss the implications arising from it. 
The Apostle's Creed he calls 'the popular science of Christianity'; 
the Nicene Creed 'the learned science of Christianity' and the Athanasian 
Creed 'learned science with a strong dash of violent and vindictive 
temper' (Super VIp P-343) Despite its imperfections as a statement 
of the essentials of Christianity, the Apostles Creed is viewed 
sympathetically, since it seems to have been a natural and relatively 
spontaneous development within the early church, and perhaps 'the only 
vehicle by which, to generation after generation of men, the method and 
secret of Jesus could gain any-access' (Super VI, p-358). But for the 
'learned science' of the other two creeds Arnold 'feels no tenderness' , 
because it has gone wrong with a great parade of exactitude and philosophy, 
creating unnecessary difficulties with its metaphysical speculations. 
The problems associated with the Christian creeds were perhaps 
inevitable, 
((ct 
For dogmatic theology is, in factt an attempt at both literary and 
scientific criticism of the highest order; and the age which developed 
dogma had neither the-resources nor the faculty for such criticism. ' (Super VII, P-345) 
To indicate the degeneration in the use of language by the time of the 
early Christian dogmatists, in whose era the Creeds arose, Arnold compares 
the language used by an adherent of St. Augustine in a Book of Soliloquies 
with the language of the Old testament psalmists in soliloquy., 
Holy. Trinityg superadmirable Trinityq and superinenarrableg and super- 
inscrutible, and superinaccessible, superincomprehensible, super- 
intelligible, superessentialp superessentially surpassing all sense, 
all reason, all intellect, all intelligence, all essence of supereelestial 
minds; which can neither be said, nor thoughtg nor understood, nor 
known even by the eyes of angelsl I (Super VI, p. 342) 
This scholastic prayer stresses sophisticated yet totally unverifiable 
metaphysical speculation, whereas simplicity and 'conduct' seem to be 
the keynote of the earlier Hebrew writer at prayer: 
Teach me to do the thing that pleaseth thee, for thou art my Godl let, 
thy loving spirit lead me forth into the land of righteousnessIt (ibid. ) 
The Schoolmen's concern with establishing a 'science' for the Church 
is much on a par with the later Protestants' efforts to establish hypo-ý- 
thetical scriptural justification for their shift in the centre of authority 
for the faithful; and both are in danger of undervaluing Jesus's concern 
for the simple moral and spiritual wellbeing of the individual in their 
anxiety for sophisticated intellectual speculation. 
The Catholic Eucharist and the Protestant Doctrine of Justification 
are neither of them (as some of Arnold's contemporariesq moved more 
vehemently by the Zeit-Geist would maintain), 'degrading superstitions' - 
both hold something of spiritual value, and together they stand in some 
measure for Jeaustalm ethod of inwardness and sincerity' and his 'secret of 
self-renouncement. " But the result of excessive at . tachment is that 'Religion 
has been made, to stand on its apex instead of its base. Righteousness is 
supported on ecclesiastical dogma, instead of ecclesiastical 
dogma being 
supported on righteousness. ' (Super VI, P. 356). Both the Catholic and 
Protestant adherents of Christianity stand to lose touch with 
the essential 
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teachings of Jesus as their sI peculations proceed in complexity; so 
that while Oboth have hold of a great truth, and get from it a great 
power', eventually, 'Neither has his unerring balance, his intuition, his 
sweet reasonableness. ' (Supek VI, p-352) 
Arnold's treatment in this chapter of the Protestant Doctrine of 
Justification is considered in more detail later ( ohqteo' G ); at this 
stage it is, sufficient'to point out Arnold's prime objection to this and 
other examples of Christian anthromorphism and Aberglaube. While they 
are 'firmly and undoubtingly held', they may serve a valid purpose, 
But, after all, the question sooner or later arises in respect to a 
matter tAken for granted, like the Catholic doctrine of the Mass or the 
Protestant doctrine of Justification: Is is sure? can what is here 
assumed be verified? And this is the real objection both to the Catholic 
and to the Protestant doctrine as a basis for conduct; - not that it is 
a degrading superstition, but that is is not sure; that it assumes what 
cannot be verified. ' (Super VI,.. PP. 360-361) 
In Chapter Teng 'Our Masses and the Bible', Arnold pursues the 
question of the need for truth to be verifiable. Arnold argues that 
while lit is a maintainable thesis that the theological dogmas of the 
Trinity, the Incarnation and the Atonement, underlie the whole Bible' 
(Super VI., P-378) among a whole variety of other speculative theses- 
the fact remains that 'absolute demonstration is impossible, and the only 
question is: Does experience, as it widens and deepens, make for this 
or that thesis, or make against it? ' (Super VI9 p-378). As the modern 
climate of thought prevails, more and more people, Arnold asserts, are 
-employing. l. the only possible test for a man to employ, - the test of 
reason and experience. 1 (Super VI, P-376); and in seeking to put a 
right construction on the Bible they are naturally inclined to reject 
whatever theses appear highly improbable - however skilfully argued. The 
Imasses' as well as the advanced thinkers, are no longer prepared to take 
things on trust: authority must be intellectually accountable: 
This is what everyone sees to constitute the special moral feature of 
our times: the masses are losing the Bible and its religion. At the 
Renascence, many cultivated wits lost it; but. the great solid mass of 
the common people kept it, and brought the world back to it after a 
start had seemed to be made in quite another direction. But now it is 
the people which is getting detached from the Bible. ' (Super VI, P-362) 
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If the masses are told there is 'a great Personal First Cause who thinks 
and loves, the moral and intelligent Author and Governor of the universe, ' 
they 'want proof of this. 
Moreover, they require proof which is clear and certain; demonstration$ 
or else plaid experimental proof, such as that fire burns them if they 
touch it. If they are to study and obey the Bible because it comes from the Personal First Cause -%4io is Governor of the universe, they require to 
be able to ascertain that there is this Governorp just as they are able to as . certain that the angles of ; triangle are equal to two right anglest 
or that fire burns. ' (Super VIv PP366-367) 
The current theological conception of God, Arnold insists, are 'assumptions, 
not 'facts' and since such assumptions are untenable to the modern spirit 
it is time to return to the simpler conception which seems to have been 
held by Israel for whom God was 'neither an assumption nor a metaphysical 
ideal but a power verifiable by experience: Ithe power. not ourselves. that 
makes for righteousness. ' (Super VI, P-368) Thus God can be apprehended 
as 'an intuition, an experience', but is not a subject for 'scientific" 
assertion'. 
In answer to the question 'How are we to, verify that there rules 
an enduring Power# not ourselveav which makes for righteousness? ' Arnold 
answers: 
How? why as you verify that fire burns, - by experience). Is is so; 
try iti you can try 1, t, - every case of conduct, of that which is more 
than three-fourths of your own life and of the life of all mankind, will 
prove it to youl Disbelieve it9 and you will find out your mistake as 
surely as, if you disbelieve that fire burns and put your hand into the 
fire, you will find out your mistakel Believe it, and you will find the 
benefit of it) This is the first experience. ' (Super VI, P-370) 
Benjamin Franklin, Horace Greeley, Jeremy Bentham and Mr Herbert Spencer 
all have ideas on morality, but they lack the genius of the biblical writers 
for awakening and nourishing an enthusiasm for righteousness, for conduct 
in tune -with the creative, spiritually fulfilling Power which sustains 
the universe. 
Speculative theology has erected a Trinity of three supernatural men 
in an attempt to designate and encapsulate this Power; but the triniturian 
concept is unverifiable notion-work. However, Arnold suggests, it is not 
unreasonable to think of Jesus as the Son of God in the sense that 'he gives 
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the method and secret by which alone is righteousness possible. ' 
(super vIv P-375) That is to say , that by being clearly and eminently in 
tune with 'the enduring Power that makes for righteousness' Jesus is 
intimately associated with it; and that-attention to his method and 
secret provides a key to a source of nourishment by means of this Power 
can be verified experimentally through experience. 
The 'true greatness, of the Old and New Testaments 
In Chapter Eleven, Arnold deals with what he calls IThe True Greatness 
of the Old Testament'. It could be said, he writes that 'whether we con- 
sider.. '. huzoan affairs at large, or... individual happiness': 
... the whole history of the world to. this day is in truth one continual 
establishing of the Old Testament revelation: 10 ye that love the Eternal, 
see that ye hate the thing that is evill to him that ordereth his con- 
versation right, shall be shown the salvation of God" (Super VII P-392) 
The true greatness of Israel lies in its emphasis on right conduct as the 
key to-happiness. Consider the Old Testament record: 
The world goes on, nations and men arrive and depart, with varying fortune, 
as it appears, with time and chance happening unto all. Look a little 
deeper, and you will see that one strain runs through it all: nations 
and men, whoever is shipwrecked, is shipwrecked on conduct. It is the 
God of Israel steadily and irresistibly asserting himself; the. Eternal 
that loveth righteousness., ' (Super VI, P-386) 
The Aberglaube of $curious coineidencels'preternatural interventions' 
and second comings 'with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob in a city shining with 
gold and precious stones' is oflitile worth beside the essential insight 
into human conduct and its consequences wbich the Hebrew prophets achieved. 
And as the belief in miracles steadily dissolves, the superstitious 
element becomes a positive hindrance to spiritual insight. 
Another hindrance is the vehement rejection by some Christians of 
sources of spiritual insight other than the Bible. Popular Christian 
missions carry with them something of good, but their approach to other 
faiths is often grotesquely inadequate: 
The non-Christian religions are not to the wise man mere monsters; he 
knows they have much good and truth in them. He knows that Mahometanism 
and Brahminism, and Buddhism, are not what the missionaries call them; 
and he knows, too, how really unfit the, missionaries are to cope 'With 
them. ' (Super VI, P-381) 
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Mohametanism, for example, has a knowledge of Ithe all-importance of 
righteousness' even if it falls short on 'the method and secret of 
Jesus'. For Brahminism Arnold has little time on account of its pre- 
occupation with speculative metaphysics - on a par with the adumbra- 
tions of western theologians) But Buddhism is 'a religion to be 
saluted with respect-for it has not only the sense for righteousness, 
it has, even, the secret of Jesus' (Super VI, P-382) - though not his 
method, his epi&eia. 
Thus Arnold attacks narrow-mindedness among his Christian con- 
temporaries and reasserts the need for a new more widely based conAx-uc- 
tion for Christianity: 
Win assent in the end the new construction will, but not at once; and 
there will be a passage -time of * 
confusion first. It is not for nothing, 
as we have said, that people take short cuts and tell themselves fairy- 
tales, because the immense scale of the history of 'bringing in ever- 
lasting righteousness' is too much for their narrowýminds... I(Super VI, p-379) 
The urgent need to recognize the approximate, non-scientific nature of 
religious expression and to apply a more adequate criticism to the Bible 
will not, Arnold recognizest meet with instant recognition: 
Probably, amongst many religious people, vehement efforts at reaction... 
(are to be expected)**#a recrudescence of superstition; the passionate 
resolve to keep hold on what is slipping away from them by giving up more 
and more the use of reason in religion, and by resting more and more on 
authority... and it will be strange if in the coming time of transition the 
Church of Rome does not gain. But for many more than those whom Rome 
attracts there will be an interval, between the time when men accept the 
religion of the Bible as a thaumaturgy and the time when they perceive 
it to be something different, in which they will be prone to throw aside 
the religion of the Bible altogether as a delusion. ' (Super VI, PP379-380) 
However, Arnold confidently asserts that the days of blind uncritical 
attachment to the Bible are numberedp while those whose response to the 
Zeitgeist has caused them to jettison Christianity overhastily, discarding 
the good with the questionable and unacceptable, will feel their loss; 
and Ithen there will come a time of reconstruction; and then, perhaps, 
will be the moment for labours, like this attempt of ours to be found 
useful. ' (Super VI, P-380) 
In Chapter Twelvev entitled 'The True Greatness of Christianity', 
(2-4-, 
Arnold argues that in the world at large what is really of most value in 
Christianity has made, much less impact than it should have as a result of 
the obseurantic speculations of both the popular and learned theologians: 
... what the world will become by the thorough use of that which is 
really rightýousness, the method and the secret and the sweet reasonableness 
of Jesusq we have as yet hardly any experience at all. ' (Super VT, P-396) 
Aberglaube has constantly got in the way of the real, serious application 
of Jesus's teaching: 
Walking on the water, multiplying loaves, raising corpses, a heavenly 
judge appearing with trumpets in the clouds while we are yet alive, what 
is this compared to the real experience offered as witness to us by 
Christianity? It is like the difference between the grandeur of an 
extravaganza and the grandeur of the sea or the sky, - immense objects 
which dw9rf us, but where we are in contact with reality, and a reality 
of which we can gradually, though very slowly, trace the laws. ' 
(Super V1, p. 400) 
The hope of immortality natural as this hope is, perhaps, for mortal 
man - has resulted in the construction of fairy-tales of a 'second advent, 
the resurrection of the body, the New Jerusaleml: 
Persons dressed in glorious habits with garlands on their heads, passing 
among trees, lying down by the fountains, or resting on beds of flowers, 
amidst a confused harmony of singing birds, falling waters, human voices, 
and musical instruments. 1 Orp even, with many, it in that of a kind 
of perfected middle-class home, with labour ended, the table,: preadt 
goodness all aroundq the lost ones restoredg hymnody incessa .1 
(Super VI, 
P-403) 
And this concentration on speculative dreams of an impossible future has 
distracted men's minds from present realities and possibilities. 'Let us 
begin with certainties, I Arnold asserts. And one certainty is 'the sense 
of life, of being truly 2, live, which accompanies righteousness' (Super Vl, 
p. 404). Christianity can only be felt and understood in the doing, there- 
fore: 'Its grandeur and truth are far beat brought out experimentally; and 
the thing is, to make people see this. ' (Super V19 p-396) 
In his Conclusion to Literature and Dogma Arnold returns to his 
persistent theme of the need for culture. Conduct may indeed be 'three- 
fourths of life', but the other quarter has to be taken care of - otherwise 
the energies that should naturally have been expended on cultivating art 
and science are in danger of being applied all amiss - as, for example, in 
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the manufacture of the abstruse pseudo-scientific theories of dogmatic 
theology) What in-needed by Christians as mueh'as by men of a scientific 
bent is ta wide and large acquaintance with the productionsof the human 
spirit, and with men's way of thinking and using words' (Super VI, p. 408). 
Art and science (tin other words... beauty and exact knowledge? ) are 
needed for a total perfection and are even vital in the interests of 
religion itself. Christians with scientific and literary experience are 
less likely to create abstruse nonsense or write doggerel hymns - by which 
qod is both Idisserved and displeased. ' God, of course, is not (as the 
theologians would have 'him') a TERSON'; but 'it would be harsh to give, 
at present this turn to our employment of the phrases, pleasing God, 
displeasing God', says Arnold, i+efence of his use of the terms; 
And yet, as man makes progress, we shall surely come to doing this. 
For the clearer our conceptions in science and art become, the more will 
they assimilate themselves to the conceptions of duty in conduct, will 
become practically stringent like rules of conducip and will invite the 
same sort of language in dealing with them. ' (Super V19 p. 410) 
Thus Arnold concludes where he began - with the influence of the Zeitgeist 
on men's thoughts afid ideas, and with the need for more stringency in our 
approach to languagel recognizing where flexibility is appropriate and where 
it is not. This recognitionq fully developed, is 'Culture'; and it is 
culture, properly understoodp which faciliiates the harmonious coexistence 
of art and science and religion in men's minds. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE RECEPTION OF ILITERATUREAND DOGMAI 
I have read every word of your book on Literature and Dogma ... Of course it will make a row, but I think it will do good. 
Alexander Macmillany 
in a letter to Matthew Arnold, (February 15,1873) 
In religion, then, he was destroyer and preserver both; like a good 
surgeon, he destroyed only for preservation's sake. 
Basil Willey: Arnold and Religion (1975) 
Arnold is caught between two hostile fires: first, from the tradition- 
alists who think him an infidel; and second, from the infidels who think 
him a reactionary. 
(ibid, ) 
Publication and range of response 
Whether or not Arnold was right in his estimation ofliterature 
and Dogma as his 'most important' book and the one 'most capable of 
being useful', (Super VI, p. 141) there can be no doubt that it made 
an immediate impact and sustained a hold on the contemporary reading 
public. It passed through three editions, totalling 3,000 copies in 
the first year of its publication, 18730 and two more editions accounted 
for a further 29500 copies by 1876. The popular editionp published in 
1883 sold 8,000 copies during Arnold's lifetime, and 10,500 copies 
between 1889-1924, not counting a further 50,000 copies of a sixth 
edition published by Smith and Elder for the Rationalist Press Assoc- 
iation between 1902-1909 (Blackburn, 1945). Thousands more copies were 
sold in successive reprintings of a pirated edition in America, before a 
new edition of Arnold's works was published by Macmillan and Company of 
New York. 1to accompany his viqit. to Americain 1883'. (Super VI, p. 453) 
And in France a translation by Charles Sarazin appeared in 1876 under the 
title La Crise Religieuse (ibid. ). According to Professor Super the 
'total sale of the book must have passed 100,000 copies. It 'was, in 
the eyes of most of Arnold's contemporaries ... his chief claim to literary 
greatness" (Super VIv p. 454). 
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Views on the 'greatness' of the workq however, were far from uniform 
and ranged from near adulation in The Contemporary Review (1873) to 
shocked hostility in'The Guardian (1873) 
tWe are convinced that this volume is a form of disbelief, ' complains 
The Gua rdian; I We believe in the existence of an institution, which is 
mentioned in the Bible, as it is commonly received, and is therein called 
"the Church of the living God. " Mr Arnold, so far as we can judge from. 
his writings, has never heard of this institution. ' In relation to a 
serious study of miracles, 'his way is simply to toss his head, to 
assure us that a treatise of this sort is out of date, that it is at variance 
with the spirit of the age, and so forth. ' And 'on no point are the differ- 
ences between us and Mr Arnold more radical and profound than on that subject 
which forms part of the title of his book, the subject of dop-ma. 1 As for 
his tone, 'Mr Arnold has never display0d towards those from whom he differs 
seriously, two persons. alone excepted, one grain of courtesy or respect., 
The reference to the 'Three Lord Shaftesburys' is, of course, beyond the 
pale. 
Meanwhile, for The Contemporary Review (1873)9 Literature and Dozma 
is 'a book of rare moral and intellectual force, original in the great- 
nOss and directness of its aim as well as in its style and diction. ' 
IThere are characteristics of Mr Arnoldle creed which are likely to make 
it, to a large section of Englishment more attractive than any rival. ' 
Finally, Owe welcome most thankfully the contributions which Mr Arnold 
has made ... towards the truer understanding of the teaching of the 
Bible.., 
A close analysis of a representative selection of contemporary 
critical reviews of Literature and Dogma will give some idea of the range 
of response it met with, and of the major preoccupations governing the 
various reviewers' interpretation of Arnold's thesis. 
Guardian of the 'status quo', 
The extreme hostility of The Guardian (1873) stemmed from its 
uncompromising allegiance to the orthodox, establishment point of view. 
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Under the editorship of Thomas Henry Haddan and MR Sliarp, if, stood for -the 
absolute sanctity of the Anglican Church and its survival intact amidst 
the contemporary conflict; the conflict itself being seen in unequivocal 
terms of Ibel ieff versus lunbelieff rather than of kinds or degrees of 
belief. The Guardian's condemnation of Literature and Dogma arose from 
a number of objections: to what it saw as pantheism in the work; to 
Arnold's rejection of miraclev prophecy and revelation; to his use of 
evidence; to his Ipatroni sing' tone and contemptuous 'dismissal' of the 
Church. A further sanction for the reviewer's rejection of 
-Literature 
and Do was found in the Westminster Review's praise of it: added proof 
that the book was 'on the side of unbelief?. 
Helpfully, The Guardian specified at the outset, in detail, what it 
understood by the term. belief. Belief, that is to say, 'belief in 
Christianity', it defined as acceptance of: 
... that religion which teaches - that man is alienated from the great 
Being. who made him, in consequence of an original and hereditary 
enfeeblement; that he has thereby lost the power of fulfilling, and even 
thoroughly knowing, his duty upon earth, and of preparing for the life 
to come; and that deliverance from this condition, a reopening of the 
sources of pardon, of virtuev and of lifev has been made by the advent 
of God in human form to, this, lower world; by the life and death, the 
resurrection and I ascension of Jesus Christ. If it be said that this 
language assumes the existence of a personal God and of a future lifev 
we reply that undoubtedly it does assume them. But we alsolhold that 
suchtruths can be proved by reason and conscience, apart from any 
further evidence. ' (P-780) 
A correlative implication of this doctrine is the existence of 'a great 
Being, Who is no mere soul of the world, but absolutely distinct from it9 
being its personal Creator and Preserver: a Being Who is alone self- 
subsistent and self-dependent: Who is Almigbty, ý.. ' Not surprisingly, 
lbe Guardian objected to Arnold's dismissal of such a doctrine as the 
result of 'a mechanical and materialising theology' manifesting an insane 
license of affirmation about God, an insane license about a future state, 
a theology which far from being based. on sound reason and a true revela- 
tion from above, is really the result of the poverty and inanition of 
our minds. '* 
*Quoted from The Guardian (P-780), which here conflates several quotations 
from Arnold into one (Super VI, P-152) 
Mr Arnold 'teaches Pantheism' The Guardian concludes, and regards any 
'real Theismt (i. e. belief in a personal God) as 'a fairy tale'. 
Btit here the reviewer thinks that the author of Literature and 
Doxna has tripped up, for 'Mr Arnold tells us that the Almighty "is 
displeased and disserved" by certain hymns', and 'he informs us that 
for anybody ... to assert that God is a Person is "pseudo-science, by 
'which God is displeased"If 'Now', says The Guardian, 'if Mr Arnold 
knows that God is displeased by certain things, we suppose that God must 
be a personal Being, for we do not see how a power, like the power of 
gravitation, can be displeased by anything men say or do. ' 
This criticism shows a complete misunderstanding of Arnold's 
'way of using words: when he speaks of God being 'displeased' or Idis- 
, served' by anything he is simply speaking metaphorically. The difference 
between Arnold's use of such expressions and that'of his detractors 
in the reviewer's camp is that Arnold knows when he is using poetic 
language while they have blurred the distinction between scientific and 
poetic modes of understanding and think of ta magnified non-natural 
man! (Super VI, p. 188) anthropomorphically undergoing a similar mental 
operation to our own if God is said to be 'displeased'. Arnold would 
be prepared to paraphrase the assertion. that 'God is displeased by a 
certain action$ by some such statement as touch an action offends or 
thwarts the. stream of tendency by which all things seek to fulfil the 
law of their being'# or 'such an action runs counter to the Power, not 
ourselves, which makes for righteousness'. 
The Guardian reviewer next asserts that the 'living and personal 
God' postulated 'must needs have the power of working miracles, ' and 
cites in support, curiously enougliq some conclusions of Jearl Jacques 
Rousseau and of John Stuart Mill on the subject. (J S Mill's contribu- 
iionq it must be admitted, is in terms of logicq rather than evidence. ) 
The miracle of the Resurrection of Christ is cited as a preeminant 
example of one that has factually happened', and Arnold is taken to 
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task for his disbelief - for asserting that 'the human mind is 
assuredly passing away, however slowlyo from this hold of reliance... and fee, 1 *ke4nsdves 
those who make it their stay will more and morekdisturbcd, shaken, dis- 
tressed and bewildered. (Super VI, p. 245) To prove that'The Guardianis 
stay is not shaken in this respect a number of books are recommended 
on the, subject, though doubts are expressed that the author of Literature 
and Dogma will benefit much by them: 
His way is simply to toss his head, to assure us that a treatise of this sort is out of date, that it is at variance with the spirit of the ageq and so forth. ' (P-780) 
In defence of prophecy as a proof of revelation further books are 
recommended, together with the assurance that 'the existence of the 
Septuagint. version of the Pentateuch proves that beforethe coming of 
Ch. rist there was a minute picture of the special woes Israel Wuld suffer, 
if disobedient to God'of (P-780) 
Moving on to Revelationg The Guardian reviewer describes Arnold's 
language on-this score as ? supremely silly and absurd'. For Arnold, the 
difference between natural and revealed religion is riot one or kind, 
only of degreel. ('If we are little concerned about it, we say it is 
natural, if much, we say it is revealed. ') The 'real antithesial(for 
Arnold) 'to natural and revealed aliket is invented. artif4cial* .. A 
system of theological notions about personality, essence, existencep 
consubstantiality,. is artificial religion, and is the proper 
opposite of revealed; since it is a religion that come forth in 
no one's consciousness, but is inventedt' (Super VI, p.: 95) Such 
a proposition inevitably orfended Ilic Guardian, pillar of orthodoxy; and 
the authority of Dr Newman is invoked in defence of Revelation: 'both 
Catholics and Protestants have written solid defences of revelation, 
of Christianity, and of dogma as such'; therefore the onus probendi lies 
with those who would prove 'the non-existence of revelationtp (p. 780). 
Arnold does not, of course, exactly want to prove 'the non-existence of 
revelation', but to considerably change its ground. For Arnold 
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revelation is 'the awakening to the consciousness' (my italics) 
of a significant natural truth; but he is anxious that the con- 
sciousness should be to a genuine truth, experimentally or experienvally 
verifiable, rather than an abstract notion, (however enobling in in- 
tention) artifically invented by theological speculation. It is 
curious that in addition to Dr Newman The Guardian quotes JS Mill 
(as a non-Christian source of evidence) against Arnold. The reviewer 
agrees with Mill's statement that, lit is now acknowledged by nearly all 
the ablest writers on the subject that natural religion is thenecessary 
basis of revealed; that the proofs of Christianity presuppose the being 
and the moral attributes of God (1! 2, Li: c, Book III , Chapter 24). 1 The 
first part of the proposition is clearly not in opposition in any 
way to Arnoldts view; and the second part simply points to the logical 
relationship between the parts and the whole of Christian doctrine as 
extant. Mill is not concerned here with the evidence upon which an 
interpretation of either the parts or the whole depends. 
Arnold's 'notion of evidence' is next attacked: tMr Arnold 
manifestly holds that discrepiancies in detail are fatal to the truth of 
a testimony on the main point at issuegI says The Guardian reviewer. 
This is a view, however, that the author of Literature and Dogma expressly 
does not, hold; although our interpretation of his viewpoint may vary 
according to our view of 'the main point at issue. ' Arnold does indeed 
notice inconsistencies in the Gospel narratives: 
Discrepancies (he writes) which we now labour with such honest pai 
, 
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by such astonishing methods to explain away, - the voice at Paul's 
conversion, heard by the bystanders according to one account, not heard 
by them according to another; the Holy Dove at Christfs baptism, 
visible to John the Baptist in one narrative, in two others to Jesus 
himself, in another, finallyp to all the people as well; the single 
blind man in one relation, growing into two blind men in another; 
the speaking with tongues, according to St Paul a sound with-out meaning, 
according to the Acts an intelligent and intelligible utterance - all 
this will be felt to require really no explanation at all9 to explain 
itself, to be natural to the whole class of incidents to which miracles 
belong, and the inevitable result of the looseness with which the 
stories of them arise and are propagated. ' (Super VI, p. 256) 
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But because for Arnold, the stories of Bible (as other) miracles are 
essentially legendary, they are not for this reason to be dismissed out 
of hand; they are si=ificant legendsv profoundly indicative of the 
range of Jesus's concern for his fellow men and of the kind of spell 
that his personality weaved among his contemporaries. The Guardian, 
howeverý maintained that 'no court of justice' takes too nice an 
account of discrepancies of detail. 'On tlx- contrary, a too, exact 
accordance in details is constantly regarded with suspicion, as giving 
ground for fear that the witnesses may have been tampered with and 
suborned'. Apparently the reviewer failed to notice that Arnold had 
made this very same point: 
The good faith of the Bible -writers is above all question, it speaks 
'for itself; and the very same critiýism which shows us the defects 
of their exegesis and of their demonstrations from miracles# 
establishes their good faith. But this could not, and did not, 
prevent them from arguiag in the methods by which everyone around 
them argued, and from ex cting miracles where everybody else expected 
them. ' (Super VI9 p. 254r 
Among discrepencies of argument Arnold discusses what he believes to be 
an error of interpretation by St Paul about what Abraham intended by 
the word Iseedl (Super VI, P. 252). Without here going into details 
of Arnold's argument, it is important to quote his concluding comment: 
'This is a good instance to take' (he says) lbecause the Apostle's 
substantial doctrine is here not at all concerned. As to the 
of the matter in question. we are all at one with St Paul (my ital cs) 
But it is ev-ident ho-w he could, like the rest of us, bring forward 
q quite false argument in support of a quite true thesis. ' (Super VI, p. 252) 
It seems then that Arnold by no means maintains that 'discrepancies in 
detail are fatal to the truth of a testimony on the main point at issue. 1 
(Unless, as was perhaps tho. case with 'llic Guardian reviewer, the 'main 
point at issue' is the maintainance of belief in miracles? ) 
'Mr Arnold's book puts the Church-entirely on one side, ' continues 
The Guardian, land this is one more reason for the deep distrust with 
which we regard it from the first page to the last' (pp-780-781). But 
far fromwishing to dismiss the Church, a conservative streak in Arnold 
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made him something of a champion of the established Church against both 
dissenters and secularists; what Arnold objected to was 'the pseudo- 
science of Church-dogmal, its anachronistic teaching. Because The 
Guardian would have the Church's teaching accepted undisputed, the 
reviewer comments somewhat peevishly on Arnold: 'If his own breast is the 
sole source of light, then assuredly the teaching of Christ's Church is 
unneeded. But there are those, and they may be counted by millions 
(some of them are perhaps as clever as Mr Arnold) who are not satisfied 
with this inward light... (P-780). ' 
The Church embodies 'Christian orthodoxy on the fundamentals of the 
faith'; therefore for The Guardian reviewer 'as might be expected, on 
no point are the differences between us-and Mr Artiold more radical 
and profound than on ... the subject of dogma 
(P-780-f Arnold1s 
'contempt', 'scepticism', 'heresy' are unforgivable. John Henry 
Newman is again cited in defence of the establishment: 
I have. changed in many things; in this I have not. From the age 
of fifteen dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion. 
I know no other religion; I cannot enter into the idea of any other 
sort of reli ion; religion as a mere sentiment is to me a dream and 
a mockery. O. 
fApokgia 
pro Vita sua, p. 120)1 
10 
The question of how 'sentiment' attaches to dogma, to an institution$ to 
a series of principles, or to a loved or respected personage is not 
entered into in this quotation, nor in the reviewer's subsequent 
discussion; but the implication, presumably, is that Arnold, eschewing 
dogmatic religion, must hold to 'mere sentiment', and thus to 'a dream 
and a mockery. 1 
But The Guardian continues, Arnold is not entirely without 
dogma; hasn't he created his own? 'Righteousness tendeth to life' is 
itself dogma, 'in connection with which there are those 'who may well 
ask for additional elucidations and proofs. ' (What is righteousness? ' 
'What is life? ' 'Which life? ' et, cetera) And if Arnold's dogma 
trigWousness tendeth to lifei is*la real moral law' doesn't it imply 
a personal lawgiver'? In failing to accept this, apparently Arnold 
has 
(3ý- 
'thrown in his lot with the sceptics'. 
Literature and Dogma has for The Guardian one saving grace, however: 
'. **proceeding from the pen of'so clear and gifted a writer as Mr Arnold' 
its readers lat least know what it is that they have to meet. ' Arnold 
'really knows what he holds and what he rejects, and can in either case 
assign, grounds for the positions he takes up. ' If 'his outspokenness in 
at times painful! p it is at least lucid. Arnold's 'atronising tone', p 
his 'contempt' for authority, and his indecorous reference to Ian aged 
philanthropic nobleman' (clearly Lord Shaftesbury) (see below, chapter 6, 
in 'the vilest of vile taste' savour little of lsweetnes4 and light'; but 
'with all its grave and serious faults' Literature and Dogma 'may, we 
suppose, be credited with good intentions, ' concludes The Guardian, but 
fortunately, in all probability, it 'will be little readil 
The Guardian's critique of Literature and Dogma has been detailed 
at some length because itrepresents a very significant body of opinion; 
'and not only of opinion, but of real power in the State wielded between 
the established Church and the Law. To deny the existence of the Diety 
or the providence of God could in law be counted as blasphemy, and 
anyone who propagated atheism stood in danger of severe penalties 
through imprisonment or restriction of rights (See chapter 8, p. Z/0) 
Arnold was'not professing atheism, still less propagating it; but his thesis 
was open to a wide variety of interpretation depending upon the prejud- 
ices and preconceptions of the reader - and for a responsible educationist, 
one of the Senior Inspectors of Schools, to venture into this field was 
not without its dangers. The force of The Guardian's strictures, there- 
fore, must be estimated by reference to the social context of the time; 
just as 'Arnold really knows... what he rejectel The Guardian's 'reviewer 
'really knows what he is guarding. ' 
Reinforcements 
The Quarterly Review (1874) similarly makes perfectly clear its 
standpoint as guardian of the status quol but detailed criticism of 
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Literature and Dogma is less easy to sort out because its critique of 
this work is interwoven with criticisms of six other essays*t two by 
Arnoldq two by Carlyle, one by Symonds and one by Pitter. 
The standpoint of the article can beat be gleaned by quotation 
from its peroration: 
Great action in the sphere of art and letters is encouraged, where 
men are content to take for granted the first principles on which 
human society dependag It becomes impossible only when they spend all 
their intellectual energies on analysis, in the idle endeavor to solve 
questions which are by nature incapable of proof. 
To conclude, we desire a culture that shall be social, public, 
national, that shall be breathed from the commoii air, not elaborated 
out of the individual mind. ' (p. 414) 
Freethinking and liberalism endanger society: men should 'perform the 
duties and maintain the dignity proper to their condition in society. ' 
(P. 415); they should shun analysis and obey the lave: 
Formed as they have been out of instincts and characteristics which have 
made society in England stable and freeg the laws which enforce these 
virtues should not be questioned, but obeyed. ' (P-415) 
New-fanglea) appeals to lCulturel glorify the individual at the expense 
of the nation. 
;. sold fashioned Culture does not consist of constant self-analysis, 
erpetual depreciation of our fathers, everlasting glorification of 
ourselves; but at any rate it is the Culture which reared the men 
of Trafalgar and Waterlooll (P-415) 
The general drift of the argument presented in the Quarterly is 
that new English brands of Gir-ondism (or sophistical philosophical 
'Perfectionism') and Jacobinism (or self-willed revolutionary activism) 
are joining forces under the banner of Liberalism to uudermine the 
British constitution, unseat the aristocracy and subvert Christianity and 
morals. 
*The complete list is as follows: 
1. Sartor Resartus. By Thomas Carlyle. Popular Edition. London, 1871 
2. Latter-day Pamphlets. By the Same. Popular edition. London, 1871 
3. Culture and'Anarchy. By Matthew Arnold. D. C. L. London, 
1870 
4. Literature and Dogma. I)y the Same. Londong 1873 
5. Sf- Pan] and Prnientantiam. By the Same. London, 1869 
6. Studies of the Greek Poets. By J. A. Symonds, London, 1873 
7. Essays on the Renaissanc . By WH Pater. London, 1873 
IS(O 
To every one who reflect it must be plain that society in England is now being exposed to 
: 
solvent like that which operated in France before the Revolution. ' (P-391) 
That solventq identical to that which led to Ithe final catastrophe 
of French history' is 'the perpetual wear and tear of reflection unrelieved 
by the opportunity of free action? which goes by the name of Liberalism. 
Liberalism is a Ireligion based on self-worship, of which self-culture 
is the last and logical development. ' (p. 412) Therefore the self- 
appointed apostles of culture, such as Arnold, propagate a dangerous 
illusion. 
The Quarterly reviewer, like that of The Guardian, takes the 
opportunity to restate the orthodox dogmatic position - 'a plain manly 
statement of Christianity' from the pen of Bishop Butler (PP-394-395) 
touching on 'a future state of rewards and punishments', original sin, 
OProvidence 1. Imiracles' and the IMessiahl. But, the reviewer laments, 
this orthodox belief 'Mr Arnold says is a failure; the working classes 
will have nothing to say to itt, and in a misguided attempt to 'suit 
Christianity to the working classesthe proposed to apply to itt 'the 
highly popular modern doctrine of Evolution. ' (P-395) Evolution implies 
change, and change (especially in connection with the working classes) 
threatens the status quo; hence the disparaging tone of this reference 
to Darwin's theory. For declaring that 'each age... has its own con- 
ception of Christianityq that it has been steadily 'evolving' Arnold is 
accused of 'that petitý pricipii which we have seen to be such a frequent 
apparition in revolutionary logic. ' 11ut it is difficult to see what 
question he is here supposed to be begging. Arnold does not suggest that 
all the changes in the interpretation of Christianity through the ages 
have been universally advancingg nor that the contemporary mode of 
understanding it which he outlines is the culmination of all past modes, 
an ideal pattern of interpretation: he simply states that changes are 
inevitablev and that our interpretations must respond to the Spirit of 
the Age (the Zeitizeist) in which we find ourselves. 
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Since the spirit of 19th Century England was becoming steadily more 
and more 'scientific', arguments in defence of the Christian religion 
must take account of this fact. But the Quarterl objects to this: 
Religion, we are told, must no longer be a matter of faith, based 
on revelationo the evidence for which is based merely on probability, 
but must be made a matter of seftee. 1 (P-397) 
This, however, is a considerable oversimplification, and to that extent 
a misrepresentation, of Arnoldts position. In the first place science 
was of less account for Arnold than literature; and the important 
thing was to recognize the essential poetry of religion. In the second,, 
'revelation'. in Arnold's use of the term, is 'the awakening to the 
consciousness' of a significant natural truth (see p. )*7above)t and 
this individual 'consciousness' could constitute a more deeply felt form 
of 'faith'-than that characterized by the suspension-of personal judgemelit 
in favour of accepting the prepackaged judgement of others. * Thirdlyt 
Arnold does not wish to make religionta matter of science' but to 
render religious language and concepts acceptable to the growing body 
of people -whose thinking was seeped more and more in the. principle of 
scientific verifiability which (made manifest in technical advances) 
was day by day tangibly transforming their environment. 
Finally, in raising the question of the 'probability' of trevelationf 
(whether as coming from Arnold or himself) the reviewer has moved onto 
shaky ground, for it makes very little difference whether an item of 
religious teaching is scientifically verifiable or not if it appears 
to a growing number of people to be highly improbable; and it was 
ArnoldIs contention that this essentially was what was happening. There 
was no shortage of apologists to explain away the 1problemot and 'diffi- 
culties' arising from the clash of traditional doctrine with scientific- 
innovation; but their credibility was weakening as their task grew out of 
al .1 proportion; and it seemed wiser 
I to shift the ground (though not the 
significance) of the doctrine. 
*( also Super VIO PP312-313) 
But the. Quarterly goes on to ask some very pertinent questions about 
Arnold1s notion of Iverifiabilityl. Quotitg from Literature and Dogma a 
passage where Arnold links his definition of God as 'an enduring power, 
not ourselves, which makes for righteousness' with the propositio n that 
'we can verify by experience' that 'Jesus is the Son of God' because 
'He gives the method and secret by which alone righteousness is 
possiblet, the reviewer asks: 
How can it be'verified that there is 'an enduring power, not ourselves, 
which makes for righteousness"9 Clearly this question is one of meta- 
physics. The origin of the moral perception in man is assigned by some 
to intuition, by others to education andb! Mr Darwin to social instinct, 
arising out of evolution and inheritance. Whichever coilclusion a man 
accepts, it is plain that he must satisfy himself with reasoning which 
amounts*to no more than probability. How, again, can it be verified 
that righteousness is alone possible by the method of Jesus? ' (p. 397) 
It seems that in relation to both questions posed here, Arnold has 
extended the notion of 'verifiability through experience' untenably; 
'begging the question' to suit his argument. We may feel that a 1power 
beyond ourselves ... makes for righteousness' and cite examples in evidence 
that 'a power beyond ourselves makes for corruption and chaos'; and which 
of the two powers proposed is more 'enduring' would be beyond the timespan 
of accumulated experience to prove. Similarly different parties could 
argue from selected instances whether ? righteousness' (suitably defined) 
is attainable solely by the method and secret of Jesus, or by other 
methods, and neither could prove his contention, though each may feel 
strongly in favour of his position. These are, of course, matters of 
fee-ling, opinion, or faith. However, fuller discussion of 'experience, 
and the verifiability of facts must be reserved for a later chapter 
(see ChapterIO, pp. 274; -7). 
Arnol-d's occasional tendency to overstatement is more than matched 
by that of his reviewer in the Quarterly, who goes on to describe Arnold 
as 'a philosopher who maintains that the whole fabric of historical 
Christianity is based on a delusion' (p. 397)9 by which he means that 
Matthew Arnold does not believe in miracles. He censures him for 
questioning the evidence for the physical Resurrection of Christ 'the 
13k 
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cardinal point of Christian theology' and interpreting the accounts in a 
purely metaphorical sense. And he complains that Arnold fails to meet 
the challenge of human conflict implied in St Paul's saying, 'When I would 
do good evil is present with me. ' 
What distinguishes Christianity-from philosophy( declares the Quarterly 
is its recognition of the truth that fact must be met with fact, that 
the radical imperfection of the human will can(only be cured by the 
supervention of a perfect and Divine Power. ' p-399) 
The reviewer here implies that 'the supervent ion of a perfect and Divine 
Power' is as much a 'fact' as is the 'radical imperfection of the human 
will. ' Without becoming involved here with the question how far the 
imperfeetion of the human will is 'radical', it is clearly easier to 
be sure about the existence of human shortcomings than of their 'cure, 
announced here with such assurance. The cure may be desirable; but 
its assertion as a demonstrable 'fact' savours of wishful-thinkings 
The reviewer fails to recognize his own assumptions. 
Although the Quarterly wholeheartedly opposes Arnold's liberal 
ph . ilosephy, it has a sneaking respeci for his styleg regarding the 
author of Literature and Dogma as 'the most polished writer of the day'. 
... if any man could found a gospel on refinement it would be 
Mr Arnold. 
Graceful and humane in his temperment, a master alike of literature and 
style, capable of receiving criticism with temper, and retorting it with 
wit, this true disciple of Goethe has received from Fortune every gift, 
except the power 'to see himself as others see him. 7 (P-394) 
And this last-mentioned shortcoming predictably appears to the reviewer 
at its worst in Arnold's characterization #of the doctrine of the Trinity 
as I'a fairy tale of the three Lord Shaftesburys" I (Super VI9 P-375). 
Whether the Quarterly is the more shocked on behalf of the living 
peer or the abstract doctrine of the Trinity it is difficult to be surej 
but the reviewer does not miss the opportunity of making capital out of 
ArnoldIs 'impropriety': 
Would he not. .. have perceived that to 
jest on a matter which, to nine- 
tenths of his countrymen, is a matte-r of religious belief places 
him 
for a time on a level with one whom he does not particularly admire, 
namely, Mr Bradlaugh? (p. 407) 
And, from the Quarterly, what condemnation could be heavier than thatl 
The tenor of the criticism in Blackwood's Edinburgh Maga2iine (1873) 
can be deduced from the title of the article presenting it: 'Amateur 
Theology: Arnold's Literature and Dogma'. The first three and a half 
pages of this fifteen page critique are devoted to melancholy reflections 
on the contemporary spate of famateurl incursions into theology - 'Which 
used to be supposed the highest and most difficult of all' departments 
of knowledge. 'Pseudo-thinkers' engage with 'flimsy confidence and 
superficial dilettanteism which passes with many for philosophy and 
theology' in the study of 'Holy Scriptures' and 'traditional dogma'. 
Our complaint is, not that theology is undergoing, as it must undergo, 
great modifications of its accumulated opinions and tkaditionsp but 
that its old opinions are frequently set aside as valueless by those, 
who have never studied them... ' (p. 680) 
For Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine. Literature and Dogma is really only 
ra large pamphlet directed in great part against the bishops of the 
Church of England, particularly the Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester' 
(p. 681). Its style is perhaps the greatest source of indignation to the 
reviewer who finds it 1constantly mantling' with 'irrepressible scorn' 
and dreary "chaff"; impertinent with 'such merely vulgar profanity as to 
shock every true and right instinct' (p. 682), especially in its presenta- 
tion ofýthe Trinity as the 'three Lord Shaftesburys' (Super VI, P-375) 
It cannot advance the conception of religion to have any of its doctrines, 
and especially one which has so powerfully swayed many devout minds, 
presented under images of ludicrous ineptitude' (p. 682) 
In a curious and interesting way this reviewer equates the author of 
Literature and Dogma with the 'Zeitgeist' itself. Arnold thought of 
himself as living in it, subject to it and needing to adapt to it; his 
critic sees Arnold as creatingand promoting iti 
Do not (the great articles of the Christian faith) still-witness to 
a far grander spirit than this IlZeit-Goist", or modern spirit of which 
we hear so much, but whose main ambition seems to be to insult or disparage 
all that has gone before it? 
Can anything be more unscientific than such a spirit? It is the very 
apotheosis of self-opinion intoxicated by its own pride, and flaunting 
its, dogmatisms with a crude audacity in the face of preceding dogmas. ' 
(, p. 692) 
Despite its hostility, this critique honours Arnold with a good deal of 
direct quotation. and takes his arguments seriously. It seeks to refute 
them on three basic grounds: (1) that religious facts are not susceptible 
to scientific verification Oreligious truthl is not 'to be tesbed by 
experiments as that by which we prove that fire burns... this is not the 
order, of religious certitude ... it se'izes 
(men) 
... as a living awe, a 
conscious presence haunting them. ' (p. 688)); (2) that moral truths are 
outside the province of science, the laws of conduct can be confirmed by 
consciencel but not proved experimentally ('facts, and the order in 
'which these facts recur, are all that science can know in a strictly 
scientific manner. We have really no right to interpret nature or life 
so far as to include in them the idea of power - still less of a Power 
making for righteousness' (p. 690)); and (3) that Dogma, far from being 
la mere excrescence or disease of religion' profoundly recognizes Ithe 
necessities of our spiritualuaturel and embodies 'the realities of 
Revelation' ('The creeds of Chr*stendom have been the fruit of ... study 
and experience. The labours of dogmatic theologians have sought to 
organize the highest ideas of the Church from age to ageil (p. 692)). 
The critique also makes out a case for the Hebrew religion having 
acknowledged a personal God before conceiving the Deity as 'a power 
for righteousness' (p. 686) - the reverse of Arnoldle contention. 
Two significant criticisms should perhaps be levelled at the 
critique in Blackwood's EdinburRh Magazine. The first relates to human 
thought, and the modern critical attitude of disrespectful criticism 
towards traditional wisdom: 
With all our increased knowledge and more exact cangns of verification, 
the capacity of human thought varies but slightly from age to age( the 
reviewer writes). It may be fairly questioned, indeedo whether the 
power of the brain, in individual cases,. retains its old level with 
the wider diffusion of intellectual culture. - (pp680-681) 
Arnold, of courseq said nothing about the capacity of human thought 
varying from age to age, but simply recognized that the forms in which 
our thought is couched must necessarily be modified as our experience and 
/ ý, '2- 
environment change. The second, and perhaps more seriousp shortcoming 
of this reviewer is his total failure to understand Arnoldle view of 
poetryq since this is practically the mdinstay upon which the whole 
thesis of Literature and Dogma relies. 'The language of Scripture is, 
I everywhere. e. a, mere poetical adaptionf* (says the reviewer); the 
conception of the personality of God is, for Arnold (he continues) 'a 
mere Poeti_c accretion'*; but 'it was plainly a very real and true idea, 
and no mere poetical ima&tnation* to the mind of Hebrew Psalmists and 
Prophet, ' and the 23rd Psalm is quoted in evidence (p. 686) It is 
strange that the reviewer failed to notice that both the Old Testament 
psalmist, David, and the contemporary Matthew Arnold were themselves 
poets) Could either of them have thought in terms of Inere poetry19 
Further on the reviewer writes fit is of the very nature of religion to 
appeal to a religious sense -'as of poetry to a poetic sense.. or music 
to a harmonic sense. # (p. 689)., Arnold, whose estimation of poetry was 
of the highest (seepp. 191 . -2) was clearly concerned to bring out the essential 
relation between religion and poetry. If for Arnold religion is 'morality 
touched by emotiOnt (Super VI, P-176) the source and nourishment of its 
emotive content derives largely from the poetry of the Scriptures. The 
reviewer need not have agreed with this point of view, but it is un- 
fortunate that he failed to acknowledge it. 
Almost as critical of Literature and Dop_ma as the foregoing reviews 
is that in The Saturday Revie (1873)t but the reader may sense a kind of 
grim appreciation of Arnold's achievement even amidst the notes of censure 
that the duty of orthodoxy demands. Certainly Arnold's style is apprec- 
iated: 'lie has clear views on religious subjects,, and is able to give 
them ingenious and lucid expres I sion' (p. 284). And again, 
lie writes the best of all prose, the prose of a poet. His sentences 
follow with the utmost freedom the mould of his thought; he repeats 
himself continuallyp but with variations like those of a skilful 
musician on a familiar airg and he avoids dulness with instinctive 
felicity. t (p. 286) 
* (mv italics 
I ff-3 
Inevitably Arnold's indiscretion over the tThree Lord Shaftesburyst is 
taken to task and the reviewer looks askance at his mocking treatment 
of the Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester. But here one may sense a 
touch of veiled sympathy for Arnold's point of view in the critic's 
'words: 
The Bi. shops in questiont we all know, are not specially remarkable 
as metaphysicians, The Bishop of Winchester, though quite capable of 
handling abstractions, generally takes things in the concretep and is 
never so felicitous as when dealing directly with men. The Bishop 
of Gloucester is beat known to students as an exact and patient verbal 
critic, who is slow to sacrifice the literal meaning of the text to 
generalizations of any kind whatever. Mr Arnold would be obliged to 
respect these prelates if he described them as they are; but he 
describes them as they are not, and laughs at them' (p. 286) 
This critic pays careful attention to Arnold's subject-matter, giving 
a careful and helpful su ary of the contents of Literature and Dogma 
before proceeding to ask his fundamental question of the author: 
We naturally wish to know whether Mr Arnold thinks that Jesus was the 
Christ - the Messiah for whomp as time, went on, the Jewish people 
learned to look with increasing fulness of expectation. ' (p. 285) 
The reviewer is disappointed here, however, for #on Mr Arnold's 
principlesq theology is or ought to be, a branch of literature, (p. 284). 
Consequently, 
If we desire, as we very reasonably may, to learn from the New Testament 
something distinct about the personage who is its principle subject, 
or about the teaching which is desired from him as from its spring and 
centre, Mr Arnold has little or nothing to offer except doubts and 
negations. 1 (p. 285) 
Disappointingly for the reviewer Li-terature and Dogma leaves little 
scope for 'religious speculation' - an observation that must have more 
than aatisfied. Arnold, who (as his critic rightly observes) preferred wide 
reading to narrow specialization. 
He is impartial in his suspicion of specialists and is prepared to 
defend the claims of literature n9t only against theologians but against 
the advocates of physical science. It is painful to think of the con- 
sequences uixich may ensue in a few years if Matthew Arnoldt with his 
delicate intellectual organizationt is forced into rude contact with those 
unsparing inquirers who put such direct questions both to matter and men. ' 
(p. 286) 
It is ironical, in respect of the last jibep to note the strong friendship 
and mutual appreciation of each other's works that developed between 
between Matthew'Arnold and Thomas Huxley during the decade following this 
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observation (seepp.. 211-k). 
Anxiety and ambivtklence 
The Spectator produced two separate notices on Literature and Downa 
in two consecutive weeks (Feb., March, 1873). The overall impression 
to be derived from these two reviews is that their author was rather 
criticalv very puzzled and somewhat saddened by Literature and Doxna. 
A curious ambivalence runs through the first article. Arnold has , 
written a 'singular volume'; but if its interpretation of the Bible 
is true, ýit presents, for us at least, a new gospel'; if its inter- 
pretation is untenable it strikes la new and heavy blow at the Bible'. 
The style is superb ('reminding usq both in its wording and-its 
liquid rhythmsp of many a passage in Father Newman'); but some of the 
allusions are 'completely unworthy of the apostle of sweetness and 
light' (p. 243), ('showing something of the cruel scorn of Voltaire'). 
'The author has a profound sympathy with the Bible, astoundingly his 
criticism may sublimate and evaporate its contents till, to eiýery eye 
but his own, only the ghost is left? (p. 243), 'So difficult is it to 
follow this great eulogist of simplicityl that all in all 'we confess 
to being a good deal at a losst (p. 243). 
The critic's main anxiety relates to the personality of God, and 
the implications of this for Christian prayer: 
Either prayer involves the belief in God as one who hears and answers 
us... or it is of the nature ofa mere poetic apostrophep an exercise 
of the imagination about a subject of deep interest to ourselvesp 
and nothing more. ', (p. 244) 
The teither-ort formulation of this question clearly oversimplifies a 
situation which by its nature very complex: the nwdber of different 
kinds and qualities of Ip'rAyer' exercised by the variety of humankind 
must be legion - they certainly cannot be resolved into two kinds as 
the critic suggests. Nevertheless he draws attention to what must for 
many Christians be a source, of unquiet - the abstract nature of Arnold's 
definition of God: 
Just substitute for a moment in any prayer ... Mr Arnold's neuter 
)4s- 
definition of what the verifiable essence of God is... "Have mercy 
upon me, o stream of tendency that makes for righteousness) according 
to they lovingkindness... (etc)... "' (p. 244) 
Howeverp elsewhere he berates Arnold for using 'the prsonal pronoun at 
all' (as in 'God is an influence, and those who would serve Him (my 
italics) must serve Him not by any form of words or ritesp but by 
inward motion and in reality. '). Ile feels that to call an abstract 
influence thiml. 4a inconsistent. But this criticism overlooks the 
inevitable distinction between a definition and a private mode of address 
to a power tbeyond ourselvest. The more orthodox definition of 
God, for example, (which h6approves) does not fit very much more 
happily into prayer: 10 "great Personal First Cause, the moral and 
intelligent Governor of the universe" hallowed be thy name... (etc), **' 
The point'Arnold is making is the need to make such definitions-as we have 
to make approximate more nearly to what can be verified by experience; 
and his definition, whatever its faults, does not seek to 1placel the 
the appearance, because un dfAty with all the appearance but 
. 
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verifiablelof scientific exactness. 
The second Spectator notice (March 1873) takes up the same point - 
the personality of God - and professes to remain 'profoundly bewildered' 
by Arnold's dismissal of metaphysics in favour or poetry. How can the 
Christian word 'Father' be used of a mere 'tendency', a kind of 'Muse 
of RighteousnessI9 Arnold, in Literature and Dogm2,, 
; *. seems to bring us back, by the help of a false passport made out under 
he name of 'Emotion', all that he was going to banish under the name 
of 'Metaphysics', and to take full credit both for the decree of exile 
and the evasion of that decree by which he defeats its whole meaning 
and drift. 1 (p. 278 
This is quite a valid. pointp but it reveals clearly the failure of the 
critic to understand Arnold's intentions. For Arnold the subjective 
element in religion is what counts for mostq hence his stress on the 
linwardnesslof Christianity. Metaphysics give an illusion of objectivity; 
but the overt framework thus created cannot stand up against the genuine 
verifiable objectivity of science whenever the two models come 
into 
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conflict9 so for Arnold lEmotion' and the poetry that expresses and 
nourishes emotion can provide a safer basis for religion than can 
metaphysics. When he speaks of an ? influence' or Isteam of tendency, 
not ourselveag which makes for righteousness' Arnold feels he does not 
offend the world of the scientist (which he shares with him); but in prayer, 
which is necessarily subjectiveg the word 'Father' is a more natural ex- 
pression of the emotion involved. 
The second objection in this critique is to Arnold's use of the 
word 'faith'. For the reviewer faith cannot be ta mere self-contained 
inward act, but has reference to a will outside the mind of the believert 
in whose breast the executive power which is to verify the faith, lies' 
(p. 279). Whether this critic was conscious of. the anthropomorphism in 
his use of the term 'breast' in this context (i. e. whether he regarded 
the expression as one of science or poetry) it is hard to know; but 
unlike Arnold his view of faith clearly demands the suspension of 
personal judgement and a resting in a judgment 'higher' than that 
ofany individuali The reviewer agrees with Dr Newman that 'Faith is, in 
its very nature, the acceptance of what our reason cannot reach, simply 
and absolutely upon testimony, I a position which Arnold refutes in 
Literature and Dogma: 
But*surely faith is ... nothing of the kind... instead of being a sub- 
mission of the reason to what puzzles it, (faith) is rather a 
recognition of what'is perfectly clear, if we will attend to it. t (Super VIp PP-312-312) 
For the reviewer it is the mystery of the unknown that provides the 
motivespring for faith; for Arnold it is the certainty of the known. 
Finallyp it is Arnold's treatment of 'repentance' (metanoia), or 
tile bethod7of Jesus, that comes in for criticism. In describing the 
method (writes the reviewer): 
Mr Arnold forgets to state that tforgiveness' was the master-key 
which led to Ichange of heart, ' and that forgiveness implies a living 
being to whom a prayer for forgiveness can be addressed. ' 
(p. 279) 
Arnold would dispute the implication referred to here 
(the need for a 
'magnified non-natural man' to be available to bestow forgiveness); but 
1 
he does have something to say on the subject of forgiveness. It is true 
that Arnold has little sympathy with the Protestant doctrines of the 
Atonement (throu& the 'precious blood of Christ') (Super VI, P-356) 
or of Justification (ibid., P-36o) (defined by JS Whale (1957) as meaning 
that 'through Christ's sacrifice on the Cross God calls sinful men into 
fellowship with himselft). Forgiveness through these means, by a God 
who would intentionally manipulate his creatures in this manner is 
repugnant to Arnold. However, on the one hand he recognizes forgiveness 
as an essential element in Jesus's healing activity (Super VI, p. 255); 
and on the other hand he adopts an interpretation of the meaning of the 
Gospels by which the need for forgiveness can be largely obviated. By 
'restoring the intuition' (Super VI, p. 285)9 says Arnold, Jesus taught 
the means to an immediate sense of peace attuned to 'the way of the 
Eternal#; through 'Metanoial (self-knowledge and repentance (super VI, 
p. 289). - 'a life-giving change of the inner man' - the corrosive guilt that 
necessitates forgiveness could be cleansed and a kind of grace achieved. 
True consciousness, or conscience properly understood, can banish the 
need either for 'punishment' or 'forgiveness': 
Punishment, government, and society, are all of them after-inventions; 
creations of assemblages of men, and not matter of the individual's 
intuition. Jesus regarded 6imply what was primaryt - the individual 
and the intuition. And in truth, if theindividual and the intuition 
are once reached, the after-inventions may be left to take care of 
themselves. And if conscience ever became enough of a power, there 
would be no offenders to punish. This is the true line of religion; 
it was the line of Jesus. To work the renovation needed, he concentrated 
his efforts upon a method of inwardness, of taking counsel of conscience. (Super VI, pp. 290-291) 
Before considering some criticisms of Literature and'Doona expressed 
in a somewhat different vein, a further point needs to be made about the 
criticisms in the five periodicals so far examined; and that is their 
relevance to the concept of 'education as initiationl. In all five, and 
particularly perhaps in Blackwood's-Edinburgh Magazine (1873), we see the 
effect of mental training based on a priori principles 
and directed 
towards the apprehension of, and submersion inp a fixed, shared b ody of 
/0 
knowledge. Theological training (as do other branches of knowledge) 
demands 'long and laborious culturet (p. 678). True thinkers are tmen 
who patiently go to the roots of questions in the light, not of their 
own fancy, but of all preceding knowledge' (p. 679) 
it no doctrines, however venerable, are entitled to acceptance merely 
because they are old, it is yet the business of the student to trace 
and acknowledge the true conditions of thought or faith out of which 
they grew, and the genuine elements of knowledge which they embrace, 
against the errors of their time. The study of dogma pursued in this 
manner, becomes a study which at once illuminates the past and guides 
the present. It iPklbest corrective of extravagant theory and self- 
confidence' (p. 681) 
Without denying the obvious virtues in this statement, one is also left 
with the sneaking anxiety that total submersion in a discipline in this 
way might also be 'the best corrective' to any kind of waywardness in 
thought - the means of guarding against the 'extravagant theory' of a 
Galileo, a Darwin or an Einstein. * 
Interestingly enough, this reviewer unconsciously reveals the very 
danger to vhich the process he is advocating is most susceptible: the 
problem of creating 'two oulturest. based on separate, compartmenf. --alized 
disciplines: 
There is less to be said perhaps for some of our (pseudo-) theological 
teachers( he writes ), than even for our rashest theorisers in science; 
for the latter are at least primarily dealing with what they have 
carefully studieA and understood. If Mr Darwin's halting logic and 
misconceptions of the nature of inference cast ridicule on some of 
his conclusions, he is thoroughly at home in the field of natural 
observation and in those crowds of facts which he seldom fails to 
marshal with accuracy however inconclusively he may interpret them, 
He and others have a genuine scientific training, and they fail only 
*At its worst the principle of saturation in a single discipline could 
give rise to a Mr Casaubon, the archetypal pedant in George Eliotts 
Middlemarch (1965), a manteapable of severe self-restraint', 'resolute 
in ... honour according to the code; ... unimpeachable 
by any recognized 
opinion', for whom 'the difficulty of making his Key to all Mythologies 
unimpeachable weighed like lead upon his mind. t In Mr Ca-CaKbin, 
regrettably, 'such capacity of thought and feeling as, had ever been 
stimulated in him by the general life of mankind bad long shrunk to a 
sort of dried preparation, a lifeless embalmment of knowledge' for he 
was 'living in a lumber-room... furbisliing up bkoken-legged theories., 
Mr Camobonts learning, in short, (as one of the other characters is 
made to express it) was ta kind of damp which might in due time saturate 
a neighbouring body'. But perhaps Mr Ckqqbon is an extreme case. 
( fýý 
when -they leave their proper domain, and traverse a region of argument 
for which they have no training... - (p. 679) 
Discussion of this problem must be deferred to a later chapter (chapter), Z); 
for the present it must suffice to state the dilemma for education 
implicit in, the critiques of Literature and DogMa so far discussed. 
How far, we need to ask, does an education conceived of as initiation 
into. traditional disciplines, militate against creative insight and 
flexible understanding; is there perhaps an inverse relationship 
between $solid scholarship' in traditional terms and the capacity to 
adapt to new forms of thought and unforeseen environmental eballengen? ' 
Progressive objections 
With the Fortnightly Review, (1873) we enter a different domain, in the 
criticism of Literature and Dogma. A focus of Liberal-Rational and 
positivist opinion, the Fortnightly had achieved a wide circulation 
(about 25,000) by 18739 and included among its contributors Thomas 
Huxley, George Eliot, William Morris, Frederick Harrison, and occasionally 
even Arnold himself. Butýits criticisms of Literature and Dogma, the 
Fortnightl- y felt that Arnold was not being progressive enough: 
. the beat praise of the wide and various culture 
(Arnold) recommends is ;o 
be found in the fact, that it has brought a critic of rare tact and fine 
perception to practical conclusions scarcely distinguishable from those 
of his beat adversaries. ' (P. 543) 
The work may contain much that is Igood and true' but it still has f, a 
bias too decided to be compatible with the half-sceptical reservations, 
the laborious many-sidedness, -which are the essence of culture. 1 In 
other words, Arnold still steers too close to traditional# orthodox 
religion on the one hand, while on tfic other his critical approach, base(] 
on Tulturel, is too tentative and diffuse, and lacks the firm grip of, 
scientific analysis. 
This critic appreciates Arnold's placing of the notion of the 
moral Inot ourselvest in subjective experience since 'the only satis- 
factory proof of the existence of a moral Not I must be, like the 
evidence of the senses to a material world, the consciousness of effects, 
of which, to the best of our belief, we are not ourselves the cause' (P-543). 
)5-0 
This leonsciousnesslt however, the Fortnightly wants to make clear is 
not universally shared: 
If every one were liable to feel an influence from without (my italics) 
strengthening and directing the conscience, there would be no atheists... 
(P-543). 
Arnold's bias takes the form of 'Rebraizing' when he tackles external 
realities and looks for "God in History": the assumption of a righteous 
power may nourish the inner man, but its existence cannot be proved 
by external evidence: 
... an extra-natural power for righteousness might preserve Hellas by 
giving the Greeks conduct, but cannot be inferred from the fact that, 
failing conduct, Greece fell. (P. 544) 
The only fault with this succinctly expressed criticism of Arnold's 
presentation of God in history is the critic's use of the expression 
'extra-natural!; since it imputes to Arnold the asswnption of a 
dimension lie would not have acknowledged. 
In the Fortniahtly, at last, however, we find a critic who 
appreciates Arnold's 'Three Lord Shaftesburys'(Super VIp Po375). 'We 
cannot but thinkg' he writes, 'the author has been misconceived, through 
a certain dulness of literary perception, such as he dondemns in theo- 
logians generally. ' (P-544). The reviewer would doubtless like to go 
a good deal further than Arnold in condemnation of theologians for he 
implies in his conclusion that Literature and Dogma, falls between two 
stools: 
*' it hardly seems that the case is made out for 
the universal 
substitution of literature for science and doctrine, 
(P-544), 
however 'attractive' Arnold's method may appear. 
The radical Fkaminer (1873), in an article entitled IThe Creed 
of Culture#, examining Literature and Dogma witb some care, and 
scrupulous attention to detail, concludes that, 
The volume is in substance an excellent one, and the friends of free 
thought cannot be too thankful for the support that Mr Arnold gives 
to their work. But they will hardly agree with its main purpose; 
which is to draw from the Bible a new theology that, though it may be 
vastly better than the orthodox sorts of theology$ 
is nevertheless a 
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theology based on something more -than the clear, practical laws of 
duty. 1 (p. 229) 
Christian puritanism can be seen here to have passed into secular 
puritanism, a theme which, as we will see, the writer pursues with a 
vengeance* 
The $pith' of Arnold1s book he sums up in the Old Testament. phrase 
'Hear 0 Israeli The Eternal is our God,, the Eternal alone' and Arnold' .s 
related 'creed of culture'.:. 'Do righteousness, and let the doing of it 
be your whole and only worship. ' Thus far the reviewer approved the 
emphasis of Literature-and Doma; but Arnold's conception of religion as 
'morality touched by emotion' he would prefer to categorize as 'morality 
-tainted by selfislinesst (p. 228), for in stressing the joy and satisfac- 
tion to be derived from right action Arnold has put the emphasis on 
spurious rewards which have no, place. in true morality: 
As soon as we allow the abstract rule of right, the true utilitarianism, 
to be affected by personal consideration, by the spurious thing 
that often goes by the name of utilitarianism, a loophole is provided for 
all sorts of mischievous doctrines. And, generally, if to reasong which 
prescribes the maxims of ethics, we super-add any unreasonable outcome 
of emotion, we may be sure that our ethics will be deteriorated. If 
religion is anything more than morality, it is inferior to it. ' (p. 228) 
This is a severe doctrine. But the reviewer is again with Arnold in his 
'heartily and honestly condemning the "Aberglaube" which brought Judaism 
to such a pass that Christ was needed to reform itv and which then 
reduced Christianity to the state in which we now see it. ' (p. 228) 
The Examiner notices with interest the distinction Arnold draws between 
th+rgiveable (though false) 'popular science of religion' and 'the 
theology of the learned' for which 'Mr Arnold has no tenderness at all'; 
but would want to go further than Arnold in the total condemnation of all 
theology, and of religious notions which could give rise to theological 
speculation: 
Unfortunately (Arnolo is not content to take his readers into the clear and 
boundless atmosphere of free thought, but lie leads them out of the thick 
fogs of conventional religion into a place, where though it may be refinedp 
0, and almost impalpable at first, there is still a god that RW be the nucleus 
of miasmata as dense and unwholesome as those from which he would Iliberate 
us. ' (p. 229) 
1. ýz 
Muted praise 
The Westminster Review (1873), a serious radical and progressive 
periodical, devotes a very favourable critique to Literature and Dogma, 
consisting of a succinct epitome of the work and a brief commentary. 
T he book is calculated to do more good than the officious Convocation 
spee6hes and writings of the entire clergy. It is an excellent antidote 
to their mischievous identifications of religion with absurd dogmas. 
(P-559) 
It 'breathes a healthy spirit ... carries the reader along with it, and 
is-substantially correct. ' 
Some minor criticisms, however, are made in respect of Arnold's 
assignations of authorship and datings of certain books of the Bible - 
and the reviewer objects to Arnold's style - especially to his elevation 
of words and phrases to 'a sort of talismanic dignitylp and to his 
repetition aikd diffuseness. But in his analysis and interpretation of 
the Old and New Testaments; his exposure of 'pretentious language' about 
it used by theologians; and his putting the Bible on 'a realýexperimen- 
tal basis... imperatively needed atkpresent timet) Arnold 
,.. shows an excellent critical faculty, and emancipates himself from 
he traditional opinions that disfigure the Bible and alienate many 
from its perusal. ' (p. 559) 
As a sort of post-script to this assessment of Literature and Dog-Ma, 
the next issue of the Westminster Review (1873) includes a brief criticism 
of Arnoldts notion of evidence. As Henry Dann (1873) had pointed outp 
Arnold's 'Eternal not-ourselves, making for righteousnesel and the 
exclusive identification of Jesus with this power are really no more 
scientifically verifiable than the more orthodox notion of 'God as a 
Person, One w1io tbin)(s ant) loves. 'It cannot be denied, writes t1iis 
reviewer, 
that as experiencet in the only sense it can have in relation to such 
matters, is a species of personal intuition or feelingy that as far 
as absolute verification goes one mants experience is about as good 
as anotherls and not better. ' (p. 454) 
Leaving aside for the moment the reductionism implicit in this last 
clause, it is clear that the critic has justly picked on a weak point in 
fsý 
Arnold's argument: Arnold's version of the deity may, be closer to what 
experience can verify than that of his theological rivals, but it is 
still beyond the reach of scientific proof. 
The readership of the Athenaeum (1873) included the Mechanics 
Institutes and readers of the publications of the Society for the 
Diffusion of Useful knowledge; an independentt progressive periodical 
supporting all forms of popular education, it had a circulation of some 
18,000. Its response to Literature and Dogma is therefore of some 
significance as a gauge of the likely popularity of Arnold's conception.. 
In its close analysis of Literature and Dogma the Athenaeum is careful 
to retain, as far as possible lipsissima verbal of the author, 
; **not only because we are anxious to do him full justice, but also 
ecause we wish to avoid even the suspicion of discussing a theory 
which it is not our business either to endorse or to controvert. 1 (p. 239) 
The readers are left largely ? to make up their own minds upon the serious 
questions raised'; but the critic's detachment is not total. He objects 
to the 'three Lord Shaftesburys' and Arnold's style- particularly his 
repetition of favourite formulae 'in all possible combinations'; but 
he thanks Arnold 'for the frankness with which he has explained his 
vievog and for the care which he has taken to express them perspicuously', 
and concludes: 
We would 0 aLnestly recommend the book to the attention of our readers. 
. 
Mr Arnold's writings are always pleasant reading, and if Literature 
and Dogma in somewhat bulky, it may be urged in its defence that we 
cannot have too much of a good thing. ' (p. 240) 
Approbation 
More surprisingt perhaps, than the generally favourable response 
to Literature and Downa shown by the last three pe . riodicals mentioned 
(The'Examiner, The Westminster Review and The Athenaeum)t is the highly 
appreciative reaction in, The Contemporary Review (1873), particularly as 
its orientation and influence were mainly religious rather than literary. 
In a 25-page article entitled 'Mr Matthew Arnoldla New Religion of the 
I sv 
Biblef, the reviewer, J Llewelyn Davies, presents a thorough analysis 
of Literature and Dotma accompanied throughout by a commentary which 
combines critical tact with genuine enthusiasm for Arnold's method and 
approach. The criticts very generous response to Arnold's thesis is 
the more noteworthy because he disagrees with Arnold on two fundamental 
points, - namely, the significance of the doctrine of the Trinity and 
the physical Re surrection of Jesus, both of which he seeks to salvage. 
He believes that. 1most of his readers will feell as he does that, 
Few books ... have ever more urgently challenged the attention of those 
who believe in the God and the Christ of Christendom. It is of no 
use to complain of the dangerousness of Mr Arnold's treatise. Its 
outspoken plainness marks it as the product of an age in which it 
is settled that, at whatever risk and with whatever consequencest 
all beliefs shall be openly called in question and searched and sifted 
without mercy. Whatever belief is to live, must live by the help of 
criticism, or, it may be in defiance of criticism, not by being care- 
lessly shielded from it. And the very quality that chiefly makes this 
book dangerous, is one which must command our cordial respect. This 
is its earnest sympathy with Christianity. 
(P-855) 
How does J Llewelyn Davies, from his relatively orthodox standpoint, cope 
with the 'challenge' presented by Literature and Dogma? After devoting 
substantial space to a faithful exposition of Arnold's thesis, he asks 
its author ('as a strict reasonert) two important questions: 
lst, what he admits to be verifiable; 
2ndly, whether it is reasonable to believe anything which cannot 
be verified by experiment? (p. 856) 
In answer to the first he finds, and approvesp ArnoldIs contention that 
'there is a tendency in things which makes for righteousness. t But having 
found this indisputable, he supports it somewhat dubiously perhaps: 
Everyone believes that prosperity depends on moralityp that honesty 
is the best policyt that in the lon run, and for comnninities# 
immorality is unsuccessful. (p. 856ý 
While accepting the second two propositions, the first smacks of the 
spirit commonly associated with Samuel Smiles (1859) and critically 
examined by RH Tawney (1922) in his Holland Memorial Lecturep 'Religion 
and the Itise of Capitalism'. The reviewer goes on, however, to distinguish 
Arnold's notion of virtue from that of the Utilitarians: 
'Mr Arnold 
wants to enlist awe, emotion, enthusiasm, in aid of virtue, whereas 
the 
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philosophical Liberals in general have not felt strongly the need of 
these sentiments I (p. 856). 
In connection with the enlistment of emotiont Llevelyn Davie, s 
argues a contradiction in Arnold's thesisp where we find on the one 
hand ridicule against regarding God as a 'Person', and on the other the 
source of Israel'slawel and Idevotiont to virtue is shown to derive from 
his anthropomorphism - 'He personified his Eternal. t The reviewercritic- 
izes Arnold's suggestion that Israel extolled the Eternal as'a result of 
this gratitude for righteousness', ('It would seem to us a mockery to 
talk of being grateful to conduct, 1 p. 858): but he approves Arnoldts 
explanation for the personifying language of Israel: 
God is a father, because the power in and around us -uhich makes for 
righteousness is, indeed, best described by the name of this author- 
itativet but yet tender and protecting relation. (Super VI, p-185) 
There is no complaint made against the tthree Lord Shaftesburys' - 
Arnold's ridicule is taken in good part; instead the reviewer shows some 
satisfaction in demonstrating that if 'the fault of us who stand by the 
Apostle's Creed and the Lord's Prayer ... is that we are anthropomorphic, 
t 
Arnold nevertheless 'justifies our anthropomorphism by the authority of 
Israel and Goethe I (P-858), 
In answer to his second question, whether 'it is reasonable to believe 
anything wbich cannot be verified by experimentl Llewelyn Davies appeals not 
to logic but to #the nature of man' which is such that fit is not reason- 
able to limit our belief absolutely, a priorit to that which can be tested 
by experiment. ' If not'as a scientifically verifiable entityp yet as a 
human conception answering a human need the 'Righteous Father' is 
0'adequately verified by experience, conscience, emotion and metaphysics 
combined I (p. 861). Moreover, he derives some. support for this approach 
from Arnold's insistence that 'the language of the Bible ia literary, 
not scientific language, ' and in seeking to express a religious conception 
of some magnitude 'the language of science about it will be below what wo 
feel to be the truth. ' 
Approval again is given to Arnold's faith in lindividualismO (p. 863); 
but this critic has less faith than Arnold in 'the masses'; however, if 
'only a few working men ... are qualified to follow' Arnold's ideas, 'many 
more in the classes above themt will follow him with the keenest interest.? 
(p. 846) 
Finally, the Contemporarv Review's critic agrees to differ amicably 
with Arnold on the question of miracles. He believes that twithout the 
Resurrection there would have been no Church, no Christianityl (p. 865), 
and he must therefore find room for this in his overall conception. 
He resolves the problem as follows: 
To accept supernatural pretensions on the ground of signs and wonders, 
is one thing: to feel it to be natural and satisfactory that the Son-of 
God should do signs and wondersl is another thing. And the latter was, 
and is, the proper state of mind of the true disciple of Christ. ' (p. 864) 
ý 
It might seem that after go much fundamental disagreement with Arnold 
this reviewer would be only too pleased to part company from him; but 
his conclusion is in the same generous spirit as his criticism throughout: 
We confess sadly how much our Christianity needs to be bettered, both in 
theory and in practice, and we welcome most thankfully the contributions 
WA* Mr Arnold has made far more than I have been able to notice in 
thi paper - towards the truer understanding of the teaching of the Bible. Is (p. 866) 
Summary and. sequel 
Obviously there is not space to include reference to all the contemporary 
reviews of Literature and Dogma; but it is hoped that some measure of 
the response to Arnold's work can be assessed from the representative sample 
selected. -Certain key reactions can be summarised. 
The establishment reviews in defence of orthodoxy tendeA to fear 
Arnold's contribution to liberal biblical criticism for a variety of 
reasons. Disrespect for the authority of established dogma brings with 
ita dangerpUs self-willed individualism corrosive alike to Faith and 
the moral basis of law. The human need for a personal God is not met by 
pantheism, 
- 
#scientific definition' of the deityq or the elevation of 
morality as the keystone of religion. Objections to miracle and prophecy 
Is% 
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undermine the structure of, and endanger credence int the Bible as a w1iole. 
'Amateur' theologyq ignorant of accumulated wisdom and specialist tech- 
niques, can only replace traditýonal dogma with inferior dogmas of its 
own. 
Radical and progressive reviewers tended to fear Literature and 
Dogma As a rearguard action fought by Arnold on behalf of established 
Christianityp and therefore a danger to 'progress' and free thought. 
'Culturefg with its tentative, eclectic approach, lacked (they felt) 
the hard-headedness of either scientific experiment or doctrinal 
systemization, and tended to diffuseness of thought. Any link between 
religion and conduct would undermine the basis and obscure the clear- 
headedness of Utilitarian morality. If Arnold's 'new theology' caught on 
it could in time become as restrictive as the old., 
Liberal Christian thinkers appreciated the challenge of Literature 
and Dogma because they felt the need for open criticism of religion and 
the Bible (along with all other phenomena) in a broadly 'scientific' 
age of transition. Arnold's acknowledgement of the virtue of lawel and 
'emotion' in religious and moral matters could provide an antidote to 
the cold aridity of Utilitarian morality. Arnold's doctrine gave welcome 
support to the liberal view that room must be left for the individual 
conscience to interpret and evaluate religious and moral truths. 
From both traditionalist and progressive reviewers came doubts 
(for 
different reasons) about Arnold's notion of tevidencel and scientific 
verification - criticism partlyp as has been seeng justifiedi and partly 
arising from failure to understand novel features of Arnold's approacht 
particularly in relation to his understanding of poetry and the distinc- 
tion he would draw between evidence based on 'imaginative reason'l. and 
the scientific verification of external observable facts. 
On the whole 
it can be said that the orthodox critics had the greater admiration 
for 
Arnold's style (apart from his technique of ridiculing personalities 
in 
authority), and the progressive reviewers for his content: 
'excellent in 
0 
substance, a lbealtby spirit... substantially correctl Ia good thing' 
which 'we would earnestly recommendlq etcetera. 
A significant omission from the contemporary critical scene might 
be noticed in the reviews dealt with above. 117he most important magazine 
of the latter half of the century was undoubtedly the Cornhill, ' writes 
RG Cox (1964). Its editorial policy thad a strict morality about 
accepting the best article offered, and not distributing charity at the 
expense of the cost of the magazine. ' It was, however, in the Cornhill 
of course that the two essays constituting the basis of. Literature and 
Dogma had been first published in July and October 1871, so that in this 
form the nucleus of Arnold's thesis had reached a substantial readership 
of some 20fOOO before ever it was printed in book form. 
Reaction to Literature and Dogma was not confined to the reviews. 
'Its repute spread rapidly; wherever Arnold went on the Continent during 
the next four months, he found it the subject of convereation(Super VI, 
P-451) and there was inevitably a great deal of correspondence about it. 
Alexander Macmillan wrote to Arnold (Buckler, 1958) on February 15,1873: 
I have read every word of your book on Literature and Dogma, and in 
general with great delight. Of course there are points on which I do 
not agree with you, but the whole aim and purpose I do agree with, 
and it is admirably clear throughout. I am calling everybody's 
attention to it that I see. Of course it will make a row, but I 
think it will do good. '. (P. 95) 
Shortly afterwards Arnold wrote to Macmillan (ibid. ): 
I am glad you have been interested, and not offended, byLiterature and 
Dogmaý .. but the book is sure to be much attacked and blamed. No one 
should suffer himself to exaggerate what can be done at one moment by 
one individual and one book: all I venture to say is that the so-called 
orthodox position cannot, I thinkv ever again be precisely the same in 
England after the publication of this book, that it has hitherto been. 
There is vnich I. o regret in giving forth a boo]( of this kind- 91411 it 
was inevitable that the blow to the received opinions should come, and 
it could hardly have come from any one -who had a more sincere sympathy 
with the good which is at the bottom of these received opinions# and 
who was more anxious to preserve this. (6 March 1873) (p. 96) 
A letter from Alexander Macmillan's publishing partner, George Craik is 
of some interest in the light it throws on the stir which Arnold's book 
had caused: 
is-I 
I have read 'Literature and Dogma' withk"great interest as any one, and that is not small - for the book has certainly created a very general interest and must have been largely read. We just bought an edition 
from Smith & Elder for the American market ... It strikes me as it has truck many that you have fairly brokenthe back of man's prejudice, 
nd that religious belief must now do without the prejudices, and 
religious faith be a very different matter. I fancy many of us were 
feeling for'the same sort of thing as you have said for us all. You 
are attacked in various quarterst but there are better things said of the book than either the Saturdkv or the Spectator have dared to say - if 
not in print certainly in talk and by really capable men. ' (Buckler, 
1958, p. 96) 
In due course Arnold (no. doubt encouraged by the general reaction 
his book had received) chose to reply to his critics - this time not 
in the Cornhillp but in the Contemporary Review. His assays in reply 
'were later published as God and the ! 3ible, (Super. Vll) from which the 
following reassertion of the aim of Literature and Dogma, comes: 
Some of the comments on Literature and Dogma didq I ownO surprise me 
in spite of a tolerably long experience of men's propensity to mistake 
things. ' Again and again I was reproached with having donet in that 
book, just what I had formerly blamed the Bishop of Natal for doing. 
But Literature and Domma , 
had altogether for its object, and so too 
has the present workq to show the truth and necessity of Christianity, 
and its power and charm for the heart, mind, and imagination of man, 
even though the preternaturalp which is now its popular sanctiono 
should have to be given up. (Super VII, P-377) 
Arnold remained unrepentant in his attack on rigid orthodoxy, 'confident 
in its traditions and imaginations' with its unfounded charges of latheismt 
levelled at liberal, open-minded interpretations of the Bible: 
So de-eply unsound is the mass of traditions and imagination of 
which popular religion consists, so. gross a distortion and caricature 
of the true religion does it presentg that future times will hardly 
comprehend its audacity in calling those who abjure it atheists; 
, 
while 
its being stigmatised itself with this hard name will astonish no one. (Super VII, p. 142) 
The-process of secularization that Arnold feared has gone even further 
than he (or almost any Victorian)'could have anticipated, so that the term 
'atheist', if not quite meaningless, has today lost most of its sting. 
In a pluralistic society it would be hard to argue 'the necessit of 
Christianity'; butk its power and value, rather along the open-ended 
lines Oat Arnold presents it, can be argued, particularly in view of 
the moral uncertainty of our time, and the numerous rival dogmas that 
challenge men's allegiance and offer to fill the vacuum. 
t6o 
CHAPWII SIX 
ILTUIERAIMPRI ANI) DOGMAt: TRONIC TENSIONS ANI) 1111-NIC AIMS 
Progress is nothing but the victory of laughter over dogma. 
Benjamin Decasseres, 'Fantasia Impromptu, 1933 
Ilumour is the only test of gravity; and gravity of humour. For a 
subject which will not bear raillery is suspicious; and a jest which 
will not bear a serious examination is certainly false wit. 
quoted by the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, 
Characteristics, 1711 
The morality of irony, like, the morality of science, philosophy, and 
art, is a morality of intelligence. The ironist's virtue is mental 
alertness and agility. Ilia business is to make life unbearable for troglodytes, to keep open house for ideasq and to go on asking questions. 
DC Muecke, I'he Compass of Irony, 1969 
The examination of a. writer's literary technique would appear 
to have little relevance to the school curriculum - even if the writer 
concerned is one of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Education. And indeed 
at the surface level of distinct disciplines neither Literature and Dogma 
nor its style make any overt contribution to curriculum construction. 
At a deeper level, however, as I hope to show, both the work and its 
method are fit objects of attention for those who are concerned to under- 
stand inter-disciplinary tensions and relationships. In examining Arnold's 
ironic approacht moreover, this chapter seeks to explore something of the 
psycho-social ethos within which our school curricula have to function - 
a changing ethos, the significance of which Arnold (a Imodernf before 
his time) was among the first to appreciate. A fuller discussion of the 
Zeitgeist, the term by which Arnold characterizes 'the main movement of 
mind' of a given timet is reserved for chapter 9. Meanwhile the present 
chapter aims to show that Arnold's irony was no mere superficial addition 
or decorative technique, but part and parcel of the message fie was deliver- 
ing - iý message aentely prefiguritig subsequent developments in literature 
and world view. 
Arnold's commit, -, ment to detachment 
'Whatever humiliations may be in at ore for religion in the future', 
Arnold observes in the Introduction to Literature and DoLnua, 'the friendsof 
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physical science will not object f, o our saying, that, after them and 
the aristocracy, the leaders of the religious, world fill a prominant place 
in the public eye-even now, and one cannot hel. p noticing what their opiij- 
ions and likings are' (Super VII p. 165). It was the opinions and likings 
of 'the distinguished Chancellor of the University of Oxford', Lord Salis- 
bury - both a member of the aristocracy and something of a lay leader in 
the religious world - it will be rememberedo that had particularly aggra- 
vated Arnold into writing Literature and Dogma by telling the public that 
'religion is no more to be severed from dogmia than light from the sun, 
(ibid., p. 166). 'He is a dangerous man, ' Arnold wrote to his mother on 
June 25,1870, 
chiefly from his wa nt of any true sense and experience of literature and 
its beneficent function. Religion he knows, and physical science he 
knows, but the immense work between the two, whichis for literature to 
accomplish, lie knows no-thing of, and all his speeches at., Oxford pointed 
this way. (Russell, 1895, vol. ii, P-35) 
Lord Salisbury upheld the dogma of religion, others had created a dogma 
out of 'science'; Arnold's Literature and Doama was an example of liter- 
ature attempting to 'work between the two' (directly in this case, and 
not indirectly as is its usual marrier of working). 
In occupying and upholding a position between the. two opposing 
points of view, maintaining elements for and against both IsidesIt and 
seeking to justify the validity of this state of ambivalence - in 
working within the tensions thus created, irony was a necessary product 
of Arnold's situation. DC Muecke (1970), discussing what he terms 
Igeneral, ironyt, puts the position thus: 
For him who sees no possibility of reconciling (unavoidable) opposites 
the only alternative is irony: a sense of irony will not make him any 
less avictim of these predicaments but will enable him in some degree 
to transcend them. (p. 77) 
In this respect, Arnold was adopting a stance of 
I 
detachment, ptirsuing (as 
he advocates in Me Function of Criticism at the Present Time (Super III) 
'a disinterested endeavour to learn and propagate the 'best that is known 
and thought in the world' (p. 283) even when this involves coping 
simultaneously with contrarieties such as the necessary objectivity of 
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science and the necessary subjeef-ivity of religion. Instead of opting 
f or one camp or the other, in the manner of an increasing number of 
his contemporaries, Arnold embraced elements of each, facing up to tile 
ironic tension between them as an inevitable factor of the human condition 
and transcending the potentially debilitating effects of the paradox by 
this very act of recognition. 
The contemporary controversy between supporters of secular and 
religious education provides an example of Arnold's Janus-like operation. 
Writing of the tension between these two forces, Gordon and Lawton (1978) 
observe that 
In particular, many in the Owenite tradition saw the secularization of 
the curriculum as an opportunity to sweep away the superstition inherent 
in the religious aspects of the curriculum, and to replace it by a 
scientific understanding of the universe and an increased aunreness of 
the political and economic aspects of society. (p. 62) 
Arnold, for his part, sought to 'sweep away the superstition? and the 
dogina while preserving the moral and the more spiritual aspects of 
religion; and to reduce the mechanistic aspects of scientific thinking 
habits while prom6ting and preserving 'a scientific understanding of the 
universe', and the scientific principles of verification and openness. 
While maintaining a high degree of detachment to the fields of his 
concern, however, Arnold was deeply committed to his enterprise of show- 
ing the importance of this detachment. He had seen too much dogmatism 
and sectarian strife to remain unconcerned about their disruptive effects 
on society; and in combating what he felt to be a pernicious social 
evil, Arnold adopted his satirical stance of ironic ridicule and mockery. 
Ilie victims of Arnold's satire - the Dean or Norwich, the Bishops of 
Winchester and Gloucester, the Archbishop of York and Lord Salisbury, 
among others - are the scapegoats chosen to bear the main burden of gruill, 
for dogmatic intolerance, largely because their iccent acts or utteratices 
in this vein laid them wide open to attack on this ground (Blackburn, 1945). 
How Arnold's employment of humour and ridicule in connection with serious 
matters outraged many (though not all) of his contemporaries has been seen 
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in ebapter 5ý However, as Batho and Dobree (1950) comment: "'levity" is 
an attitude of mind allowable to a man who wishes -to attack sometiling lie 
feels to be dangerous; it is a more effective weapon than solemnity., 
Some ebara cieristics of Arnoldts method 
Even among the severer critics of Arnold's Litorature and Dogma were 
some who felt compelled to praise his style. The critical reviewer of 
The Saturday Review, for example, a(buitted thaf: 
Ile 'writes the best of all prose, the prose of a poet. His sentences follow 
'with the utmost freedom the mould of his thought; lie repeats himself 
continually, but with variations like those of a skilful musician on a 
familiar air, and he avoids dulness with instinctive felicity. (The Saturday 
Review,. l March, 1973) 
This is generous-praise indeed considering the assault Arnold makes on 
the orthodox position held by The Saturday Review. This assault is mounted 
by means of a whole battery of devices; logical argument; the accumula- 
tion of examples from literature and from contemporary events; the 
suggestive power of repetition with variations; the substitution of 
foreign terms (German 'Zeitgeist' and tAberglaubelf Greek lepicikial, 
Imetanoial and Inecrosistg etc. ) for their English counterparts, in order 
to draw attention to overlooked significances; and innumerable ironic 
devices such as understatement, overstatement and Socratic ignorance. It 
is this pervasive use of irony which must now be considered. 
A helpful categorization of the 'basic features of all irony' occurs 
in Muecke (1970) -wfiere the author lists: '(i)(an ironic) 'contrast of 
appearance and reality, (ii) a confident unawareness (pretended in the 
ironist, real in the victim of irony) that the appearance is only an 
appearance, and Gii) the comic effect of this unawareness of a contrast- 
ing appearance and realityl (p. 35). And to these Muecke later adds two 
further features: (iv) tan element of detacbmentv and(v) an nesthetic 
element' (p. 48). I 
In relation to (i) the ýcontrastl might consist, for example, of 
(a) the difference between the ironist's overt statement and its real 
underlying meaning, or it might relate to (b) an exposure of the diff- 
erence between the apparenf significance of an utterance or notion of the 
/ Wf - ironist's"victim and its actual i, loaning when given concrete embodiment or 
carried to its logical conclusions. The first of these kinds of contrast 
(a) is exemplified when Arnold writes. of the authors of the Old Testament: 
'Alas, these poor people were not Archbishops of York? or IvAien (Israel) 
begins to speculate, in the schools of Rabbinism, lie quickly shows how 
much less native talent than the Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester ne 
has for this perilous businesst (Super VI, pp. 183-1,911). T'heir 1povertyl 
and 'lack of native talent' in speculative matters are meant by Arnold, 
of course, to be their distinct advantage in apprehending religious matters 
over the theological doginatists whose concepts are clouded by 'too much 
talent for abstract reasoning. 1 Ube second kind of contrast 
(b) is employed 
by Arnold in dealing with 'the proneness of the human mind to. take miracles 
as evidence' of divine intervention. 
Suppose (he writes) I could change the pen with which I write this into a 
penwiper, I should not thus make what I write any the truer or more con- 
vincing. Mat may be so in reality, but the mass of mankind feel (liffer- 
ently. In tile judgment of the mass of mankind, could .1 visibly and 1111- 
deniably change the pen. with whicli I write this into a peniviper, not only 
would this which I write acquire a claim to be held perfectly true and 
convincing, but I should even be entitled to affirm, and to be believed 
in affirming, propositions the most palpably at war with common fact and 
experience. (Super VI, p. 245) 
This reductio ad absurdum of a notion more readily entertained 
in the 
abstracty or in the relatively abstract context of anc 
, ient historyt 
facilitates Arnold's later conclusion that tthere is, after all, no nee- 
essary connexion between walking on the sea and proceeding from the Eternal 
that loveth righteousnessý (Super VI, p. 264). 
Muecke Is categories are not of course intended to be mutu. ally ex- 
elusive - they are the 'basic features of irony' which may exist 
in 
isolation or in any combination. Consider, for example, Arnold's way of 
attacking what lie calls the theologians' 'insane licence of affirmation'. 
Already in St Paul and Protestantism he was treat'ing the Calvinistic 
doctrine of Justification - 'the covenant of redemption, made and agreed 
upon... says Calvinism, between God the Father and God 
the Son in the 
Council of the Trinity before the world began... 
' (Super VI, p. 11). 
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After a fairly lengthy expositioii of this doctrine Arnold sums up the 
position as follows-- 'The important points of Calvinism (are) original 
sin, free election, effectual calling (and) Justification througli imputed 
righteousness ... I Ile concludes that: 
The passiveness of man, the activity of God, are the great features of 
this scheme; there is very little of what man thinks and does; and what 
God thinks and does is described with such Rarticularit. Y that the fjgýlre 
I have used of the man in the next street cannot but recur strongly to 
t Lie mind. (Super Vlt P-13) 
By the. time he is writing Literature and Dqýpna (Super VI, pp. 360 and 
375-376) 'the mild -touch of irony I have underlined above has been super- 
ceded by the more trenchant irony of the Three Lord Shaftesburys I (See 
below, p, 161) after which Arnold comments on the speculative theologians: 
To think they know what passed in the Council of the Trinity is not hard 
to them; they could easily think they even knew what were the hangings 
of the Trinity's council chamber. (P. 361) 
The comic effect achieved by the concrete imagery draws attention to the 
ludicrousness of asserting any positive knowledge of anything - concrete 
or abstract - taking place in the (already abstract and hypothetical) 
Council of the Trinity; and consequently to the 'confident unawareness, 
of scholars and theologians prepared baldly to make such assertions. The 
sequence, developed with ironic detachment and aesthetic artistry, well 
illustrates the remaining qualities regarded by Muecke as the ebaracteris- 
tic features of irony. 
Arnold's irreverent and ironic treatment of the three creeds has 
already been referred to above (see chapter Y pp. lff-f). Bishop Samuel 
Wilberforce, the Bishop of Gloucester, is indirectly the prime butt of 
Arnold's irouy here. Of another victim, a certain Mr Maurice who Ideclared 
that by reading between the lines he saw in the Thirty-nine Articles and 
the Atbanasian Creed the altogether, perfect expression of the Christian 
faitht, Arnold writes: 
... that pure and devout spirit, - of whom, however the truLh iiiust. at lasL 
be told, that in theology fie passed his lif'c beating about Che bush with 
deep emotion and never starting the hare ... 
(Super VI, P-38.3) 
Atid to Mr Erskine of Linlathen's earnest assertion that 'It seews difficult 
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to conceive that any man should i ead through the New Testament calldidly 
Und aLIA111tively, WiLIJOILL 1jeing coiivinced 1.1jal. Hie doelxiiie of' the Trinil, y 
is es. sential to and implied in every part of the system', Arnold comments: 
Even already many readers of Mr Erskine feel, when they come across such 
a sentence as that, as if they had suddenly taken gravel or sand. into 
their mouth. 1 (ibid. ). 
In such ways dignity, whenever closely asso ciated with dogma is continually 
knocked off iLs perch by Arnold's ironic jiixLapositioiis. 
Sometimes lie achieves his effect by apparent praise: 
It, is clear that dogmatists love religion; - for else iirhy do they occupy 
-themselves with it so much, and make it, most of them, the business, 
even the professional business of their lives? (Super VI, p. 167) 
nie sting here is in the tail of the sentence: 'professional bnsinOSSI 
smacks sufficiently of profit to cast a shadow over the Olovel of religion 
with which the sentence began. Me uncharitable vay in which too many 
dogmatists ? occupy themselves' with religion is later satirized by Arnold 
when lie illustrates verbatim some of the abusive terms by which rival 
sects harangue and castigate each other in the columns of The Rock and 
The Church Times (Super VI, p. 278). 
Self-disparagrement and polite pillorying 
Much of Arnold's irony is achieved by means of apparent self-dis- 
paragement. He speaks, for example, of his own 1known inaptitude for 
sittruse reasoning? (Super Vl, p. 167) and four natural inferiority to these 
ingenious mon'(Super VI, p. 410). But any misunderstan ding of his intentions 
is usually clearly avoided by the way the context develops; 
Cripples ... have been knoAm, now and then, to be cast by their very infirmity 
upon some mental pursuit which has turned out happily for them; and a good 
fortune of this kind has been ours. (Super VI, p. 411) 
The fortunate mental pursuit for Arnold was a wide acquaintance with 
literature, 'letters', for 
Minds with small aptitude for abstruse reasoning 
ýay 
yet, through letters, 
gain some hold on sound judgment and useful knowledge, and may even clear 
up blunders committedo out of their very excess of talent, by the athletes 
of logic. (Super VI, p. 169) 
Sengupta (1961) in an unpublished AD thesis writes of'Arnold that 
His humility and politeness, mostly affected, were more insulting than 
(67 
even direct-insult. Some-times aii indiscriminate use of irony marred the effect. His denigration of personalities was at times not in 90 . of] taste. Sometimes it might be doubted, if his devastating attacks upon the Nonconformists -were in keeping with his doctrine of sweetness and 
light. (P-596) 
Similarly, his attacks on establishment churchmen have been criticized 
by some writers, His relentless pursuit of the Bishops of Winchester and 
Gloucester throughout the pages of Literature and Dogma, is a case in point. 
Perhaps Arnold's satire was a little hard on them; but it must be remembered 
that at the time Arnold was writing the orthodox High Churchmen, of which 
these two prelates were convenient symbols, held the whip hand in church 
and even academic matters, controlling many academic appointments at the 
universities, certainly until the abolition of the University Test Act in 
1871. Both Bishops had engaged relentlessly in a controversy denouncing 
Dean Stanley for allowing 'a Unitarian named Vance Smith, to receive Holy 
Communion at Westminster Abbey on June 22,18701 (Livingston, 1970) and 
again both took a major part in promoting the retention of tip compulsory 
Prayer Book reading in churches of the Athanasian Creed with its Idamn- 
atory clausesI, abhorred by Arnold for its un-Christlike spirit. The Dean 
of Norwich, the Archbishop of York and Lord Salisbury get off relatively 
lightly at ArnoldIs hands, but his irony dwells on the Bishops of 
Winchester and Gloucester throughout Literature and Dogma. 
Everyone-remembers the Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester malting in 
Convocation their remarkable effort 'to do something9l as they said, 
'for the honour of Our Lord's GodheadIf and to mark their sense of 'that 
infinite separation for time and for eternity which is, involved in reject- 
ing the Godhead of the Eternal Son. 1 
Arnold, despite his lack of Trinitarian orthodoXyt evidently didn't feel 
this 'infinite separationt, and eternity appamitly held no horrors for him. 
He knew that his attempts at 'a literary treatment of religious history and 
ideas' were anathema to the two bishops! 
Those who'make theiii they speak of as 'those 1,11o Hilve rijade shipi, -rech of the 
faith; I and they talk of 'the poison openly disseminated by infidels, ' 
and describe the 1progress of infidelity, ' irhich more and more, according 
to their account, denies God# rejects Christ, and lets loose every human 
passion. ' (ibid. ). 
By quoting their own narrowly intolerant and uncharitable words Arnold 
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allows the Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester to condemn themselves, 
and his subsequent reiterations of their notion of 'doing something for the 
honour of Our Lord's Godhead' (a metaphysical abstraction) increase the 
sense of fatuity attaching to it. 
Henri Bergson in Le Rire (1900) suggests that 'the attitudes, gestures 
and movements of the human body are laughable in exact proporti*on as that 
body reminds us of a mere machine. ' (p. 79). The same could be said, per- 
haps of the human mind. That-is why dogmatists are relatively easy game 
for the satirist. Fixed, 'inert' ideas, inflexible judgments remind us 
of machines; they cannot react to the paradoxes and vagaries of the 
dynamic human condition. The 'single vision?, says Mueeke (1970) is 
'non-ironical': 
Ironical, art and literature should ... have both surface and depth, both 
opacity and transparency, -should hold our attention at the formal level 
while directing it to the level of content'. (p- T) 
It is the play between the surface and the deeper meanings of an utterance 
or situation, or between alternative valid points of view, that generates 
the Ipsychic tension' characteristic of irony. Dogmatists, Arnold would 
have argued, choose. to adopt fixed and rigid patterns of thought in order 
to avoid such 'psychic tensionlp prefering the security, of group consen- 
sus to the perils of individual eclecticism. 
The Three Lord Shaftesburys 
Muecke develops f urther the concept of 'psychic tension' by quoting 
from AR Thompson's Dry Mo (1945) to the effect that Ithe ironic contrast 
must, to be ironicq affect us k both painful and comic': 
In irony, emotions clash... it is botti emotional and intellectual - in its 
literary manifestations, at any rate. To perceive it one must be detached 
and cool; to feel it one must be pained for a person or idea gone amiss. 
Laughter rises but is withered on the lips. Someone or something -we 
cherish is cruelly made game of; we see the joke but are hurt by it. 
(P. 15) (quoted in Muecke, 1970, P-33) 
One of the most effective passages in the original versions of Literature 
and Dog_nna was one vhich many critics considered took the ironic cruelty 
too far. Many people failing to understand tfie item in its context thought 
it 'an abominable illustration attacking Christianity' 
(Super VI, p. 142) 
and the 'victim? himself, bord Sbaftesbury, was apparently pained by it so 
that Arnold eventually withdrew it - in the Popular Edition of 1884. In 
doing so Arnold avowed that he was making no concessions to the violent 
protests of dogmatists, 
But the illustration has given . pain, I am told, 
(he explains), in a 
quarter vhere my deference, and the deference of all who can appreciate 
one of the purest careers and noblest characters of our time, is indeed 
due; and finding that in that quarter pain has been given by the 
illustration, I do not hesitate to expunge it. (ibid. )- 
As a result of this it is not easy to consult the original passage in its 
entirety, but in order to illustrate why it caused the furoxethat followed 
it, and to consider its implications in detail, I sliall quote it in full 
from my firstýedition copy of 1873. Its aim - as will be seen , is to 
illustrate the literal interpretation commonly adopted, albeit unconsciously 
of the Protestant tenet of Justification (the dogmatic interpretation of 
the biblical words: 'The Son of Man came to give his life as a ransom 
for many. '): 
In imagining a sort of infinitely magnified and improved Lord Shaftesbury, 
'with a race of vile offenders. to d: eal with, whom his natural goodness would 
incline him to let off, only his sense of justice will not allow it; then 
a younger Lord Shaftesbury, on the scale of his father and very dear to 
him, who might live in grandeur and splendour if he liked, but who prefers 
to leave his home, to go and live among the race of offenders, and to be 
put to an ignominous death, on condition that his merits shall be counted 
against their demerits, and that his father's goodness shall be restrained 
no longer from taking effect, but any offender shall be admitted to the 
benefit of it on simply pleading the satisfaction made by the son; and 
then, finally, a third Lord Shaftesbury, still on the same high scale, who 
keeps very much in the background, and works in a very occult manner, but 
very efficaciously nevertheless, and who is busy in applying everywhere 
the benefits of the son's satisfaction and the father's goodness; - in an 
imagination, I say, such as this, there is nothing degradingg and this is 
precisely the Protestant story of Justification. (Arnoldt 1813t PP-305-306) 
This was probably the longest single sentence in Literature and Dogma; it 
was certainly the liardest-Iiitting. But interestingly enougl) it does not 
hit out at Lord Shaftesbury himselfq but at the anthropomorphising do&nnatic 
theology it illustrates. Lord Sbaftesburyt respe 
I 
cted by Arnold as by most 
of his compatriots, is the vehicle only of the illustration, not its butt. 
It is doubtful vhether Arnold could have found anyvhere a more suitable 
vehicle for making his point. The veneration in wbich the philanthropic 
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Lord Shaftesbury was held can beat be gleaned, perhaps, from Edwin Hodder's 
(1887) biographyq and its final pages (PP-775-776), . quoting tributes 
to the Earl by the Duke of Argyle and Lord Salisbury, come as near to 
deification as mortal man can hope to attain (without benefit of legis- 
lation in the Roman manner). 
In a letter to his publisher, Smith (Super VI, P-1152), Arnold 
justifies his use of -the illustration, saying thaL fthough it makes 
people cry out, yet it has the advantage of fixing sharply in their minds 
what I meant. Later he had to justify himself to his sister, Fan. In 
a letter dated November, 1874 he maintains that 'ponderous works produce 
no effect; the religious world which complains of me would not read me 
if I treated my subject as they say it ought to he treated' (ibid. ). And 
he continues, fortified by his sense of the positive value of his work: 
Mere is a levity which is altogether evil; but to treat miracle and the 
common anthropomorphic ideas of God as what one may lose and yet keep one's 
hope, courage and joy, as what are not really matter of life and death in 
the keeping and losing of them this is desirable and necessaryq if one 
holds, as I do, that the common anthropomorphic ideas of God and the 
reliance on miracles must and will inevitably pass away. (Russell, 1895, 
vol (ii), 'p. 120) 
Another Lord Shaftesbury 
A curious and ironic feature of this whole episode is that in Arnold's 
lighthearted play with the name of the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, for 
the advancement of religion, he was (unconsciously, 1 believe) following 
the advice of the Third Earl of Shaftesbury. (The Is. ins of the fatherst, 
it seemsshall indeed 'be visited on the sons unto the third and fourth 
generation'l) 
I am indebted to a work of It L Brett (1951) for details of the Third 
Earl of Shaftesburyls'lDoctrine of Ridiculet largely developed in the 
latter's work Characteristics (1714) 
I have often wondered (the Third Earl writes) to see men of sense so 
mightily alarmed at the approach of anything like, ridicule on certain 
subjects; as if they mistrusted their own judgment. 
(Brett, 1951) 
Brett summarizes part of Shaftesburyts view as follows; 
Laughter is... a faculty provided by God to correct the extravagancies of 
our fancy. The reason is often obstructed and overthrown by conceits 
and follies w1ii. ch are the product of an excited fancy. Die use of laughter 
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is to act as a corrective to these flights of fancy and to bring back 
the mind to the ways of sober reason. In other words, ridicule is a 
practical test of the truth. The affectations and enthusiasms which are 
deviations from reason will wither at the blast of ridicule and truth will 
stand forth free and unobscured. (ibid. ) 
Arnold could scarcely have found a better justification for his use of 
the 'Three Lord Sbaftesburys' illustration than in the arguments of the 
Seventh Earl' great-great-grandfather. 
There wa: a considerable gap, however, between-the views of the 
Third and V-ýe Seventh Earls of Shaftesbury. While by no means humourless 
(see eg. Hodder, 1887, p. 648), the Seventh Earl had very strict views 
about the sober treatment 'with reverence and godly fear' 4 'the awful 
verities of religion' (ibid., p-726). The Third Earl, on the other hand, 
saw humour and religion in close alliancet as instanced by the three 
principles of his second Miscellany: 
let. That wit and humour are corroborative of religiong and promotive 
of true faith. 
2nd. That -they are used as proper means of this kind by the holy 
founders of religion. 
3rd. That nothwithstanding the dark complexion and sour humour of 
some religious teachers, we may be justly said to have in the 
main a witty and good-bumoured religion. 
As a help in assessing Arnold's viewpoint in relation to irony,. by comp- 
arison with that of the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, it is useful here to 
consider why the latter held the cheerful view of religion attested by 
these three principles, 
For this purpose it is convenient to refer to Brett's succinct 
abridgment of Shaftesburyls argument: 
Ridicule is a test of truth only because lie already holds a certain theory 
of truth. He believes that reality is an organic, harmonious and perfect- 
ly congruous whole. Any statement that is true - in other words, any 
statement that is descriptive of this reality - cannot but refer 
to these 
features, and while these characteristics may not give us a definition, 
they do provide us with a criterron of truth. Anything that 
lacks, the 
'characteristics of organic harmony and congruity will 
be unreal; any 
statement that in incongruous, any statement that reveals an 
internal dis- 
harmony, is untrue. Falsehood is characterized by a quality that can only 
be described as ridiculous. 
(Brettý 1951, p. 172) 
In other words Shaftesbury holds an essentially optimistic view of 
nature. It is not surprising to learn that, in connection with one of 
Shaftesburyls works (Brett, 1951, p. 63 et seq. 
)t beibnitz 'declared that 
it anticipated most- of his own tIt(! orics I in relation to'lheological 
Op timis"I. 
Many of Arnold's ideast too, can be seen prefigured in the writings 
of the Mird Earl of Sliaftesbury: fie has a high respect for reason 
(Brett, 1951, p. 216), but rejects Isystems' (p. 59); good is relative 
('We cannot say of anything that it is good or bad in itself, withoul, 
knowing whether it is part of a larger whole which may transcend its 
goodness or badness' (P-75))v but 'Happiness will result from... our 
being virtuoust (P-7 7); lie bases his arguiiient ror the existence or God 
on the order and regularity of the laws of nature' (p. 64) rather than 
upon 'miracles, ghosts, (and) apparitional; he dislikes 'entangling, 
abstruse philosophy? (p. 66) and looks for harmony in Ithe mutual dependence 
of thingst (P. 70; enthusiasm is in itself a very natural honest passion' 
(p. 167), but 'all affections have their excesses' (ibid. ) and religious 
conviction out- of control can Itoo easily mount into'high fanaticism or 
degenerate into abject superstition' (ibid. ); he deplored Puritan dogma 
which Iso debased the world that it failed to declare the glory of God' 
(P-187), and finally this moral philosophy gave an order and coherence 
to moral experience, while allowing moral judgments to remain free of 
theological authority' (ibid. ). 
This is not the place for a critique of Shaftesbury's thought (for 
which the reader is referred to RL Brett's work); but some account of 
his leading ideas has been given in order to show certain similarities 
with Arnold's viewpoint and to pose the question whether Arnold1s ironic 
treatment inliterature and Dogma stems from a similar optimistic outlook. 
Satire and Irony distinguished 
It may be helpful here to consider a distinction often made between 
satire and irony. Morton Gurewitch (quoted in Muecke, 1969) suggests that 
Perhaps the fundamental distinction between irony and satire, in the 
largest sense of each, is simply that irqny deals witli the absurd, where- 
as satire treats the ridiculous. The absurd may be taken to symbolize 
the incurable and chimerical hoax-of things, while the ridiculous may 
be accepted as standing for lifele corrigible deformities. This means 
(72- 
that while the manners of men ar- the domain of the satirist, the 
morals of the universe are the pi-es, erve of the ironist. 
Although this rather brief quotation oversimplifies the relationship 
between two overlapping concepts, it does draw attention to two (juife 
dis',, inct modes of thought: the 'node of thought which ridicules aber- 
rations from behavior appropriate to a world exhibiting fundamental order 
and harmony; and a viewpoint which questions fundamentally the order, 
harmony and beneficence of the -world itself. Satire, seen in this 
context, is the corrective weapon of the optimist keeping things in 
order; irony the stoical affirmation of the pessimist defying chaos. 
The Third Earl of Shaftesbury fits comfortably into the first category: 
where does Arnold fit? 
The examples of Matthew Arnold's irony quoted earlier in this 
Chapter (see pp. 1(6ý-70) are essentially satirical shafts directed against 
individuals and groups, and against specific dogmas upheld by such 
individuals and groups. But they are not (like the early Shaftesbury's 
satire) directed primarily to uphold prevailing orthodoxy; they are 
directed aaainst the prevailing orthodox Christian position. Neither are 
they directed to uphold the new budding orthodoxy of science, as are the 
writings, in their different ways, of Thomas Huxley, Herbert Spenser and 
Charles Bradlaugh. Arnold is therefore himself in an ironic position- 
straddled between two disparate orthodoxies. it is a position compar- 
able in certain respects to that of Spinoza, Goethe, Byron or Heinrich 
Heine - all authors admired by Arnold, authors with whom he felt a certain 
rapport. 
. Arnold is therefore in the position characterized by Muecke as that 
of the General Ironist: 
The General Ironist is, on the 'wliole, the sort of person who, while 
accepting or seeing no way of rejecting the positivist view, likewise 
sees no way of rejecting the opposite view and consequently is very 
much aware of the pathos of heavents falling; lie Icitiniol, NO ' remember 
such things were that were mosL precioust to him. lie dwells, historically, 
in the densely populated no-man's land between the old and the new differ- 
ing from his fellow countrymen in that lie knows where be is, knows, that 
is to say, that there are two sides and that be cannot take either side, 
or bring them into accord., Uhat lie can do is recognize them anti, by 
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1 7p- 
resenting them ironically, traivirend t1tem - though riot absolutely. 
? 
7ecke, 
1969, P-130) 
To find a mood in Arnold corresponding to the ironis0s dwelling 
in the ? no-man's land between the old and the new' we have only to 
remember the lines from his tStanza froms the Grande Chartreuse[ where 
the poet speaks of awaiting and searching forlornly. - 
Wandering between two worlds, one deadf 
The other powerless to be born... 
(Allott, 1965, p. 288) 
Arid if we turn to the poem 'Dover Beach I we f ind further cotif innation that 
Muecke's description of the General Ironist is relevant to Arnold. Despite 
the calm sea and the fair moon of the poem's opening, the ebb and flow of 
the waves bring IThe eternal note of sadness in', and we are presented 
with Ithe. pathos of the heaven's falling' (to use Muecke's phrase) in 
the lines: 
The Sea of Faith 
Was once, toot at the full, and round earth's shore 
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furl1d 
But now I only hear I 
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar... 
(Allott, 1965, p. 239-243) 
Finally the poem presents a grim, ironic contrast of optimistic hope 
dashed by cruel realisation: 
... for the world, which seems To lie before us like a land of dreams, 
So various, so beautiful, so new, 
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light, 
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain; 
And we are here as on a darkling plain 
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and fiýht 
Miere ignorant armies clash by night. (ibid. 
AlAboiigh tbim popm was probably wrfften aboO, Weiii, y yertr" before 1, ii. eral. itre 
and DoWna (1851 is Kenneth Allott's suggested (late) it was not published 
until 1867, indicating that Arnold was still prepared at this late (late 
to acknowledge its tenor as having validity. Me overwhelming cosmic. irony 
Itere is reminisceut of Momas Hardy's most pessimistic strain. But there 
remains one note of hope which I have omitted from the beginning of the 
final stanza quoted above: 
I ?. T 
Ah, love, let us true, 
to one anotherl... 
Here, in subjective terms, at the level of personal commitment, is the 
element that breaks through the pessimism of the grimly-drawn environ- 
ment, and holds the poem (albeit slenderly) in equipose. 
This positive element embryonically present in Dover Beach is more 
fully developed in the prose of Literature and Dogma in the stress oil 
the joy and happiness derivable from right 'conduct' - essentially a 
matter of right human relationships. Although there is a positive, 
optimistic strain throughout Literature and Dogma itis clearly not the 
same kind of optimism that we find in the theology of Leibnitz or of tile 
Third Earl of Shaftesbury, nor is it the more deeply entrenched (because 
more heavily assailed) Optimism of Cardinal Newman or the &venth Earl 
of Shaftesbury. 
General irony and the Zeitgeist 
The clue to Arnoldts orientation, and thus to the mode of his irony, 
seems to lie in the shift of perspective which he develops in his pres- 
entation of the Zeitgeist. A fuller discussion of this must await chapter 
9; but Muecke's observations on the development of General Irony are 
highly relevant at this point. As a result of the pressure of scientific 
development and technical progress, he ifrites: 
The world also came to be regarded as basically dynamic ... Mutability, 
, 
is now cast as the heroine, Progress, and the new villains are the 
obstacles to free growth and development; customsq laws, institutions, 
and to some extent even civilization, systematic thinking, and art. As 
soon as one begins to think of life as dynamic, anything that stabilizes 
life -will be deplored. Any kind of system, for example, will appear as 
a solidification of something esseiitially fluid and hence as a falsifica- 
tion arid an obstructioti. (Muecke, 1909, p. 126) 
EXcepting for the suggestion that anything fthat stablizes life will be 
deplored1p this virtually epitomizes Arnold's position - his satire is 
adopted in the service of the Zeitgeist; th 
+ rtliodoxy in defence of 
which he unleashes his shafts of ridicule is a semi-autonomouso dynamic 
conception: 
For (lie writes) it is what we call the Time-Spirit which is sapping the 
/A 
proof from miracles - it is the 'Zeit-Geist' itself. Iffiether we attack 
them, or whether-we defend them, does not much matter. The human mind 
as its experience -widens, is turning away from them. And for this reason: 
it sees. as its experience widens, how they arise. (Super V19 p. 246) 
His new satire defends fluiditY, 'not fixity: rightly sought, he suggests, 
'judgment comes almost of itself ... We are not beaten from our old opinion 
by logic, we are not driven off our ground; our ground changes with ust 
(my italics) (Super VI, p. 168). The very object of Arnold's special 
concern in Literature and Doxma - the Bible - is 'not rigid, fixed, but 
'fluid, passing, and literary' (Super VI, p-152). And here, perhaps, is 
our final clue to our understanding of Arnold's irony: tile Bible is Iliteraryl 
to Arnold while it remains a talisman to many of his contemporaries because 
his apprehension is literary. It is this mode of literary apprehension - 
part of Výiat Arnold means by the term 'culture' - that he seeks to Promote 
more widely. 
The title 'Literature and Dogmal could easily be 'Literature versus 
Dogma' because in a real sense (to be discussed more fully in Chapter5.7 
and 8) literature and dogma are incompatible. It is primarily the ironic 
element in literature which makes this so - particularly in modern lit- 
erature. To revert to Muecke: 
For most serious writersp whether poetag novelists, or dramatistaq irony is 
now much less often a rhetorical or dramatic strategy which they may or may 
not decide to employp and much more often a mode of thought silently imposed 
upon them by the general tendency of the times. ' (Mueekep 1969, p. 10) 
For Arnold, this mode of thought, I hope to show, was both inevitable (see 
chapter 9) and congenial. He enjoyed juggling with different and opposite 
points of view, juxtaposing themv evaluating them and either reconciling 
or (where this was impossible) simply reacýqnizing them. In this sense he 
is essentially a modern thinker. Muecke comments on the prevalence of 
irony of this kind in the first half of this century: 
The object of this ironic procedure might be to achieve a balanced all- 
round view, to express one's awareness of the complexity of life or the 
relativity of values, to express a larger and richer meaning than would 
be possible with direct statement, to avoid being over-simple or over- 
dogmatic, to show that one has earned the right to an opinion by showing 
that one is aware of its potentially destructive opposite. (Muecke, 1.970, p. 2h) 
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For Arnold, irony was partl. ), - a 'Sophisticated weapon at the disposal of 
satiret (in the old sense, but for a new purpose)p but he also belongs with 
the more modern General Ironists-who recognize 'that the world was not made 
with them particularly in mi . t1d. 1 fie may not have been prepared. to accept 
'the death of Godf, but he was happy to transmute the orthodoxg personal 
anthropomorphic God of his contemporaries into 'the stream of tendency by 
which all things seek to fulfil the law of their beingl or Ithe enduring 
power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness. ' 
His own means of Idefenting cosmic hope and despairl, in addition to 
transcending it through irony, was to stress the availability of love, help, 
spiritual and emotional nourishment to those prepared to pursue self- 
knowledge and right action# and unafraid to make the attempt to ? see life 
clearly and to see it whole' - incongruities and all. Ultimately, Arnoldý 
aims in Literature and Do"na, were irenic, seeking reconciliation-between 
clashing cultural values; while his means were ironic, attacking with 
satirical shafts the citadels of authoritarian dogma. As Basil Willey 
(1975) justly observes: 'like a good surgeon, lie destroyed only for pres- 
ervation's sakW. 
PART THREE 
SOME KEY CONCEPTS CONSIDERED 
17q 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE CONCEPT OF 'LITERATURE, ' 
000 A criticism of life. The endkaim of all literature, if one 
considers it, attentivelyq is9 in truth, nothing but that.. 
Matthew Arnold:, Joubert, 1864 
A society without a literature has that much less chance of embodying 
'within its temper and so-within its organization something of the 
fullness of human experience. We only know certain things by art- 
iculating them or bodying them out. This does not mean that we have 
to 'argue them out'. We may know some things only by approaching 
them metaphorically, as dramatic 'play'. 
Richard Iloggart: Speaking to Each Other, 1973 
Matthew Arnold makes high claims for literature as a source of 
value-acquisition; his view-of religious dogma for this purpose is 
correspondingly low. It is the object of this chapter to examine Arnold's 
view of the nature and function of literaturep enlarging the discussion 
to include the views of other significant writers on the subject as 
appropriate. Although, in considering the relation of literature to 
science and religion certain curricular implications will emerge in this 
chapterp the more specific discussion of literature and the curriculum 
is reserved for chapter 11. 
Nature and scope of litera: ture 
'Literature is a large word19 Arnold writes in an essay on Literature 
and Science (Super X, pp-53-73)v fit may mean everything Witten with 
letters or printed in a book. Euclid's Elements and Nevtonts Principia 
are thus literature' (P-58). It is certainly more than 'the study of 
belles lettres,... and other ornamental thingev of little use for any one 
whose object is to get 'at truth and be a practical man' 
(P-57). 
'Literaturelfor Arnold is the essence of Iculturelf the object of which is 
a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to knowp on all 
matters which most concern usp the best which has been thought and said 
in the world - and through this knowledge, turning a stream of 
fresh 
and free thought upon our stock notions and habits. 
(Culture and-jnarcýy, 
Super V, p. 233) 
This process is opposed to rigid, mechanical thinking and dogmatic 
assumptions, and isi above allp an inward operation employing 
the imagination 
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in conjunction with the intellect. 
In an essay on Joubert (Super III) Arnold speaks of literature as a 
riticism of life' for 'the end and aim of all literature, if one con- 
siders it attentively, is, in truth nothing but that' (p. 209). In other 
wordev in its imaginative presentation of an aspect of life a work of 
literature embodies implicitly an evaluative element contributed either 
consciously or unconsciously by the writer, by which the action is, so to 
speak, judged. By engaging extensively with literature a readerls judgmeatt 
in turn, is developed, for: 
the valuable thing in letters ... is the judgment which forms itself insensibly-in a fair mind along with fresh knowledge; and this judgment 
almost anyone with a fair mind, who will but trouble himself to try and 
make. acquaintance with the best which has been thought and uttered in the 
world, mayp if h6 is lucky, hope to attain to. For this judgment comes 
almost of itself; and what it displaces it displaces easily and naturally, 
and without any turmoil of controversial reasonings. (Super VI, p. 168) 
This is somewhat akin to TS Eliot's view that our reading, like our food, 
'affects us during the process of assimilation and digestion'. The power 
of criticism develops naturally, says Eliot (1953) because 
in the process of being affected by one powerful personality after another, 
we cease to be dominated by any one, or by any small number. The very 
different views of life, cohabiting in our minds, affect. each other, and 
our own personality asserts itself and gives each a place in some arrange- 
ment peculiar to'ourself. (p. 37) 
Such development depends, of course on relatively wide reading. In 
Literature and Dogm , Arnold insists that a cultured man will have %be 
hae. of so many books that he can afforj not to over-use and mis-use one', 
whether it is the Bible or any other. We need to gain from a wide acquain- 
tance with literature 'experience of the way in which men have thought 
and spoken' so that we learn Ito read between the lines' for: 
if we read but a very little, we 'naturally want to press it all; if we 
read a great deal, we are willing not to press the whole of what we read, 
and we learn what ought to be pressed and what not. Now this is really 
the very foundation of any sane criticism. (Super Vlf P-153) 
At times Arnold suggests that his own acquaintance with literature is a 
very random, hit-and-miss affair, writing nonchalently of being Ithrown 
on letters; thrown upon reading this and that' (p. 411); but this is a 
( 
stylistic pose adopted for polemical reasons; his recommendations else- 
'where for systematic reading are more convincing: 
culture is reading; but reading with a purpose to guide it, and with 
system. Heý does a'good work who does anything to help this; indeed, 
it is the one essential service now to be rendered to education. (p. 162) 
Central significance of poetry 
So far we have emphasized Arnold's concern for extensive reading; 
now it is necessary to focus upon what he regarded as central within the 
whole spectrum of literature - that i a, poetry. In an essay on IThe Study 
of Poetryl(Super IX) Arnold declared his belief that 'we should conceive 
of poetry worthily, and more highly than it has been the custom to 
conceive it' (p. 16i), since it is a medium destined more and more 'to 
interpret life for us, to console us., to sustain us'. Moreover, 'without 
poetry, our'science will appear incomplete; and most of what now passes 
with us for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry' 
(pp. 161-2). 
This last claim can scarcely be maintained since both religion and phil- 
osophy serve different functions from poetry, although they may in different 
ways interact with it. Arnold's point about the incompleteness of science, 
however, is justifiable since by definition science must be incomplete - 
a tentativet corporate analysist infinitely pursued. Whereas science 
is analytic, poetry is synthethic, and'its sustaining power, Arnold would 
argue, lies in its capacity to create 'whole' experiences, or at least 
satisfying illusions of completeness which help to interpret life to us. 
Science explores, poetry tells; Arnold's quarrel with dogmatic religion 
was that it sought to 'tell' in an area which, even more than that open 
to science, can only be imaginatively lexploredl; and whereas poetry 
admits that what it tells is only fictional - albeit meaningful fiction - 
dogmatic theology presented itself as fact. In thus competing with 
science dogmatic religion was vulnerable in a way which poetry could never 
be. Therefore, said Arnold: 
The future of poetry is immense, because in poetry, where it is worthy 
of its high. destiniesq our race, as time goes onj will 
find an ever surer 
and surer stay. There is not a creed which is not shakent not an 
t 2? - 
accredited dogma which is not sbown to be questionable, not a -received 
tradition which does not threaten to dissolve. Our religion has 
materialised itself in the fact, in the supposed fact; it has attached 
its emotion to the fact, and now the fact is failing it. But for poetry 
the idea is everything; the rest Is a world of illusion, of divine 
illusion. Poetry attaches its emotion to the idea; the idea is the 
fact. The strongest part of our religion to-day is its unconscious 
poetry (Saper IX, p. 161) 
If we allow for a certain amount of exaggerationt this passage expresses 
a profound insight with considerable prophetic accuracy in terms of the 
changing emphasis in theological. speculation during. recent decades. 
To take just one example from The Future of Catholic Christiani: ýy 
(1968), EI Watkin-ts view has moved a long way from that of his Victorian 
predecessors -when he writes: 'That so much in Scripture has been shown 
to be myth or legend does not disturb the Platonist who shares his 
masterts, valuation of myth as a vehicle for conveying truth beyond the 
grasp of reason' (p. 247); and again: #Scriptural statements... are human 
and fallible translations of spiritual insights into conceptual terms 
or their presentation in and through imagery, poetical and often mythical' 
(p. 234). Suck has been the degree of this shift of emphasis that this 
same Catholic writer is able to quote approvingly of the atheist 
philosopher, Bertrand Russell, who has arrived on a similar plane of 
thought from a different direction when he speaks of: 
the sense. of a mystery half revealed* of a hidden wisdom and glory, 
of a transfiguring vision in which common things lose their solid 
importance and become a thin veil behind which the ultimate truth of 
the world is dimly seen. It is such feelings that are the source of 
religion and if they were to die, most of what is best would vanish out 
of life. (quoted on p. 227) 
Russell is here speaking-about art, which he believes 'starts from 
instinct and rises into the region of the spiritt. 'The life of tile 
spirit, in its turn, centres round impersonal feeling as the life of the 
mind' (to which he is contrasting it) Icentres around impersonal thought#. 
Rassell's view of art and its spiritual significance expressed here is 
)lot f*r different from Arnoldls view of poetry as given in his essay on 
'Maurice de Guerin' (Super 111): 
The'grand power of poetry is its interpretive power; by which I mean, 
1? 3 
not a power of drawing out in black and white an explanation of the 
mystery of the universe, but the power of so dealing with things as 
to awaken in us a wonderfully full, new and intimate sense of them and 
of our relations with them. (pp. 12-13) 
In the same e, ssay Arnold develops his view of the moral influence 
of poetryq bhowing with respect to Keats and de Gu4rin how beauty and 
truth can be distilled from the suffering and. isolation of the poet 
and excesses of feeling shaped into artefacts with a healing and re- 
conciling power: 
I have said that poetry interprets in two ways; it interprets by 
expressing with magical felicity the physiognomy and movement of the 
outward worldt and it interprets by expressing, with inspired convic- 
tion, the ideas and laws of the inward world of man's moral and spiritual 
nature. * In other words9 poetry is interpretive both by having a natural 
magic in-it, and by having moral profundity. In both ways it illuminates 
man; it gives him a satisfying sense of reality... It reconciles him with 
himself and the universe. (P-33) 
Here 'natural magic' seems to express, in a heightened formp what Russell 
called 'instinct', and 'moral profundityl equates perhaps with the dimly 
envisioned lultimate truth' refe rred to by Russell. The ethical value of 
all this, it must be admitted, is 'in very general terms: we have so far 
been speaking of 'value' rather than 'values'. We might ask, too, 
whether in moral matters it is enough for man to be 'reconciled with 
himself and the universelp whether a sense of 'divine discontent' (to 
use Charles Kingsleyls term) might not be more appropriate as a spur to 
moral responsibility, and the amelioration of the human condition. 
Arnold's own poetry, in many instances, expresses discontent and question- 
ing of the status quo. Indeed he withdrew Empedocles on Etna because. it 
presented 'a continuous state of mental distress ... unrelieved by, incidentg 
hope, or iesistancel (Super I, pp. 2-3). This withdrawal was based on 
ArnoldIs critical conviction that poetry should be a source of joy - poss- 
ible even for a tragedy by its enoblement of the action. As well as 
presenting poetic truth a poem should be la representation from which 
men can derive enjoyment' (ibid. -, p. 
2). As he wrote in a letter to Clough 
(Lowry, 1932), 'There are two offices of Poetry - one to add to one's 
store of thoughts and feelings - another to compose and elevate the mind 
by a sustained tone, numerous allusions, and a grand stylef (P-100)- 
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This elevating function was for Arnold, it appears, its own moral 
justification. 
Poetry at its best an implicit 'criticism of life' 
If poetry is to achieve this quality of moral elevation it 
followed, for Arnoldq that '-we must also set our standard for poetry 
high, since poetry, to be capable of fulfilling such high destinies, 
must be poetry of a high order of excellence. We must accustom our- 
selves to a high standard and to a strict judgment' (Super IX, p. 162). 
It was in consequence of this aim that Arnold set up his much-debated 
'touchstones' approach to literary criticism. Although it is now 
commonly recognized that this is not a satisfactory way of evaluating 
the vast diversity of poetry that exists, it perhaps had the salutary 
effect of reminding readers that there are degrees of excellence, sound- 
ness and truth in poetry and that sound literary judgment is a valuable 
protection against charlatanism and mediocrity. Perhaps. it should be 
added that althought in this connectiont Arnold praised Wordsworth 
among other poets for cooperating 'with the benign tendencies in human 
nature and society' and being lefficacious in making men wiser, better, 
and happier' (Super IX, P. 55), he believed that the beneficial effects 
in question derived from those poems where the moral element was 
imRlicit rather than explicit. Once a poem begins to preach, to elab- 
orate an ethical system, to philosophize, 'however true the doctrine 
may be, it has... none of ýhe characters of poetic truth which we require 
from a poety and,, in. which Wordsworth is really strong' 
(ibid., p. 49). 
So pervasive is Arnold's respect for Wordsworth that we find him 
discussing him in his essay on Byron (Super IX); examining the kind of 
truth a poet is concerned with: 
It is the power with which Wordsworth feels the resources of joy 
offered-to us in naturet offered to us in the primary human affections 
and dutiesp and in the power with which, in his moments of inspiration, 
he renders this joy, and makes us, too, feel it; a force greater than 
himself seeming to lift him and to prompt his tongue, so that he speaks 
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in a style far above any style of which he has the constant command, 
and with a truth far beyond any philosophic truth of which he has the 
conscious and assured possession. (pp. 230-231) 
Arnold's essential point here seems to be that Wordsworth can-apprehend 
and express through his poetry more than he can comprehend or convey 
through. reasoned discourse of the potential for happiness in nature and 
human. relationships. Poetic truth works through limag inativereason', 
not through logical or philosophical reason; to be a just 'criticism of 
lifel it must combine Itruth and seriousness of substance and matterl 
with 'felicity and perfection of diction and manner' (ibid., p. 228). 
Thelhigh seriousnes sl (Super IX, p. 184)'Arnold, demands of the poet he sees 
in terms of 'absolute sincerity' - something which today critics feel uneasy 
about assessing, but -which for Arnold seems toýbe observation and reflec- 
tion without cant or hypocricy. There is something paradoxical, perhaps, 
in Arnold's Sophoclean concern to 'see life clearly and to see it whole, 
and his predilection for finding truth and beauty in constant combination. 
He praises Keats for perceiving 'the necessary relation of beauty with 
truth, and of both with joy' (Super IX, p. 214). ' Shortly afterwards he 
speaks of the ? vital connection of beauty with truthl (ibid. ), and here I 
think he is on safer groundt if we take 'vital' to mean life-giving, 
life-enhancing; but to speak of a necessary connection between, beauty and 
truth is to ignore the unlovely, ugly and sordid aspects of life as 
reprehensibly as some advocates of 'realism' exaggerate them. 
This perhaps gives some justification to WF Connell's (1950) 
complaint that Arnold did not attempt to explain thow good poetry can 
beget a love of truth' (p. 184). Howevery as he continues Connell 
himself goes astray: 
From the fact that it has a peculiarly emotional appeal it might equally 
be contended that good poetry is sometimes inimical to a rational con- 
sideration of the facts with which it deals. The duty of being true to 
ourselveso and of learning to see things as they really arev which is an 
important element of Arnold's doctrine of culturev as it was also of 
Plato'43, implies rather a search for truth freed from its emotional 
trappings. (p. 184) 
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This prosaic observation suggests an inability to distinguish between 
'truth' and Ifact'. Poetry is concerned with the truth of experience not 
the isolation and analysis of the 'facts' which provide its context - 
even if such, & thing were possible. Ekperience is too complex to yield 
to any kind of comprehensive factual analysis: even the saturation 
techniques of Virginia Woolf and James Joyce involve an immense amount of 
selection from the potential context. The kind of truth with which lit- 
erature is concerned cannot be 'freed from its emotional trappings'; 'to 
see things as they really are' is for human beings to see them imbued with 
emotional significance. Moreover, any would-be 'rational consideration, 
of the facts of life which fails to take account of this will dangerously 
oversimplify them. 
Freedomand form: the autonomy of poetry 
'Catherine Runcie (1969) shows a better understanding of Arnold's 
view of literature in her discussion of myth and poetry: 
Arnold sees myth as a shape# as a structurep bearing. and retaining 
original and permanent human significance or value - naturalistic or 
ethical or intellectual or affective. As a formulation of this value 
of man in the universe, my-th is what the poet goes back to in his search 
for actions that have meaning-for all men. Poetry, theng which Arnold 
says is the imitation of a noble and significant action, of which the 
source is most probably myth, is the representation of nothing less than 
the. permanent value of being and being human in an alien world... (P-30) 
It is the artistic structure that gives me aning and a satisfying sense 
of permanence to human actions and purposes in 'an alien world'. In 
discussion of the theory of symbols, Northrop Frye (1965) makes a 
somewhat similar point. Ile distinguishes between 'descriptive or ass- 
ertive writing' vixere. the emphasis is directed loutwardsl, to the world of 
facts, and 'imaginative', hypothetical or literary writing where 'the 
standards of outward meaning are secondary'. 
In literature, questions of fact or truth are subordinated to tile primary 
literary aim of producing a structure of words for its own salcep and tile 
sign-valuesof symbols are subordinated to their importance as a strucLure 
of interconnected motifs. Wherever we have an autonomous verbal structure 
of this kind, we have literature. (P-74). 
The comnunication of poetic 'truth' depends upon a shared convention; 
'the poet ... depends, not on descriptive trutht but on conformity to his 
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hypothetical postulatesl, (P. 76), and the value of his product is that- 
its linward meaningr the self-contained verbal pattern, is the field of 
the responses connected with pleasure, beautyt and interest' (P-74). 
This is perhaps what Arnold intended in his affirmation of a necessary 
relation between beauty and trutho since for Arnold, toov literature is 
an inward operation relatively independent of the outward world of 
facts. 
It is important to recognize, however, that literature is only 
relatively independent of tbe world of facts; it is not absolutely 
independent of it, otherwise it would simply be a game. Me word 'playl 
applied to drama suggests the game-element in literature; but no play, 
poem or novel can escape the incorporation of factors from real life 
however fantastic it may seem in its presentation of them - and in its 
transmutation of fact into fiction'it can scarcely fail to embody an 
evaluative element. It is this evaluative element which constitutes the 
Itruthl of poetry. Hence the term 'poetic justice'; ' although the truths 
presented through literature are often more subtle and sophisticated than 
that suggested by the simple formula of success and happiness for the good 
and the punishment of failure for the bad. The truths and complexities 
of literature, while retaining their own essence and structure, must 
reflect the truths and complexities of life. As Samuel Johnson 
(1756) 
observedg 'literature is a kind of intellectual light which, like the 
light of the sun, may sometimes enable us to see what we do not likelf 
Like the sun, it 'makes the world aware of itself1v to quote the words 
of Jean-Paul Sartre (1967) who contin4esq 'It is by means of the book 
that the members ... of society 
(are)... able to get their bearingsp to 
see themselves and see their situation' (p. 118). It is an offering 
freely made 'to the free judgement of all men, the reflective self- 
awareness of a classless society' (ibid. ), an(i as such is the means of 
man's Ispiritualiationt: 
Spiritualization, that is, renewal. And there is nothing else to 
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spiritualize, nothing else to retiew but this multicoloured and concrete 
world with its weight, its opaqueness, its zones of generalization, and 
its swarm of anecdotes, and that invincible Evil, which gnaws at it 
'without ever being able to destroy it. The writer will renew it as it isv 
the raw, sweaty, smelly, everyday world in order to submit it to freedoms 
on the foundation of a freedom. ' (p. 118ý 
The freedom'of the writer is in one sense limitless (since anything 
imaginable can be written down)v but in another sense limited by the 
laws of credibility. If literature promises too much, sooner or later it, 
lets its reader down; if it promises too little it fails to elevatet 
nourish. or sustain. We feel most secure with literature that 'sees 
life clearly and sees it wholelý 
Ge6rge, Steiner (1969) takes IA Richards to task for suggesting (in 
Practical Criticism) that 'the question of belief or disbelief, in the 
intellectual senseq never arises. when we are reading well. If unfortun- 
ately it does arise, either through the poetfs fault or our own, we 
have for the moment ceased to be reading and hav e become astronomers, 
or theologians, or*moralists, persons engaged in quite a different type 
of activityli On the contrary, George Steiner asserts9 'we have become 
men' for tto read great literature as. if it did not have upon us an urgent 
design ... is to do little more than to make entries in a librarian's 
catalogue' (p. 90), and he goes on to quote approvingly froin a letter by 
Kafkao. 'what we must have are those books -which come upon us like ill- 
fortune, and distress us deeplyq like the death of one we love better 
than ourselvesp like suicide. A book must be an ice-axe to break the 
sea frozen inside us'. (ibid. ). I thinkg in faett that the two views 
are not irreconcilable. IA Richards seems to have been calling for 
what Coleridge expressed as a 'willing suspension of disbelief"in order 
to meet the writer halfway;, he was not, I thinkg asking the reader to 
abdicate all moral responsibility in his final evaluation of the work read. 
But it is time to return to Arnold's view of literature, and in particular 
to the distinctions he drew between literature and science. 
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Poetry and science 
IPoetry', said Arnold (Neiman, 1960), Igives the idea but it gives 
it touched with beauty, heightened by emotion ... Science ... adds thought 
to thought,. accumulates the elements of a synthesis which will never 
be complete' (p. 230). If this-synthes'is is 'touched with beauty and 
emotion' it has, in Arnold's view, 'passed out of the sphere of 
science'. This seems a little unfair to science. Were is no doubt 
that scientific discoveries, or syntheses - however tentative by 
nature - have inspired their discoverers with a sense of their beauty 
and aroused a powerful emotional reaction in them. We have only to 
recall Archimedes cry of 'Eureka)' on witnessing the tell-tale dis- 
placement of his bathwater; and Paulo Uccello, the first artist 
to put the science of perspective on a sound footingg is said to 
have aroused his longsuffering wife in the middle of the night ex- 
claiming: 'Oh what a wonderful thing is this perspectivell For 
Arnold, however, it seems that such reactions would have been well-nigh 
incomprehensible, 
For the study of letters (he wrote in School and Universities on the 
Continent (Super IV) is the study of the operation of human force, of 
human freedom and activity; the study of nature is the study of the 
operation of non-human forces, of human limitation and passivity. 
The contemplation of human force and activity tends naturally to heighten 
our force and activity; the contemplation of human limits and passivity 
tends rather to check it. (p. 292) 
WF Connell (1950) rightlk observes that this assumption that 'the 
study of humanactivity is on the whole inspiring, whilst the study 
of natural forces is for the most part depressing' 
(p. 172) is 'a 
curiously partial one'. Since even Arnold had admitted that his own 
. peom %pedocles on Etna' was depressing he should be prepared to accept 
that both the humanities and the sciences were equally capable of dep- 
ressing - or for 'that matter inspiring. From which Connell fairly 
concludes: 'All that Arnold has really said, thereforev'is that inspiring 
things tend to inspire, and depressing things tend to depress - which is 
not a particularly important contribution to the philosophy of education' 
I ?v 
(p. 172)o While I agree with Connellts criticism voiced here, it may be 
possible, toýsalvage a shred of truth from Arnold's contention if we 
consider not the methods. and discoveries of science but the results 
of a great deal of scientific development in terms of technology, for 
example in (say) high-rise buildings or nuclear reactors which have 
often. been found to have a dwarfing$ alienating effect on human beings 
where one might have expected them to. be inspiring. A further mitigating 
point on Arnoldle behali is that he recognized, despite his rather ill- 
judged comparison, the importance of both scientific and humanistic 
pursuits for attaining the 'full circle of knowledget desirable in 
education (Super IV, pt 291). 
In Literature and Science (Super X), two decades later, Arnold 
spelt out the importance of science more fully. He was concerned in this 
essay to defend literature from those scientifically-minded educational- 
ists who wanted to go beyond the modest claims of Thomas Huxley and oust 
the humanities in favour of a staple diet of science in schools: 
There is..,. really no quarrel between Professor Huxley and me an to 
whether knowing the great results of the modern scientific study of 
nature is not required as a part of our culiuret as well as knowing the 
products of literature and art (P-59)9 
so long as a balance is maintained, and science in not made the be-all 
and end-all. 
Moreover, it is quite true that the habit of dealing with facts, which 
is given by the study of nature, is... an excellent discipline. The 
appeal, in the study of nature, is constantly to observation and ex- 
periment; not only is it said that the thing is so, but we can be made 
to see that it is so... (p. 60) 
This recognition is in line with Arnold's own practicet as his concern 
I*or OveriFication' in Literature and Dogma bcars witness. Earlier in 
the same essay on literature and science Arnold affirms that 'there 
can be no doubt that ... all learning is scientific which 
is systematically 
laid out and followed up to its original sourceso and that a genuine 
humanism is scientifict (P-57). He could scarcely go further in 
seeking to reconcile the claims of the two main area of the 'circle of 
knowledget: both become identified with its complete circumferencel 
t? l 
This again is reflected in Arnold's practice: his aims in Literature 
and DogMay however much he may have fallen short of them, were those of 
a ? genuine humanism' in his disinterested concern to get back to 
'original sourcest and examine anomolies systematically. 
Nevertheless, Arnold was concerned to distinguish between those 
studies which tended-to issue in conduct (through their concern with 
goodness, beauty, self-preservation) and those purely 'instrument- 
knowledgeal which could pursue their way as isolated specialisms aloof 
from the business of living although potent ially 'invaluable as 
instruments to something beyond# themselves (p. 63). Formal logic, 
the study of Greek philology and pure mathematics are cited in this 
category, and all are felt to be remote from the interest and aptitude 
of the bulk of mankind. 
The natural sciences do not, however, stand on the same footing with 
these instrument-knowledges. Experience-shows, us that the generality 
of man will find more interest in learning that, when a ýaper burns, 
the wax is converted into carbonic acid. and water, or in learning the 
explanation of the phenomenon of dew, or in learning bow the circula- 
tion of the blood is carried on, than they find in learning that the 
genative plural of pais and I)as does not take the circumflex on the 
termination. And one piece of natural knowledge is added to another, 
and others are added to that, and at last we come to propositions so 
interesting as Mr Darwin's famous proposition that 'our ancestor was 
a hairy quadruped furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably 
arboreal in his habits. ' Or we come to propositions of such reach 
and magnitude as those which Professor Huxley delivers, when he says 
that the notions of our forefathers about the beginning and the, end 
of the world were all wrong, and that nature is the expression of a 
definite order with which nothing interferes. (p. 64) 
Despite, the playful reference to Greek grammar and our hairyt arboreal 
ances tor, Arnold is essentially serious hereq sharing with Huxley a 
deep respect for the 'definite order with which nothing Interferes' 
in natureq and willing to assert in Literature-and Dogma, as we hhve 
seen, the then highly controversial proposition that 'miracles do not 
happen', on the strength of this. 
Arnold welcomed the frank acceptance of the advances of science; 
the Zeitgeist was moving that way, and there was no point in resisting 
it. And in any came, 
the more that men's minds are cleared,. the more that the results of 
1 ? 2- 
science are franky accepted, the more that poetry. and eloquence come to 
be received and studied as what in truth they really arev - the criticism 
of life by gifted men, alive with extraordinary power at an unusual 
number of points;, - so much the more will the value of humane letters, 
and of art alsog which is an utterance having a like kind of power with 
theirs, be felt and acknowledgedg and their place in education be 
secured, (pp. 68-69) 
Arnold therefore sought to avoid Unvidious comparisons' between the 
merits of the humanities and those of science, but despite this he 
felt more concern for the 'student of the natural sciences only' than 
for a student whose-education was restricted to 'humane letters' for 
the former twill probably be unsatisfiedt or at any rate incomplete' 
(p. 69) as the result of his restriction to factual knowledge alone. 
Thomas Huxley (1849)9 on his parto recognized that fthere are other 
forms of culture beside physical science; and I should be profoundly 
sorry (he added) to see the fact forgotten# or even to observe a 
tendency to starvep or cripplet literary, or aesthetic, culture for the 
sake of science'. 
The rift between science and the humanities 
In the nineteenth century the language of science and the language 
of literature were relatively undifferentiated: Darwin and Huxley 
coulil express feelings alongside the facts th+pounded without any 
suggestion of incongruity. In the early twentieth centuryt however, 
cognitive and affective aspects of discourse began to be much more 
sharply differentiated, literature largely confining itself to subjec- 
tive emotion and science to the objective exposition of facts and 
related theories. -Increasing specialization accelerated the process 
of dichotomization and exacerbated its ill effects making comiminication 
between adherents of the arts and of the sciences increasingly impossible 
so that by 1959 it was possible for CP Snow 
(1964) to write about 'two 
cultures' inhabiting two mutually incomprehensible worlds* In a post- 
atomic age his alarm was justifiable: 
It is dangerous to have two culturea which can't or don't communicate. 
In a time when science is determining much of our destinyt that is whether 
we live or die, it is dangerous in the most practical terms. Scientists 
lqs 
can give bad advice, and decision-makers can 
' 
It know whether it is good 
or bad. On the other handI, scientists in a divided culture provide a 
knowledge. of some potentialities which is theirs alone. All this makes 
the political process more complex, and in some ways more dangerous, 
than we should be prepared to tolerate for long, either for the purposes 
of avoiding disasterag or for fulfilling - what is waiting as a challenge 
to our conscience and goodwill -a definable social hope. 
(p. 90) 
As a novelist and technological administratorg CP Snow was well qualified 
to-express an opinion on this problem. The education system with its 
overspecialization and exam-biased curriculum was entrenching the positioil. 
Library services, at the centre of comminication structures, became increas- 
ingly sensitive to certain aspects of the problem, and DJ Fosicett (1964) 
in Science. Humanism and Libraries made an outright plea for the humaniza- 
t. ion of scientific writing: 
By seeking to make their prose lobjectivelt scientists deny themselves 
the support of the human faculty of experiencing emotiont which brings 
their attempts at communication to a monotonous level of colourless 
uniformity. They find interest and often inspiration in their work; if 
they stress this aspect, instead of trying to eliminate itt they will 
catch the imagination of other men, and by mutual effort we shall break 
down the barriers of understanding. (P-32) 
While fully recognizing the reasons for scientific detachment and 
care. in expositiong Foskett was concerned about the growth of esotericism 
and the entrenchment of hostility between arts-trained and science-trained 
writers and readers. He was able to quoteg to exemplify his own princi- 
ples of good conmuinicationg the successful mid-century lectures of 
Professor R0 Kapp on the presentation of technical information: 
Kapp's well-known series of lectures aroused great interest, and their 
popularity shoved how widespread was the concern over the communication 
of ideas., His theory of Functional English marked a new step forward, 
for although he drew a distinction between Functional and imaginative 
English, he allowed the writerg even of a scientific paper for scien- 
tists, to draw on the resource of his imagination and to use colourful 
words and metaphors if they were appropriate. (p. 4) 
I am not qualified to judge how far scientific writers have followed this 
lead, bat it is saddening to note the degree to which writers on literature 
are tending towards obscurantism and quasi-scientific jargon in what seems 
to me to be an inappropriate attempt to keep up with the Zeitgeist. If 
open cross-cultural communication between science and the humanities in 
to be developed we need a reduction of jargon in both camps and a 
willingness among both to be vulnerable - to 'risk' being understood 
even if this seems to reduce owstature. Thisq if we revert to Arnold's 
terminology, is the function of culture, for (as he writes in Culture 
and Anarchyq, (Super V))Ithe men of culture are the true apostles of 
equality 
The great men of culture are those who have had a passion for diffusing, 
for making prevail, for, carrying from one end of society to the other$ 
the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time; who have laboured to 
divest knowledge of all that was harshl uncoutho difficult, abstract, 
professionalp exclusive; to humanize itt to make it efficient outside 
the clique of the cultivated and learned, yet still remaining the beat 
knowledge and thought of the time... (P-113) 
This kovening function was the value of literature# understood in 
its widest sense. Arnold could point to his friend Huxley. as Foskett 
could cite Professor Kapp as scientific exponents of this principle; 
he himself sought to humanize #theology' in Literature-and Dogma, - 
seeking. to make available to critical minds what the Zeitgeis had 
estranged them from. Arnold saw this process as necessary not only 
between specialisms within society, but between classes: culture, in 
this senset is 'the social ideal (Arnold's italics), &It seeks to do away 
with classes; to make the beat that has been thought and known in the 
world current everywhere; to make all men live in an atmosphere of 
weetness and light, where they may use ideas, as it uses them itself, 
reely, - nourishedv and not bound by them' (p. 113)- Writers and readers 
share a responsibility in this process. Readers by, keeping their critical 
faculties and powers of apprehension alert through wide acquaintance with 
literature. Writers by making 'harsh' knowledge palatable; 'uncouth' 
(i. e. unfamiliar) knowledge more widely current; 'difficult, knowledge 
easier to comprehend; 'abstract" ideas accessible through concrete 
examples; 'professional' knowledge more generally available; and 'ex- 
ýIusivel . knowledge accessible universally., IPlenty of people will try 
to indoctrinate the masses with the Bet of ideas and judgments constit- 
uting the creed of their own profession or partyl (p. 112)o Bat culture, 
unlike 'religious and political organisations' works by making its ideas 
available freely - so that people are 'nourished, and not bound by them' (P113). 
Literature_*- science and do&a 
We have seen something of Arnoldlsýview of the relation between 
literature and science, and of the continuing significance of this; 
it is now necessary to look at the distinction he makes between litera- 
ýture, and theological dogma. His main contention is that theologians 
h4ve. sough t to make a science out of data which belongs more properly 
to the province of art. In his Preface to God and the Bible (Super VI) 
Arnold tells how 'Mr Gladstone complains that objectors to the Athan- 
asian Creed seem_to forget# most of them, 11that theology is a sciencev 
and that it therefore has a technical language which is likely to be 
grossly misunderstood by those who have never made it a subject of 
study"' (p. 387). Inevitably Arnold objects to the esoteric basis of 
this complaint. However, his reply goes well beyond this objection: 
. *. the fact is, that their science is a science going gravely and 
confidently upon the uncorrected data of a time of imperfect observa- 
tion and boundless credulity, and, therefore, the more formal and 
technical it getst the more hollow it is. And the hollowness of the 
results exhibited by theologians is more apparent than the reason 
thereof, and a clear-headed man can often perceive that what the 
theologians say is futileg, although he may never have been led to see 
that the untrustworthiness of their miraculous data is the real cause. 
(P-387) 
Science makes effective progress to the extent that every new discovery 
harmonizes and verifies the structure of data extantf or, when new 
findings contradict and challenge current structurest by modifying its 
data to take account of them. With theology there in no means of 
either verifying or challenging the data; it simply becomes out of 
step. if thoughtpatterqs current in society change with the Zeitgreist. 
The only way to renew the insights of religion when this haýpens 
is to go back to the original data and examine them afresh; and the prin- 
ciple data of theology are in biblical scripture. However, wben v6 examine 
this material we find that 
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The language of the Bible ... is literaryg not scientific 
language; 
language thrown out at an object of consciousness not fully grasped, which 
inspired emotion. Evidently, if the object be one not fully to be graspedv 
and one to inspire emotion, the language of figure and feeling will sat- 
isfy us better about it, will cover more of what we seek to express, than 
M6 
the language of literal fa 
, 
ct and science. The latiguage of science 
about it will be below what we feel to be the truth. (Super VI, p. 189) 
The sub-title of Ijiterature and Dogma (from which this quotation comes) 
is significantly: 'Towards a better apprehension of the Bible' (my 
. 
italics). 'Apprehension' is a literary mode of understanding, 
particularly appropriate to poetryt as distinct from. leomprehension, 
which is more fittingly applied to the understanding of discursive ex- 
position and rational thought. We apprehend the 'language of figure and 
feelingIt responding to it with imaginative insight., Imagery, symbolism, 
personification are appropriate means of expressing religious insights: 
the important thing in to recognize them for the literary devices they are, 
and not to mistake them for history and science: 
Wordsworth calls the earth "the mighty mother of mankind", and the 
geographers call her "an oblate spheroid"; Wordsworth's expression 
is more proper and adequate to convey vhat men feel about the earth; 
but it is not therefore the more scientifically exact. (Super VI, 
footnote, pp. 189-190) 
If the Bible is read in this spirit, the language of mir4clep prophecy, 
figure and feeling is not-likely to be made the data of an exact science 
uch as Mr Gladstone (and the Bishops of Winchester and Gloucester) would 
efend. 
Once such a 'science' is ossified into a system its vulnerability 
to change and to other systems of a similar nature makes it'inevitably 
the subject of special pleading in a demeaning effort to maintain it. 
Worse still, the system as a whole, with all its imperfections,. may be 
used ? to indoctrinate-the massestv to #bind them' to thought forms which 
may be inimical to the climate of the age. Hence Arnold' a determination 
to go back to the roots of the scriptures and to 'treat the evidence 
about the Canon with a mind resolutely free and straightforwardp, deter- 
mined to reject nothing because it does not suit usq and to proceed as 
we should proceed in a literary enquiry where we were wholly disinteres- 
ted' (Super VII, p. 263)- On the whole Arnold does this with a high degree 
of detachment and faimindednesog*although of course he is not entirely 
I7 
disinterested since he is deeply concerned to salvage the Christian 
values - the principles of conduct from the theological edifice he 
subjects to scrutiny.. He believest howeverg that these values will 
be better sustained 'by the suggestive poetic power of scriptural 
literature than by the crumbling theological edifice of Christian 
theological. dogma. 
Arnold shared with Keats a papacity described by the latter as 
'negative capability' (Forman, 1948) - 'that isq. vhen a man is capable 
of being in uncertainties, mysteries$ doubtaq without any irritable 
reaching after fact and reason' (p. 72).. Able to tolerate our human in- 
capacity to 'express the in-expressible' Arnold was offended by 4olmas 
which assertively categorised and classified ineffable mysteries in 
neat compartments fýr general consumption. The tentative offerings 
of literary expression were more. congenial to him.. In this respect 
ag&In he would have agreed with Keats: tWe hate poetry' (the 
latter wrote) Ivhich has a palpable design on us ... Poetry should be 
great and unobtrusiveg a thing which enters into one's soul, and does 
not startle or amaze it with itself, but with its subject' (Letterst 
p. 96). Dogma - whether it is Christianp Muslimt or Marxist - has a 
'palpable design on us': to keep us securely within the fold of the 
elect, and to dictate the criteria for judging the outsiders. Its 
laudable intention is to protect and preserve society for the benefit 
, of 
the individuals composing it; but the more foreefully'it pu rsues 
this end, the more the wellbeing of individuals Is likely to be 
overlooked in favour of the abstract general 'good'. Literature on 
the other hand, is concerned to present the predicaments of particular 
individuals in specific situations not as fact, but as imaginative 
possibility. 
Arnold would certainly not have agreed with Lenin's view of literature: 
that fit must become a cog and a screw 
'of 
one single great social demo. - 
cratic machine' (Eagletont 1976) or with lienints assertion that literature 
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must be #inseparably linked with the working-class movement'. Arnold's 
concern for democracy and for the 'masses' (the working class) could 
certainly not have been brought to justify the promotion of literature 
Iwith a palpable designI on its readers - lintellectual food prepared 
and adapted to 'talk down to' the masses he would have called this. And 
to Lenints observation that Ithe freedom of the bourgeois write r is only 
masked dependence on the moneybag' he would doubtless query the 'freedom' 
of the writer in. a Marxist-Leninist state. ' Similarly with Marxist 
critic. ismg one cannot imagine Arnold agreeing far with Plekhanov 
(Lukaes, 1962) that 'the first task of a critic is to translate the 
idea of a given w6rk of art from the language of art into the language 
of sociology, to find what may be termed the social equivalent of the 
given literary phenomenon'. There is scarcely room for a tfree spontan- 
eous flow of consciousness# in such a procedure; it is (to quote a fav- 
ourite phrase of Arnold's) 'mere machinery'. Finally, on this issue, 
writing of the Soviet Futurists and Constructivistso Eagleton (1976) 
declares that I ... the enduring achievements of these men stand as a 
living denial of bourgeois criticism's smug assumption that art is 
one thing and propaganda anothert (P-57). Oddly enough, Arnold's single 
reference to 'propaganda' suggests that he did think that art and pro- 
paganda could go together. Writing approvingly of the novelist George 
Sand (Super VIII) he asserts that Iher own place is of course with the 
party and propaganda af organic change. ' Howeverv he proceeds, with 
his. characteristic sense of balance: 'But George Sand felt the poetry 
of the past; she had no hatreds; the furies, the folliesq the self- 
deceptions of secularist and revolutionist fanatics filled her with 
dismay' (p. 234). They also filled Arnold with dismay. Me need to 
adapt to, and to promote change was a constant theme of Arnold; but 
he sought 'organic change' not the'bitterness of revolution. Dogmatismg 
either for the establishment or for revolutionary change# vere equally 
foreign to his way of thought. 
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Importance of the novel 
In discussing ArnoldIs view of literature -we have inevitably tended 
to concentrateg untilthe mention of George Sand, on poetry* Arnold's 
references to the novel are far from prolific, and some of them are 
decidedly offputting. Writing in Literature and Dogmaq for example of 
Ithe. lovers of miracle and predictiontp Arnold describes them ds 
like people who have fed their minds on novels or their stomachs on 
opium; the reality of things is flat and insipid to them, although 
if is in truth far grander than the phantasmagorical world of novels 
and of opium. Dut it is long before the novtl-reader or the opium- 
eater can rid himself of his bad habits, and brace his nerves ' and 
recover the tone of his mind enough to perceive it. Distress and 
despair af the loss of his accustomed stimulant. are his first 
sensations. (Super VI? P-379) 
Novels, for Arnoldt like religion for Karl Marxq would appear to be 
little more than 'the opium of the people'. Geoffrey Tillotson (1951) 
observes that 'to the last Arnold expected a little too much of the 
Greeks and not enough of George Eliot' (p. 146). This view would, at first 
sightt appear to be justified when, writing of George Sand (Super X), 
Arnold asserts that 'the novel is a more superficial form of literature 
than poetryl. Howeverg he continues 'but on that very account more 
attractive' (P. 189). Further on still he speaks of her 'ample and 
noble style' resting upon 'large and lofty qualitiesl, and links her 
name with his most admired writers: 
In -the literature of our centuryq if the work of Goethe is the greatest 
and wisest influence, if the work of Wordsworth is the purest and most 
poetic, the most varied and*attractive influence, isq perhapaq the work 
of George Sand. (p. 189) - 
Arnold contrasts her with the realist Balzae, whose motive is merely 
'curiosity' and compares her own motivation as a writer with that of 
Shakespeare# Homer and Dante - to 'let the good prevail', presenting 
'the life of man in its fulness and greatness' (p. 188). He doest then, 
regard the novel as a source of moral powert a storehouse for the 
acquisition of values. 
Two main reasons account for Arnold's apparent disparagement of the 
novel. " against poetry. One vas the plethora of second-rate novelistic 
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material being produced by the popular press in the mid-Victorian 
. period, much of it sensational, superficial and moralistic in tone. 
Another vas the fact that the giants of the Victorian novell then 
coming into. its own, vho stood head and-shoulders above the general 
'run of fictionaliserep were Arnold's contemporaries# and Arnold was 
loath to offer criticism of the contemporary literary scene: 'No man 
(he wrote) can trust himself to speak of his own time and his own 
contemporaries with the-same sureness of judgment and the same prop- 
ortion as of times and men gone by' (Super VIII9 p. 248). When Arnold 
does break away from this principle it is a sign of exceptional interest. 
It is therefore something of a surprise to find him commentingg in an 
article entitled 'Copyright' (Super IX) On Henry James and 'those 
charming novels of his which we are all reading' (P-130)- In fact, 
as Kathryn Hanson has shown in an unpublished PhD thesis (1976) Arnold 
shared with this American novelist tan intellectual and personal 
relationship which has had a lasting significance for English and 
American letters' (P-350). She shows among other things that -they 
shared a 'deep affinity for a broadp disinterested criticism, (and) for 
moral art which embodied lifet (ibid. ). Wminating their long friend- 
ship Henry James was 'one of the two Americans present at the funeral', 
of Matthew Arnold (p. xviii). 
Againt Arnold writes of 'Count Leo Tolstoi' (Super XI)f during his 
lifetime, describing him as ta great soul and a great writerl 
(P-302). 
On the subject of the novel Anna Karenine Arnold writes of Tolstoils 
'extraordinary fineness of perception ... his sincere fidelity to 
it' and 
'the absolute reality of his-perso. naL; qs and their doings' 
(p. 285) and 
develops the theme that the Christian values embodied in Tolstoils 
novels are unliIVly to be made any more accessible in the more philo- 
sophical works to which Tolstoi wa, beginning to devote the latter part 
of his life. Arnold praises the d: licacy as well as the imaginative 
penetration of Tolstoils novel-writing, comparing his discreet handling 
of sexual relations in Anna Karenine with what he describes as 'the 
Lubricityl of Flauberits Madame Bovary, a 'taint' in the latterls work 
vhich he believes 'Petrifies feeling's Of the portrayal - of Tolstoils 
Karenine he-commends #the treasures of compassiont tendernessp insight, 
vhich alonep amid such guilt and miseryl can enable charm to subsist and 
to emergel (p. 293); *. and of Levinels mental history in the same novel he 
vrites: 
Points raised in that history are developed and enforced; there is an 
abundant and admirable exhibition of knowledge of human nature, pene- 
tratin insightv fearless sincerity, wit, sarcasmv eloquence# style... 
p. 2971 
However, there is no explicit moralising in the novel 'no fine sentiment, 
at once tiresome and false' (p, 292) and the reader is free to extract 
the values implicitly embodied in the complexity of the human relation- 
ship presented. 
As a final example of Arnold's hidden interest in the novel we 
turn to an article appear/ing in the periodical Nineteenth Century in 
1881 (Super IX) vhere Arnold, refers to one of Dickens's novels for the 
first time. - 
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What a pleasure (he writes) to have the opportunity of praising a work 
so sound, a work so. rich in merit, as David Copperfield, l ... Of the 
contemporary rubbish which is shot so plentifully all round usp we cang 
indeed, hardly read too little. But to contemporary work so good as 
David Copperfield we are in danger of perhaps not paying respect enough, 
reading it-Tfor who could help r. eading it? ) too hastily, and then putting 
it aside for something else and forgetting it. Miat treasure of gaiety 
inventiong lifeg are in that booki what alertness and resourcel what a 
soul of good nature and kindness governing the vholel 
Arnold's enthusiasm for this 'admirable work' derived in part from his 
personal experience as School Inspector of establishments typified by 
Salem House and of 'educators who are more or less like Mr Creaklet. He 
knew all too well that 'the great mass of the middle part of our community, 
were Ibrought. up in establishments of this kindIp and he rejoiced in 
Dickens's exposure of the stunting. effects of such misguided teducationl. 
Some establishments may be exceptionally better than Salem House# and some 
teachers and pupils escape from Salem House unscathed, or else recover later; 
-i 
But, on the mass, the training produces with fatal sureness the effect 
of lowering their standard of life and impairing their civilisation. It 
helps to produce in them, and it perpetuates, a defective type of religion, 
a narrow range of intellect and knowledge, a stunted sense of beauty, a 
low standard of manners. (pp275-6) 
In ArnoldIs description of David Copperfield as 'a charming and 
instructive book' we have the essential clue to his estimate of the 
value of literature - the novel as well as poetry; it 'charms' through 
the embracing magic of its imaginative presentationg and it 'instructs' 
through the values embedded in the actions portrayed - values vhich the 
reader is free to discover, assessp accept or reject at will. 
Conclusion 
To sum upt literature (or 'letters'),, for Arnold, covers a wide 
range and true culture demands a broad acquaintance -with it. Through its 
implicit criticism of life, literature (of which poetry is the quinteR3- 
ential expression) is a prime source of value acquisition which I it 
achieves almost unconsciously, by an inward, interpretive process. 
Encounteredt as it should beg at its beatt it has a moral and spiritual 
influence - 'religious' in quality, though untramelled by dogmatic 
presuppositions. It sustains us by creating satisfying wholes, giving 
form to the perplexing chaos of experience. Compared with science, 
literature is rýitively autonomous, being bound not by facto but by 
the credibility of the truths it embodiest vhich are essentially 
truths of subjective emotion rather than of cognition of the external 
world. It is not hostile, but complementaryt to science; and we should 
seek to gain a unified conception of both, In an increasingly scientific 
and mechanistic worldt however, it becomes more and more important to 
develop the openness and flexibility of mind which a wide acquaintance 
with literature can promote, 
2-0.1 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE CONCEPT OF IDOGMAI 
A federation of Christians is inconceivable in -which each member 
retains his own opinions and private judgment in matters of faith. 
Pope Pius XI, 1928 
Religion ... as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean for 
us tthe feelings, acts and experiences of individual men in their 
solitudep so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation 
to whatever they may consider the divine. 
William James:. Varieties of Religious Experience., 1902 
Men are united by their doubth, but divided by their certainties. 
Peter Ustinovq in a Radio broadcast, 1976 
A. prime value of literature, it has been suggested above, is to 
Icharmland 'instructs at the same time by combining imaginative vision 
with implicit value judgments 'which the reader is free to discover, 
assess, accept or reject at will'. Moreovert generally speakingo good 
literature presents a number of valuest often ironically juxtaposedg so 
that the reader is obliaed to make his own discoveries and assessments 
in order to extricate such values as are personally meaningful to him, 
This is the fundamental difference between literature and dogmaq which 
must now be considered. 
Defining dogma 
The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (1933) defines 'dogma' an a 'body of 
opinion formulated and authoritatively stated; tenets or principles held 
collectively'. And 'philosophical dogmatism# it defines as 'a system 
of philosophy based upon principles dictated by reasoning alone; 
opposite to scepticism. More generally a way of thinking based upon 
principles which have not been tested by reflection'. The essential 
features here are that dogma is collectively held opinion, sanctioned 
by authority, which may be incorporated in a system developed by a priori 
reasoning closed to sceptical reflection. David Edwardag Canon of West- 
minster, has recently defined Idogmal more fully in respect to religion 
as: , 
A term of Christian theologymeaning a doctrine claiming authority over 
any private opinion or hesitation in a believer's mind. It is held to 
2-0q- 
be a religious truth established by divine revelation and defined by the Church. If the believer rejects itv he becomes to that extent a heretic* The term is applied specially to the decreesq mainly about Christology, of the Ecumenical Councils, of the Church (325-787)... (Bullock and Stallybrass, 1977, P-179) 
Canon Edwards then distinguishes between Roman Catholic emphasis on Papal 
authority and Protestant emphas: Ls on the authority of the Bible before 
adding the significant observationg coming as it does from a dignitary 
of the Church of England, that 'in religion as in other fields, the term 
is today mostly used pejorativelyt to mean, an opinion held on , grounds,, 
and propagated by methodst which are unreasonable' (ibid. ). This shift 
of opiaion within the Church would have delighted Arnold who saw lortho- 
dox divinity' as 'an immense literary misapprehension' (Super VI, p. 276) 
because: 
Dogmatic theology is an attempt at both literary and scientific criticism 
of the highest order; and the age which developed dogma had neither the 
resources nor the faculty for such a criticism. (Super VI9 P-345) 
Lord Salisbury had disquieted Arnold by declaring the common contemporary 
assumption of the Church that 'religion is no more, to be severed from 
dogma than light from the sun# (Super VI, p. 279). Arnold's contention 
was that, 'dogma' and ttrue doctrine' are far from synonymous; the current 
dogma was a 'false criticism' conflating facts and assumptions. fLearned 
pseudo-science applied to the data of the Bible is beat called plainly 
what it is, - utter blunderl (Super VI, P-384) he wrote in Literature 
and Dogma and 'to try to tinker such criticism only makes matters worse... 
The hour for softening downg and explaining awayt is passed; the whole 
notion-work has to got (ibid. ). The quality of our religion must be 
judged on the basis of our psychological experience not on the degree of 
our adherence to theological authority (Super VIp p. 73). No series 
of maximsp not even, for example, the Sermon on the Mount is, to be 
exhibited as the ultimate sum and formula of Christiankj. Christianityq 
and scriptural writings related to it, are a sourcep not a bond. 
Dogma distinguish_ed from principles 
However, as Arnold writes in Literature and Scienc-et 
everyone knows how we seek naturally to combine the pieces of our 
knowledge together, to bring them under general rules, to relate them to j2rinciples (my Italics, RGA); and how unsatisfactory and tiresome 
it'would be to go on for ever ... accumulating items of fact which must 
stand isolated, (Super Xt pp62-63) 
Why then should not the facts of Christianity be brought together in the 
form of jointly acceptable dogma? Firstlyp because the 'facts' (as dis- 
tinct from the ideas or-individual beliefs) can now scarcely be 
positively known - 'the truth on these matters is something so relative' 
and secondly,, because by fixing them in a system we lose, the fluidity, 
the 'spontaneity of consciousness' that, enables us to gather freely from 
our interpretation of them'the nourishment 'we need. We must distinguish 
at this point between 'dogma' and Oprinciplesl; dogma makes a demand 
upon us -(intellectually and emotionally); a principle invites our in- 
terest and concern. This view comes out clearly in Arnold's discussion 
of Emerson, of whom he writes: 
He is the friend and aider of those vho would live in the spirit. All the 
points in thinking which are necessary for this purpose he takes; but he 
does not combine them into a system, or present them as a regular philos- 
ophy. Combined in a system... they would be less useful than as Emerson 
gives them to us... (Super X, p. 177) 
The 'points' Emerson makes (or the principles he adumbrates) are 'true 
and fruitful' if understood in a certain high sense' (ibido). In other 
words the responsibility for apprehension and interpretation rests with 
the individual reader. 
Karl''Popper (1966) makes an observation (in connection with the 
doctrine of equality) which is helpful here. "'Equality before the law" 
is not a fact but a political demand based ul! on a moral decision; and 
it is quite independent of the theory - which is probably false - that* 
"all men are born equal"' (p. 234). Popper's viewl as a rational 
Inunanitarian, is of course in favoitr of adopting the principle of equality 
before the IdwIfts a, principle inviting our moral allegiance. A further 
example of this important distinction can be given by reference to a 
LOS' 
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sample of dogma, or its modern equivalent, lideologyt, taken from the 
'writing of Lenin: 
When people have become accustomed to, observe the fundamental principles 
of social life ahd their labour is sQ productive that they will volun- tarily work. according to their abilitles ... there will be no need of any 
exact calculation of the quantity of products to be distributed to each 
of its members; each will take freely 'according to his needs'. (quoted in Niebuhr, 1963, p. 194) 
Admirable as the vision may be, it is essentially a dogma, since, 
although it is expressed authoritatively as a 'fact, it is cast in the 
unverifiable domain of the future. It can be compared however with the 
-principle 
incorporated. in the well-known dictumt 'From each according 
to his-ability, to each according to his needs'# which simply invites 
our moral allegiance without demanding it. To take a further step we 
can move from dogma, through principle, to the expression of the same 
idea in literature, for example in the parable of the 'Labourers in the 
Vineyardl (Matthew XIX, 30-XX, 16) or the parable of the ILast Judgmentl 
(Matthew XXV). In theme literary presentations the lideal to aim at and 
govern practicel signified in the principle above is given a concrete 
human dimension by its embodiment in character and narrative. 
Arnold's aversion to dogma 
Arnold's abhorence of dogma in manifest in his life and writing 
in numerous instances. His aversion to the Thirty--nine Articles is 
referred to in chapterIO (p. 2.63); and Edward Walford tells us that. at 
Balliol Arnold 'used to say that the strict imposition of creeds had 
done more to break than to unite churches and nations and families' 
(Chambers, 1947, p. 6). His close friendt Arthur Clough (we are told in 
the same work) 'resigned his Fellowship and Tutorship at Oriel in 1848 as 
a resu It of recurring scruples about the obligation of subscription to 
the 39 Articles imposed upon University men' (p. 26) at that time. In 
Culture and Anarchyq Arnold balances the Hellenic virtue of the 'free 
spontaneous flow of consciousness, t against the Heýrew virtue of 'strict- 
ness of conscience' (with its inherent danger of rigid and unthinking 
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dogmatic adherence to rules). lie objects in the same work to Mr Frederic 
Harrisonts Jacobinism-twith its fierceness, and its addiction to an 
abstract system' (Super V, p. 109), * On the other hand he delighted 
in the fact. that. French schools vere largely undenominational (Super II, 
P-83) and so freed from the pressures of religious dogmatism. His 
metaphorical objection to Imachineryl is in the same vein: 
Faith in machinery is, I said, our besetting danger; often in machinery 
most absurdly dispropoxtioned to the end wbich this machineryt if it, is 
to do any good at 'all, is to serve; butalways in machiýxery, as if it 
had a value in and for itself. What is freedom but machinery? what 
is population but machinery? what is coal but machinery? what is wealth 
but machinery?, -what are even religious organizations but machinery? 
(Super V, p. 96) 
'What', he might have added* 'is downa but machinery? ' 
Occasionally Arnold lapses into dogmatism himself: 'Miracles do 
not-happetypt is surely a dogmatic statement - though for most of us, 
perhaps, more readily verifiable from experience than its contrary. At 
least he tried not to dogmatise. He was concerned when his sister Jane 
thought his-third Oxford Professional lecture on Homer 'too dogmatic' 
in toneq and later in the published introduction to his inaugural lecture 
in the Poetry Chair he apologizes for the style ', which is that of the 
doctor rather than that of the explorer, ... a style vhich 
I have long 
since learned to abandon' (Chambers, 1947, P. 70). 
Support for doma 
To return to Church dogmav however, there was no shortage of voices 
in Arnold's day to support it. Cardinal Nevmanq whom in other respects 
Arnold admired, saw dogma as the vital centre of religionj writing in 
Apologia Pro Vita Sun, (1864, p. 11): 
From the age of fifteeng dogma has been the fundamental principle of my 
religion. I know of no other religion; I cannot enter into the idea of 
any other sort of religion; religion, as a mere sentimentp is to me a 
dream and a mockery. 
*Oddly enough, the orthodox Quarterly Revie regarded. Arnold himself as 
a representative of Jacobinismi 
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Faith, for Newman, was fin its very nature, the acceptance of ubat our 
reason. cannot reach, simply and absolutely upon testimony', a view with 
which Arnold strongly disagrees (Super VI, Pe347) because it provides 
(for others, of not Newman) an open passport for unexamined dogma. 
Among the reviews of Arnold'-s Literature and Dogma, comes a spirited 
defence of religious dogma:. 
For what are dogmas, after allf but ments highest thoughts about religion - 
the thoughts of the Church formulated and set down in order respecting 
those Divine relations out of which all religion comes, and into which, 
when we make it a subject of reflection it always runs. (P-Lac ýoodsý 
Edin iurgh Magazinjq, vol CXIII, no. DCXCIlq June 1873, p. 6811) 
From another anglep Thomas Carlyle (writing in relation to Chartism) 
supplies a powerful supporting argument for dogmatism: ISurelyt (he 
writes) 'of all "rights of man", this right of the ignorant man to be 
guided by the wiserg to be gently or forciblyt held in the true course 
by himt is the indisputablest'. This is probably the most pervasive 
argument presented in favour of dogmaq although (pace Carlyle) not the 
least disputable. RH Thouless (1951) provides a better argument in 
its support: 
Every religion has a systematised body of beliefs (its dogma); a 
system of emotional reactions to the objects of these beliefs; and its 
system of ways of behavior (the religious rite). All three of these are 
organically connected together. Religious dogma is not merely a set of 
intellectual propositions; it is also a statement of the possibility 
of religious ways of feeling and of the effectiveness of religious. 
modes of behavior, and it cannot be understood properly unless con- 
sidered in conjunction with these ways of feeling and behaving. 
(p. 406) 
Thouless points out that the individual's religion# including its dogma, 
is 'largely taken over (by the process of group suggestion) from his 
social environmene; but that for each individual an experiential and a 
rational element I are brought to bear on the system (most probably at 
adolescence) so that the 'system is accepted and modified or tcOL11y 
rejected according to how far it satisfies the requirements of these 
influences' (P-407). Howeverg as he points out laterp 'We should not 
invite people to accept a spiritual interpretation of the universe merely 
because such a belief will make them more moralg happier, or better 
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adjusted; it is to be accepted nnly if we believe it to be truct (P. 1109). 
A view which accords closely with Arnoldis. 
A criticism somet imes levelled against Arnold (as against other 
liberal critics) is that he is liable to accept or reject scriptural 
material item by item to suit his own presuppositions and theories. 
It would be better, it. is arguedg to accept the Canon as a vhole. This 
argument can readily be countered by que5Lng whether the acceptance as a 
whole of the scri. ptural canon (to suit the presuppositions involved in 
accepting it) in the face of internal and external evidence to the con- 
trary is any more valid. Surely the sharing of presuppositions by more 
people does not in itself make them more valid; any more than their 
sharing by fewer people makes them less valid. 
Opposition to Christian dogmatism and its effects 
An argument against Christian dogm .a occurs - from a quite different 
standpoint - in JS Mill's On Liberty (1859) where he writes that 
Its ideal is negative rather than positive, passive rather than active: 
Innocence rather than Nobleness; Abstinence from Evil rather than ener- 
getic Pursuit of Good; in its precepts... 'thou shalt not' predominates 
unduly over 'thou shalt'. In its horroy- of sensualityp it made an idol 
of, aseeticism which has been gradually compromised away into one of 
legality. (Klingopulosp 1964, pp. 45-46) 
The negativeness Mill objected to was sometimes all too evident in the 
contemporary scene. Witness the Manifesto drawn up by EB Nsey in answer 
to the liberal churchmen"s publication Essays and Reviews 
(1860). The 
liberals (Frederick Templet Benjamin Jowett and others) had queried the 
damnatory clause of the Athanasian Creed among other things. In answer, 
EB Pusey and 119000 clergymen signed a Manifesto (1864) as follows: 
We# the undersigned presbyters and deacons in holy orders in the Church 
of England and Ireland, feel it to be our bounden duty to the Church 
and to the souls of men to declare our firm belief that the Church, in 
common with the whole Catholic Church ... teachesq 
in the words of our 
Blessed Lord, that the "punishment" of the "cursed" equally with the 
"life" of the "righteous" is "everlasting",, 
Six years later the Roman Catholic Church went further than this in its 
promotion and support of religious dogma by promulgating in July 1870 the 
Doctrine of Papal Infallibility, by which the Popels official teaching was 
thenceforth to be regarded as divinely inspired authority. 
The personal and social effects of the contemporary emphasis on 
dogma were varied. Doubtless there were I many in a changing social and 
intellectual climate who found comfort and security in the authority of 
Church dogma. Bat this was by no means universal. Beatrice Webbýt for 
example, writes in )4v Apprenticeshiý (1938) how she felt at 14 that 
'intellectual difficulties of faith make it impossible to believe. I 
am very, very wicked; I feel (as) if Christ can never listen to me 
again' (p. 83). Such troubled personal sentiments find expression in 
numerous diaries of, the period. At the social-political levelq the con- 
flict finds expression in legal ense tments. Even ten years after the 
appearance of Literature and Dogmaq the Editor of the. Freethinkert George 
William Fook, was sentenced in March 1883 by Sir Hardinge Giffordq Q. C. 
(afterwards Lord Halsbury) to twelve months imprisonment for blasphemy. 
In the judgels. eyes if (among other things) 'by writingg or verbally, 
anyone denies the existence of the Deity, or denies the providence of 
God' this itself constituted blasphemy. In passing sentence the ju I dge 
expressed his regret that 'a man gifted by God with such great ability, 
should have chosen to prostitute his talents to the services of the 
Devil'. (Bonner, 1934) 
The demise of dolonatic credence within the Church 
No doubt events such as this helped to set in motion the steady 
d, emise of credence in Christian dogma which the past century has witnessed. 
Arnold's Literature and Dogma expressed a malaise that was being experien- 
ced by a good many questioning but conscientious minds. George Eliot, 
who had translated Strauss's theological workp wrote in a letter to her 
orthodox father of he r respect for Christ's teaching, but confessed that 
she found the theological doctrines surrounding him pernicious. Lord 
Tennyson in In Memoriam expressed an increasingly common sentiment when 
he vrote that 
? -(0 
There lives more faith in honest doubtp 
B elieve mep than in half the creeds... 
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Thomas Huxley, discussing science and immortality, in a letter to Charles 
Kingsley (September 23,1860) adopted a totally open-minded stance: 'I 
neither deny or affirm the immortality of man. I see no reason for 
believing in it, but, on the other hand, I have no means of disbelieving 
it. ' By 1898, the year of Arnold's deathq many scientific minds had 
swung completely away from Christian dogma. HG Wellsp for example, asks: 
How did we see the world in 188? Time had opened out for us, and the 
Creationg the Fall of Man and the Flood, those simple fundamentals of 
the Ju&o-Christian mythology, had vanished. For ever. Instead I saw 
a limitless universe throughout which the. stars and nebulae were 
scattering like dust, and. I saw life ascending, as it seemed, from 
nothingness towards the stars. (Wells, 1946ý P-13) 
This is not the place to trace in detail the winnowing process that 
Christian dogma experienced within. the Church, interesting as it is, 
especially in the acceleration which took place in this century under 
the influencet for example, of'Braithwaite's &Ririciat's View of the 
Nature of Religious Language (1955), Van Buren's The Secular Meaning 
of the Gospels (1963) (with its similarly linguistic preoccupations)', 
and Bultmann's work (195'0) Idemy-thologizingi scriptural literature. 
John Robinson, the Bishop of WoolwichI4 Honest to God (1963) was the 
popular climax of the process in England9 and John Hick's The Myth of 
. 
God Incarnqrtlýt a recentq more advanced development by a group of theo- 
logians writing in a similar strainp incorporates close parallels to 
ApnoldIs views on the language of religion. 
A century after the publication of Literature and Dogmap the Guardian 
(26/4/73) published some figures from a Report of the Anglican Consulta- 
tive Council which claimed 32.5 million nominal members of the Church of 
hhgland in the United Kingdom. The latest figure available for East er 
communicantav howeverg was 1,814,000, suggesting a realp active member- 
ship of some 5 per cent of the community. On the other hand a Sunday 
Times Opinion Research Centre poll. (quoted in the same article) showed 
that-Ionly 18 per cent of those questioned regard themselves an unbelievers 
or don't knows: and even in the age group 16-24, where religious affinities 
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have been assumed to be vanishing, 17 per cent had said a prayer the 
day before. Of this group alone 57 per cent held some*form of religious 
belief. 1 The leader vriterr suggests that it may be that 'the majority 
of British people vho profess a religious belief are undecided about 
'what it is and do not vish to have to declare it in specific formularies'. 
They may even velcome a degree of archaism in religious language Ito 
disguise their ovn imprecision of feeling'. The final paragraph of 
the article is a significant comment on the attitude to religious dogma 
generally prevalent in the United Kingdom today: 
Persons can (1) believe in God and His continued sustenance of the 
universe; (2) believe that Christ's teaching, if followed, would lead 
to a kinder world and a happier individual; (3) believe that the natural 
laws were suspended for Christ's incarnation and death; (4) believe that 
we inhabit a spiritual as well as a material world and that, for example, 
prayer has its own incomprehensible efficacy. It is a rare man nowadays 
vho accepts all four of these propositions. It would probably turn out 
to be a-very usual man who held oney twoq or three. By making a require- 
ment of church membership acceptance of the whole canon, and in words 
vhich allow no reservationst the Church of England may exclude many who 
would like an affinity with the Church and in general assent to what 
it says and does. (The Gl=dian, 26/4/73) 
Such is the view of AN Whitehead (1954) vho wrote that 'it is death to 
religion to insist on a premature stage of precision', adding the ironic 
comment that 'the vitality of religion is shown by the way in which the 
religious spirit has survived the ordeal of religious education' (p. 50). 
That was in 1929. ' The Quardiants statistics suggest that in certain- 
indefinable respects it is still surviving. In America from time to time 
there are even occasionalt though quite iigorousq campaigns# to turn the 
clock back and #bring back the religious creation theory into science 
teaching' (seeg e. g. Times Educational Supplement (9/3/73))- However, 
leaving aside such extreme proposals, it is probably true to say with 
Canon HC Imce (1960) that within the Church 'the relevance of Christ 
today depends on what he van and vhat he taught rather on miracles or 
dogma'. 
Ideology: the new dogma 
So far the discussion has been conducted virtually on the basis that 
dogma is a phenomenon confined to the Christian Church. But this is far 
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from the case. Under the name of ideology it continues to take innumerable 
forms within the multitudinous '-isms I current in the modern world - Marxism, 
Communismg Mohammedaniamp Buddhism, Racismw Behaviorism, and so on (almost) 
ad infinitum. (It is not suggested that all '-isms' are always dogmatic; 
but that there is generally in each of them a dogmatic or ideological 
strain promoted by at least some of its adherents. ) 
According to Daniel Bell (Bullock and Stallybrass, 1977) the word 
lideology... has been variously used to characterize ideasq ideals, beliefs, 
passionav valuest We I tans chauungen, religions, political philosophies (and) 
moral justifications'. It signifies therefore (in John Plamenatz, words) 
'a family of concepts'. Bell points 6u+ Mannheim's distinction between 
'particular' ideologies (based on the united self-interest of specific 
groups within a community in respect to a particular shared concern, e. g. 
that of 'small businessmen') and 'total ideologies' or WeltansPhauungen 
characterising 'complete commitments to a way of lifel (ibid. ). He also 
quotes Lionel Trilling who, as ah Arnoldian scholarp is of particular 
interest here, In Trilling's view ideology is 
the habit of showing respect for certain formulas to which, fo Ir various 
reasons having to do with emotional safetyq we have very strong ties of 
whose meaning and consequence in actuality we have no clear understanding. 
(Trilling, 1950) 
If, in in this senset virtually identical to dogmag that I wish to discuss 
ideology here. 
Such ideological formulas, bidding for unquestioning adherence in 
return for emotional securityv are often systematically linked vith a 
measure of what Arnold called Aberalaube (or extra-belief). An an examplet 
in place of the Victorian Christian Aberglaube. - 
'And the earth shall be filled with the glory of God 
As the waters cover the sea... I 
we have the Marxist-Conwinist Aberglaube, of Utopian predictions based on 
'economic-historical necessity'. Presuppositions of this kind creep into 
Marxist criticism almost unnoticed. Eaglesion (1976) provides a fairly 
recent sample: 
zj ((- 
The social relations of feudalism ... become an obstacle to capitalism's development of the productive forces# and are burst asunder by it; the 
social relations of capitalism in turn impede the full development and 
proper distribution of the wealth of industrial societyp and will be 
destroyed NE socialism. (p. 61) 
I have italicized the element of unverifiable prediction 'which in con- 
junction with its authoritative tone characterizes ideological dogma. 
Lukacs (1962) provides an example in a slightly different veinj: 
Today's historical novel has arisen and is developing amid the dawn of a 
new history. -This applies not only to the Soviet Union where the tempes- 
tuous development and vigorous construction of Socialism have produced 
the highest form. of democracy in human history. Socialist democracy.. -(P-344) 
Here the ideological value judgment I-have italicized in the second 
sentende would be difficult, or impossible, to verify; and the momentous 
time-division implicit in the first sentence exhibits. and demands a measure 
of Aberalaube to be appreciated. Ideological presuppositions no doubt 
permeate most literary, ciiticamp at one level or another, but the Marxist 
literary criticism of Lukaes (despite its many excellencies) readily ex- 
emplifies a number of the traces of potted ideological thipking-charac- 
teristic of this genre. He. writes, for examplet of 'Scott's exceptional 
and revolutionary epic ifts' (ibid. ); the literary path of Walter Pater, 
however, 'leads indirectly but surely into imperialist decadence... f (p. 246) 
We-learn that 'even in socialist reality capitalist prose is still a factor 
to be reckoned with' (p. 348); and that elsewhere Ithe historical novel 
of our day, despite the great talent of its best exponentsp still suffers 
in many respects from the remnants of the harmful and still not entirOly 
vang 
I 
uished legacy of bourgeois decadencet (P-17). 
Before examining some of the effects of this kind of ideological 
thinking it is necessary to look briefly at its counterpart on the other 
side of the ideological fence. A pamphlet produced by Dr Frank Buchman's 
Moral Re-Armament movement in the early 1960's provides copious examples. 
Here is a typical sample of two-valued orientation characteristic of 
ideological thinking: 
There are two ideologies bidding for the world today. One is Moral 
z1'r 
Re-Armamentp which believes that God's Mind should co , ntrol 
the world 
through human nature that has been changed; the other is Communism, 
which believes that man's mind should control the world thr uh human 
nature that has been exploited. One or the other must win. 
0 fp. 
i) 
Moral Re-Armamentbelieves that 'Only a new spirit in men can bring a 
. new spirit, 
in industry' with 'national service replacing selfishness, 
and lindustrial, planning based upon the guidance of God'. According 
to Dr Bachmang 'When labour, management and capital become partners 
under God's guidance, then industry takes its true place in national 
life' (P-13). Thus unitedo 'every man can know the immediate action 
he can ýnd must take' (ibid. As well as neatly solving all industrial 
problems, this ideology meets the needs of the military sector: 
If the free world is not to be out-manoeuvred by this new and very 
powerful weapon, ideology, we must meet the enemy on his own ground and 
with the sameweapons. That weapon is Moral Re-Armament. If we can 
unite the ideological and military factors we will h, ave a real defence 
of freedom. We will achieve peace and be able to build a new world. 
(P-18) 
According to Moral Re-Armament the 'only way' to deal with 'such a 
corrosive thing' as Communism is 'with an ideology diametrically opposedt 
(P-31). This ideology provides 'fresh faith that free men with God's 
guidance and only with God's guidan ce will yet re-make the world and 
achieve lasting justice and an honourable peace for all menl (ibid. ). 
The Aberglaube in this needs no stressing nearly two decades later. 
It is, howeverp tempting to clutch for emotional security to sharply-cut 
lines of thought and action such as Moral Re-Armament proposes; and 
difficult to sort out the genuine elements for concern in relation to 
its opposite ideology centred on Moscow from the less genuine promotion 
of immediate material benefit to investors in the, industrial-military 
complex linked conveniently with the Pentagon. It would be helpful, 
perhapat if the pamphlet gave advice on how to distinguish 'God1s guidance, 
from Dr Bachman's. 
It is sometimes possible, by hindsightv to find classical examples. 
of ideological Aberglaube. This is true of a pamphlet, 1966 In Reviewq 
Published by the United States Information Servicet the text of which begins: 
When historians one day chronicle the Vietnam conflict they are likely to write that 1966 was the year in which the Viet Congand North 
Vietnamese armies lost the Initiativeg their momentum and any chance 
of winning the -war, (P-3) 
Whatever the phrase 'winning a war'. may mean philosophically, it is 
. clear 
(a ddeade or so later) that, politicallyq this piece, of ideological 
Aberglaube failed to materialize* 
Some effects of do=a_t_ie thinking in the modern world 
With modern ideology as with Victorian dogma the mere personal 
allegiance'to a dogmatic system of one kind or another is not a matter of 
great concern. The individualizing process described by Thouless (p. 
above), comes into effect without necessarily incurring harm to others. 
There may even be a benificent aura shed on society aIaa result of an 
individual's dogmatic adherence, as when in the early seventies of this 
century the late Bishop of Glohcester (the modern counterpart of Arnold's 
butt) 'asked people to pray for rain'. in order to prevent an all-white 
South African cricket tour, in accordance with his anti-racist principles 
coupled with a particular conception of the nature of prayer. There is 
a dogmatic element in the Bishop's conception of prayer in that it would 
be difficult to verify its efficacy (sincet for e xamplep others may have 
been praying for sunshine). Howevert it must be assumed that the Diety 
would approve the message (its being in line with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights) even if events failed to sanction the medium. 
. 
But there is a big difference between adopting dogmatic system for 
. oneself - be it Christian or Communist - and imposing it upon others by 
political, legal or social sanctions. Inquisitions, sackings and intern- 
ments are among the bitter fruits of imposed ideologies. At peAaps the 
milder level of such sanctions a report from Rome in The Guardian 
(17/10/73) tells of the transfer of a primary school teacher 'from one 
Milan school to another because she had refused to teach religious educa- 
tion or to attend lessons given to her class by an outside "spec ialist 
in religion"'. She is reported to have said in her defence: 11 believe 
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in the teaching3 of the Gospel, but I'm embarrassed to hear the recitation.. 
of laws. and dogmas which are used like policemen regulating traffic'. 
(A sentiment virtually identical with that expressed by-George Eliot 
a century ýLgo (see p. 2.10 above)tand of course close to Arnold's point 
of view. ) 
More alarming, of courset was the hounding of Communists in the 
USA during the McCarthy era in the 1950's, and the contemporary intern- 
m6ni of Soviet dissenters in mental hospitals. Arthur Milleris playq 
The. Crucible is a powerful example of literature in opposition to the 
dogma qf McCarthyism - of historical symbolism indic ting ne, o-contemporary 
fact. The ISamizdatf, or private underground publication system in the 
ýSSRt is a continuing indictment of the political-ideological suppression 
of liberal Soviet'writers. A -Ouardian article 
(18@11#75) based on an 
Amnesty International Reportq Prisoners of Conscience in the USSR: their, 
treatment and conditionj (1915) reported that there are 
at least 10,000 political and religious prisoners in the Soviet Union todayt 
and the 120 people known outside the Soviet Union to have been confined in 
psychiatric hospitals for political reasons are-'only a fraction' of the 
total number of prisoners treated in this ways 
When consulted about this report, Mr Lev Smirnov, the Chairman of the 
Soviet Supreme Court, refused to discuss '"what you call a book that is 
vulgar falsification and defamation of Soviet reality and Socialist 
legitimacy'll. To detail accounts from the Amnesty International Report 
And from a similar brief report The Internment of Soviet Dissenters 
in Mental Hospitals (Mee, 1971) would make a sorry catalogue of suffering 
which it is not the object of this thesis to undertake; but one or two 
items from the latter report will serve to put the ideological problem 
in, perspective. 
The Constitution of*the USSR9 Article 123v states that:. 
In conformity with the interests 'of - the workeraq and in order to strengthen 
the Socialist orderp the law gaarantees the citizens of the USSR: 
a) Freedom of speech, 
bý Freedom of the pre'sav 
(c 
Freedom-of association and assemblyp 
d) Freedom to hold processions and demonstrations in the street.. (Meel. 1971t 
P. 
r- 16- 
. 
This article is basically in line with Article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Hovever, a problem arises in cases of 
political or social dissent from what is regarded as the norm of 
Socialist ideology. Dissent from a norm is, by (rigid) definition 
labnormalitylp which by extension is equated with Imadness'. If this 
is regarded as a danger to the social fabrict incarceration and 'psy- 
chiatric treatment' are said to be-justified. In the words of X. 
Krushchev, quoted in Pravda (24 Mayp 1959): 
A crime is a deviation from the generally recognized standards of behaviorg frequently caused by mental disorder. Can there by awdis- 
eases# mental disorders, among certain men in communist society? Evidently. there can be. If that is so# then there can be delinquencies 
characteristic of people of an abnormal mind. (quoted in Meet 1971, P-1. ) 
'Special' psychiatric hospitals, in close cooperation with the X. G. B. 
are believed to be appropriate establishments for the treatment of 
such1disorders' and'delinquencies'. The privately circulated 'Samizdat' 
Chronicle for June 1969 affirms that: 
All these "special" psychiatric hospitals have the following features 
in common: - political prisoners, although of sound mindq are kept in 
the same wards as seriously disturbed psychiatric patients (who may 
have committed... marder, rape, thuggery); if they will not renounce 
their convictions they are subjected, on the pretext of treatment, to 
physical torture, to injections of large doses of laminazinet and Isul- 
fazinelt which cause depressive shock reactions and serious physical 
disorders' (quoted in Mee, 1971) p-4) 
Oetails of these physical disorderaq and of physical and mental tortures 
inflicted'undei-the guise of treatment arethen given in the report. 
Also extracts from a number of case bistorieso) A liberal Soviet Commmist 
Ivan Yakhimovichp of unexceptionably correct backgroundt was concerned at 
the trial of Galanskov, and Ginsburg and otheraq and at ideological supp- 
ression, of Isamizdat',, 'and wrote a letter to the Central Committee of 
the CIPSU' calling for the extension of freedom of. publication: 
0 ne should not undermine the confidence of the masses in the Party (he 
wrote)... "Samizdat' can be abolished in only one way: by developing 
democratic rights, not by strangling them; by respecting the Constitution 
and not by violating it; by putting into practice the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights to which Vishynsky agreed on behalf of our State and not by 
putting it under an extinguisher. (quoted by Mee, 1971, p. 13) 
Two months later (March 13,1968) 'be was expelled from the party' and 
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dismissed from his postt. A year later he vas arrested, and ton 
April lot, 19690 he undervent an out-patient psychiatric examination'. 
'Extracts from the Doctoral statements describing Ilia condition' include 
the followipg observations: 
According to objective information he often took part in meetings with 
critical reamrks about various questions sometimes of an originalv ir- 
relevant and trifling nature. In January 1968 the patient became 
involved in the spread of slanderous fabricationsv smearing the Soviet 
government and the social system. In March 19680 on account of this, 
he was excluded from the Party and dismissed from his post as chairman 
of the collective farm. However, the patient continued to spread 
scandalous fabrications and wrote essays and letters in similar vein... 
The patient does not deny his guilt and considers himself to be in 
good health ... Ile underestimates his actions, not understanding their 
treacherous, criminal character. 
09* Preliminary diagnosis of the commission: Schizophreniat paranoid 
syndrome? (quoted in Meet 1971, p.. 14) 
A significant response to this manifestation of collective ideology 
emerges from a later diagnostic statement emanating from the Serbsky 
Institute: 
In his depositions when interrogated the patient pointed out that in his 
actions-he pursued only one aim, the triumph of trutht for truth 'must 
be worked out with our own brains, must be felt in our own hearts, by 
every cell of the body'. The patient ended his testimD. ny with a poem 
by Yevtushenko... (quoted in Mee, 1971*9 P-15) 
The subjectivity of 'literary truth' is seen here in determined opposition 
to the 'collective objectivity' of an ideological Weltanschauung. 
To quote briefly from just one other case: after Vladimir Borisov 
had "signed an appeal to the United Nations in May 1969, and a letter 
in defence of Grigorenkof he was 'subjected to psychiatric examination'. 
At his subsequent trial 'it was stated that the 11samizdat" in his poss- 
ession, and his signatures to protest letters could only be regarded as 
evidence. of mental disorder or hooliganism' 
(Chronicle, December 1969, 
quoted in Mee, 1971, p. 16). 
This brief, but necessary, excursion into some of the effects of 
enforced political ideology raises the question asked by one of the 
characters in George Orwell's novel, Nineteci Eil-flity-Four: 
*At this date Yakhimovich was ia Riga City Psychiatric Hospital. 
For after all, how do we know fliat two ant] two make four? Or that the 
force of gravity works? Or thatthe past in unehangeable? If both 
the past and the external world exist(only in the mind I and if the mind itself is controllable - what then? Orwell, 1962p p. 84) 
Perhaps 'the mind itselft is 'controllable#; perhaps not. Education, as 
I understand it9 works on the basis that it is not; 'that it can, and 
should, be nourished, but not controlled. However, the tendency of the 
human mind to seek security and imposed order in periods of tension and 
anxiety (as for example during adolescence) must be recognized as a 
constant danger to the development of autonomy. To quote WD Wall-(1977): 
Certain systems of education have exploited this tendency by continuous 
indoctrination coupled with a dominant leadership. The drive to self- 
actualization and the quest for a sense of worth make any clear-cut 
system, which offers security in return for loyalty, deeply seductive 
in adolescence when so much else seems uncertain. The disturbed, 
the unsatisfiedg the maladjusted and the unstablel are particularly 
prone to see in authoritarian philosophiest religious or political 
systpms the refuge of casting the burden of decisiong and of guilt, 
upon others. But the mentally healthy also search for an interpretation 
and a discipline which will integrate their own lives and may for a time 
accept such solutions as a respite. (P-59) 
Seductive as it may seem, no such interpretation and discipline is an 
adequate substitute for a genuine education for autonomy. 
Some of the manifestations and effects of both Christian and Communist 
indoctrination have been indicated in this chapter, which is essentially 
a plea for open-ended education. Closed-mindedness issues from the 
assumption that things are known and certain, or at least unquestionablet 
when they may well be in fact temerariousq unverifiable and open to 
question. Soviet Comminist ideology works on the basis that Utopia 
already exists in 'Soviet realism' when it is a far off, distant ideal. 
ýhristian. theological dogma assumes knowledge of the universe and its 
Maker and workings that in the present state of man's knowledge are far 
from verifiable and often down-right misleading. Both cramp the human 
spirit and cripple the working of creative imagination and empathy. They 
pretend to a scientific objectivity which is illusory; and so instead 
of forwarding the development of potential benefits for mankind they stifle 
it with error. 
? -210 
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Advocates of dogma andideological adherence claim its social and 
spiritual efficacyq the benefits of emotional security and correct 
orientation it gives to the individual in his search for a world view 
to give meaning to his life. Perhaps this is true for some. But there 
is ample evidence pointing in another direction - to a different con- 
clusi. on. In this alternative viewp dogma is the Procrustean bed of the 
human spirit; literature, on the other hand, born of the unconfinable 
imagination, seeks to nourish and expand its scope. Dogma is afraid of 
mystery, fearful of the unknown. Literaturep impervious to mystery, can 
even relish it; and can apprehend the numinous without feeling the 
need to pin it down. It complements the exact, verifiable knowledge which 
science provides for our physical benefit with a wise tentativeness in the 
exploration of meaning and motive which our spiritual and emotional well- 
being require. 
tzz 
CUPTEP NINE, 
Till", CONCE'll, 01" 
Time moves, and Opinion , loves witil it-; l1loves to(jay, how fast,, how 
sweepinglyl 
Matthew Arnoldv St Paul and ProtesLantisail, 1870 
We are sharply cut off from our predecessors. A shift in flie scale - 
the sudden, slip of masses held in position for ages - has shaken Che 
fabric from top to bottom, alienated us from tbe past and made us perliaps 
I, oo vividly conscious or the present. Every day we rind ourselves doing 
saying, or thinlýing things that would have been impossible (, o our fatbers. 
Virginia Woolf, Iffie Common Reader, 1938 
Ilie most interesting feature of curricul. 11111 studies is t1lat its society 
changes the curriculum will also need to cliange. 11jerc is no master plat) 
which will work in all societies at all times. 
Denis Lawton, Social Change. Education nieory 
and Curriculum Planning, 1973 
This chapter aims to define and explore the concept of Zeitgeist (or 
Time-Spirit) which permeates'Arnoldis Literature and Dogma. It considers 
Arnold's varied uses of the term and examines its peculiar significance 
and relevance in the modern world. Certain aspects of science, religion 
and literature in turn are considered in relation to the, Zeitgeist. Some 
attention is also given to a complementary conceptq Weltanschauung 
(or 
World-View)p not used by Arnold, although its significance is implicit 
in all his writings of this period. It is suggested that the lopen' world- 
view of art, advocated by Arnold, is a means of transcending the tensions 
of clashing dogmas in an age of change. Finally Arnold's optimistic 
Weltanschauung is subjected to criticism in the light of Albert Schweitzerts 
world-view -which seems-better adapted to the demands of the Zeitgeist as we 
experience it today. 
Definition of 'Zcitgeistf. and Arnold's uses of the term 
The Shorter'Oxford Dictiongry gives as its definition of 'Zeitgeist': 
'the tbought. or feeling peculiar to a generation I 
or period'; tile American 
Random House Dictionary offers: 'the spirit of the time, general trend of 
thought or feeling characteristic of a particular period of time? and The 
New English Dictionary suggests: 'the s. pirit or genius which marks the thought 
or feeling of a period or age'. All these three definitions are essentially 
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static; the only words implying a dynamic or influential aspect are 
'trend' and Igenius', respectively: but on the whole these defiaions 
suggest a synchronic rather than a diachronic conceptp a contemporary 
point of view rather than a moving power to be reckoned with. Fraser 
OL 
Neiman (1957) shows that Arnold's uses of the term change from kstatic 
to a dynamic sense: 
Like the operations of the Zeitgeistp neither Arnold's meanings for the 
figure nor his intentions in using it are constant. In particular, there 
appear to be two periods - that of the letters to Clough and that of the 
writings on Church and Bible - when Arnold favours the word. But a wide 
gulf separates the meanings. In the one peri6dp Zeitgeist willp I thinlý, 
be found to be the temper of the times, with the additional idea that 
time is a local, changeable phenomenon opposing eternal values; in the 
other, Zeitgeist is an aspect. of the eternal, Promoting change as a 
manifestation of its own being. (p. 979) 
(my italics, RA) 
Or as Neiman adds a little later, 'the term that in 1848 expressed the 
dullness of the world to be overcome expresses in the 1860's the plastic 
stress itself' (ibid. 9 P-932). Howevert at all stages, 
Neiman points 
outp the term 'Zeitgeistl is used by Arnold as a lfigurelý, a symbol or 
metaphor, which enables him in his polemical and pragmatic tasks to con- 
vey bis own ideas on mutability at the same time as suggesting 'an 
extramundane force ordering the change in accordance with some law, 
(ibid. 
# 
p. 984). At times this extramundane force seems to be the product of human 
intellect a nd reasonj at times a kind of divine urge a transcendental agency, 
of intellectual changel (p. 992); but in all cases it is bound up inextric- 
dbly with the development of human thought: 
The. life of humanity appears to grow, on the side of, intellect, as more and 
mo . re areas of belief are validated, or rejected, by reason. Divinity 
manifesto itself in so'far as this process is discerna5le. The Time-Spirit 
is a name for divinity thus manifesting itselfg not through its other 
channel, conscience, but through the history of the 
human min(]. (Ne iman, 
1957, p. 992) 
Here Neiman correctly indicates Arnold's tendency to separate conscience 
as private, individual and intuit ive from the more general and public 
development of human reason. It is the public embodiment of reason which 
Arnold seems to express through anthropomorphic metaphors: 
'slowly does 
the Zeit-Geist unveil it', 'the "Zeit-Geisf, "... discovers 
it to uslv 'the 
Time-Spirit has not then turned his light' are among 
the numerous 
t24 
metaphors of intellectual flux adopted by Arnold in Literature and Dogma. 
Arnold's sense of historical change, of the new spirit of evolution, 
was derived in part from the 'higher criticism? emanating from Germany 
(with which his father, Thomas Arnoldq had been much engaged); but in 
parti. cular-perhapst as Louis Bonnerot (1947) contends, Matthew Arnold's 
conception of the idea of evolution derives powerfully from his. intellec- 
tual mentorl Goetbe: 
Cleat 
... a ce dernier, qu'Arnold Llemprunta et cleat du Zeit-Geist, du Time-Spiriti, clest-a-dire de la loi4&'tleveloppement et du changement, 
qu'Arnold fit le principe central de sa philosophic religicuse, parce 
(julil la trouva en conformite avec sa notion intuitive de mouvant. 
Tout en etablissant que llessence de la vie religieuse, est la morale 
et Ilemotion, Arnold se vit force de reconnaitre que lea idees intellect" 
uelles apportant a la religion une importante contribution. Or ces idees, 
toutes lea idees, sout le domaine du ( liangement, "the dominion of the 
Time-Spirit". Elles sont relatives et non absolues. (p. 248) 
In addition to the suggestion that Arnold's sensitivity to change was 
lintuitivef,, Bonnerot makes two important observations here; first, 
regarding Arnoldls concern that religion needs to be in step with intell- 
ectual life generally; and secondly, that this involves a relativistic 
approach to religious ideas and a disinissal or the authority of a bso luti sill. 
The Zeitgeis , seen as here in evolutionary terms, is a demonic - or divine 
power sweeping through human history with a dynamic power to which human 
minds and institutions must adjust, or perish through their failure to do 
SO. 
Dic signiiican2e of the 'Zeitgeist' Concept in the modern world 
Arnold, was supremely conscious of the accelerating pace of life. (In 
his poetry his response to this tended to be pessimistic; laterp in his 
prose, his apprehension of change is expressed more optimistically. ) III 
? The Scholar Gipsyl lie speaks of 'this strange disease of modern life, /Witli 
its sick hurry, its divided aims' (Allott, 1965, P-342), and in another 
poem$ 'The Future', he laments that 
... repose has fled 
For ever the course of the river of Time. 
That cities will crowd to its edge 
In blacker incessanter line; 
That the, din will be more on its banks 
Denser the trade on its stream... (ibid., p. 266) 
2-Z5'- 
-and so on. Ibe zci-(-,, roist is in . )Ile sense Clio intellectual coiicomitatit, 
partly cause and partly effect, of the technological revolution. As one 
accelerates the other must follow suit, so that as the pace of their 
mutual interaction increases change becomes the rule rather than the 
exception in men's life,, style. To understand the significance of the 
Zeitgeist today is to understand the qualitative. change in life brought about 
by this dynamic acceleration. It is no longer a case of 'plus ca change 
olus clest la meme_ 
_chose1q 
because many of the changes over the last 
century are fundamental, and their effects are cumulative. 'It is only wlien 
one specifies the nature of the process that the contrast between past and 
present change becomes clear', writes Margaret Mead (1972) in a recent 
study of the generation gap; and she continues: 'One urgent problem is 
the delineation of the nature of change in the modern worldl including its 
speed and dimension sl so that we can better understand the distinctions 
that must be made between change in the past and that 'Adch is now going ont 
(p. 92). 
A few representative examples from the bewildering mass of. evidence 
available may serve to illustrate the qualitative modification of our 
twentieth century world view - or rathert world viewst for although it is 
more than ever true that it is only one world that we'share, there remain 
inevitably, many views of it, reflected in the literatures and dogmatic 
beliefs of the various cultural groupings now being forced together by 
events, as 'we move from parochialism, through multiculturalism to 
globalism. 
If we reflect upon the range of chaiiges in medicine, getieral comfort, 
pulilic Welfare, recreationg architecture, educatiopi, travel, weaponry, 
conanunications, etc. which have patently occurred during the past century, 
it is evident that all these changes can be accounted for by developments 
in three primary spheres: massive ticeelcralJoii in terms of flower, Int)IIiIiLy 
and knowledge. 'llie significance of changes in these three areas in rel- 
ation to literature and dogma, will be discu/tsed in due course (see pp. 2-05-9) 
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Meanwhile, at the risk of oversim, plificatiollp some key factors will be 
noted. 
A graph showing progress in the fields of power, communications and 
knowledge would show no significant change of rate from the year I A. D. 
until the middle of the eighteenth century, %dien perhaps the first 
doubling of knowledge was achieved. Wind, water and muscle remained the main 
sourcc of power and the speed of communication by land and water continued 
fairly constant. But with the advent of steam power followed by electrical 
and nuclear energy, the graph ascends sharply, the lines of communication, 
power and knowledge becoming nearly vertical if projected to the year 2000. 
A. 33. Figure 1 brings home forcibly the staggering rate of change in the 
pace of technological advance, and the near verticality of the lines 
during the past century suggests the arrival of, or at least the need 
for, qua litative changes in human thought and behavior in order to cope 
with the dynamic circumstances of modern life. It has been suggested 
(Dauman, 1969) that if we assume the appearance of modern man some 
60,000 
years ago, (a conservative estimate), then of the 800 life-spans this would 
give us up to the present day: 11lie majority of discoveries 
that con- 
tribute to our material well-being (will) have been made in the lifetime 
of the 800th and the 801st can expect to experience more changes 
in his 
lifetime than in those of all 800 preceding him put together' 
(P-5). 
In the same issue of the Cornhill Magazine that saw the publication 
of the second part of Literature and Dop_ma 
(October 1871) a columnist 
contributed some 'Notes on flying and flying-machinest. Ile. wrote 
There can be little question that this problem is one of great 
difficulty. 
It has, indeed, been long regarded by nearly all practical mechanicians as 
really insoluble. But of late years careful researches have 
led competent 
men to entertain doubts as to the validity of 
the objections which have 
been urged against the theory that it is possible for men 
to fly. Facts 
have come to light urhich seem, to say the least, highly promising. 
(p. 438) 
Mat aircraft would be produced a century later travelling fit twice the speed 
of sound could scarcely have been imagined even by this optimist. And when 
Arnold wrote tDover Beach' (published in 1867): 
ýL 
2.2. 
The sea is calm to-pight, 
Ilie tide is, full, Lhe moon lies' fair 
Upon'the straits... 
he could scarcely have visualised his fellow-creatures scrabbling on the 
surface of the moon with their scientific apparatus, successful experiments 
in tidal power, and nuclear submarines cruising interminably beneath tile 
surface of the sea, 
The expansion of knowledge, having contributed to developments in 
power and communicationsi is also a phenomenon in its own right. The 
storage and retrieval of knowledge has of course been vastly improved by 
developments in computer. technology, culminating (at least for the time 
being) in the miniscule silicon-chip devices. The year of the publication 
of Darwin's Origin of Species, 1859, had brought t! -. -e 
invention of the 
slide rule which doubled tile number of, calculations that could be done in 
one minute - for examplev from fifteen to thirty a minute. But on the same 
basis, 60 million calculations a minute can be achieved with the modern 
computer. The net result of these developments in terms of knowledge is 
that whereas knowledge was doubling every hundred years by mid-nineteenth 
century, the mid-twentieth century saw a doubling every fifty yearst and 
by 1970 it was said to be doubling every five years. 
All this has resulted in an almost complete reversal of our attitude 
to facts. In 1875 Matthew Arnold wrote that 'far more of our mistakes 
come from want of fresh knowledge thari from want of correct reasoning' 
(Super VI, p. 168). A century later the anxieties are very different; we 
are still rightly concerned to want to ascertain the facts of a situation 
before exercising judgment, but we are more confident of their availability 
and less confident of our capacity to employ them aright, even fearful of 
'the tyranny of factsl overwhelming our judgment; of the trees obscuring 
the wood. To quote 13 JA Hargreaves (1970): 1 
lit a world of change it is apparcut*that the facility to learn is more 
important than a particular skill ... We have to escape from 
the tyranny of 
facts - the pressure to acquire certain knowledge by specified periods 
in 
our careers. Facts change and get out of date: the ability to relearn 
is more important. 
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The lability to relearni is important today not only in terms of 
skills but also in terms of attitudes. As the world contracts through 
technological accelerationp diverse and disparate cultures are dralvii or 
forced together by unprecedented circumstances, and values enshrined in time- 
honoured systems of doctrine and dogma are brought into question in the 
light of alternative systems or of challenges from scientific development. 
Unquestioned trutht suddenly become vulnerable, and their devotees are 
faced either with deeper unthinking retrenchment in their former views, or 
reckless abandownent of these in favour of the new ideas encoinitered; or 
with re-thinking and reinterpreting their traditional doctrines in such a 
'way as to reconcile them with their new experience. 
Scientific change and religious conservatism 
Arnold believed that progress in both science and religion was 
subject to the inevitable inflilelice of (liscovery and change, but that 
progress is uneven because science is not afraid to adjust its past ideas 
as it goes along; in fact it is bound to do sop for tscience makes her 
progress not merely by close reasoning and e., 10"cation, but also, and much 
more, by the close scrutiny and correction of the present comronly received 
data' (Super VII, P-387). But whereas 
modern writers in other departments of science have now corrected their 
old data from top to bottomp (and) half of these data they have clean 
abandoned, and the other half they have transformed ... theologians have 
not yet done so in their science oftheology, and hence their unprofit- 
ableness, (ibid., P-387) 
Furthermorep 'there can be no worse science than materialised poetry, 
(ibid. P-396); and this insecure basis of accepted theology puts it at 
risk in an increasingly scientific world, as well as jeopardizing lucidity 
of thought among those who strain to encompass both the religious and 
secular aspects of life in their outlook. 'Ibis is the justification for 
Arnold's relativistic approach to religion, referred to by Bounerot above 
(see p. ZZ4-) and in particular for his stress upon the poetic, an(] there- 
fore suggestive, tentative and mutable, nature of scriptural language: 
To understand thaL the language of the Bible is fluid, passing and literary, 
23o 
not rigid, fixed and scientific, is the first step towards a right under- 
standing-of the Biblee But to take this very first step, soine experience 
of how men have thought and expressed themselves and some flexibility of 
spirit are necessary... ( Super VI, p. 152) 
In Literature and Doppap Arnold demonstrates how the Zeitgeist is 
affected by the oscillation between language and historic context; and 
in doing. so he shows an intuitive grasp of semantics (without of course 
using the term, which did not come into currency until nearly a decade 
after his death). He shows how times and conditions create needs for 
words; and how words in their turn, having undergone change in their 
signification, may modify the intellectual climate, the Zeitgreis , of later 
periods. ' Mis is not the place to examine this in detail, but a few ex- 
amples convey something of Arnoldts approach to this phenomenon. His 
task in Literature and Dogma was not, he points out, to write a history 
of religion but to trace 'its effects on the language of the men from 
whom we get the Bible' (Super VIj p. 182). fie shows, for example, how' 
personifying terms used by the early Jews metaphorically are used meta. - 
p)iysically by the later Rabbis and Christians (Super VI, p. 184); and 
even litter still malevolently in some cases its whP-A the M, hanitsian 
Creed's damnatory clauses, endowed in course of time with talismanic 
authority, are empowered to bring human misery in their wake. 
(Super VI, 
PP-342-343) 
Again, Christ's use of the concepts of Ta. therhood' and 'Sonshipt 
Arnold regards as metaphorical, not scientific nor metaphysical (Super VII 
p. 243) until fixed to all appearances as such for centuries by theological 
speculation. Concrete meanings oscillate with abstract meanings over the 
course of history; the language of 'hope and aspiratioO generated in times 
of trial becomes the language of expectation and prophecy 
(Super VI, p. 222) 
in later periods; ethical lanpoige designed to influence conduct is abstrac- 
ted for sacerdotal purposes and its moral implications largely jettisoned 
(Super VI, Ch. 1 passim); prophetic utterances of one period are misapplied. 
by hindsight to later occura nces, turning profound contemporary insight into 
spurious 'prediction'; events recorded in 
th e language of miracle appropriate 
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at the time of their occurence aro passed on by the Zeitgeist to periods 
when such languagq along with the concepts it expresses, is no longer 
appropriate (Super VI, Ch-5), and so on. The oscillation between language 
and events is for good and ill as circumstances vary, but in greneral Arnold 
sees the flow optimistically: the Zeitgreist moves to clarify our under- 
standing and increase our awareness. The words of Jesus, for example, 
in many cases 'imperfectly understood' among their first hearers and for 
a lc-ng time afterwards, 'come at last gradually to stand out clearer by time, - 
Time, as the Grech maxim says, the wisest of all thiijgs, for lie is tile ull- 
failing discoverer' (Super VI, p. 265). 
Zeitgeist. renewal and__eternitv 
One of ArnoldIs definitions of God has close similarity with his 
, 
conception of the Zeitgeist. Seeking to find a form of words which 
expresses 'scientifically# and without metaphysics the concept of a creative 
and sustaining force he suggests that 'for science, God is simply the stream 
of tendency by which all things seek to fulfil the law of their being, 
(Super V"I. p. 189)t The main difference between the two concepts is that 
God (as defined here) is the enabling process providing the pattern, the 
direction and tho consuminative energy to maintain the cosmos while the 
ZeD. 1-reist is largely concerned with our understanding, of the process; both, 
however, are evolutionary. Whereas, that is, when 11tomas Aquinas said that 
'everything is in a continual state of becoming' be meantp by and large, 
that i* was continually becoming the same thing; for Arnold and most of 
AA4- 
his contemporaries it seemed clear4everything was continually becoming 
something else, and probably soMvthing better. As Tennyson put, it: 
The old order changeth, yeilding place to new, 
And God fulfils himself in many ways... 
('11ic Idylls of the King) 
For the rationalist side of Arnold, tile si(16 that needed verification 
as an anchorage for religious belief, the Zeitgeist was probably a useful 
'way of dealing with the problem of 'Eternal Life' in the limitless cosmos 
created by science. For those eager for reassurance of personal, individual 
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and subjective experience after life - either in a renewed body or a 
disembodiid soul - the Zeitgeist has little to offer. But for those who 
tempermentally eschew$ or have reluctantly abandonedp hope of any kind of 
natural continuence or miMculous restoration of powers after death the 
Zeitgeist offers a convenient, and almost indisputable, consolation. For 
an increasing number of people today, including many theologians, Eternal 
life is seen as concurrent withp rather than following consecutively, our 
earthly life. In this view the lenlightenedt live their personal indivi- 
dual lives within eternity, sharing creatively in the inheritance from 
the past and the contribution of contemporaries, and leaving a positive 
and purpos eful residue of themselves in the stream of life passed on to 
the future. The 'unenlightened' are those who fail to participate fully 
in this stream of human experience, regarding their own brief time span 
as the sum of their significance, and viewing the world as a kind of 
lucky (or unlucky) dip, or a brief sphere for personal plunder and 
exploitation. Enlightenment, in this perspective, is seeing the Kingdom 
of Heaven, not as some future estate, but within each of its, to be nour- 
ished by, and to nourish in turn, the stream of life into which ýe are 
projected. Individual life may be briefl but it is endowed with 
permanent significance since by being ineradicably intertwined with the 
larger life stream it becomes meaningful in terms of the survival of 
humanity. This is in its essentials the doctrine Arnold develops through- 
Gut Literature and Dogma and related religious works. Rejecting the 
concepts of ?a future state' and of 'the corporeal resurrection' of 
Christ, Arnold assertR tbat: 
The true centre of gravity of the Christian religion is in the method and 
secret of Jesus, approximating, in their application, ever closer to the 
pie--ikeiaq the sweet reasonableness and unerring sureness of Jesus him- 
self. But as the method of Jesus led up to his secrett and his secret 
was dying to 'the life in this world' and living to %he eternal life', 
both his method and his secret culminated in his 'perfecting' on 
* 
the 
crosep which lie himself foresaw and foretold. (Super VI, P-318) 
The culmination on the cross is the guarantee of a life lived in the here 
and now, but contributing with consummate integrity to' the eternal stream; 
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and the, foretelling of this grim (-. onclusion not the prescient prelude to 
a cosmic miracle but the expiýession of determination to see through a vital 
and dangerous mission to the predictable end. Jesus is 'no metaphysical 
phantoml. bat a man whose utter unselfishness enabled him to penetrate 
deeply into the corporate life of mankind; 'for to live by dying to our 
life in this world is to transfer the natural love of life from the 
personal self to the impersonal selfq - the self that we share with all 
other men' (Super VI, P-334) and to make a profound contribution to the 
Zeitgeist. 
In expressing such views Arnold seemed dangerously way out to his 
theological contemporaries, but events have tended to. bear him out; the 
movement of the Zeitgeist has fa-voured his view. Discussing changes in 
Christian theology, for example, Paul M Van Buren writes: 
Marx and Freud have played their part in defining Jesus as 'the man for 
others', and the development in the nineteenth century of the Western 
understanding of man separates a Boaheoffer, a Barth and a Bishop 
Robinson from a Luther, a Calvin and a Bishcp Jewel. 
Arnold is certainly closer to the twentieth century theologians quoted 
than to the earlier trio, without benefit. of Marx and. Freud. 
The Zeitgeist and Marxist criticism 
Although Freud had scarcely made. his mark during Arnold's lifetime, 
the influence of Marx was beginning to establish itself. There are, it 
appears no direct references to Karl Marx in Arnold's prose writings 
but a brief quotation from Marx occurs four times in Arnold's Note- 
Books (Lowry, 1952) between 1875 and ArnoldIs death in 1888: 18ociety 
is a sort of organism on the growth of which conscious efforts can 
exercise little effect' (pp. 228,273,299 and 438). The quotation is 
ironical considering the concern. of both Marx and Arnold to influence 
their society. Perhaps for Arnold in his latter years it was entered 
as a kind of comforter; or perhaps. it was a tribute to 
the Zeitgeist, 
in which case it has, like much Marxist criticism, a Hegelian ring. 
Howeverl although in part, Arnoldts concept of the Zeitgeist derives 
indirectly from Hegel's Heraclitian doctrines that reality' must be 
C-. 5 t 
understood in terms of change and flux, Arnold had little time for system- 
izers (of which Hegel was a prime example) and, in his essay on Spinoza, 
he quotes with relish Heinrich Heine's comment on Hegel: 
I have seen Hegelq he criesq seated with his doleful air of a hatching hen 
upon his unhappy pggs, and I have heard his dismal clucking. - How easily 
one can cheat oneself into thinking that one understands everything when 
one has learnt only how to construct dialectical formulas) (Super III, 
p. 182) 
Dialectical formulas in the Hegelian tradition, however, are the 
etock-in-trade *of Marxist criticism and no discussion of the Zeit-geist, would 
be complete without reference to this. 
Lukics, a moderate among Marxist literary oritiest is like Arnoldy 
concerned with the Zeitgeist and with literature. The Historical Novel 
(1962) examines the rise of historical consciousness in literaturep 
however; whereas (by contrast) Arnold, ts Literature and Dogma explores 
'what amounts to the growth of historical unconsciousness -a kind of 
speculative miasma progressively befogging biblical and theological 
writing. Writing relatively specifically - with his eye on the object - 
(on Sir Walter Scott, for example), Lukics is sensitive and penetrating. 
Generalizing, however, his writing suffers from the Marxist literary crit- 
ical compulsion of bending the data to match the theory: 
The great novels of world literature, in particular those of the nineteenth 
century, portray not so much the collapse of a society as its process of 
disintegration, each one embracing a phase of this process. Not even in 
the most dramatic of novels is it at all necessary to allude to the social 
collapse as such. To fulfil the aims of the novel all that is required is 
to show convincingly and owerfully the irresistible course of social- 
historical development. 
Mkics, 
1962, p. 144) 
All that is requiredo apparentlyp is total presciencep in order to as- 
cettain 'the irresistible course of social-historical development'. 
This is a tall order which Iakdcsts own experience might have warned 
him ofiattemptingp since in the Preface to the Eaglish edition of 
The Historical Novel in 1960 Ink9cs had already candidly admitted that 
'This book was composed during the winter of 1936/7 ... Certain expectations 
have proved too optimiotieg have been belied by historical events. For 
examplep the book pins exaggerated# indeed false# hopes on the indepen- 
dent liberation movement of the German people, on the Spanish revolutiong 
ný 
etc... I (Luk6es, 1962, P-13). Wi, 3tber, it is assumed that long-range 
forecasting is easier than short-range prediction I don't know, but the 
assumption in either case seems hazardous* 
Another Marxist writer interested in the Zeitgreist is JD Bernal, 
vh-ose Science and History (1965), a masterly production full of insight 
and challenge, interprets the past more convincingly than it predicts the 
future. Leaving aside the mass of historical interpretation for vhich I 
have profound respect, I wiAh here only to draw attention to brief 
passages which, on the negative. sidej I found disturbing. Writing of 
the enormous changes being brought about by scientific developmento 
particularly in molecular biology and computer technology, Bernal comments 
on the impact of these changes on philosophy: 
The realization of the process of science itself and espe ' 
cially of its 
extremely rapid advance is bound to put into question the very central 
objectivity of philosophy - truth. First in the ' 
course of a single 
lifetime, then in a decade, now in a year we linve found new basal facts 
and whole attitudes of viewing the universe are going to cliangcý Injere 
is no evidence at all that this process is slowing down, on the contrary 
it is speeding up. Theý fact itself must be recognized and is, in effect 
being recognized in practice by most of the scientific thinkers who have 
added to our knowledge. I have called it provisionalism ... It is more 
than scepticism, it is a conviction that whatever we think now, people 
in a very short time from now will think differently and better. Truth 
thus presents a moving function; we happen to believe, for the time 
being, fully recognizing that it is only for the time being. The search 
for more knowledge goes on, but that for a stable complete knowledge must 
be definitely abandoned. 
Most of this is unexceptionable; indeed it expresses in large part the 
fundamental change in conditions brought about by the Zeitgeist vhich it 
is the object of this chapter to conveyo and of vhich Arnold had already 
begun to see the significance. My objection is to the confusion of Itrutb? 
with thelier'. 'Tru-01 is a(buittedly ati abstraction, sigriifying uliat is 
often difficult or impossible to ascertain; but it seems to me to be 
important to preserve it inviolate as a concept, repreFienting 
(to quote 
from the Concise Oxford Dictionarv) what is 'in accordance with fact or 
reality, not false or erroneous. ' For a thing to be 'true' it must be 
'in accordance with reason or correct principles or rec6ived standard, 
rip-htlv so called (my ital ids), genuine, not spurious or bybrid or counterfeit 
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or merely apparent (my italics)... I This is different from lbelieff 
whichp however sincere, may be Imerely'apparent' and may be bound up 
with reason and 'principleal and a 'received standard' which are merely 
superficially 'correctl (i. e. in accordance with the dominaAt will of 
the group concerned). To substitute lbelieft for ? truth' is to risk 
moving into the realms of Orwell's Nineteen-Eil-Thty-Fouriof the refurbished 
thistoryl. of Nazi Germany, of the philosophy-and theology of South African 
Apartheid, -and of fpsychiatric treatment' for political deviationists. It 
is not, as Bernal suggests, truth which 'presents a moving functiont, but 
our apprehension of truth - our belliefv and this is a very different thing. 
A second point of objection is to Bernalts amelioristic assumption that 
when 1people in a very short time from now will think differently' they 
will necessarily think 'better'. It surely depends upon what they are 
thinking about, on the realm of discourse or intellectual discipline t1ley 
are engaged in. Will they necessarily think better. than Socrates, Christ, 
Erasmusq, Galileog Newtont Einstein, Martin Luther King, Dietrich Bonheoffer, 
and in what sense lbetter'9 The thought of the futurewill presumably be 
as provisional as the thought of the present time; its passage in various 
respects may even prove to be circular or spiral. It will move according 
to the 'whimsp idiocyncraciea, fashions and limitalions of the human mind 
(hovever much assisted by computers); but its object 'truth' moves only 
in a ccordance with quite different laws, the laws of the altering fact 
regardless of our capacity to perceive and interpret it. 
The other disturbing passage I wish to quote from Bernalts Science 
in History comes from his conclusion: 
Now, thanks to science, we can make that margin (of production over sub- 
sistence) as big as we like, but misery and danger will remain the lot of 
man until science can be freely used, and not distorted for mean and 
destructive ends. In all previous class stugglesv one class simply took 
the place of anotherl and exploitation went on in'a different form... 
In the transformation from capitalism througlýocialism to Communism, 
that necessity will finallývanishq productiortvill be ample enough to 
remove any need for proletarians or serfs. But there will still be a 
need for science, now not limited to a few specialists, but part of the life 
of the whole people. (Bernal, 1965, P-977) 
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Once again I agree entirely with the earlier observations on the 
importance of productivity being directed equitably to meet human needs 
and on re-direction of scientific enterprise from its present destructive 
ends; bat the futuristic assumptions are of an entirely different. category, 
not enunciating principles for legitimate future guidance of policies, but 
asserting dogmatic predictions quite unverifiable in practice. The hist- 
orical Inecesgity' of communism is simply dogma, as is-the assumed qualityg 
without exploitationt of the outcome of future class struggles. Theory 
has taken over from sure knowledge and has warped interpretation. 
In an essay with the intruiging title 'The Houyhnhnms, the Yahoos, 
and the History of Ideas', RS Crane (1967) makes an important observa- 
tion on the use of history in this way: 
There is nothing intrinsically illegitimate in the mode of historical 
'writing that organises the intellectual happenings of different ages 
in terms of their controlling 'climates of opinionl, dominant tendencies, 
or ruling oppositions of attitude or belief; and the results of such 
synthesizing efforts are sometimes... illuminating in a high degree. 
The objection is rather to the further assumptiont clearly implicit in 
these arguments, that the unifying principles of histories of this type 
have something like the force of empirically established universal laws... 
(p. 600) 
Here Crane isýwriting about the application of the Zeitgeist concept 
to liýerary criticism, and advocating an empirical regard for recognizing 
the specificity of artefacts amidst the general rules we may draw up 
about a period; but his point is equally applicable to prediction on 
the basis of abstraction from the past. This is more fully developed 
by Karl Popper in The Open Society and Its Enemies (1966). 
Karl Popperts opposition to historicism 
Popper's main concern is to demonstrate the dangers of thistoricism? 
- the danger of regarding the Zeitgeist as an ultimate power to which 
mankind and his doings arc totally subservient. 111istory' be says Ibas 
no meaning', in fact 'in the sense in Mlich most 
'people speak of it (it) 
simply does not exist' (p. 269) since it is simply the sum of the various 
interpr'etations of the past which a diversity of men have selected from 
the vast range of data available, and necessarily ignored from the vaster 
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rallge of' illuccemnible dubt. Cowicilitently, it in dimtrerous ('or meri to look 
for 'the essence of human destiny' by contemplating history. A crucial 
paragraph indicates his view: 
To sum up, there can be-no history of Ithe past as it actually did happenl; 
there can only be historical interpretations, and none of them final; 
and every generation has a right to frame its own ... It also has a kind 
of obligation to do so - for there is indeed a pressing need to be answered. 
We want to know how our troubles are related to the pastj and we want to 
see the line along wbich we may progress towards the solution of what we 
feelo and what we choose to be oxtr wain tasks. JA is Chis need, lAieh, if 
not answered by rational and fair means# produces histoiicist interpretations. 
Under its pressure the historicist substitutes for a rational question: 
lWhat are we to choose as our most urgent problems, how did they arise, and 
along what roads may we proceed to solve theint 1 the irrational and 
apparantly factual question: 'Which way are we going? Wliatj in essence, 
is the part that history has destined us to play? l 
This, Popper believes, is the route to totalitarianism; whether Christian, 
Communist or Fascist in origin, abandonment to the Zeitgeist is abandon- 
ment to the ruling clique prepared to bolster their power with the mystical 
associations of an approved Destiny for mankind. Since the history of 
power with which -we are usually confronted was 'written not by God, but, 
under the supervision of generals and dictatorst by the professors of 
history, it is pure blasphemy to take history as the self-revelation of 
God. 11 contendlp Popper writeeg 'that this view is pure idolatry and 
superstition, not only from the point of view of a rationalist or humanist 
but from the Christian pointof view itself. ' (p. 270- In an important 
parenthesis lie writes: 'conscience must judge powerv and not the other 
-way round' (p. 273). This point is worth developing, for 'conscience' in 
Popper's view (as in Arnold's) is personal, as distinct fromrreasoný which 
'like language, can be said to be a product of social life' 
(p. 22ý). 
Moreover lexperiencel (as for Arsjold, wi-1, I) bis eml)llltsis Otl verification 
) 
must he the impartial arbiter of couLroversies. Diticu88ing Lbe liuLer- 
subjectivity' and $public character' of scientific methodg Popper writes,: 
When speaking of 'experience? I have in inind experience of a 
1public, 
character, lil(e observations, an(] experimentos its opposed to experience 
in the sonse ol' more 11wivitLot m! mLliptic or religioils ex1wrimico; ItIld 
an experience is 'public' if everybody who takes the trouble can repeat 
it. In order. to avoid speaking at crossý-purposes, scientists try to ex- 
reas their theories in such a form that they can be tested, 
i. e. refuted 
or else corroborated) by such experience. 
(p. 218) 
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However, although 'scientific objectivity' is a social Product, perman- 
ently open to criticism and argument, Poppe r stresses that society must 
always be seen to be composed of I certain concrete individuals I, however 
numerous-and anonymous these may be: 'Therefore (he writes), in speaking 
of a 'social' theory of reason (or of scientific method), I mean more 
precisely that the theory is an inter-personal one, and never that it is' 
a collective theoryt (p. 226). In consequence he believes that society 
should be organized in such a way as to guarantee open access to knowledge, 
to encourage democratic and scientific criticism, and to eschew dogma and 
scholasticism. The amelioration of the human condition should be based 
not on systematic ideological social engineering, but on a piecemeal 
approach to problems, based on a combination of ethical and practical 
considerations. It will be seen that Karl Popper's approach resembles 
Arnold's in many respects, while at the same time, drawing attention to 
the dangers inherent in the Zeitgeist concept if this is regarded as a 
directive power in human affairs and human destiny. Where Arnold appears 
to slip from a figurative to a purposive use of the term his writing 
becomes suspect; but the concept is nevertheless valuable descriptively 
and metaphorically, which I am convinced is his usual intention in employ- 
ing it. 
Zeitgeist and Weltanschauung 
J Keating, in an article on 'Arnold's Social and Political Thought' 
(Allott, 1975) admirably indicates the conjunction of the Zeitgeist and 
Weltanschauung concepts: 
The pace and radical nature of social change in the nineteenth century has 
given, Arnold argues, a greater sense of urgency than ever before to the 
disinterested contemplation of the historical process, and need to 'find 
a true point of view', and the man who can discover this ( and Arnold 
never doubted he had done so) becomes the potential prophet of nineteenth- 
century society. (p. 214) 
Here we have the accelerating 'historical process"(the 
Zeitgeis demand- 
ing an interpretive 'point of view' to take account of 
its contemporary significance. For Arnold, as Keating points out, 
'the 
princi pal transforming force at work in Western society 
is the movement 
towards democracy' (ibid., p. 215). The problem for education is to create 
autonomous men and women capable of shouldering the responsibilities of 
democracy in a fast-changing world. Ironically, tne very iacTors wnion 
make the production of 'whole men' and 'whole woment so vital are 
the same 
conditions which militate against harmonious and complete adjustment. 
A 
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century ago, Matthew Arnold put fhe problem like this: 
Our present age has around it a copious and complex present, and behind 
it a copious and complex past; it... exhibits to the individnal man 
who, contemplates it the spectacle of a vast multitude of facts awaiting 
and inviting his comprehension. The deliverance consists in mail's com- 
prehension of this present and past. It begins when our mind begins to 
enter into possession of the general ideas which are the law of this 
vast multitude of facts. It is perfect iviien we have acquired that harmon- 
ious acquiescence of mind which we feel in contemplating a grand spectacle' 
that is intelligible to us; when we have lost that impatient irritation 
of mind, which we feel in presence of all ilmnense, moving confused spectacle 
'which, while it perpetually excites our citriosity, perpetually baffles 
our comprehension. (Super 1, p. 20) 
We must have, as he puts it elsewhere, 'an idea of the world' in order to 
come to terms with it, and with our place in it, -a 'point of vicvý from 
which to contemplate the moving and multitudinous spectacle of the world 
around us. In like manner, Karl Popper (1966), a staunch advocate of the 
lopen s6cietyl stresses nevertheless that 'we cannot avoid a *point of 
yiew"; and the belief that we can, must lead to self-deception and lack 
of critical care'. And EF SchMnacher (1974), writing on education 
(as distinct from training), believes that 'what people are really looking 
for is ideas that would make the world, and their own lives, intelligible 
to them. When a thing is intelligible you have a sense of participation - 
when a thing is unintelligible you have a sense'of estrangement 
) (p. 68). 
This danger of estrangement is also voiced by WD Wall (1977): 
Inic multiplicity of values in our societies, the many clashes of creed, 
the apparently limitless range aud multiplicity of life styles, and the 
uncertainties of parents and teachers, make the task of finding out what 
to believe and to do extremely difýicult. It carries with it the risk 
that choice may be refused in favour of an unreal conversion to dogma or 
postponement of thought or a sealing off of the quest in a kind of 
hedonistic escapism or denial. (p. 60) 
' 
At the same time, in Wall's view, this openness and rmige of scope 
CL 
provides a creative challenge for those tempetentally and circumstantially 
able to copý with it. 
Margaret Mead (1972) holds a similar view, We have arrived at a I 
condition where Imen who are -the carriers of vastly different cultural 
traditions are entering the present at the same point in time' 
(p. 96) 
and in the resultant state of flux Itoday the elders can no longer 
present with certainty mor al imperatives to 
the young' 
(p. 103). 
. 
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Consequently, the young are pionviýrs in a new situation, with new dangers 
and new potentialities: 
Just as man is newly faced with the responsibility for not destroying the 
human race and all living things and for using his accumulated-knowledge 
to build a safe world, so at this moment the individual is freed to Stan(] 
aside and question, not only his belief in God, his belief in science, 
or his belief in socialismg but his belief in anything at all (p. 10). 
Margaret Mead postulates three kinds of cultural relationships between 
the generations: 'postfigurative, in which children learn primarily from 
-their forebearS, -. cofigurative, in which both children and adults learn 
from their peers, and prefigurativel in which adults learn also from their 
children' (P-309 and she believes that we are moving fast into the third 
of these. It is true, she remarks, that 
in many parts of the world the parental generation still lives by a post- 
figurative-set of values. From parents in such cultures children may learn 
that there have been unquestioned absolutes, and t1tis learning may carry 
over into later experience'aB an expectation -that absolute values can 
and should be re-established. Nativistic cults, dogmatic religious, and 
political movements flourish most vigorously at the point of recent break- 
down of postfigurative cultures, and least in those cultures in which 
orderly change is expected -to occur within a set of stable values at 
higher levels of abstraction. (P. 105) 
This is a plea for open-ended education, since any attempt to re-establish 
'Postfigurativol (absolutist and dogmatic) elements will result in their 
being 'far more rigid and intractable than in the past because they must 
be defended in a world in which conflicting points of viewt rather than 
orthodoxiesq are prevelant and accessiblel (P-107). In fact this is 
something of an over-simplification, since there are botli 'conflicting 
points of view' and 'orthodoxies' at the disposal of the questioning mind. 
These viewpoints and orthodoxies, whether total ideologies$ dogmatic systems 
or loose clusters of principleag can be called collectively Weltanschauungren. 
Weltanschauung, from the German meaning approximately 'world outlook' 
has been defined by Anthony Quinton (Bee JJullock and Stallybras, 1977) as, 
a: 
General conception of the nature of the world, particularly as containing 
or implying a system of value-principles. Any philosophical system way be 
so styled which derives practical consequences from its theoretical component. 
It is common for important but comparatively local scientific discoveries 
or conjectures to be generalised into total systems of this kindp for 
example, those of Newton, Darwin, Marx and Freud. 
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A significant feature of this del'inition is the reference to the 'practical 
consequences' of a world-view: the interpretation of the individual or 
group provides a guide to action. The definition needs enlarging to 
include theological along with philosophical systems. To quote from 
Albert Schweitzer (1961 (1923)), who has probably written more deeply on 
this issue than any other theologian-philosophe. r: t... the distinction 
between a religious world-view and a-philosophical is quite superficial. 
The religious world-view which seeks to comprehend itself in thought 
becomes philosophical, as is the case among the Chiriese ant] the Hindus. 
On the other hand a philosophical world-view, if it is really profound, 
assumes a religious characterl (p. 42). The translator of Schweitzer's 
Civilization and Ethics, from which this o bservation-came, reminds us in 
a note that 'it should be borne in mind that the German word Welt has also 
the wider meaning of "universe"' which explains why Schweitzer 'himself 
defines Weltanschauung, as the sum total of the thoughts which the 0--ommunity 
or the individual thinks about the nature and purpose of the universe arid 
about the place and destiny of mankind within the world' (p. 245). Because 
of the links between world-view, law and ethics Schweitzer observes that 
'a world view is the germ of all ideas and dispositions which are deter- 
minative for the conduct of individuals and of society' 
(p. 15). A further 
consideration that needs brief mention here is the connection between 
lang!! age and world-view. If I may quote from air article I wrote for the 
London Educational Review (AndrewsV 19711) 
Not only do human beings move in a world of words, we make our world of 
words, filtering our experience through the symbols with which language 
provides us. Words have been described ... as 'bridges' ... They can also 
be conceived of as teages' imprisoning our minds in assumptions and 
preconceptions over which our conscious minds have little controlt and 
blinkering us against awareness of alternative interpretations of things. 
(P-53) 
This consideration ar ises partly from a study of'general semantics and 
partly from the concept of 'linguistic relativity' associated with Sapir 
(1921) and Whorf (1956). Benjamin Lee Wliorf believed that we are 'very 
much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the mediumof 
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expression for our own parti . cular society, citing crucial lexical and seman- 
tic differences between different languages in evidence. Ilowever, 'his 
hypothesis that fall observers are not led by the same physical evidence 
to the same picture of the universe unless their linguistic backgrounds are 
similar, or can in some way be calibratedt (p. 214) can be pushed too far. 
A modified version of this theory is expressed by Kellner (1972): 
I't seems (Kellner writes) that critical consideration of the results of 
recent research on the relation of language and cognition makes it very 
difficult to maintain the notions of determinism associated with Sapir and 
Whorf. One is then rather inclined to view that a particular language (be 
it the language of a, culture, sub-culture, or social group) maps out the 
world for the individual in different degrees of intensity and typicality. 
In other words, language functions so as to filter and mediate cognitime 
processes; it does not causally determine hem. Aspects of reality are 
not perceived in a certain way only because a certain linguistic system 
is superimposed upon them. Rather, language affects perception in 
connection with-&e'specific problems posed for individuals or for groups 
by their social action. (P-79) 
Weltanschauung, structuralism and collectivist criticism 
Perhaps midway between We 1 tans chauung peen as total ideology in terms 
of clear-cut doctrinesq and world view as mediated through the filter of 
language, is the concept of IstructuralismIt linked with both. Eagleton 
(1976) is among the Marxist critics drawn to tbis approacb. Describing 
the work of Lucien Goldmann, Eagleton writes that 'what Goldman ii seeking 
is a set of structural relations between literary text, world vision and 
history. itself. He wants to show how the historical situation of a social 
group or class is transposed, by the mediation of its world-vision, into 
the structure of a literary work (P-33). Goldmants critical method is 
called 'genetic' structuralism because he is concerned to show how collec- 
tive mental structures fare hiS. torically produced concerned, that is to 
say, with the relatioiis between it world vision and the historicul corioliLioiia 
which give rise to i't. 1 (Ihgleton, 1976, p. 33) Sucb relations and Condit- 
ions are inevitably seen in terms of class struggle, since, as Eagleton, 
I 
writes, 'Ideology is not in the first place a set of doctrines, *. it sig- 
nifies the way men live out their roles in class-society, the values, 
ideas and, images which tie them to their social functions and so prevent 
them from a true knowledge of society as a vholel 
(pp-16-17). Thus in 
Marxist criticism, TS Eliotts Tl, )-(, - Waste Land, is explained as 'a poem which 
springs from a crisis of bourgeois ideology' although it has no simple 
correspondence with that crisis or with the political and economic 
conditions v4iich produced it' (Eagleton, 1976, p. 16) However, any 
complete understanding of a literary work of art must, according to 
Eagleton, Itake into account a whole series of "levels" which I'mediate" 
between -the -text itself and capitalist economy' (p. 14). Sir Walter Scott's 
'artistic World-view, is that of a 'sober, conservative petty aristocrat', 
'writes Lukics (1962), redeemed by the fact that 'Scott'sees the endless 
field of ruin, wrecked existences, wrecked or wasted heroic, human 
endeavor, broken social formationst etc. which were the necessary pre- 
conditions of the end result' (p. 514). 
These. examples of critical observations regarding the ideology and 
world-view of writers are of course influenced by the Weltanschauungen of 
the criticsq in thi's case cri: ties sharing a 'collectivist' world-view of 
the kind objected to above (p. 219) by Karl Popper. ln this case, tile 
criticisms voiced are apt and just (: with the provision that the biograph- 
ical element in each case would be regarded as redundant by many critics). 
Probably Karl Popper would not object to either obnervation. But 
collectivist-criticism is not always as justq, particularly if it is on the 
defensive, when (to quote Margaret Mead (above)) it becomes 'wore rigid 
and intractable'. Take for example the following passage from an attack 
on Alexander Solzhenitsyn from Literaturna-va Gazeta (Labedzq 1972): 
Our entire people and our entire creative intelligentsia regard reneg, -ades 
with scorn. Only individual writers wh6 had failed to examine closely the 
spiritual make-up of these renegades gave bourgeois propaganda an excuse 
to list them among the 'supporters' of Ginzburg, Galanskov, and-their crew 
and appeared before public opiTtion in their own country as politically 
immature and irresponsible persons. (P. 190) 
Objections are made to Feast of the Victorsq'Cancer Ward, and The First 
Circle ('containing malicious slander on our social systeml 
(p. 196)). The 
'correct' attitude for a writer is then outlined: 
History has charged Soviet writers with the great and noble respons * 
ibility 
of'beralding the advanced ideas of our ageq the ideas of communism and of 
fighting for the social and spiritual values achieve(] by the socialist 
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system. 111is is a responsibilitv to history, to societyq and to their own talents, 'which flourish only in oerving great goals, in serving the 
people. This is the responsibility of a person who feels he is not a 
detached observer in today's world, or a grumbling nihilist, but a fighter 
for communist ideals. (p. 196 ) 
At a meeting of the Ryazan writers' organization, field on )i November 1969, 
Alexander Kozhevnikovj secretary for campaigning and propaganda of the 
Ryazan regional committe of the CPSUI concluded a -speech upbraiding 
Solzhenitsyn with the words: 'We must all toe the lineq go forward to- 
gether, in orderly ranks all acting as one - not under some kind of lash 
but in accordance with our conscience', (p. 216). Alexander Solzh enitsyn's 
conscience was the wrong shape: he was expelledt and sent into exile. 
In his Nobel Speech (Solzhenitsyng 1972) he expresses his credo as a 
writer and as an individual: 
Man is built in such a way that ... his experience of lifel both as an individual and as a member of a group, determines his world outlook, his 
motivations and his scale of values, 11is actions and his intentions. As 
the Russian saying goes, 'Trust not your brother: -trust your own eye, 
even if itts crooked'. This is the soundest basis for understanding onels 
environment and for determining one's behavior within that environment. (P-10) 
The century following Matthew Arnold's Literature and Dogma has witnessed 
a dramatic turnabout in Western culture; Christian dogmatists rounded on 
Arnold's rationalistic interpretations; a hundred years later Solzilenitsynos 
Christian individualism is decried by rational dogmatists. 
Power. mobility and dogMatic ideologies 
There is by no means a uniform Weltanschuung even in Europe; but 
the Zeitgeis has made its'mark universally by the dramatic shifts in know- 
ledget powe r and mobility referred to earlier (pp. Z?, 5'-2" ). These changes 
entail significant implications in relation to dogma and literature, which 
will now be considered in turn. 
A dogmatic system depends for its survival upon the subordination of 
.Z acquired. knowledge to its fundamental organiAtional pattern. In other wordsp 
it makes little difference how much knowledge is acquired so long as the 
items (of information are filtered through the machinery of a particular 
conceptual system before being categorized and compart, -mentalized. For 
24L 
example, as Arnold points out in connection with the-writers of the New 
Testament and their cone eptual sebema; their Weltanschauung, 'The men 
being what, and when and whence they wereq the miracles would certainly 
grow up for them around and in the wake of Jesus' (Super V19 P-324). 
The same Ifilteringl principle can be observed in more detai. 1 in 
works, such as the Critical and Expository Bible gycloRaedia popular in 
the lateninateenth century. The autbort Dr AR Fausset, Canon of Yorkp 
deals, for example, with a problem of chronology in Genesis by stretching 
the normal length of a generation: I ... the length of a generation varies. 
Abraliam, at a time when life was so much longer than it is now, implies a 
generation was about 100. years (Gen. xv, 169 comP. 13)9 "the fourth gener- 
ation" answering to "four hundred years". D)e Ifebrew text was preserved'with.. 
scrupulous care. *.? 
(Faus. setv c. 18959 p. 129). And biblical details which 
would in the normalcourse of events imply rather an extraordinary degree of 
human fecundity lie explains as follows: 
T he increase from 70# at Jacob's going down to Egypt, to 600,000 at the 
exodus is accountable when we remember the special fruitfulness promised 
by God. There were at the eiso0us 51 pairs at least bearing children, 
for there were 67 menp viz. Jacob's 12 sons, 51 grandsons, and four 
great grandsonsp besides one daughter and one granddaughter (Gen. xlvi, 
8-27). Mese 51 must have taken foreign wives. Then, besides, pelygamy, 
prevailed. All these causes together fully account for the great increase 
in 215 years. (p. 129). 
Similarly a recent Musl im Commentary on the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, (Tabandeh, 1970). Faced with the concept of 'equal rights.. 
without distinctions of any kind such as sex... ' the traditional attitude 
of the faith is justified in the following terms: 
Islam has granted to women the fullest possible measure of freedom that 
is riot con 
' 
trary to her nature, her constitution and her chastity. 71. icre 
are certain things in life which are not suitable f' or women, and certain 
tasks which do not conform to her nature; and these Islam forbids lier 
to undertake: e. g. interfere in politics... (etc. etc. ). (P-51) 
Mus information or concepts u6ich might be felt, to endanger the system 
can be dealt with in a variety of witys: by 'logical' confutation 
(logic, or 
pseudo-logic, can be used almost as successfully against the truth as for 
it); by appeals to higher authority; by relegation of the conflicting 
data to inferior status; by ridiculd; by suggestion; by evasion, and. 
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so on. Such devices are used by the dogmatist - sometimes consciously, but 
njore often tban not probably as a result of unconscious rationalisatioll. 
Information and concepts, which are supportive to the dogmatic system in 
question are eagerly embraced and made mucli of by elaboration and integra- 
tion with the system., Of oourse, not all world-views are (logmatic; but 
where they are, this filtering and integrating process must inevitably take 
place to safeguard the system's preservation. 
For the process to be successful within any closed ideology or dogmatic 
system, the dogniiatists are dependent iipon the power strucUire they inhabit. 
If the economic and political power favours the dogma. in question its 
proponents can rely on the support not only of 'authority' per se but of 
concomitant social constraints in the form of reward and punishment patterns 
imposed by the state or community. (Both perception and 'belief' are highly 
adaptibie to circumstances, and the human urge for survival commonly finds 
a ready ally in the capacity for rationalization. The penalty for failing 
to adapt is the painful phenomenon sometimes termed 'cognitive dissonance' 
which can prove either debilitating or a spur to creativity. ) Power, 
whether it is life-enhancing-through provision of food, sheltert medicinev 
educationp etc. orlife-menacing by threats of imprisonment, violence or 
death, etc. is therefore of crucial importance to the maintainance of a 
dogmatic system; and it does not matter very much 
(from this point of 
view) whether the power is exercised by despotic monarchy, theocracy, social 
democracy, or 'co-operativel, so long as its constraints are felto and in- 
escapable. 
This leads to the third aspect in question, mobility. Given the 
existence of rival alternative d+atic systems or of topen societies? where 
free enquiry is allowed or encouragedt tile success of any particular dog- 
matic. system depends to a considerable degree UpOh tile immobility Of tile 
mass of its adheretits, or the gruaratiCee that Hic grairting ol' mobility will 
be limited to those so thoroughly indoctrinated as to be impervious to other 
influences. The indocrination may be conscious or 'unconscious, but the net 
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result is the same: deeply embedded assumptions are unlikely to be 
shifted by relatively casual contacts, especially among those ubose per- 
mission to travel and vhose status on readmission are advantageously linked 
with their community's pover structure. The seclusio'n of Japan until the 
mid-nineteenth century protected for many centuries a system of assumptions 
which included elements long ago shed in Europe. The more recent isolation 
of Communist China enabled a series of doctrinal developments to take place 
without outside interference. Travel between East and West and between 
countries with rival ideologies in Africa continue to present problems 
because. ofAhe, unwillingness of authorities to risk the exposure of their 
subjects to dangerous external influences. And so on. 
I am using the concept Imobilityl here in preference. to tcommunication' 
because commun ication is to a large extent language-bound. 
('11lere is not 
much point in my tuning in to. an Arabic radio station if I do-not under- 
stand Arabic; and the chances of having an adequate capacity to translate 
and interpret Arabic material are greatly enhancedt if not totally 
dependent upon, the opportunity to spend time in an Arabic-speaking 
community. ) Given differences in language, the power structure of a state 
can largely determine the amount of translated communication available 
within its confines. The term Imobile', which I am taking 
to mean Imovableg 
not fixed, free to move; easily changing... from place to place' 
(Concise 
Oxford Dictionary), can be applied both to people and to knowledge, and 
the 
genuinely free movement of either is necessarily a 
threat to the continued 
existence of a dogmatic system. Hence the importancep 
for a condition of 
open enquiry, of mobility. 
Mobility and literature 
Mobility is also important to the growth and nourishment of sioifi- 
cant literature, since the prime value of literature 
is to express tile 
universal elements in human experience,. albeit 
through the representation 
of particular details. On the one hand , the confined 
life is prevented 
from sufficiently wide exposure-to a variety of experience 
to be able to 
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distinguish -Aat is universal from what is individual or parochial. 
On ibe other hand the containment of literary production Within the 
country or culture of its origin, limits the possibilities of creative 
cross-fertilization and of offering the chance to others in other cultures 
to extend their ovAi understanding of vhaL is universal and significant 
in Inman existence. 
It is, of coursep the opportunity provided by literature to Pxtend 
the range of our experience oven if only vicariously, that induces 
anxiety among dogmatists and leads often to censorship anti proscription. 
The systemized organization of shared and authorized opinions is immedia- 
tely threatened by the intrusion of alternative opinions presenting a 
different world-view or convassing new or uncensored assumptions. The 
very existence of dogmatic adherence derives from individual anxiety; 
a sense of individual inadequacy to cope with the vorld1s Imultitudinousnesst; 
or its apparent inconsistency or paradox, leads men to lean on the author- 
ity of the group or of tradition. Literature, by presenting different 
points of view and by engaging the feelings of the reader in sympathy with 
these different viewpoints, may introduce forbidden knowledge, or knowledge 
in. a forbidden (unfiltered) from, thus encroaching dangerously on psych- 
ological allegiance to accepted authority. It alsJintroduces a new principle 
of power: there is more týan a little truth in the oft repeated maxim 
? the pen is mightier than, the sword'* If it were not so there woulld be no 
need for the application, of such charges as lattempting to subvert the 
State by means of poetry recently invoked 
(in 1975) against a dissident 
*v. (e. g. ) 'Many wearing rapiers are afroW of goose-(juills' 
(Shakespeare, 
Hamlet, =1 c. 1601); 111ow much more cruel the pen may be than the sword' 
TRoberi Barton, Anatoifiy of Melancholy 1p 1601); IMore danger comes by 
thiquill than by the sword? (Martin Parkert 1641 , 
); IScholars are men of 
peacey they carry no arms, but their tongues are sharper 
than Actus his 
razors; their pens carry further and make a louder report 
than thunder. 
I had rather stand the abock of a basilisco than the fury of a merciless 
pen'. (Sir Thomas Browne, Religio 1je_dici- IIv 1642); 'Caesar 
had perished 
from the world of men/ Had not his sword been rescued by his pen. 
" (Henry 
1) 
Vaughan I Sir 11iomas Bodley's 
Libraryq c. 1650; 'The rn is iniglitier than 
the sword' (10, G 1hilwer-Lyt-Loit, Itichelieu . 
11,18-58. Data from HJj Meticken 
(1966)). 
Note: Perhaps this sentiment unjong literary meii is bardly murprisingrl 
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white South African, or for the exiling or confinement of 'unacceptable, 
novelists in the U. S. S. R. That -is -why Solzhenitsyn as poet and novelist 
is also a symbol of the living power of literature to modify human con- 
sciousness, to distmrb assumptions and subvert unquestioned beliefs. 
Attempts to silence him or immobilize his writing proved unsuccessful and 
the experienVal knowledge he was determined to communicate has thankfully 
resisted the power structure that sought to stifle and contain it. 
On the other side of the coin, but equally significant, is the prev- 
ention of writers and journalists from entering countries of competing 
ideologies; as for examplev the U. S. State Department's refusal to allow 
all but a selected-few 'exceptional' Americans to travel in China in the 
post-war period up to the late sixties. According to Edgar Snow (1970) it 
was not until 1969 that 
Under pressure from publishers, scientistal educators and some congressmen, 
the State Department cautiously increased the number of exeeptions made 
to the administrative. ruling which excluded Americans from travel in China... 
but, by then the issue had become somewhat irrelevant. China had closed its 
doors to all but a handful of foreign visitors d ri the Great Proletarian 
Revolution and Americans were not in that handful. p. 29) 
Power, knowledge and mobility are neutral in themselves, but in practice 
they soon become intertwined -with values (and of course with each other). 
Perhaps it is as well that the acceleration in their advance has been 
virtually parallel; it certai nly seems important that knowledge, including 
particularly the personal and individual kinds of knowledge embodied in 
literarylexperiencel should be freely available, and that peoplep as 
well as the books they read and write, should be allowed maximum mobility 
since open communication is likely to provide the surest checks against 
the solidified entrenchment of dogmatically oriented power. 
The open world-view of art -a means of--transcendinar tensions 
So far we have been considering the concept of Weltanscliuung largely 
I 
in terms of closed ideologies or fixed dogmatic systems; but the term 
(as has been suggested) can also be applied to a loose cluster of 
principles such as might be held by a liberal thinker er, an imaginative 
writer. Maecke (1969) discussing Romantic Irony and its appeal for a 
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writer it, the modern lopenl worP believes that 
It both saw and answered flie basic questions with which a moile-ril Weltan- 
schau-u-mg confronts the artist. It recognized, to begin With, Man7_s ironic 
predicament as a finite being, terrifyingly alone in an infinite and 
infinitely complex and contradictory world of which he could achieve. only 
ajinite understanding, and in his art only a finite presentation, but a 
'world for which he, and particularly the artist, the artist as God since 
there was no other, had nevertheless to accept responsibility and give 
it meaning and value. It went on to recognize that implicit even in the 
artist's awareness and acceptance of his limitations there lay -the possib- 
ility, througýthc self-irony of art, of transcending his predicament, 
not actuallyýýntellcctually and imaginatively. 
(p. 215) 
Such an approach avoids the escapism of pure subjectivity and of false 
'harmonious resolutions' in literary works; and equally avoids the destruc- 
tivetiess of nihilism. Theorists of Romantic Irony 'wishing to keep open, 
the place ofart in an open world.. prescribed "dynamic" literature Voich 
would ironically accept and ironically express within itself the general 
ironies of art and of the human predicament at large and so preserve itself 
against "the destructive power of the whole"'(ibid. 
). This viewpoint and 
this task are not, however, entirely restricted to theorists of Romantic 
Irony; to a lesser exten+ perhaps, but equally importantly, literature in 
general (where it is conceived in a genuinely open, creative and imagina- 
tive way) seeks to delineate rather than evade the tensions, perplexities 
and paradoxes - in short, the ironies of lifet and thus make 
them meaning- 
ful if possible and bearable whether meaningful or not. 
Arnold's ewdaemonism criticised 
The question of life's meaningfulnbss or otherwise brings us to the 
final issue relating to Arnold and Weltanschauung. I am inclined to agree 
with those critics who see in Arnoldts optimistic naturalism and his 
eudaemonism a flaw in his world-view. For example, in writing about what 
he saw as the high point of the Hebrews' perception of the Et ernal, or God, 
in Literature and Dogma he asserts: 
I 
God or Eternal is here really, at bottom, nothing but a deeply moved way 
of saying tthe power that makes for cond! lSt or righteousness. ' 'Trust in 
God', is, in a deeply moved way of expression, the trust in the law of 
conduct; 'delight in the Eternal. ' is, in a deeply moved way of expressing 
the happiness we all feel to spring from conduct. Attending to con(luct 
to judgment, makes the attender feel that it is the commandment of the 
Eternal, and that the joy got from it is joy got from fulfilling the 
commandment of the Eternal. (Super Vl, p. 193) 
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Witbout wishing to deny that therv is an element of truth in this, it seems 
pýrhaps from the ilistance of the last quarter of the 4, weiitieLIK ceittitry it 
little too neat, -too glib. It-is certainly some way from the feeling expressed 
in Arnoldts poem 'Moralityl 
'(Allott, 1965) two decades earlier: 
We cannot kindle -Aten we will 
The 
-fire which 
in the heart resides; 
1he spirit bloweth and is still 
In mystery our soul abides. 
But tasks in hours of insight willed 
Can be through hours of gloom fulfilled... 
(p. 259) 
-a statement which is at least equally true. Mere is an intriguing 
ambiguity in the definition of God as 'the power that makes for conduct 
or righteousness'. Does it mean the power that will ensure that, righteous- 
nessultimately prevails; or does it m can the power that fa. -cilitates such 
righteousness as is achieved in the world? It seems to me that Arnold's 
poetry adopts in general the secondo more stoical viewpoint; his prose'- 
(closer to the first viewpoint) savours at times of the general current of 
Victorian optimism. 
Life views and world-views distinguished 
In Civilization and Ethics, written half a century later than Arnold's 
Literature and DoMa, Albert Schweitzer (1961 (1923)) faces up to the same 
issue, resolving it by a 'unified. combination of the two separated elements 
we find in Arnold. Schweitzer's main contention is that our 'life-viewf is 
ifidependent of our world-view. Our Ilife view' is our will-to-live and our 
recognition of the 'will-to-livel in others, our sensitivity resulting from 
this, and our conception of the cosmic scene where we play out our relatively 
infinitessimal lives. fWe are entirely ignorant of what significance we 
have for the earth, ' he writes. 111ow much less then may we presume to try 
to attribute to the infinite universe a meaning which has us for its object, 
or which can be explained in terws of our existen 
. 
cc. ' (p. 182). Naturc. lis 
a wonderfully creative forcep and at the same time a senselessly destructive 
force. We face her absolutely perplexed'' (ibid. 
). However: 
nic li. re-view beld by Ii., uropean t1iought being op-timistic-ethi Call UIC 
sanic character was attributed to0orld-view iii defiance of 
fitets. Wishful 
m 
thinking, 'Without admitting it, overpowered knowledge. Life-view prompted 
and world-view recited. So the belief that life-view %. ias derived from 
world-view was only a fiction. (p. 183) 
Here Schweitzerv reacting like Kierkegaard against the Hegelian Absolute, 
(the all-embracing Zeitgeist sweeping men forward in its divine purpose)p 
puts the responsibility for ethical consciousness, and behavior fairly 
and squarely upon mankind, and adopts what is essentially an existentialist 
position. Schweitzer concedes that 'the greatness of European philosophy 
consists in its having chosen the optimistic-ethical world-viewf but 
asserts that 'its weakness (was) its having again and again imagined that 
itwas putting that conception on a firm foundation' (p. 180). I think 
this points tokweakness in Arnold too. 
Schweitzerts charact erization of the Rationalist world-view, which his 
own existentialist position discards, is very much akin to Arnold's: 
Its optimism consists in that it assumes as ruling in the world a general 
purpose directed to the achievement of perfection, and that from this 
purposiveness the efforts of individual men and of mankind in general 
to secure material and spiritual progress derive meaning and importance, 
and in addition a guarantee of success. (p. 23) 
Stich a view, to the Victorians, newly awakened to the principles of evol- 
ution and witnesses of unparalleled material advance, is understandable; 
but for twentieth-century man it is less tenable. Schweitzer's ethic of 
reverence for life is based on the generalization of our individual 
'will-to-livel not on cosmic purposep therefore, and on the basic prin- 
ciplt that 'it is good to maintain and to encourage life; it is bad to 
destroy life or to obstruct it': 
As a matter of fact (be writes), everything which in the ordinary ethical 
valuation of the relations of men to each other ranks as goof] caii be 
brought under the description of material in(] spiritual 'maintainance or 
promotion of laiman life, and of effort to bring it to its highest value. 
Converselyp everything which ranks as. bad in human relations is in the 
last analysis material or spiritual destruction or obstruction of human life, 
and negligence in the cndcavour to bring it to its highest value. Separate 
individual catelrories of rood 1111(1 evil w1iich lie far apart aiid have appar- 
ently no connection at all with one another fit together like the pieces of 
a jig-saw puzzle, as soon as they are comprehended und deepened in this the 
most universal definition of good and evil (p. 214) 
Like Arnold, Schweitzer eschewed metaphysics (Ifantastic systemst, as he 
called thejý); like Arnold he sought to combi ne theological and philosophical 
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conceptions from the East with those current in the West; like Arnold lie 
eg0 Salir el, hics 
(or lenii(Inet' ) as the cen-tral. issiie in r-H ri ii; like Ariiolil 
he declined to define God in any but the most -tentative terms. However, 
Schweitzer succeeded in bringing together two elements which in Arnold's 
development had been separated, resolving the pessimism of Arnold the poet 
and the optimism of Arnold the prosewriter in a convincing liberal-humanist 
Weltanschauung suited to meet the exacting , Iemands of our fast-changing 
pluralist twentieth century society. At the same time, Arnoldfs world-view 
had an inherently modern ring imbued as it was with a consciousness of 
the changing significance of the prefiguring that more recently 
expounded by Margaret Mead, WD Wall and other twentieth century writers. 
Summary of implications 
The implications for education of the Zeitgeist, as discussed in this 
chapter, are of several kinds. Firstly the qualitative. change in our time- 
scalev resulting from constant technological acceleration, demands a 
curriculum geared towards flexibility and adaptibility of skills and out 
look among our school students. Over-specialization could restrict the scope 
of pupils whose future needs. cannot ý any longer be predicted. EmotiorIoLl sec- 
urity is needed to cope with change; but f ixed ideas and values embedded 
in tightly structured dogmatic systems are likely to result in excessive 
strife and anxiety from culture-clash in a shrinking world. Although a 
'point of view? is needed to contend with the complexities of modern life, 
individuals will need to acquire this within a context of lopent discussion 
if democratic values are to be upheld amidst the seductive security of the 
all-inclusive totalitarian Weltanschauungen also currently on offer. 
Religious education needs to be presented in an 'open' way if it is to meet 
tile needs of multiculturalism and avoid the pitfalls of tYing its more 
spiritual truths and insights to Ifacts' or dogmas vulnerable to shifts in 
the Zeitgeist. And finally, literature call provide a means of overcoming 
to some extent the limits of our mobility and of transcending emotionally 
sonw-, ofthe tensions in the constant, although not altogether unhealthy, clash 
lim 
of diverse points of view which must be a feature of a truly open society. 
PART FOUR 
LITERATURE VERSUS DOGMA 
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CRAPTFR TEN 
MATTHEW ARNOLD: EDUCATIONAL PRODUCT AND PROPONENT 
We may say, then, that Arnold inherited from his father his religion 
-his certainty that its essential truths were unassailable, however 
much creeds and dogmas might be shaken. He also inherited from him 
his 'liberalism'. taking that word to mean all that Newman most passion- 
ately opposed; above all, readiness to trim one's sails to meet new 
'winds of doctrine. 
I Basil Willey, Arnold and Religion, 1975 
Resolve to be thyself: and know that he 
Who finds himself, loses his misery... 
Matthew Arnold: 'Self-Dependence', c. 1850 
In-this chapter Matthew Arnold will be consideredg for reasons 
whichI hope will become clear, first as the Rroduct. of a particular 
kind of education, and second as a proponent of certain educational aims. 
It will not attempt a complete epistemological study of Arnold, *but con- 
centrate on'those aspects of his work which have bearing on a 'literary, 
or 'dogmatic' - an 'imaginatively open' or a 'resolutely closed' 
approach to education. It will consider the educational implications 
of Arnold's own character, and the formative influences upon its devel- 
opment, before turning to an examination of his epistemological pre- 
occupations and his central concern -with 'conduct? as the major constituent 
of life, and thus a chief concern of education in general, and of liter- 
ature and religious education in particular. 
Arnold's essential modernity and flexibility of spirit seem to stem, 
as one might expect, from the particular circumstances of his upbringing. 
His confident, questioning approach to life and its problems has a rele- 
vance to today's educational demands that makes it worthwhile considering 
some of the factors contributing to his early development. 
The brief examination of background factors in Arnold's early life 
and upbringing which follows will concentrate on those elements which 
have a particular relevance to present-day needsg notably the factors 
regarde d as of primary importance by a number of modern educators 
including WD Wall (1959), John Wilson (1967) and the anthropologist, 
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Margaret Mead (1972) the need Cor emotional security coupled with 
flexible adaptability. This joinC requirement is best switmed up 
perhaps by coupling John Wilson's observation in An Introduction to 
Moral Education (1967) that children 'should eventually be able not just 
to think for themselves and entertain doubts, but to -feel secure enough 
to do these things without severe anxiety or unhappiness' (p. 162) with 
WD Wall's recognition of the need for men and women who 'whilst basic- 
ally secure and immune from overwhelming and neurotic anxiety ... are able 
to take calculated risks, willing to seek for, accept and digest change 
(and) who are, in a word, dynamically adaptable and grow with the time, 
(19599 P-34) 
Arnold's home background 
lt is true, if we examine Arnold for these qualities, that -we find 
him having to cope by means of his poetry with a measure of anxiety 
and unhappinessq but that this was severe in any crippling or debilitat- 
ing sense is repudiated by the record of his life and relations with his 
family, friends and associates and by his confident challenging of 
established orthodoxies. Similarly, the image of Matthew Arnold being 
overshadowed and dominated. by his father, Dr Thomas Arnold of Rugby, is 
scarcely tenable. This myth is propagatedoy Trilling (1955)p for 
exampleg when he sees in Arnold's poem 'Sohrab and Rustum1fat least a 
shadowy personal significance. The strong son is slain by the mightier 
father... 1 (PP-134-135); and WH Auden's poem 'Matthew Arnold' makes 
Arnold declare: 
I am my f ather Isf orum and he shall be -heard 
Nothing shall contradict his holY final wort) 
Nothing... 
so that the poet must 'thrust his gift in prison till it dieV leaving 
him with 'nothing but a jailor's voice and face. '.. '. Such interpretations, 
while psychologically intriguing, ignore the independent stature achieved 
by Matthew Arnold and the channelling of his creative and imaginative 
energies into his witty and provocative prose writings, Friendship's 
e gi 
Garland (1871), Culture and Anaielly (1869), Literature and Pogina (1873), 
etc. They also seem to confuse filial respect and affection (which appears 
to have'been well earned. by the father) with a hind of filial self-abase- 
ment and psychological suicide on ArnoldIs part for which there seems to 
be no objective evidence. The fact is that Arnold got on remarkably well 
with his parents9 and his home life seems -to have provided the two requis- 
ite features of a modern education: a high degree of security and love, 
and an open, questioning intellectual environment. 
From the distance of the late twentieth century 'Momas Arnold may 
appear to be a conservative and reactionary figure; to his contemporar- 
ies lie was far from this. As a historian he welcomed the New Criticism 
in theology emanating from Germany and pioneered the new interpretations 
among English theologians. Neiman (1968) describes him as 'a reformer 
in a reforming aget who 'tried to awaken his students to awareness of 
social injustices in the world outside the school' (p. 19); who tried 
(in his own words), for example, tto get up a real Poor Mail's Magazine, 
'which should not bolster up abuses and veil iniquities, nor prose to 
the poor as to children; but should address them in the style of Cobbett, 
plainly, boldly, and in sincerity, excusing nothing, concealing nothing, 
and misrepresenting-nothing, but speaking the very whole truth in love' 
(ibid. p. 19). His biographer, Stanley (1893, p. 255), writes of 'the 
vehemence of the. outcry by which he was assailed' during the 1830's for 
his supportý of the liberal views of Hampden and the Oriel Noetics. 
Thomas Arnold's views on the role of an educationalist seem to have 
been equally advanced. Stanley quotes from a letter Ile wrote. to a 
friend enquiring, about tutoring. In reply Arnold draws upon his own 
experience at Laleham (where Matthew's early-years were spent): 
I should say, have your pupils a good deal witb'youl and be as familiar 
'with them as you possibly can. I did this continually more and more I)efore 
I lef 
't 
Lalcham, going to bathe with them, leaping and all other gymnastic 
exercises within my capacity, and sometimes sailing or rowing with them. 
They I believe always liked it, and I enjoyed it myself like a boy, and 
found myself constantly the better for it. (p. 20) ' 
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An ex-pupil, a Mr Price, is quoted by Stanley (op cit) in confirmation 
of the atmosphere prevailing at Laleham: 
The most remarkable thing which struck me at once on joining the Laleham 
circle was, the wonderful healthiness of tone and feeling which prevailed in it. Everything about me I immediately found to be most real; it was 
a place where a new-comer at once felt that a great and earnest work was 
going forward ... an indescribable zest was communicated to a young man's feeling about life; a strange joy came over him on discovering that be 
had the means of being usefulv and thus of being happy; and a deep 
respect and ardent attachment sprang up towards him who had taught him 
thus to value life and his own self, and his work and mission in this world. Who that ever had the happiness of being at Laleham, does not remember the lightness and joyousness of heart, with which he (Dr Arnold) would 
romp and la i the gardent or plunge 'with a boy's delight into the y In 
Thames ... 
tpp. 
22-23) 
Thomas Arnold believed that the usefulness of a boy's education 
depended upon the activit--jr induced in his mind - 'whether he has learned 
to think, or to act, and to gain knowledge by himselfj or whether he has 
merely followed passively as long as there was some one to draw him' 
(Stanleyp 1893, p. 21): 
As a general rule, he never gave information, except as a kind of reward for 
an answer, and often withheld it altogether, or checked himself in the very 
act of uttering it ... and 
his questions were of a kind to call the attention 
of the boys to the real point of every subject and to disclose to them the 
exact boundaries of what they knew or did not know. (ibid. p. 80) 
His unorthodox, yet kindly approach is evidenced in a letter from the young 
Arthur Stanley (later tne Dean, his biographer) to his mother. Stanley writes 
from Rugby: 'Ohl how particular he is; but at the same time so mild and pleas- 
ant. I liked saying tobim very much. He asks very much about history, and 
asks queer out-or-the-way questions. He seems very much pleased when I answer 
anything'(Prothero, 1909, P. 32). Meriol Trevor (1973) writes of a memorandum 
Thomas Arnold had prepared for his brother-in-law Trevenen 'about the upbring- 
ing of his children in the event of his death'. As well as showing a broad- 
minded attitude to denominational teaching it shows concern to avoid lover- 
strictness, which tended to lead children into hypocracy "and then to desperate 
outbreakl"(P. 31). 
Meriol Trevor (op cit) writes of the atmosphere of the Arnold's 
family life; 
They were a happy family, acting plays and reciting poems from their 
earliest years, and Mary (Thomas's wife) was an intelligent clear-minded 
young woman$, more calm and stable than Arnold. He could not have chosen 
better, for Mary shared his interests and ideals without being so easily 
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carried away by enthusiasm. 
Matthew Arnoldle letters to his mother bear witness toflie love and 
stability thus created. Many-years after his days at Laleham and 
Rugby he writes to her on. her birthday, for example: 'Accept every 
loving and grateful wish from a son to whom you have for thirty years 
been such a mother as few sons have. 'Ilic, more I see of -the world the 
more I feel thankful for the bringing up we had, so unworldly, so sound, 
so purel (Chambers, 1947 , p. 125). lie often mentions his father in his 
correspondence with his mother. Twenty-five years after Thomas had died, 
-wrlien Matthew Arnold is just forty-five years old lie writes -to his mother, 
on Christmas day: 
I have been reading this year in connexion with the New Testament a good 
deal of Aristotle and Plato, and this has brought papa very much to my 
mind again. Bunsen used to say that our great business was to get rid 
of all that was purely Semitic in Christianityt and to make it Indo- 
Germaniep and Schleiermacher that in the Christianity of us Western 
nations there was really much more of Plato and Socrates than of Joshua 
and Davi4; and, on the whole, papa worked in the direction of. these 
ideas of Bunsen and Schleiermacherv and was perhaps the only powerful 
Englishman of his day who did so. In fact, he was the only deeply 
religious man who had the necessary culture for it. Perhaps the 
change of times and'modes of action being allowed fort my scope is 
not so different from his as you and I often think. (Super VI, P-456) 
Here (in the last sentence) we see a hint of Arnold's independence of 
his father as well as of his overall respect and admiration for him. 
This independence Matthew had caught from his father: it is in the 
spirit of Thomas's ecclesiastical liberalism 'that is said to have cost 
him a bishopric' (Neiman, 1968, p. 20). If Matthew Arnold's testimonial 
in his poem lRugby Chapell is -to be believedr such setbacks made 
little 
difference to his fatherls outward demeanor: 
If, in the paths of the world I. 
Stones might have wounded thy feet 
Toil or dejection have tried 
Thy spiritt of that we saw 
Nothing - to us thou wust still 
Cheerful, and helpful, and firm! ... 
(Allott, 19,6S' , p. 9-0) 
More telling as a testimonial to his father, perhaps, because unconscious, 
are the words Matthew uses in Literature and Dogma to justify the use of 
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the word 'Father' for the concept 'God': 
And it is the sanic with all the language otir Ilebrew religioniffl; Uses (lie wril. cs). God is a rittlier, becanse Hip. power in aiid around us,, wliic-Ii 
makes for righteousness, is indeed beat described by the name of this 
authoritative but yet tender'and protective relation. (Super VIP P. 185) 
The morewe look into theirecord, especially lietween the lines, the more 
it becomes evident that Matthew Arnold both respected his father's 
stature and cherished a lively affection for him as a person. Ile 
certainly does not appear to have been overawed or crushed by him. 
Swinburne, appartntly, 'once quoted a witty. critic who referred to 
Matthew Arnold as "David, the son of Goliath"' (Neimano 1968, p. 14). 
Without pressing the comparison too far, it is worthwhile remembering 
which of these two protagonists came off bestl Matihew's ultimate 
achievement might not have been easy to predict from early evidence, 
however. Meriol Trevor writes of Arnold's early childhood that: 
he was always a great one for, doing as he pleased, puzzling his good 
serious mother by his carelessness, his tricks and whims. Matt ... was 
quick and imaginative but lazy in the way creative people sometimes 
are lazy, unable to work until their interest is wholly engaged. (p. 21) 
Even at Oxford his obtaining only a second class degree scarcely prefigured 
the honorary degree of D. C. L. that the same University was later to grant 
him unsought, 
Creativity. independence and self-concept 
At this point it is interesting to consider Arnold's character 
profile in the light of two modern studies of personality traits. lie 
matches remarkably well with 'the creative members' of DW MacKinnon's 
experimental samples, as described by Liam Hudson (1967): 
The creative members of MacKinnon's samples differ from the non- creative 
by being more emotionally lopen'; legis hidebound in attitude and belief; 
and exceptionally self-reliant. In other words, they seem to differ 
not in their intellectual equipment, but in the use that they see fit to 
make of it. In this respect, MacKinnon's results agree precisely with 
my, own, find the interpretation is supported by bis f iliding 1, bat the 
creative members of his sample were frequently uhdistinguished at school 
and university. Usually, their average grade was a OBt, or less: 
In work and courses w1iich caught Lbeir interest they could turn it) an 
A performance, but in courses that failed to strike their imagination, 
they were quite willing to do no work at all. In general# their attitude 
in college appears to have been one of profotind l3ke pti C-i Bill. 
(Hudson, PP. 11111-5) 
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That Arnold was already at Oxfoid-a sceptical and 'divergent thinkerl 
(to use Liam lludsonts term) was eviden .t from a letter written in 1888 
by a former Balliol scholar Edward Walford, to The Times, and quoted 
in Lowry, (1932): 
well remember how, -wrlien. we waited in the Vice-Chancellorls ante-room 
for admissiono Arnold professed to us his great aversion to sundry state-, 
nients in the Thirty-nine Articlest wrhich at that time we were all forced 
to subscribe, especially that article which expresses an approval of 
the Athanasian Creed, and -that wb. icb denounces and renounces the Pope 
of Rome. In his early days,... l shall never forget how, in opposition 
to the Tractarianism of the day, he used to say that the strict imposition 
of creeds had done more -to break up than to unite churches, and nations, 
and raniiiies, and how even tlicqin our stuall and hi. -bly priviTeged circle, 
lie was the apostle of religious toleration in every direction. (pp. 23-21i) 
An interesting study by 0J Harvey on 'Conceptual Systems and 
Attitude Change? (Warr, 1970) which links personality constructs with 
parental upbringing indirectly throws considerable light on Arnold's 
own case. Harvey describes four basic conceptual systems to which 
subjects have been found to conform to a significant degree in terms 
of ttheir personal ordering of'significancel of the norms and values 
of their society. Harveyo to my mind rather misleadingly, describes these 
four theoretical systems as representing different levels of 'concrete- 
ness-abstractriesst (P-318), where they seem to me to move rather from 
frigid parental conditioning' to 'open mutuality and reflexion'; but 
Harvey's designation at least has the merit of brevity. 
Self-system One results when ? the individual has been restricted in 
the exploration of that part of his world concerned with values, power 
relations and social causality' (ibid. ). Such an, individual has been 
molded to conform Icatechismieally to the omnipotently and omnisciently 
imposed standards ', of the parent or controlliug authority'. As in the S; -It 
model of psychologyt values are internalised 'without insight and the 
ritualistic adherence to rules without understandingl is fostered: 
I 
System I functioning consequntly manifests itself in such characteristics 
as high superstition, high religiosityt high absolutism and closedness 
of beliefs, high evaluativeness, high positive ties with and dependence 
on representatives of institutional authority ... such as God and religion.. 
high identification with social roles and status positionsp high conven- 
t*onality and high ethnocentrism, etc. (p. 318) 
I 
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Self-system Two is associated with equally lomnipotenitand '. omniscient' 
parental behavior, but capricious (rather than rigid) 'control of rewards 
and punishments' administered by authority. Such an unpredicLable and 
unstructured world creates 'uncertainties, distrust of authority and 
rebellion' so that; 
System 2 representativeso more than persons of any of the other self- 
8ystems,. -seem to be in a psychological vacuum, guided more by rejection 
of social prescriptions and avoidance of dependency on God and other 
representations of institutional authority ... than by positive adherence 
to personally derived standards. (P-319) 
Self system-Three results from 'overindulgence by one or both parents, 
whichp by preventing exploration of the physical world and by encouraging 
manipulation of the parents produces... inflated notions of esteem and 
social power alongside the feeling of inability to cope with problems 
except by the control of others through dependency' (P-319). Therefore: 
System 3 representatives ... are concerned with establishing fr, ienCtships, intra-group consensus and dependence relations in order to avert the 
feeling of helplessness and social isolation that would result from 
being forced to be on their own. Through tile use of highly developed 
skills of manipulation, particularly through exploitation of dependencies, 
System 3, functioning tends to favor success in effecting desired out- 
comes in the social sphere. (PP-320-321) 
Because of what seems to me to be its close applicability to Matthew 
Arnold's case, I will quote Harvey's description of System 4 in full: 
SýVstem 4. The inoBt abstract of the four systems, tbiB mode of construal 
and behaving is viewed as the consequences of childhood freedom to explore 
both the social and physical aspects of one's own experience and thought 
and to solve problems and evolve solutions without fear of punishment 
for deviating from established truth and the social imperatives. This 
developmental history eventuates in a 1, igh task orientation, information 
seeking, exploratory behavior, risk taking and independence. (P-320) 
It avoids authoritarian deference and acquiescence as in system one; it 
is free from the negative social rebelliousness of system two; and is 
independent of excessive peer group dependence to which system three 
tends. In Harveyls words iSysten, 11 is the most abstract, more impersonal 
and more oriented toward information seeking and problem solving for 
intrinsic rather than extrinsic rewards' (P-320). Significantly, the 
test scores of System 4 persons 'fall, in, the cell of low authoritarianism 
low dogmatism' (P-321). Taking the evidence from Arnold's life and 
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writing in conjunction with llav, eyls account of work on personality 
cons tructs, there seems to be much to commend the view that his 
preference for literature over dogma - for openness as against fixed 
and rigid rules - was no accident, but an inevitable result of his up- 
bringing. If the views of. W D Wall, Margaret Mead and John. Wilson as to 
the hind of personality needed to face the (1cmands of twentieth cenLury 
living are accepted, then the quality of Matthew Arnold's particular 
upbringing has important educational and curricular implications. 
Arnold's religious and moral background was'relatively secure 
(in terms of love and acceptance) while at the same time relatively 
'open' (. questioning, advanced and unorthodox). As a result the inevitable 
tensions of growth and adjustment to the wider material and spiritual 
universe were worked out relatively early in his life through his poetry. 
Ile was thus able to achieve an equilibrium, a mental poise, and a high 
degree of 'disinterestedness' (one of his favourite terms) 
to tackle 
philosophical and theological problems as he saw them. Unperturbed by 
the competitive material and sectarian confusion around him, with no 
'axe to grind' he endeavoured to 'see life clearly and to see 
it whole'; 
and with material and spiritual anxieties reduced to a minimum his out- 
look could remain generally optimistic, generous, 'progressive' and 
tolerant. 
In a paper on Illumanism and Christianity: The Common Ground of 
Moral 
Education? Hemming and Marratt (1969) discuss the significance of early 
education for the development of emotional security combined with 
intellectua .1 flexibility.. In their view the primary school has an 
important part to play in establishing the right. basis-for growth; 
There has been a tendency (they write) to regard the, need of the junior 
child for security as involving the exclusion of areas of conflict from 
the primary classroom. Although there is some justification 
for this 
attitude, we think that the security of the younger child should 
be 
based on secure relationships rather than on an attempt to exclude 
differences of view. If this is so, then there will 
be no harm in the 
study, "at a distance", or situationally, of problems of moral conduct 
as soon as they are relevant. (p. 26) 
It seems to me that Matthew Arnold's upbringing tends to fit this pattern, 
and that his subsequent confident flexibility tends. to confirm the 
desirability of the practice recommended. 
Arnoldts doctrine of inwardness and self-knowledge 
Matthew Arnold's sense of personal security derivesp it has been 
suggested not from subservience to group authority and the comforts of 
institutionalised dogma but from the inwardness of self-knowledge and 
self-respect nurtured by domestic affection and reciprocity. Consequently 
it is not surprising that Arnold continues to preach inwardness and self- 
knowledge as a main theime of Literature and DoLUna an(] in related writings. 
Already in Culture and Anarchy fie declares that 'the culture we recommend 
is, above all, an inward operation? (Super Vt p. 234) designed to challenge 
the mischief of mechanical allegiance to 'stock notions'. 'Religion says 
(he writes): The kingdom of God is within y2u; and culture, in like 
manner, places human perfection in an internal condition... I (ibidq peq4)* 
However, lie is careful to distinguish between inwardness and personal 
isolation: 
Perfectiong as culture-conceives itq is not possible while the individual 
remains isolated. The individual is requiredt under pain of-being 
stunted and enfeebled in his own development if he disobeys, to carry 
others along with him in his march towards perfection, to be continually 
doing all he can to enlarge and increase the volume of the human stream 
sweeping thitherward. (ibid. p. 94) 
In other words, while the cultured individual must resist being led by 
the crowd, lie must serve the interests-of the majority by expanding tile 
general scope of society for individuals to share the'freedom to develop 
their own inwardness. He is against the kind of individualism expressed 
in competitiveness, on the basis of the maxim 'every man for himself#, 
with each individual following his own pursuits regardless of the well- 
being of others, since: 
the ided of perfection as a general expansion of the human family is at 
variance with our strong individualism, our hatred of all limits to tile 
unrestrained swing of the individual's personality ... and ... the idea of 
perfection as a harmonious expansion of human nature is at variance with 
r- our inaptitude for seeing more than one side of a thing, with our 
intense absorption in the particular pursuit we happen to be following. 
(ibid, P-95) 
Z67 
In Literature and Dogma, Ait, old speaks of Jesus's role its having 
come Ito restor the intuition? (Super VI, p. 284). The idea of 
righteousness which had become for Israel the province of mechanical 
obedience to strict rules needed to be restored to the realm of emotion 
and to its association with happiness; and to do this. Jesus provided 
what Arnold describes. as his ? method of repentancet and his Isecret 
of peacel (Super VI, p. 286). He showed that 'The things that come from 
within a manIs heart, they it is which defile him (Matthew, XV, 18)ý 
(Super V1, p. 287); and demonstrated this principle in symbnlic parables 
and acts of which the story. of the Woman. -Taken in Adultery provides a 
fitting example of the complex relationship between invardness,. conscience, 
gui It and punishment (Super VI, pp. 290-291). By encouraging his hearers 
Ito take each rule or fact of conduct by its inward side, its effect 
on the heart and character' - rather than simply as a 'mere matter of 
blind rule' - they were helped -to mal(c 'a return upon themselves, 
(Super VI, pp. 218-219), and to recognize. that 'conduct' (at least ill 
its roots) is 'an inward operation'. For Israel, in Arnold's view, this 
'was the introduction, in morals and religion, of the famous know thyself 
of the Greeks' (Super VI, p. 289). 
Self-knowledge, through culture, had been an important theme of 
Culture and Anarchy, and a poem I Self -Dependence It probably written about 
1850, concludes with the lines: 
Resolve to be thyself; and know that he, 
Who finds himself, loses his misery! 
(Allott, 1975, P-144) 
In Schools and Universities on the Continent Arnold writes of the aims of 
education, declaring that, fits prime direct aim is to enable man to know 
himself and the world' (Buper IV, p. 290); and adding that, 'such know- 
ledge is the only sure basis for action... To knoý himself, a man must 
know the capabilities and performances of the human spirit; and the 
value of the humanities' (referring here to classical literature, 
particularly of Greece). WF Connell (1950) reminds us that this report 
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'Was produced at a critical period in the development of the curriculum. 
The controversy lbetwqen the advocates of science and the old guard of the 
classics was at its heightl (P. 170)- Consequently Arnold was defending 
literature (as then taught) against the incursions of science which 
threatened to oust it from the curriculum: ? literature' (whether 
classical or otherwise) was to promote self-knoidedge; 'science' to nur- 
ture knowledge of the world of nature. Mus a balanced curriculum was 
his aim. 
Returning to Literature and Dogma, the meatis and-ainis or scif- 
knowledge are further explored in Christian terms: 'Self-examination, 
self-renouncement, and mildness, were,... the great means by which Jesus 
Christ renewed righteousness and religion ... While the Old Testament says: 
Attend to conductl the New Testament says: Attend to the feelings and 
dispositions whence conduct proceeds, P '(Super VI, p. 221). Emotion 
is thus linked with morality, by searching for its essence, by 'staying 
our thoughts upon it': 
raising oneself out of the flux of things,... steadying oneself, concen- 
trating oneself, making order in the chaos of one's impressions, by 
attending to one impression rather than another... (Super VI, P-179) 
by this means the self is freed from the tyranny of the world's multi- 
tudinousupss. Arnold also expresses 'the notion of a whole self as 
opposed to a partial self, a best self to an inferior self, to a 
momentary self requiring the restraint of impulses a mail would naturally 
have indulged... I (ibidp p-179). And this recognition of potentially 
conflicting selves brings with it, for Arnold, the need for the Christian 
(loctrine of epickcia, self-renouncement, Jesus's Isecrof I as Arnold pill-, 
it (see above) of 'peace'. Renunciation is not perhaps a very popular 
concept in the West today. A tempting abundance of goods and" experiences 
combined with a widespread conviction that there 'is nothing to hope for 
beyond this world (and that even the duration of that "lily he niullbered) 
tends to encourage us to create and snatch opportunities while we can. 
Our youths are therefore more li*ly to seek escape in hedonism where the 
z4 
rewards are iijuiiediate Clian to (tall), witli rentinciation where Ole rewards 
appear to be more uncertain. Be that as it may, the importance of the 
Self-concept has certainly come to the fore in the twentieth century 
as a vital factor in effective education. Another factor in relation to 
which Arnold was something of a pioneer, yet which we now take for 
granted, is the recognition of an unconscious mind as a-powerful dynamic 
element of human life. 'njis, of course, is again related to his concern 
for inwardness. 
ln a poem 'The Buried Life', written about 1850, Arnold writes 
of 'Our hidden self' which is a more significant aspect of our human 
striving than the things on the surface that 'we try in vain to speak 
and act?. Typically he uses the metaphor of flowing water to communicate 
the concept, calling it, 
Tbe unregarded river of our life... 
The buried stream#*@. 
Eddying at large in bliud uncertainty, 
Though driving on with it eternally. 
(Allottp 1975,, p. 273) 
At times, amidst the din and striving of our life, "Mere rises an 
unspeakable desire/A-fter the knowledge of our buried life'; but 
its 
mystery lies too deep. Very occasionallyt in moments of profound emotion 
and self-knowledge, however, 
A man becomes aware of his life's flowp 
And hears its winding murmur; and lie sees 
. 
The meadows where it glides, the sun, the 
breeze 
(ibid. p-175) 
(i. e. It rises into his ordinary consciousness. 
) A somewhat, similar notion 
is expreErsed in Arnold1s essay St Paul and Protestantism to explain a 
disparity between Paul's intellectual utterances and what Arnold believed 
were the spiritual and mystical pressures ultimately responsible 
for 
them. The fraýrment runs: - 
13clow the surf ace, streamp sliallow and light, 
Of what we say we feel - below the stream, 
As light, of what -we jbink we feel - there 
flows 
With noiseless current strong, obscure and 
dqep, 
'Me central stream of what we feel 
indeed... 
(Super VI, P. 51) 
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With Freud and Jung between Arnold and ourselves there may seem nothing 
remarkable in these lines; but they express a concept (albeit poetically) 
Which, scientifically presented decades after Arnold's words, have shaken 
our coiiception of the human mind from top to bo-Uom. It is Lruc thaL 
Carl Gustav Carus 'anticipated many of the conclusions of ... Jung, though 
without the latter's accumulation of empirical data to support them' 
(White, 1960, p. 53) in his book Psyche published in 1848, but there is 
no evidence that Arnold read'this. It seems more likely that lie arrived 
at his conception intuitively, partly through his interest in myth, partly 
as a result of his concern for inwardnesso and partly due to his recog- 
nition of the power of the imagination and of suggestion (see below, ep. 279 -? -n') 
That Arnold's concern with inwardness links powerfully with his 
advocacy of literature as against dogma finds strong support in some 
words of Lukdcs (1971)p where he is discussing the novel: 
'Me novel tells of the adventure of interiority; the content of the 
novel is the story of the soul that goes to find itself, that seeks 
adventures in order to be proved and tested by them, and, by proving 
itself, to find its own essence. (p. 89) 
It is concerned, in short, with the search for self-knowledge, and may 
thus assist symbolically in the reader's own quest for self-understanding and 
adjustment to the worldp for promoting the impulse w1iich Arnold sees as the 
guiding principle of Hellenism 'to the development of the whole man, to 
connecting and harmonising all parts of him, perfecting all$ leaving none 
to take thdir chance' (Culture and Anarchy, Super V, p. 184). A succinct 
and potent expression of a conception dear to Arnold occurs in Samuel 
11utler's novel 'Mc Way of All Flesh where the autlior writes fliat: 'A lire 
will be successful or not according as the power of accommodation is equal 
to or unequal to the strain of fusing and adjusting internal and external 
changes' (P-309). In other words, our inwardnes 
Js 
must fa/-cilit-ate, and 
not obstruct, our keeping step with, the Zeitgeist. 
System and system-makers 
For the individual to cope adequately 'with life Arnold believes that 
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lie 'must begin with an Idea of the World in order not to be prevailed 
over by the world's multitudinousness' (Lowry, 1932, P-97). How do we 
arrive at such an 'Idea of U16 World'? Not, according to Arnold, by im- 
posing a system upon it. lie quotes, with impish delight in a leýter to 
the Editor of the Pall Mall Gazette from 'a squib, brilliant indeed, but 
unjustifiably severe' by 'the celebrated young Comtisttp Mr Frederic 
Harrison, -who had declared: tWe seek vainly in Mr A. a system of 
philosophy with principles coherent, interdependent, subordillate, and 
derivativel (Super V, p-76), regarding this as a compliment rather than as 
a criticism. In Culture and Anarchy lie levels at the disciples of 
Comte for what lie describes as their Jacobinism, their addiction to 
tabstract systems of renovation applied wholesale' involving a 'new doc- 
trine drawn up in black and -white for elaborating down to the very small- 
est details a rational society for the future' 
(Super V, P-107). 
Similarly with the Utilitarians, if 'Bentham (is) cried loudly up as 
the renovator of modern society' (p. 111) Arnold believes that the rep- 
resentatives of Culture should resist this along with his systematising 
tendencies. Culture should be selective: if Jacobinism seeks ? to impose 
on us a man with limitations and errors of his own along with the true 
ideas of which he is the organ' (p. 111) there is no reason why we should 
accept the whole system. Arnold quotes August Comte's belief that 'the 
systematization of ideas' is conducive to 'the systematization of senti- 
ments' (Super V, p. 506) with. distaste, recognizing its seductive appeal 
to the English taste for dogmatic adherence. Ile fears its effect on his 
countrymen, 
with their fatal weakness for machinery, their bent for attaching themselves 
to thist and losing all sense, -while they so attach themselves, of tile 
spirit and truth of things, everything excessive in the way of machinery, 
all that gives them a chance of forgetting the pilincipal in the accessory, 
the end in the means, is particularly dangerous. 
(Super V, p. 506) - 
His objections -to 'system-mongering and machinery-wongering' are equally 
forcefully directed at the opponents of Utilitarianism and Comtism, the 
dogmatic theologians. In Literature and DoMa, lie opposes Israel - 'who 
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had but poetry and eloquence, and no system, and who did not mind 
contradicting himself' (Super VI, p. 188) to the 'scientific' flicology 
of the creed-makers, which with all its neat elaboration Of detail he 
condemns because it is misapplied and wrong. The author of the Fourth 
Gospel is praised for imaginative power and poetry but criticised for 
his theoretical speculation and systematising tendencyý 
_(Super 
VI, p. 297)* 
The three Creeds, purporting to be 'purely a methodical arrangement of 
the admitted facts of Christianity? (p. 345) are, he declares, far from 
'the genuine teaching of Jesualp which is based on experience and not 
systematized theory. 
In Arnold's view the trouble with systematizers, vhether religious 
or anfi-religious, liberal-or illiberal, is that they 'attempt far too 
much'. 'If we want ... to have. what is admittedly certain and verifiablev 
we must content ourselves with very little' lie writes in Literature and 
Dogma (Super VI, p. 190). A few principles, well understood and verified 
by experience, are worth mountains of systematic speculation however 
attractively integrated, taken second-hand from others. Moreover rigidly 
constructed systems are unamenable to the Zeitgeist, resistent to the 
necessity for change, or if directed towards change 
(ast say, communism 
orlutopianism) resistent to the altering circumstances which necessarily 
occur during the processes of change. Elxcessive systematizing also tends, 
for the individual, to inhibit 'spontaneity of consciousnessf which 
(in Culture and Anarchy) Arnold praises as the invaluable 'governing idea 
of Hellenism'. 
In condemning systematizers, however, Arnold is not against system 
in all its aspects. lie fought for a Inatioital systeml of education, for 
example, to , counteract 
the random, hole-and-corner provision of schools for 
tile bulk of the population before the Education Act of 1870; and to improve 
Lhe system afterwards. lie also believed in systematic study. lFor wheii 
'we say that culture is, To knoW the best that has been thought and said in 
the worldq 'we imply that, for culture, a system directly tending. to this end 
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is necessary in our readingl (Super VI, p. 162). And again, 'culture 
is indispensably necessary, and culture is reading with a purpose to guide 
it, and with systemt (ibid. ) But 'system' in this sense is far different 
from the kind of system related to a 'tyrannous theoryl (Super VII, P-326), 
and is the servant not the 
# 
master of its user. A sense of the danger in 
the kind of systematic theorising Arnold objected to is shared by a modern 
literary critict Northrop Frye, who writes in The Anatomy of Criticism 
(1970) 
Whenever we construct a system of thought- to unite earth with heaven, 
the story of the Tower of Babel recurs: we discover that after all we 
can't quite make it, and that what we have in the meantime is a plural- 
ity of languages. (P-354) 
Genuine communication, that is to say, is incompatible with artificially 
engineered thought constructs. 
Arnold and e2istemologl 
Given Arnold's distaste for systematic philosophy 'with principles 
coherent, interdependent, subordinate, and derivative' is it possible 
to deduce anything in the way of epistemological principles from his 
writing? It is not a simple task# but it is important to attempt it, 
for the questioning spirit in relation to religious matters which Arnold 
welcomed and sought to meet in Lit-e_r_ature and Dogga has now broadened 
its influence in relation to teaching in generalt and with a fear of 
? indoctrination' in education comes a demand for justification and 
validation of what is taught in schools. The raison dietre of Literature 
and Dogma was to meet the needs of 'those who "ask for the reason and 
authority for the things they have been taught to believe" (for) ... Rude 
aiid hard reasoners its they are, they will never coiisent Lo udmiL, its a 
self- evident axiom, the preliminary assumption wifl, which the churches 
start' (Super V1, p. 150). Mat wus in 1873. In The Concept of Education 
(Peters, 1973) JP Mlite writes of tteachers who are worried about indoc- 
trination in schools today... Like myself 
(be writes), in my Iiistory Leaching 
days, they bave in mind, Lts para(ligrin cilses of iiii1octrijintioij, commuijist 
? -7ý- 
systems -of "political education" or, perhaps, the teaching of religion 
in Roman Catholic sciloolsi (p. lsl). In the same collection or essays 
John Passmore seeks actively to encourage the critical spirit in pupils: 
Iteaching a child to be critical? involves lencouraging him to look 
critically at the value of the. perf ormances in which he is taught to engage, 
as distinct from the level of achievement arrived at within such a perform- 
anecif (p. 198), and makes demands on his 'initiative, independence, courage 
and imagination'. 
Verification 
Arnold's primary response to the growth of critical questioning rests 
on the principle that 'whatever is to stand must rest upon something which 
is verifiable, not unverifiable' (Super VI, p. 149). Already in St Paul 
and Protestantism be had asserted that (the scientific sense in us, the 
sense which seeks exact knowledge, calls for... verification' (super VI, 
p. 9)p and had taken Calvinism to task for carelessness in this respect. 
The Puritan interpretation of St Paul, he believed had got its priorities 
wrong because of this neglect: 
And first let us premise what we mean in this, matter by primary and 
secondary, essential and subordinate ... We mean, so 
far as truth is con- 
cerned, a greater or less agreement with facts which can be verified, 
and a greater or less power of explaining them. Miat essentially 
ebaracterises a religious teacher, and gives him his permanent worth 
and vitality, is, after all, just the scientific value of his -beaching, 
its correspondence with important facts and the light it throws upon 
them. (Super VI, p. 8) 
Without entering into the argument about St Paul and Calvinism, we can 
see here something of Arnold's view of the principle of verification: 
that it is a scientific principle,, based on observed facts and seeking 
to explain their correspondence or agreement. In religious matters, as 
he writes elsewhereq verification may be hard to come-by: 'If we want hereq 
its we do want, to have what is admittedly certain and verifiable, we must 
content ourselves -with very little', (Super VIp p. 190). ? Evidence has 
three degrees of forcetp Arnold writes in God and the Biblep 'demonstration 
probability, plausibilityt (Super VII9 p. 278). In discussing 
. 
the Fourth 
Gospel 'demonstration cannot really be reached at all.. The data are 
275ý 
insufficient for it, (p. 279); awl 1plausibility, -such a display of 
ingenuity as makes people clap their hands an(] cry Well doneJ but does 
not seriously persuade them, - is not much worth a wise man's ambitioný 
ingl(ibid. ). 'There remains probability1v whiclip in the absence of any 
demonstrable certainty based on inference from texts, depends upon 
considerations drawn from experience of human naturep and from 
acquaintance with the history of the human spirit, which themselves gruide 
our inferences from these texts. And what is the great help for inter- 
preting aright the experience of human nature and the history of the 
human spirit, for getting at the fact, for discovering Aiat is fact and 
what is not? Sound judgment and common sensev bred of much conversance 
with real life and with practical affairs. (Super VII, pp-2279-280) 
For theory in these matters Arnold has little room; we may admire the 
ingenuity of the German biblical critics, lie suggests, but their theories 
very seldom attain probability let alone demonstration. In Arnold1s 
'view observed facts can alone provide demonstim-tion; tradition, inter- 
preted with common sense, probability; and theory, only plausibility. 
Arnold is here close to Karl Popper's view of the scientist: 'It is 
important for him to remain in touch with realityp with practicev for 
those who overlook it have to pay by lapsing into scholasticisml (Popper, 
19669 p. 222). Both prefer a practical and piecemeal approach to 'verbal 
fireworks'. Arnold's view of ]2robability is much akin to the linguistic 
philosopher AJ Ayer's definition of 'verification in principle' in 
Language. Truth and Logic (1971): 
It is necessary to draw a distinction between practical verifiability and 
verifiability in principle. Plainly we all undorstandt in many cases 
believe, propositions which we have not in fact taken steps to verify. 
Many of these are propositions which -we could verify if we took enough 
trouble. But there remain a number of significant propositions, 
concerning matters of fact, which we could not verify even if we chose; 
sir"ply becallse we lack the practical iticaiis of placing ourselves in the 
situaLion where the relevant observaLions could be inadc. 
In such cases, where 'I do know what observations would decide it for 
me, if, as is theoretically conceivablep I were once in a position to 
make them ... I say that the proposition is verifiable 
in principle, if not 
in practice, and is accordingly significantl (p. 119). When AJ Ayer cites 
the metaphysical pscudo-proposition ithe Abs(ilute enters into, buL is 
itself incapable of, evolution and progress' as a proposition 'not even in 
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principle verifiable' his view acnords. entirely with Arnold's (see pp. above). 
There would also be a measure of agreement between Arnold anil Ayer in Ayer's 
contention that 'all utterances about the naturebf God are nonsensical' 
(Ayer, 1071, P153), since Arnold objects to ti ie 'licence of affirmation' 
of theologians regarding concepts which are beyond verif ication. But their 
views 
: 
part. company when Ayer asserts that the intuitions of a mystic are 
invalid or that linguistic philosophy has disposed of the argument from 
re ligious experiences for the existence of a god. (pp-156-157). In 
being unwilling to 'express the inexpressible' Arnold does no(, wish to 
deny the existence of transcendental (or, at least, immanent) power or to 
diminish our sense of awe towards the unknowable. For Arnold, experience 
as we shall see, is the test and proof of the validity of religion; and 
poetry is, by and largeg the appropriate means of expressing religious 
truth. There is a truth of science and a truth of religion; and 
'while 'assertions in scientific language must stand the tests of scientific 
examination' (Super VI, p. 9), Ithe scientific sense iq us' does not deny 
'the rights of the poetic sense, which employs a figured and imaginative 
languagel (ibid. ). It is all a question of appropriateness. 
But to revert to Arnold's view of experience, he states in the 
Preface to Literature aiviDognna -that his object 
is to 
give to the Bible a real experimental basis, and keep on this basis 
throughout; instead of any basis of unverifiable assumption to start 
with, followed by a string of otber unverifiable assumptions of the 
like kind, such as the received theology necessitates. 
(Super VI, p. 151) 
and, of Christianity, that 'its grandeur and truth are far best brought 
out experimentally; and the thing is, to make people see this' 
(P-396) 
In a praiguatic vein, lie asserts that experience is the test jointly of 
morality and religion. We may be at a loss to answer enquirers' questions 
about 'a Great Personal First Cause, iifio thinks 4nd loves, the moral and 
intelligent Governor of the Universe' adumbrated by theologians; 
But if,, on the other hand, they ask: 'How are we to verify that there 
rules an enduring Power, not ourselves, Adch makes for righteousness?, 
-we may answer at once: 'How? why as you verify that fire 
burns, - by 
Z? 7 
experiencel Is is so; try itl you can try it; every case of conduct, 
of that which is more than ihree-lourths of your own life an(] of the life 
of all mankind, will prove it to youl Disbelieve it, and you will find 
out your mistakes as surely as, if you disbelieve that fire burns and 
put your hana into the fire, you, will find out your mistake! Believe it, 
and you will find the beneift 'of itl" This is the first experience. (Super VI, P-370) 
There is no doubt that a re 
t lationship between right conduct and its effects 
in, tenns of well-being is easier to test (at least in specific instances) 
than a relationship between the Universe and a Great Personal First Cause. 
But the gene rjalized conclusion that 'there rules an enduring Power, not 
ourselves, which makes for righteousness' is open to question, according 
to variations in individual experience. If I believe it, it is an act 
of faith rather than of experimental verification. However, Arnol d states 
in Literature and Dogma that 'the cardinal rule of our present enquiry is 
that rule of Newton's: "Hypotheses non fingo" (Super VI, p. 275), and 
his usage of evidence here is largely in accord with that advocated by 
Newton in the passage from which the quotation comes: 
I do not deal in hypotheses (writes Newton); for whatever is not deduced 
from phenomena is called a 'hypothesis'; and hypotheses (whether meta- 
physical, physical, occult or mechanical) have no place in experimental 
philosophy. In this sphere of study propositions are deduced from 
phenomena and give rise to universals by means of inductive reasoning. * 
Arnold's reasoning is, like Newton's essentially inductive; but it 
might be better to call it, in today's terminology, lexperip-diall rather. 
than lexperimentall, since in the testing of the proposition there is 
little or no control of the variables involved. Arnold's main point,. 
however, is that in adopting a pragmatic approach to religion the emphasis 
is shifted from the 'metaphysical' authority of learned religion and the 
hiraculoust authority of popular religion 
(Super VI, pp. 243-244) to an 
*My translation from the Latin quoted in RH Super's notes 
(Super 
VII p. 485) 
Illypotheses non fingo. Quicquid enim ex phaenomenis non deducitur, 
jbMothesis vocanda est; and hypotheses, seu Metaphysice, seu Physice, 
sem Qualitatum Occultarum seu Mechanicaep in Philosophia Experimentali 
locum non habent. In hoe Philosophia Propositiones deducuntur ex phae- 
nomenis, and redduntur generales per indudtionem. 1 
(Philosophiae ý, 
Naturalis Principia Mathematica, conc4sion of Book III) see Super VI, 
(Notes) p. 485 
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authority verifiable from personal experience. Where it differs from 
Newton is that the latter is dealing with the externally verifiable 
phenomena of natural science, whereas Arnold is concerned with the less 
easily observable sphere of interior human nature and motivation. 
Verification, in Arnold's view can be an inward phenomenon, since he 
writes approvingly of Lu. ther making 'an inward verifying movementl with 
'the individual conscience once more the base of operations' (Super V1, 
P-353). Conscience thus becomes the means of verification as well as 
being (as the internalised recognition of such Power as makes for right- 
eousness) that which is being verified - making Arnold1s reasoning somewhat 
tautological. Perhaps there is no escaping this - unless we are prepared 
to jettison conscience altogether - for our conscience, nurtured by 
experience, becomes in turn one of our chief means of interpreting it,, 
It is no doubt largely for this reason that Arnold advocated a 
broad culture and wide literary experience. Since by this means we can 
at least partially overcome the limitations of our own inevitably relat- 
ively narrow and limited experience. Here again his view is close to that 
advocated by Karl Popper in Me Open Society and its Enemies. Both 
npprove the hind of attitude which admisLs fliat 11. mity I)e wrong anil. 
you way be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth' 
(P opper 1966, p. 225 both approve an "'attitude of reasonableness"... 
very similar to the scientific attitude, to the belief that in the search 
for truth we need cooperation, and that, with the help of argument, we 
can in time attain something like objectivity' (ibid. ) - or Idisintered- 
ness'; both recognize that 'Reason, like language, can be said to be a 
product of social life' (ibid. ) (a concept central to Arnold's 
interprdhtion of the Zeitaeist); and Arnold's pruginatism is akin to 
Popper's 1piecemeal approach' to social engineerIng. Dat whereas Popper 
(like AJ Ayer) has no room for mystici, sm, Arnold (although with a 
different conception of it) believes that it has its place. Discussing 
the Pauline conception of faitb, lie writes in a significant passage: 
27f 
It is both mystical and rational.; and it enlists in its service the best forces of both worlds, - the world of reason and morals, and the 
world of sympathy and emotion. Tbe world of reason and duty has ai 
excellent clue to action, but wants motive-I)ower; the world of sympitily 
and influence has an irresistable force of motive-power, but wants a clue for directing its exertion. The danger of the one world is weariness in 
well doing; the danger of the other is sterile raptures anti immoral 
fanaticism. (St P&P, Super VI, P-47) 
It will be seen that Arnold here sidesteps Popper's main objection to 
mysticism by himself rejecting fanaticism (which is what Popper fears for 
;n tla? ehkpvým Ae4edvrM k i)V colWVSims 
examplekin state totalitarianism). Also evident'again here is Arnold's 
distinction between the 'truth of sciencet and the Itrutli of religiont 
and the need for their harmonization (Super III, p-711). Truth of science 
is analytical, exploratory; truth of religion relates to the emotions, 
is motiv'ational. Scientific verification - demonstration resting on 
experiment and observation, - is vital, and 'our theologians ... suffer 
from having too little' (Super VI, p. 408); but it is not enough. Our 
emotions and our sense for beauty are as important as our demand f-or exact 
knowledge (Super VI, p. 409); art is a vital complement to science. 
Hence Arnold develops the concept of 'imaginative reason' as complemen- 
tary to his concern for verification. 
Imaginative reason 
Although Arnold accepts that we must finally remain ignorant of 
transcendental powers, if such there be, calling them 'the unexplored and 
inexpressible' (Super VI, p. 200), and despite the fact that he rejects 
miracle and the supernatural, he recognizes that it is quite natural that 
the spirit of man should entertain hopes and anticipations, beyond what 
it actually knows and can verify' (Super VI, p. 212). lie also rejects 
as futile the species of 'rationalism' which endeavours tio reduce. all 
the supernaturalk(the scriptures) to real events' (Super VI, p. . 268). 
Factual details of events recorded in scriptural writing can never be 
I 
known or positively recovered by research, since the circumstances and 
viewpoints at the time of their recording were so different from our 
own. The kinds of truths embodied in such writing can rarely be pene- 
trated by reason'alone; they are more accessible to the imagination. 
2210 
Arnold recognizes in God and the Bible a close and vital relationship 
between imagination, religion and conduct: 
For the power of Christianity has been in the immense emotion -which it 
has excited; in its engaging, for the government of man's conduct, the 
mighty forces of love, revorence, gratitude, hope, pity and awe, - all that host of allies -which Wordsworth includes under the one name 
imagination... 
Popular Christianity has enjoyed abundantly and with profit this help 
from the imagination to virtue and conduct. I have always thought, 
therefore, that merely to destroy the illusions of popular Christianity 
'was indefensible. Time, besides, was sure to do it; but when it is 
done, the whole work of again cementing the alliance between the imagina- 
tion and conduct remains to be effected... (Super VII, pp-377-378) 
We are here concerned with imaginative apprehension - the recognition of 
truths inaccessible to reason alone ývithout a degree of imaginative empathy; 
and yet. with imagination sometimes accessible even when embodied in 
illusions eroneously perpetuated by tradition. 
There is also the creative and artistic use of imagination in 
religion to be taken into account. Arnold acknowledges the concept of 
limagiaative intellect' in a discussion of St John's Gospel (God and the. 
Bible, Super VII, P-323), although fie denies that this is an appropriate 
term for this evangelist, believing that he is 'writing 'in good faith' 
as a recorder rather than as a Ifreely inventing artistl for which the 
term would be more appropriate. The freely inventing artist'draws on 
his imagination to create character and situation ex nihilo, or at least, 
from the chaos of the worldts multitudinousness; and he draws on his 
intellect, or reasont to make his characters and situations credible; 
embodiments of recognisable truths, though not of facts. 
For guidance as to conduct we are often caught between adherence 
to dogmatic rnits Oinexamiiiefi riats, stinctioiied by traditioll, to be 
followed mcclianically) and intellectual understanding dependent upon 
facts of 'which we are as yeL ignorant 'subject to further research'. 
The choice between moral automatism and intellec'tual paralysis can be 
circumvented by imaginative reason. Ibe parables of Jesus are good 
examplesp cited by Arnold, of poetic penetration bypassing both rabbi- 
nical rules and logical exposition. Ilicy compel inferential- interpretation 
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and are essentially literary devices. Arnold, comparing poetry with 
the art'of the painter or sculptor,. f in(Is it ', more intellectual ... more 
interpretive' for 'along with the plastic representation it utters the 
idea, it thinks' (Neiman, 1960, p. 238): 
;t 
But it thinks emotionally, and hereinkdiffers from science, and is more 
of a stay to us. Poetry gives the idea, but it gives it touched with 
beauty, heightened by emotion. That is what we feel to be interpretive 
for us, to satisfy us - thought, but thought invested with beauty, with 
emotion. Science thinks, but not emotionally. It adds thought to thought, 
accumulates the elements of a synthesis which will never be complete until 
it is touched with beauty and emotion; and when it is touched with this, 
it has passed out of the sphere of science. (ibidt p. 238) 
Poetry for Arnold is 'more explicative than art' more Isolidt than 
'systematic philosophy', more refreshing and satisfying than science, and 
more reliable than religious dogma. In an Introduction to Poetry(from 
which the above quotation 'comes) Arnold expresses this view forcibly 
in the final paragraph. 'There ielp he writes: 
not a dogma that does not threaten to dissolve, not a tradition that is 
not shaken, not a fact which has its historical character free from 
question. - Compare the sfability of Slial(espeare with the stability of 
the 'Mirty-Nine Articles! Our religion bas materialised itseu in the 
fact - the supposed fact; it has attached its emotion to the fact. 
For poetry the idea is everything; the rest is its world of illusion, 
of divine illusion; it attaches its emotion -to the idea, the idea is 
the fact. The strongest part of our religion today is its unconscious 
poetry. The future of poetry is immense, because in conscious poetry, 
where it is worthy of its high destinies, our race, as time goes on, will 
find an even surer and surer stay. (Neiman, 1960, p. 239)* (also Super, 
IX, p. 63) 
Here, essentially, lies Arnold's justification for 'imaginative reasoul: ý 
it provides a 'stay' for the mind, in the form of sustaining ideas, while 
our conception of facts and dogmas undergoes changes forced upon it by 
the movement of the Zeitizeist. 
The conjunction of reason and iinagillation in the moral sphere stressed 
by Arnold Is also seen to be of importance by Karl Popper: 
The rational and imaginative analysis of the consequences of a moral 
theory (he writes) has a certain anal ' ogy 
in scientific method. -But there 
is a fundamental difference. In the case of a dcientific theory, our 
decision depends upon the results of experiments. If these confirm the 
theory, we may accept it until we find a better one. If they contradict 
*For a revised version of this passage opening Arnold's essay Me Study of 
Poetry, see Super IX, p. 161, and pp. 171-2 of this thesis 
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the theory, we reject it. But in the case of a moral theory, we can 
only confront its consequences ý, ith our conscience. And while the verdict 
of experiments does not depend upon ourselves, the verdict of our conacience 
doeg. (Popper, 1966, p. 233) 
Thus Popper, although he doeg not use the term ýimaginative reason' or 
connect it directly with Irt, recognizes, like Arnold, the need for it. 
And, like Arnold, Popper sees the use of the imagination as a powerful 
antidote to dogmatism: 
It appears that rationalism* must encourage the use of imagination because 
it needs it, while irrationalism must tend to discourage it. The very 
fact that rationalism is critical, whilst irrationalism must tend towards 
dogmatism (where there is no argument, nothing is left but full acceptance 
or flat denial) leads in this direction. Criticism always demands a 
certain degree of imagination, whilst dogmatism suppresses it. (Popper, 
1966, p. 2ý9) 
In Arnoldso writing the conjunction of imagination and reason crops 
up in a variety of forms if we attend carefully to its undertones. His 
promotion in Culture and Anarchy of the expression 'sweetness and lightl 
is an example, where 'sweetness' stands for the heart and the imagination 
and Ilight. 1 for the intellect, reason and logic. Again his frequent' 
references to what he calls the 'sweet reasonableness' of Jesus bring 
these two elements together. And in his long poem The Scholar Gipsy we 
have the 'scholar' (standing for intellect and reason) conjoined with the 
lgipsyl (of whom we are told in Glanville account, Arnoldls source, 'that 
they had a traditional kind of learning among themp and could do wonders 
by the power of imagination$). 
Suggestion 
In his understanding of the importance of the imagination, Arnold 
had an intuitive grasp of the significance of the power of suggestion, 
It"d recoifiil-y-ed bel'ore Freiid, Jitiig niid Hic developmeni. ol' olioderii 1)myell 
ology, that through suggestiong tho imagination has often more power 
over our actions than have reason or willpower. In Literature and Dofqna, 
for example, he asks himself how necessary emotion can be brought to bear 
*Popper uses the term 'rationalism' in its widest sense, including (and not 
in opposition to) empiricism. 
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on moral ideas to make them effective in practice, and answers: tWhy, 
how (foes one get to feel much about any matter whatever? By dwelling 
upon it, by staying our thoughts upon it, by having it perpetually ill 
our mindt (Super VI, pp-178-179). He recognizes how words and phrases, 
echoing, continually in the mind, gather meaning to themselves. Hence 
his concentration, in. discussing culture, on our engaging ourselves with 
'the best that has been thought and said in the world' (my italics). His 
advocacy of scriptural material rests on this principle. The suggestive- 
ness of Jesus's teaching lies in its expression in 'pregnant sentences, 
gnomic sayings' (Super V11, p. 308), rather than Pset speechest; and lie 
applauds the ? maxim-like' character of Jesus's teaching (Super VII, p. 327). 
Intellectual and emotional growth from suggestion is largely impercept- 
ible. Arnold notes that St John 'plants his loggial'suggestibly in his 
gospel (Super VII, p. 292); writing of the Old Testament, he speaks of 
? an immense poetry growing round and investing an immortal truth' (my 
italics), (Super VII, P. 370); and of the New Testament lie describes how 
for good or ill - miracle stories 'grow' from earlier loggia 
(Super VII, 
P-351). Writing in Literature'and Dogina of 'suggestions and stimulations, 
he asserts 'Hardly a day passes but we have some experience of them' 
(Super VI, p. 181). We are commonly unconscious of these, but: 
Die moment we seriously attend to conscience, to the suggestions which 
concern practice and conduct, we can see plainly enough from which source 
a suggestion comes, and that the suggestions from 'one source are to over- 
rule those from. the other. (Super VI, p. 292) 
Arnold must have been aware of early developments in the field of 
hypnotism in which suggestion plays such a vital role. Indeed his 
originally proposed title for Die Scholar Gipsy was fThe First Mesmerist 
listed in his Notebook in 1849, and changed subsequently to Die Wandering 
Mesineristl (v. Bryson, 1964, p. 790) before the final title was reached. 
(Interestingly enough the source of the poem was in Glanvil's work entitled 
The-Vanity of Dogmatising which Arnold appears to have read in 1845. The 
attraction of the title for him is clearly apparent- from his later prose 
writing. ) 
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In recognizing the positive, therapeutic pow r of suggestion Arnold 
was not ignorant of its negative side, of its dangers. Discussing in 
St Paul and Protestantism the puritan view of sin, lie disapproves of any 
absorbed contempl ation of it: 'Sin is not a monster to be mused on, but 
, an 
impotence to be got rid of. All thinking about it, beyond what is 
indispensable for the firm effort to get rid of it, is waste of energy 
and waste of time. ' (Super VI, p. 35). At the same time he understands 
that counter-suggestion, rather than will-power, will prove the most 
likely antidote to morbid brooding: 
But how to find the energy and power to bring all those self-seeking 
tendencies of the flesh, those multitudinoust swarming, eager and incessant 
impulses,., into obedience to the central tendency? Mere commanding and 
forbidding is of no avail, and only irritates opposition in the desires 
it tries to control. It even enlarges their power, because it makes us 
feel our impotence, and the confusion caused by their ungoverned working 
is increased by our being filled with a deepened sense of disharmony, 
remorse and dismay. (Super VI, P-32) 
In this penetrating and significant passage, we see an early recognition 
of the psychological principle of the Law of Reversed Effect 
(v. Hartland, 
1971, P-37). 
Arnold praises Emerson for his style because 'his main points recur 
again and again, and become fixed in the memory' (Super X, P-177) -a 
comment which helps to explain the repetitiveness of Arnold's own style. 
Ile saw the repetition of key ideas and suggestive phrases as an important 
means of implanting ideas in the reader's mind, so that they would grow 
steadily, imperceptibly, gathering meaning to themselves. 
For educationalists suggestion is a two-edged concept; but whether 
we employ it or reject it, it is important that, like Arnold, we recognize 
its significance. Suggestibility appears to be a function of intelligence. 
It has positive, but by no means infallible, survival value, We may, like 
lemmings, be led Tiy our suggestibility to destruction; on the other hand 
we may make valuable contributions to our society in response to early 
educational suggestions. Suggestibility is not necessarily reduced by 
education. A dogmatic education, for example, tends to induce us to accept 
7. K 
the current, major intellectual suggestions of the ddy: witness the 
learned doctors who rejected the discoveries of Copernicus or Galileo; 
the literary and scientific intelligentzia who adapted to Ilitlerfs Nazi 
regime; or the South African Christian lendCrSIO advocacy of' "Apartheid" 
A sound education will involve not only the positive, creative and' 
morally unexceptionable use of suggestion, but also an understanding 
of the way suggestion works so that pupils can be protected from its 
potential dangers. 
In creative literature we are, led by suggestion along contrary an(] 
irreconcilable paths of action and value judgment as we follow the thoughts 
and behavior of diverse characters. Because these irreconcilables are 
temporarily harmonized within a satisfying aesthetic framework we are 
helped to bear paradox, tentativeness, etc., in our daily lives. 
Tolerance and eclecticigm 
Just as complex or penetrating literature provides us with a variety 
of viewpoints, so can we raise our tbresbold. of tolerance by a wide 
variety of reading., Hence Arnold's stress on this aspect of 'culture', 
and its moral significance. Bonnerot (1947) makes an important obser- 
vation to this effect; 
11 faut savoir... qu'Arnold a puise son inspiration morale ailleurs, chez 
des auteurs nombreux, appartenants h des pays et des temps tres divers, 
qu'une part de son originalit+st precisement dans. soir eclectisme, dans 
sa facult4 d'accueil. qui lui fait chercher ses "points dtappuill dans 
la Bible aussi bien que chez le's grands auteurs profanes. (Bonnerot, 
19! t7, p. 241) 
Bonnerot sees eclecticism as a feature of ArnoldIs originality, and so 
does Robbins (1959):. 'The distinguishing marks of ArnoldIs religious 
tbougbt may be seen as eclecticism and an individual use of the princi- 
ples of accomk"dation, acc 
I 
ommodation to a large middle range 
I 
of religiously 
inclined but dissatisfied people' (p.. 166). As for the 'principle of 
I 
acconuijodationt, reference to God and the Bible will show that Arnold 
preaches what he himself practiceaq for he approves in the Leaching of 
Jesus the use of the #language of acconnnodationt to meet the hearerst 
understanding and lead them on (Super VII, P. 359). Arnold's use 
zk4 
of the language of accommodatioil has alrea(ly been referred to (see 1). 37 
above). A striking example of his eclecticism occurs in Culture and 
Anarchy, (Super V) where Arnold delineates and reconciles the coutribu- 
tion of Greek and Ifebrew thought to Western culture. tAggressively 
religious people', writes Sengupta (1961), 'often blanied him for his 
. stress on 
Hellenism; they unfortunately failed to see that Arnold had 
not condemned Ilebraism; he had actually effected a reconciliation between 
the two; for lie believed that between thinking and acting, conduct-and 
culture, Helenism and Ilebraisin there was no incompatibility? (P-597)- 
Robbins sees the composition of Arnold's thought resulting from his 
eclecticism as a valuable mix, flexible yet positive: Illis position in 
his early poems and letters is compounded of religious agnosticism, 
philosophical tentativeness and moral certitudet 
(p. 166) -a satisfac- 
tory recipe for living and coping with the inevitable tensions of modern 
life. And be sees the 'practical idealism? of Arnold's values as 'a 
means of reconciling the persisting differences of Christian, scientist 
and humanist' (p. 213). 
Certainly Arnold . Is eclecticism militates against narrowness and 
exclusiveness of outlook. He praises Abelard, Lessing and Herder 
because they thumanised knowledge; because they broadened the basis of 
life and #telligence; because they worked powerfully to diffuse sweet- 
ness and light,, to make reason and the will of God prevail' (Culture 
and Anarchy, Super V, P-113). This contrasts forcibly with the view of 
TS Eliot that 'it is essential for the. preservation of the culture of 
a minority that it should continue to be a minority culturel. This may be 
true, in fact, but to promote it as a virtue signals an esoteric view of 
culture totally at variance with Arnold's view. 
Eclecticism is often frowned upon because it suggests the 
indescriminate and random picking-up of ideas. niis was far from 
Arnold's concept, which called for a higb degree of critical selective- 
ness: 
To read to good purpose we must read a great deal, and be content not to 
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use the whole, or nearly the wbole, of what we read... (for)things 
are on such a scale, and progrers so gradual, and what one man can do is so bounded, that the moment we press the whole of what any writer 
says, -we fall into error' (Super VI, P. 155) 
The-thing to know with a writer is 'where he is all himself and his 
best selfq where he shows his power, where he goes to the heart of the 
mat-ter, %iiere he gives'us what no other man gives us, or gives us so 
well' (ibid. ). Arnold continually employs this principle of select- 
ivity in his own writing, comparing the relative virtues and shortcomings 
of-writers, -ideas and institutions in such a way as to produce akind of 
critical profile, or series of profiles. For example, in A Comment on 
Christmas, he maps out various features, attractive and repulsive in 
turn, of Catholicism, Anglicanism and Dissenting Protestantism - in 
each of which he sees virtuesg limitations and excesses (Super X, p. 235). 
Similarly in Literature and Dogma, in discussing the frequent narrowness 
of the outlook of missionaries he makes comparative relative observations 
on Buddhism, Brahaminism and 'Mohametanism' (Super VI, p. 382), observ- 
ing that; 
the non-Christian religions are not to f fie wise- man mere monsters; lie 
knows they have much good and trutli in them, He knows that Mohametanism, 
and Brahminism and Buddhism are not what the missionaries call them; 
and lie knows, too, how really unfit the missionaries are to cope with 
them. (Super VI, P-381) 
Terms such as 'relative', 'fluid', 'flexible', 'proportion' occur 
frequently in Arnold's writing, in passages indicating the need to break 
down rigid, artificial barriers and bring things, ideas and institutions 
into new comparative relationships. In a letter, for examplep to his 
brother 'when commenting on a new volume of Ruskin's Modern Paintersl, 
lie recogni, ved Ithat the one thing nee(Iful was noL the percepLion of isol. al, ed 
verities, but of the ordering and interconnections of truthl (Neiman, 
1968, p. 81). This view in no way contradicts what has been said above 
(seepp. 170-72) about Arnold1s. hostility to system-makers; it is simply in 
accordaKce with the principles expressed by Locke that knowledge is 
'nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagree- 
ment and repugnancy, of any of our ideast (Locke, 1690, IV). Arnom 
za 
would certainly have approved AN Whitehead's opposition to ? inert 
ideaslin education- 'ideas that are merely received into the mind without 
being uti. lised, or tested, or -thrown into fresh combinations' (Whitehead, 
1954, P. M. And Whitehe#dls view of culture is not far 'from Arnold's: 
'Culture is activity of thoughtt and receptiveness to beauty and humane 
feeling. Scraps of information have nothing to do with it. A merely 
well-informed man is the most useless bore on God's, earthl. (ibid. ). 
Arnold's eclecticism bas notbing to do with the random collection 
of 'isolated verities', but is a means towards breadth of vision; and 
from this,. in turn, towards a wider tolerance and understanding of the 
human condition. The process of education for toleranceg Arnold believed, 
should begin in school. He describes with approval the approach in 
a French Catholic girlst. school at Fontenay to a lesson dealing with a 
variety of religious questions, delighting in the fact that Ireally these 
girls were led to treat them in the same large and freep but at the same 
time tolerant, sympatbeticý and pious spirit, in which M Pecaut treated 
them himself' (Super XX, p. 96). The development of tolerant attitudes 
depends, upon Iturning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock 
notions and habits' (Super V, p. 233), and upon developing a Iwide, 
large acquaintance -with the human spiritland with man's ways of thinking 
and using words' (Super VI, pý. 408-409), nourished by literary ex perience. 
Arnold was deeply concerned, however,. at what he felt'was the inadequacy 
of much state education in England in humanizing, or civilizing its 
pupils. A random stock of positive knowledge and the ability to read 
the newspapers was not enough; it was Iqualities of tolerance, under- 
standing and critical detachment' thatp in Arnold's view the 'rising 
classest really needed (v. Connell, 1950, p. 181).. 
Morality and religion 
Morality, religion and culture are, for Arnold, closely intertwined. 
Conduct (or morality) required culture (Super VI, p. 407)p and both 
scientific and literary culture fare requisite in the interests of 
al 
religion itsclfl (SUper VI, p. 1109). Religion an(] culture share, 
basically, the same aims - 'to make reason and the will of God prevail' 
(Super V, P. 91); and to some extent the same means: 
Religion says: Die Kingdom of God is within you 
'; 
and culture, in like 
manner, places human perfection in an internal condition, in the growth 
and predominance of our humanity proper, as distinguished from our 
animality. (Super V, PP-93-4) 
In Arnold's view culture and religion work side by side essentially to 
promote morality, or conduct; 'in praising culture, we have never 
denied (he writes) that conduct, not culture, is three-fourths of human 
life' (Super VI, P-407). The increasing rejection of the Bible as a means 
of acquiring moral insights., because of the Bible's association with 
questionable, Church dogmasq alarmed Arnold because he felt the alternative 
contemporary sources of moral guidance on offer were inadequate: 'Take a 
course of the Bible first, and then a course of Benjamin Franklin, Horace 
Greeley, Jeremy Bentham, and Mr Herbert Spencer, -see which 
has the most 
effect, which satisfies you most, which gives you the most moral force... 
(Super VI9 P-371). Behind this observation licso not only a tempejental 
attachment to tradition, but a, preferen. ce for the suggestiveness of tile 
poetry of scriptural material as against the discursive rule-making of 
systematic philosophy. 
The moral law, for Arnoldt is a scientific fact. Ile agrees that 
Littre and the Comtists may be correct in deducing the evolution of 
principles of conduct from the human instincts of self-preservation and 
reproduction (Super VII p. 287). and that the two basic kinds of human 
misconduct - faults of temper and faults of sensuality - are associated 
with these instincts. But 'however this law may have originated', 'the 
moral law... is in our actual experience among the greatest of facts' 
(Super VII P-30). And 
i 
the best confirmation of the scientific validity of the importance 
which Paul attaches to the law of righteousnessp the law of reason and 
conscipnce, God as moral law, is to be found in its agreement with tile 
importance attached to this law by teachers the most unlike him; since 
in the eye of science an experience gains ... by having universality... I 
(ibid. ). 
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Cooperation with the 'universal order' brings harmony; disregarding it, 
disharmony; 'In conformity to the will of God, as we re ligiously name 
the moral order, is our peace and happiness' (Super VI, P-32). 
Catherine Runcie sums up Arnoldts position in the following words: 
Unlike Mill, Arnold accepts *e anthropomorpiiized prediction of deity, 
not to refute its implications, but to reinforce the notion of some power 
akin to God in the universe; and unlike Bunsen* fie reinforces this 
notion not by some transcendental a priori, but by 'proof' that historical 
man actually felt the "not ourselves that makes-for righteousness" oper- 
ative in the world. Arnold thereby comes to believe in a moral universe, 
one in which value is inherent. (Runcie, 1969,. Footnote, p. 29) 
That Arnold's view is overýsanguine has been suggested by comparing it 
with Schweitzer's (see above pp. &Sllk) which seems to take a more realistic 
cosmic view; although their outlook in relation to practical aspects of 
human conduct itself would-be relatively close. 
Arnold's eudaemonism has also been referred to above (seerp. 2, ri-2) 
Ile insists on a relationship between conduct and happiness. Emerson 
(along with Wordsworth) is praised for his stress on thappiness, in labour, 
righteousness and veracity; in. all the life of the spirit, happiness and 
hope I (Super X, p. 181j), And Carlyle condemned for his 'perverse attitude- 
towards happiness' vbichIcuts him off from hope' - for Carlyle #fiercely 
attacks the desire for happiness' (Super X, P-183). Arnold disdains 
'the morbid sentimentalities of Protestantism about man's natural 
vileness' (Super VI, p. 206), preferring to concentrate on 'the sense 
of life, of being truly A. Iiveq which accompanies righteousness' (Super 
VI, p. 404). Self-denial, inecrosist or denying one's old self, is 
approved for the happiness #the sense of going rightp hitting the mark, 
su cceedingl - it entails (Super'VI, p. 293). But the fanatical self- 
denial of the early martyrs and of certain modern puritans is rejected 
(Super VI, p-301,339). Necrosis'should be adequate, but not exceseive. 
Related, perhaps, to this short-term optimism id relation to individual 
behavior is a degree of long-term optimism on a broad front. In A Comment 
on Christmas, for example, we find a confident belief in the end of an 
age - bringing the dissolution of aristocratic power and wealth and the 
dawning of an age. of democracy (Super X, pp. 237-238). 11jis, for Arnold, 
'Was the general movement of the Zeitgeist. A century later we tend to 
think (in theoryt though much -li? ss 
in practice) in terms of the recog- 
nition of human rights as an aspect of this evolution. For Arnold 
this -was less clear: 'Noman (lie writes) who simply follows his own 
consciousness, is aware of any claims, any rights, whatever; -"fiat lie 
gets of good makes him thankful, what lie gets of evil secins to him 
natural? (Super'VI, p. 188). His tendency is to stress individual 
responsibijities (e. g. Super VI, pp294-295) rather than rights. 
Natural religýion and the nature of faith 
ArnoldIs description of religion as 'morality touched by emotion, I 
met a hostile reaction from some quarters which was much publicized. 
DG James, for example, writes how 'it is well known that in Ethical 
Studies, published in 1876, P'll Bradley turned on Arnold and gave him 
no mercy' (James, 1961, p-77). This is not the place for a detailed 
critique of Bradley's objection to Arnold's use of this phrase and 
to other aspects of Arnold's Literature and DoMa (Bradley, 1927). 
Bradley's exercise (which turns upon Arnold in its Concluding Remarks 
from p. 315 onwards for several pages) results from a wilful misreading 
of Arnold, lacking in what Arnold would describe as 'literary tact'. 
Perversely selecting a nuinber of Arnold's phrases and ideas ont of 
context, Bradley ki cks them out by the back door, only to readmit many 
of them through a side window dressed up in abstract terminology. As a 
sample of Bradley's exposition which is supposed to have eliminated 
Arnold we have, for example: 'For morals -the ideal self was an "ought", 
an, 11is to bell that is not; the object of religion is that same ideal 
self, but here it no longer only ought to be, but also is' 
(Bradley, 
1927, P-319). The author omits to mention how this mysterious 'is' 
becomes. And again: 
In the very essence of the religious consciousness we find the relation 
of our will to the real ideal self. We find ourselves, aPk4 that 
will, against the object as the real ideal will, which is not ourselves, 
and which stands to us in such a way that, though real. it is to be 
? -? 
realized, because it is all and the whole reality. (ibid., P-320). 
'A statement' the author suggests, 'which may stagger us; but ... a 
simple fact of the religious cousciousness' (ibid. )I Me difference 
between Arnold and Bradley is 
ihat Arnold recognizes the shortcomings of 
metaphysical abstraction, the impossibility of finally delineating the 
unknown, and prefers the suggestive tentativeness of metaphor; Bradley 
believes he has positively pin-pointed aspects of infinity by means of 
his neat. logical exposition. 
Since Bradley, other philosophers (mostly because of a renewed 
interest in the complexities of language) have moved closer to Arnold's 
conception, either by the rejection of metaphysic's or by expressing 
themselves in a form, closely in keeping wit-b Arnold's. Arnold's 'morality 
touched by emotion' is echoed, for example, by Edward Sapir, ' in Culture, 
LangLiaga and Personality: I ... Only when one's philosophy of lifeýis vit- 
alized by emotion doeg it take on the character of religion' (Sapir, 
1966, p. 125). And, on a different level, the general semanticist, Hayakawa 
in Language in Mought and Action, parallels Arnold's distinction between 
the delineation and motivation of morals when he writes: 'Science makes 
us able to co-operate,; the arts enlarge our sympathies so that we become 
willing to co-operatel (Hayakawa, 1966, P, 135) 
In God and the Bible Arnold develops his conception of the evolution 
of religion from natural law: 
Man and his history begint -we say, when he becones distinctly conscious 
of feelings, which in a long preparatory period of oscure growth, fie 
may have been forming. Then he calls this habit, - acquired by a process 
which he does not recollect, - nature, and he gives effect to it in fixed 
customs, rules, laws, and institutions. His religion consists in acknow- 
ledging and reverencing the awful sanctions with which this right way 
for man has, lie believes, been invested by the mighty not ourselves 
which surrounds us... (Super VII, p. 225) 
Here again, is a further expression of the idea of religion as 'morality, 
(here natural law) touched by '. emotion' (the awe and reverence felt 
towards the Power 'not ourselves' seeming to sanction our apprehension 
of right conduct). Arnold's distinction between 'natural' and''revealed' 
religion has been given already (see chapter4, p. 107). Revelation, for 
Arnold, is no more esoteric than nature. His view of Nafure itsel F, 
? -ý3 
derived from Spinoza and Goethe and reinforced by his devotion to 
Wordsworth, is of a power impressing itself upon us by its grandeur; ' 
composing us by its rhythms and at times by its tranquility; f illing 
and satisfying our imagination by its majesty; and finally energizing 
us (if we respond to it) to joyful activity (see Harvey, 1969, P-50). 
Its potential moral influence i's expressed by Arnold in a poem originally 
simply entitled 'Sonnett which in 1853 was used as the motto for Arnold's 
poems as a idiole: 
chlid. + Wn-rlr 
One lesson, Nature, let me learn of thee, 
One lesson which in every wind is blown, 
One lesson of two duties kept at one 
'ni-ough the loud world proclaims their enmity - 
Of toil unsevered from tranquilityJ 
Of labour, that in lasting fruit outgrows 
Far noisier schemes, accomplished in repose) 
Too great for haste, too high for rivalryJ 
Yes, while on earth a thousand discords ring, 
Man's fitful, uproar mingling with his toilq 
Still. do thy sleepless ministers move on, 
Their glorious tasks in silence perfecting; 
Still working, blaming still our vain turmoil, 
Labourers that shall not fail,, when man is gone. 
(Allott, 1965, pp106-107) 
The concept of steady, imperceptibleg tranquil growth discussed earlier 
2S3 ) Pr 
is shown here to have its origin, apparentlyg in Arnold's response to 
Nature. 'The same evolutionary doctrinev applied to the development of 
Christianity, is applauded by Arnold when he quotes Dr Newman's con- 
ception of its growth; 
Development is not an effect of wishing or resolving, or of forced 
enthusiasm, or of any mechanism of reasoning, or of any mere subtlety 
of intellect; but comes of its own innate power of expansion within the 
mind in its season, though with the use of reflexion and argument and 
originnI thought, more or less its it may happe"t wit, 11 a dependence oil 
the etlii6al growth of the mind itself, and with it reflex inrluence 
upoll it. (quoted in St Paul and Protestantism, Super V1, pp88-89) 
I 
'It is impossible', Arnold comments, 'to point our more sagaciously and 
expressively the natural, sPOntaneous, free character of true development; 
how such a development must follow laws of its own, may often require 
vast periods of time, cannot be hurried, cannot be stopped' (ibid. ). 
In Nature, thus apprehended, Arjinld finds the 'Eternal non-ourselves' 
by, wbich lie designates one conception of God. EK Chambers (19117) is- 
puzzled by, Arnold's Inot. ourselves', commenting: 'I should have rather 
expected him to bold that the human tendency to righteousness. came from 
no outside source, but wa s part of our "instinct"t (pP. 103-104). This 
seems to arise from a misconception of Nature, excluding ourselves as 
one of its manifestations. Arnoldv bearing in mind that we too are 
part of nature, surely mewis tmore than ourselves' (i. e. not merely 
ourselves alone) and not simply something different from ourselves; 
though that part of nature which has power over us rather than that over 
'which we have power. We may note his approving quotation of Emerson: 
11here is a power above and behind us, and we are the channels of its 
communication' (Super X, p-178) which suggests the apprehension of a 
power which operates both within and beyond ourselves. 
There is a, possibly apocryphal, story of an American 'Society for 
Pragmatic Mystics', with the motto., 'Unscrew the inscrutible and de- 
mist the mystical'I Arnold would not have joined such'a society, 
despite his aversion to metaphysics and his tendency towards pragmatism. 
The lines in, nie Scholar Gipsy: 
Still nursing the unconquerable bope, 
Still clutching the inviolable shade 
(Allott, 1965, P-342) 
typically represent an acceptance of mystery which the poet shares here 
with his subjecto the Scholar Gipsy. Yet despite this, 'Or perhaps because 
of this, willing acceptance of mystery, Arnold sees no conflict between 
yeligiotts faith and reason providing no demands are made ill the shitpe 
of fidelity to metaphysics. On this issue Arnold is forced to part 
company with Dr Newman who believes that "'The moral trial involved in 
faith" ... "lies in the submission of the reason to external realities 
partially disclosed"', and that "'Faith isp in its very nature, tile 
acceptance of what our reason cannot reach, simply and absolutely upon 
testimony"I (Super V1, PP312-313). In Arnold's view if we avoid tempting 
? -? I(- 
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our reason too far with metaphysics, faith is a very simple matter. 
It is. 
Neither the submission of the reason, not is it the acceptance simply 
and absolutely upon testimouy of w1iat reason cannot reach. FaiLh is: 
the being able to cleave to a power of goodness appealing to our 
higher and real self, not our lower and apparent self. TSuper VI, p-315) 
(Similarly, 
prayer, rather than being a species of esoteric conjuration, 
is for Arnold, simply antenergy of aspiration towards the Eternal Not 
ourselves' (Super VI, p. 190, footnote); an orientation of ourlhigher 
self' with the power of goodness insofar as we are able to apprehend it. ) 
The motive power"for faith is not simply 'the moral motive that inwardness, 
mildness, and self-renouncement make for man's happiness' (Super VIt 
p. 229) - though this has its place - but alfar surer ground? uhich un- 
selfconsciously confirms this, ? in personal devotion to Jesus Christ, 
-who brought the doctrine to his disciples and made a passage for it into 
their hearts' (ibid. ). Thus (leaving aside the question of doctrinal 
bias in the agent) the power of suggestiong and of imaginative reason 
are brought to bear again, ip place of rigid adherence to credal statements 
straining the intellect. Under pressure of the Zeitgeist the Yalse sciences 
of these-metaphysical speculations which have been 'blocking up the view, 
must go, (Super VI, P-349). For Arnold held, like Kant in his Prologo- 
mena, that 'to patch up the crazy guilt of metaphysicsp or to give it a 
new pattern ... is not what the. world needs' 
(quoted by Popper, 1966t p. 2MO. 
He recognized, too, the fact that deification is always easier than 
discipleship: the one is primarily mental -a matter of words - the other 
..! -P. 
2 invo Ives action, 'conductI. In the Preface to Literature nj o La, he 
expresses this belief forcibly: 'the futdatnental thing for Cliris-Uans 
is not the incarnation but the imitation of Chrisfl 
(Super VI, p. 1116). 
Like 1(arl Popper, Arnold believed that (in Popper's words) 'we need hope 
for Ito actr to live without hope goes beyond our strength. But we do 
not need more, and we must not be given more. We do not need certainty. 
Religion... should not be a substitute for dreams apd wish-fulfiment; 
it 
should resemble neither the holding of a ticket in a lottery, nor the 
2-f j 
holding of a policy in an insur-wice company' (Popper, 1966, p. 279). 
The putative rewards of such a Itickett or linsurance policy' - 'The 
materialistic future state, the materialistic kingdom of Godp of our 
popular religion' - will, in Arnoldts view, 'dissolve "like some unsub- 
stantial vision faded"' (super VIp p. 145). Such misplaced materialism 
must give way to a more spiritual apprehension, compatible with a 
realistic and rational view of the world. 
Despite this breadth of view, Arnold is occasionally guilty of 
i 
somewhat extravagant claims for Christianity (as well as- for the bias 
already noted). Mirases like Inons other saves I or the idea that the 
-world 'can be shown-to be moving necessarily towards the triumph of 
Christianity (but divested of its Aberglaube, or superstitious accretions) 
(Super VI, p. 402) - such phrases jar upon the modern ear 
(except perhaps 
the fundamentalist ear). However, they must be seen in context, in 
relation to Arnold's audience and the 'language of accommodation'he was 
obliged to use to communicate his ideas. Nevertheless, his tendency 
towards rationalism stopped short of a totally impersonal and unpoetical 
'secular morality', since he believed that this would fail to have the 
holding and motivating power which a religious faith (albeit severely 
modified) can provide. 
For the scientific materialist, or secular humanist, the power of 
man's mind appears to be almost infinite; its achievements depending 
solely upon the extent to which the laws of the universe can be ascertained 
and organized; and this is felt to be largely a question of time rather 
than of potential capacity (v. Henderson, Me Unbridled Ego, 1978). For 
the transcendental theistt on the other hando man's mental powers are 
regarded as essentially finite, functioning within the scope and will of 
the infinite mind of an all-knowing creator, podtulated to fill the gap. 
left by man's finitude. For Arnold, as for a number of other humanists, 
the relative finitude of. pan's mind is recognized without the need being 
felt to assume the existence of an omniscient mind elsewhere, transcending, 
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embracing or permeating the universe. Neither his Zeitizeist (which is 
nourished by the communicated ideas of mankind) nor his 'Eternal not our- , 
selves I (see above, p, 1019) belong-to this category. His view is therefore- 
essentially that of a Christian Humanist, open-minded and tolerant townrds 
other persuasions, humanist or otherwise. Fraser Neiman (1968) sums up 
Arnold's position as follows: 
Rationalist though Arnold may appear to be because of his himianistic 
CIIII)IMSiS Mid I)C-CILItSe of the, illusioii of cluriLy thaL his mLyle Di(luces, 
he was equally a Transcendentalist, at least in his view of historic 
process. On the one hand, Arnold insisted on the superiority of Jesus, 
among religious teachers, to persuade men to right conduct an(] he insists 
on the responsibility of the individual to strive towards perfection; 
yetp on the other hand, he believes that collective human experience, 
seen in the long perspective of time, is itself subject to the plastic 
stress of a divine mind... (pp. 118-119) 
On the whole, I would agree with this, adding that his 'transcendentalism' 
such as it is, is not a fundamental aspect of Arnold's philosophy as much 
CL 
askvestigial remnant of Christian orthodoxy dissolved in the general 
evolu, tionary. current of the time. Arnol(ý varied, and essentid y meta- 
Phorical, expression of this concept in terms of the Zeitgeist, which has 
already been discussed (see p. 22a above) should be borne in mind. 
Lanavaixe 
It would have been impossible to discuss Arnold's epistemological 
preoccupations without frequent reference to his views on language. 
Certain parallels between Arnold's and the linguistic pbilo-sopher AJ Ayerls 
views oil metaphysical and scientific language have been noted 
(seepp. 275-6); 
his conception (like Karl Popper's) of the social significance of language 
is observed (see p. 2179); his concern that the essentially poetic, or, 
literary language used by Jesus should be recognized as such is referred 
to (p. M); and there is reference to the suggestiveness of language ýP. Z? Z-O; 
and to the language of accommodation etc- Some discussion of his 
conception of tile oscillation in history between language, experience and 
ideas was included in an earlier chapter (chapter 
ý)p. 230). A sound 
working knowledge in particular of Latin, Greek, French, German and 
Italian inevitably developed Arnold's sensitiveness to langUiLge. Ile was 
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aware of its varied uses-, its slisceptibility to c1lange; and of the 
pitfalls of translation. A footnote in Literature and DoLqiia is typical 
of this recognition: 'It isto be remembered ... that ufiereas Jesus spoke 
Aramaic, the most concrete and uninataphysical of languages, he is 
reported in Greekv the most metaphysical' (Super VI, P-308). 
His excursions into etymology are probably the least successful 
aspects of Literature and Doj_rma, but a certain precocity an(] over- 
exuberance in this, area he shared with a. general intellectual current 
of the nineteenth century when much more seemed to be provable by 
etymological analysis than we would nowadays admit. Etymological obser- 
vations on 'man' (, Super VI, P. 179), freligionl (p. 176) and 'God' (PP-171 
and 182), for example, are open to question in the light of further 
developments. Oliambers (1947) observes of Arnold's definition of IGodI 
that 'modern philology does not bear him out here, preferring to relate 
the word to one or other of the two Aryan roots, one meaning 'to invokell 
the other 'to pour, to offer sacrifice? (p. 101), rather than to the 
Aryan word for Ishining' or 'brilliant'. 
But the essential and most significant contribution Arnold makes 
in relation to language is his insistence on the difference between and 
yet the equal importance of scientific and literary language, as for 
example in his observation that 'The language of the Bible... is literary, 
not-scientific language; language thrown out at an object of conscious- 
ness not fully graspedp'which inspired emotion' (Super VI, p. 189). To 
complement this we have its corollary in St Paul and Protestantism: 
'Assertions in scientific language must stand the tests of scientific 
examinationt (Super Vl,, p. 9). Me literary critic, IA Iticliards, expressed 
his recognition of the importance of this distinction in 1929 as a result 
of his researches into the relationship between intellectual 
(scientific) 
and emotional (poetic) belief. Like Arnold, fie regards both kinds of 
understanding as important, if not always easily attainable: 
The absence of intellectual belief tieed not cripple emotional belief, 
though evidently enough in some persons it may. But the hahit of attaching 
? -ý9 
emOtiOlIal belief only to intellechially certified ideas is Strong it) 
some people; it is encouraged by some forms of education; it is perhaps 
becoming tbrough the increased prestige of science, more conmion. (p. 278) 
And in a pertinent footnote, IA Richards adds: 
I have discussed this danger at length in Science and Poetry. I'here is 
reason to think that poetry has oft ' en 
arisen through fusion (or confusion) between the two forms of belief, the'boundary between what is intellec- 
, 
tually certified and what is not being much less sharply def 
' 
ined in 
former centuries and defined in another manner. Me standard of verifi- 
cation used in science today is comparitively a new thing. As tile 
scientific view of the world (including our own nature) develops, we 
shall probably be forced into making a division between fact and fiction 
that, unless we can me. et it with a twofold theory of belief on the lines 
suggested above, would be fatal not only to poetry but to all our finer, 
more spiritual, responses. (pp. 278-279) 
More recently Paul Hirst (1966), among other educationists, influenced 
by Wittgo-enstein, and perhaps to a lesser extent by PH Phenix, asks: emiat 
kinds of things do we do with words? i. e. vAiat realms of meaning are 
there, and How in words are these things achieved, i. e. by what uses of 
language are these functions fulfilled?, * (p. 72). In seeking to answer 
these questions he deplores the Idefective theory of meaning? which may 
result from an education overstressirfg tile verifying and logical use of 
scientific language: 
Insofar as, education'conceives itself as restricted to developing only 
this limited form of understanding it has succumbed to a disastrously 
narrow concept of its intellectual task. Certainly there is now little 
backing for any such restriction in contemporary philosophyp for such 
doctrinaire theories of meaning have given place to a great deal of 
steady and sober work on the distinctions in language which mark clear 
distinctions in its uses. That moral discourse has a function and meaning 
quite different from scientific discourse and that both these have a 
function quite distinct from that of say poetic discours-e, is now gener- 
ally accepted and that without derogatory comments being passed on the 
function of say moral, poetic or even religious discourse. (P-73) 
In this and other educational works, including the influential Bullock 
Report, (DE. S, 1977)) (nee pli-188-19")) Amold's flisCiijetiorim are uplield 
in gretieral, ir imi. it, poractaur WY111m, itm, 'in C()11C(! r11 J1181JUC(l, 
Conclusion 
Not only do we find what were Arnold's particular preoccupations 
with language coming more to the fore, but his general eclecticism 
represents a mode receiving more recognition latterly. In Conflict and 
Cbanl_rc in Education (ed. Janni, 1975)9 an important recent American 
contribution to educational thought, we fin(I a similar concern to 
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Paul Hirstts expressed. 'We feel somehow trapped in our ideology uhich 
suggests, that schools must primarily transmit information' writes lanni, 
yet 'We know that the latter is not true' (p. 465). We have to recognize 
that in assessing the values of society -We need to be more eclectic as to 
our means of validation - 'the process by which we, as individuals, or 
in groups, decide what is and is not true, what is and is not acceptable, 
(p. 466). lanni then proceeds to delineate five alternative modes of 
'validation'; the authoritarian mode, the logical rational mode, the 
. 2mRjKjR! jj mode, the pragmatic mode and the consensual mode. Ilic particu- 
lar kind of validity of each of tbese modes is demonstrated acid their 
interrelationship discussed in such a way as to show thaL, - 
in general, 
we tend to adopt combinations of these validations in varying patterns and 
proportions depending upon the problem we are seeking to solve, or the 
item we are concerned to validate. 
The study of Arnold's epistemology reveals an eclectic mind given 
to such a range of means of validation (or lverificationl, ýas lie would 
have said). lie makes use of autliorities, resorts to logic and reason, 
seeks for experimental or empirical proof, looks for practical or 
pragmatic implications and appeals to consensus as the occasion demands. 
He would have found much to agree withkthe author concerned; and would 
certainly have agreed with these words from his Preface: 
Thus, we see the role of education not as presenting students an arsenal 
of ready-made solutions to any problem they encounter, but rather as 
-preparing people to make increasingly more accurate judgments about 
values and the social issues they generate. (Ianni, 1975, P. M) 
This chapter began with reference to the needs of presentday educ- 
ation advocated by Wall, Wilson and Mead. I hope that it has been shown 
that Arnold's upbringing and thought make a contribution to those needs. 
Wall (1959), for example,. believes that modern living demands 
I 
provisional belief rather than conviction, the acceptance of the notion 
that 'truth' may be personal and many-sided, the dynamic tolerance of 
true agnosticism -which accepts that doubt is an essential background to 
action and that conviction may be a bad master. (p. 29) 
He goes on to acknowledge that these are ! psychologically very difficult 
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attitudes to maintain' and that 'such a state of mind demands, psycho- 
logically speaking, great personal security from the inilividuall (p. 29). 
Margaret Mead (1972) believed that, to meet rapid cultural cliange and 
diversity, Ithe young must ask questions that we would never think to ask, 
and that 'we must create new models for adults who can teach their 
children not what to learn, but how to learn and not what they should be 
committed to, but the value of commitment' (P-115). 
Matthew Arnold, with his confidently questioning outlook, his espousal 
of the openT I iess of literary culture, his sceptical rejection of the security 
of dogma, and his personal moral commitment to Christian Humaiiism along 
'with his imaginative tolerance of other points of view, exemplifies the 
tempepetital qualities advocated by Mead and Wall; and a consideration 
of his upbringing gives some indication of how lie came to develop these 
qualities. 
I 
i 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
IMAGINATIVE LITERATURE IN THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM 
What is comprised under the word literature is in itself the greatest 
power available-in education; of thi6 power it is not too much to say 
that in our elementary schools at present no use is made at all. 
Matthew Arnold: Reports on Elementary Schools, 1871 
Literature brings the child into an encounter with language in its 
Most Complex and varied forms-It provides imaginative insight into 
what another person is feeling... It confronts the reader with problems 
similar to his own, and does it at the safety of one remove. 
I The Bullock Report: A Language for Life, 1975 
Introductory 
This chapter considers the place and value of imaginative literature 
in the school curriculum as a means towards the emotional and moral devel- 
opment of pupils. It is essentially concerned with principles, but 
attitudes towards classroom practice are implicit in the discussion. 
Earlier chapters have raised various issues relevant to this 
question and it is proposed in this chapter to draw these together to-wards 
a tentative conclusion. Chapter 3 indicated the main lines of development 
in the teaching of literature 'as revealed in a series of official and un- 
official reports from the Newbolt Report (1921) to the Bullock Report 
(1975) including in passing a dissenting voice from America 
(Postman, 19'70) 
claiming that the teaching of reading was 
a 
emi-sinister plot to maintain 
the status quo of a corrupt authority. 'nie survey ended with reference 
to recent proposals to develop a 'Core 'curriculum' in United Kingdom schools. 
After delineating the contents and the reception of Arnold's work entitled 
Lite. rature and_Dogma (chapters 4 and 5), chapter 6 examined the essentially 
literary significance of his ironic stance. Chapter 7 broadly indicated 
Arnold's views on literature in general, and considered these in relation 
to the views of others; and ch apter 10 discusse4 Arnold's basic epistem- 
ology, particularly as this throws light on his view of literature and 
its language, and their'relation to morality and religion. 
At this 1)oinL tentative definitiops of 'literature' andIdog"ijal 
respectively may be helpful. (For the purposes of this chapter, it 
should be understood, the discussion of literature will be restricted to 
? imaginative literature 1. ) Imaginative literature,, it could be said, 
employs the written, word in an openýended exploration of experience and 
invites the reader's individual response to the writer's interpretations 
and evaluations. Doama on the other hand, presents an authoritative, 
corporate schema of concepts and values, demanding the allegiance of 
adherents in return for the promise of emotional security within the eon- 
text of social mores it represents. It is an assumption of this chapter 
that human individuals need verbal guidance or nourishment in developing 
their value-systems and moral principles and that (apart from the people 
they encounter - undoubtedly the primary source) they are likely to look 
towards'literature (and its associated arts) or towards dogmatic form- 
ulations for support. 
Impossibility of proving moral efficacy ofliterature 
It must be frankly admitted at the outset that 
(in the witer's view) 
it is imppssible to prove that the use and teaching of literature in schools 
will improve a pupil's ethical values or moral behavior. Questionnaires 
can tell us what people read and enjoy 
(or otherwise)g but not how their 
actions are influenced. There have been short-term studies it is true of, 
for example, the effectiveness of film propaganda in changing the attitude 
of troops preparing to engage in a war - such as the series of American 
films entitled Why We Fight described, by Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield 
(1949). And studies of the effects on behavior of television violence have 
a marginal relevance to the problem of the moral influence of verbal 
literature. But the long-term ethical effects of television programmes, 
films, or literature of an unbiased non-propagandistic type would be very 
difficult to evaluate with any, decisive statistical'accuracy. 
Even 
longitudinal studies of individuals'would be beset by all kinds of prob- 
lems of sampling, isolation of relevant factorsq management of complex 
variables, etc. 
L04- 
Yet despite this inevitable lack of posiCive evidence there continues 
Lo be it Collulloilly accepted 1)01. i. (! r i. imc so, im, ow or. faiwr mir vio, es, iives 
and behavior are influenced by j*terature. Otherwise it is-impossible 
to explain the prevalence of'censorship in various comimnities and 
cultures; the phenomenon 3f Marxist criticism; the anxieties of education- 
ists concerned about racism or sexism in ebildrents books; the imprison- 
ment of-writers; or the eagerness of prisoners of conscience to acquire 
literature to sustain their morale. It is clearly believed that literature 
has an effect on us -a potentiality for modifying our outlook, and so 
our behavior - and that reading is more. than a mere aesthetic exercise. 
In the absence of proof that literature is a more effective means of 
value-acqui, sition than dogma it is the object of this chapter to present 
some arguments and evidence favouring such a view, recognizing that 
finally any such belief must be a matter of subjective individual 
judgment. 
Pros and cons 
Perhaps-the strongest argument against the moral efficacy of liter- 
ature has been voiced in recent years by George Steiner 
(1969) who 
pointed out that readers of Rilke and Shakespeare Could man the gas- 
chambers of Dachau and Buchenwald without any sense of incongruity. 
Their sensibility to literature had not found issue in a comparable 
sensitivity to real life. Apparently intellectual-aesthetic sensitivity 
is not necessarily the parent of moral-emotional sensitivity or of ethical 
behavior. Dr Goebbels, in fact, was able to draw on his cultural back- 
ground and use his considerable literaryakills in the service of dogmatic 
Nazi propaganda. There is no escaping this. On the other hand, in the 
same environment, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1967) drew upon similar resources 
for the necessary spiritual and emotional nourishment to work 
in opposition 
to the Nazi regime. Such contrary examples indicate the complexity and range 
of the problem we are concerned with. All arguments in this sphere,, it 
would seem, presuppose a series of potential links along 
the following'lines: 
fiction.? imagination-ýmoral outlook--ýbeltavior I 
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It would appear that in some cases, as with Bonhoeffer, Oe imagination 
is harnessed towards the final two stages, while in others, as with 
Dr Geobbels, it is shunted off into a siding concerned purely with 
aesthetic satisfaction, while nourishment for moral outlook and behavior 
is sought and found elsewhere. 
Another modern example of an individual finding emotional nourish- 
ment through literature - this time in the writing of it - can be seen 
in Wole Soyinl(als work. Shuttle in the Crypt which arose from his exper- 
ience of two years solitary confinement in prison. According to Gerald 
Moore (1973), his biographer, the writing of this work gave the poet 'the 
imaginative equipment to convey his anguish without a loss of control' 
(p. 96). And Soyinka (1972) himself writes of the work that 
Self-identification with this essence of innate repletion was a natural 
'weapon to employ against the dangers of inhuman isolation. It was never a 
mere poetic conceit; all events, thoughts, dreams, incidental phenomenon 
were, in shee 
"r 
self-protection perceived and absorbed into the loom- 
shuttle unity of such an experience. (p. vii) 
Before reverting to Matthew Arnold1s views on this issue it is inter- 
eating to consider testimonies from two of his near contemporaries, 
Charles Darwin and John Stuart Mill. Charles Darwin records in about 1875 
how his concentration on purely scientific matters seems -Go have robbed 
him of the capacity to enjoy poetry, painting or music: 
My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws 
out of large collections of facts, but why this, should have caused the 
atrophy of that part of the brain alone, on which the higher tastes depend, 
I cannot conceive... The loss of these tastes is a loss of happiness and 
may possibly be injurious to the intellect, and more probably to tbe-moral 
character, by enfeebling the emotional part of our nature. (Klingopulos, 
1964, P-55) 
Darwin's designation of the arts as 'higher tastes' is interesting, 
as is his concern for the loss of 'happiness' he deplores in their absence. 
Also noteworthy is the directýrelationsliip he assumes between emotion and 
moral character (along lines suggested in the modbl above, see p. 304. ). 
John Stuart Millis observation that"the habit of analysis has a tendency 
-to wear away the feelings, had a poignant- basis in the depression (des- 
cribed so vividly in his diary) w1iich lie suffered in his early manhood. 
The 
30t 
Utilitarian, James Mill, his fathfýr, had provided his son with a thorough, 
but strictly factual, education in the belief that there was little 
utility in imaginative literature. On reaching manhood John St(Astrt Mill 
had a brilliant intellect but with his emotions starved life seemed 
utterly pointless and empty to him. He describes howp eventually, he 
Itoolf up the collection of (Wordsworth. 's) poems from curiosity with no 
expectation of mental relief from it'. `lhe result was, however, (he 
'writes) ? that I gradually but completely emerged from my habitual dep- 
ression, and was never again subject to it' (Mill, 1873, ppl46-149). 
Arnold would have explained John Stewart MillIs therapeutic experience 
of literature in terms of its 'positive?, 'vital', Ilife enbancing' 
qualities. Writing of Wordsworth, Arnold declares: 
WordsworthIs poetry is great because of the extraordinary power with which (he) feels the joy offered to us in nature, the joy offered to us in the 
simple primary affections and duties; and because of the extraordinary 
power with which, in case after case, he shows us this joy, and renders 
it so as to make us share it. (see Wordsworth, Super-IX, p. 51) 
In this explanation there is a hint of poetryls moral value (in the word 
'duties'), but the emphasis is on the emotion of joy. Elsewbe), -e Arnold 
brings out the ethical implications of Wordsworth's poetry more fully: 
... poetry is at bottom a criticism of life; ... the greatness of a poet 
lies in his powerful and beautiful application of ideas to life, - to the 
question: How to live' (ibid. p. 46). Writing of Maurice de Gu4rin, Arnold 
attests that 'the power of poetry is. its interpretive powerg' by which I 
mean, not a power of drawing out in black and white an explanation of the 
mystery of the universe, but the power of so dealing with things as to 
aw"ken in us a wonderfully full, new anil intimate sense of thein, at)(1 of 
our relations with themf (Super III, pp. 12-13). Later in the same para- 
graph he seems to be putting his finger on the problem expressed above 
by Darwin: I 
The interpretations of science do riot give us this intimate sense of 
objects as the interpretations of poetry give it; they appeal to a limited 
faculty, and not to the whole man. It is not Linnaeus or Cavendish or 
Cuvier who gives us the true sense of animalsg or waterv or plants, who 
seizes their secret for us, who makes us participate in their life; it 
is Shakespeare ... Wordsworth., ', Keats-, etc. 
(1bido) 
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The reader, or appreciative critic, shares the animating excitement of 
the poet because 'to have the sense of creative activity is the great 
happiness and the great proof of being alive' (Super 111, p. 285). 11, 
all this Arnold's orientation is close to that of Schweitzer * above, 
p. ZS'3); Ireverence for life' andk"'sense of participation in the life 
around us has a reciprocal influence on the participant, since by the 
Golden Rule his sense and valuation of his own life are au&niiented. 
The naturc__and scope of literature 
So far the evidence offered has been in relation to poetry -a 
widely differentiated art in itselfq but far from being the awn of lit- 
erature, which must now be considered in its broader aspects. Wellek and 
Warren (1973) recognize "Ifictionality", "invention"p or "imagination" as 
the distinguishing trait of literature' (p. 26). The author Jbiasell Hoban 
(1979) sees stories as virtually coterminous with life: 
The action systems of the universe are the elements from which life and 
stories arise. Ilie patterns of blue-green algae an(] the numinous wings 
of the Great Nebula in Orion and the runic scrawl of human chromosomes 
are stories. Begotten by no one knows whatv stories beget people to 
live them. We are the offspring of immeasurable ideas. (p. 5) 
Myths, legends, fairy tales, novels, plays and poetry all serve not only 
to illuminate life but to create Aq or to re-create it afresh in recog- 
nizable patterns and forms. But it is essentially subjective life - 
the wnrld of feeling and imagination - that they are concerned to re- 
create. In the words of. Suzanne Langer (1964): 
The primary function of art is to objectif! j feeling (my italics, ILA) so 
that we can contemplate and understand it. It is tile formulation of so- 
called "inward experience", the "inner life", that is impossible to acilieve 
by discursive thought ... Art objectifies tile sentience and desire, self- 
consciousness and world-consciousuess, emotions and moods that are 
generally regarded as irrational because words cannot give us clear ideas 
of them (pp. 80-81) 
All this is achieved through the use of imagination - 'probably the oldest 
mental trait that is typically human' (p. 81). 
Suzanne Langer's contention that art lobjectifies feelingl is a major 
argument justifying the use of imaginative literature in the educational 
curriculum. Considering the place that feelings occupy in our lives - 
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their pre-eminence in all our doirigs in terms of motivation, attention 
and response to the world around us -to ignore them, to leave them in- 
choatep would be an unforgivable, act 'of neglect. Not that literature 
seeks to spell out analytically and discursively the nature of a feeling 
or emotion, defining 'trauma', IcomplexIq lobsessionIq Iconationt, etc. 
in generalized abstract tenuinology; rather it presents them to us embodied 
in individual characters set in situations and passing through stages of 
development. recognizable to us as they penetrate our own dimly apprelle"(1- 
ed experience and unfold its significance to our view. 'A literary work 
of art', according to Wellek and Warren (1973), 'is not a simple object 
but rather a highly complex organization of a stratified character with 
multiple meanings and relationships' (p. 27)- Because of its multiple 
character each of us is able to take from it according to our own part- 
icular need of the moment. Whereas scientific language is denotative, 
working on a one-to-one basis of correspondence, literary language is 
connotative, working by ambiguity, open association-and suggestion. Hence 
its accessibility to a variety of subjective needs. According to Suzanne 
Langer (1964) 'there is nothing necessarily confused or formless about 
emotionsl(p. 82) although they may lie below the level of consciousness. 
However, 
As soon as the natural forms of subjective experience are abstracted to 
the point of symbolic presentation, we can use those forms to imagine feeling 
and understand its nature. Self-haiowledge, insight into all phase$ of 
life and mind, spring from artistic imagination. That is the cognitive 
value of the arts. (ibid. ). 
When the anonymous eighteenth century moralistic author of Little 
Goo(ty Two-Shoes (1765) complained that 'people stuff children's Heads with 
Stories of Ghosts, Fairies, Witches, and such Nonsense when they are 
young, and so they continue Fools all their Days' he was only half right. 
To believe in the objective existence of ghosts and fairies all one's 
days is-indee. d a sign of folly - an abandonment to 
Aberglaube, in Arnold's 
terms - but to ignore the subjective, ps ycbological significance of such 
phenomena, and to be deprived of experience of their embodiment 
in 
30ý 
imaginative stories, myfhs and lf! ýýfends is to miss out on a huge and vital 
slice of life. 
lba% C, I David (1964)., in, the Introdaction, to The TwelvekErincesses and 
Other Fairy Tales, writes of 'the deep roots traditional stories have in 
the imagination', reminding us that 'Fairy Tales are not, as is commonly 
believed, a form of children's literature; they are, like fables, legends 
and ballads, among the many forms of adult literature that children 
have adopted' (pp. ix-x), because of their universal or archetypal 
significance. And Bruno Bettelheim (1978) in The Uses of Dichantment, 
spells out in some detail the psychological significance, and the value 
for mental health and growth towards emotional maturity of folk tales which 
at surface valuation might be dismissed as mere flights of fancy. 
This is not the place for a critique of Jungls theories Of 'archetypes 
of the collective uncon2c_io_us! or of the 'personal or 'the shadow'; but 
some mention of the last-named must be made in view of its relevance to 
both 'literature# and Idogmal. I will quote for simplicityls sake from 
Preda Fordlimis Introduction to Jung'S PSYCIIOIO (1953): 
l'be shadow is the personal unconscious; it, is al. 1 1 '110se luticivilized 
desires and (. tylol. iolls that are incompaLible wiLh social standards and our 
ideal personality, all that; we are ashamed ofi all that- we do not wd-nt to 
know about ourselves. It follows that the narrower and more restrictive 
the society in which we live the larger will be our shadow... 
The collective aspect of the shadow is expressed as a devil, a witch 
or something similar... (P-50) 
Authoritarian dognna-ridden or ideology-ridden societies find and define 
their collective shadows in terms of what is collectively repressed. 
Seventeenth century Salem objectified it in witchcraft, McCarthyite America 
in Ireds under the beds', Communist Russia in #bourgeois capitalist 
decadeftee I, and so on. 'Mis is clearly an over-simplification of a 
complex phenomenon, but the principle is demonstrated. In a liberal 
democratic society, the need for objectifying a collective shadow in this 
'way is reduced by the increase in individual autonomy. But there is no 
escaping the need, for autonomous individuals to recognize and come to 
terms with their own individual tshadowl for maximum mental heal , th. 
And literature, through its symbolic representation of various 
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states of mind with which we are invited to identify, is a chief means 
of achieving thi a. "17he shadowip Freda Fordham reminds us, 'cannot be 
touched by ordinary methods of education' (P-50). But appropriate 
freely accessible literaturet together with help in understanding its 
function as pupils move towards maturity, is one means of coping with it. 
Iruth. fact and fiction 
Initially, by the young child, of course, the story is accepted on 
its own terms without question. Sooner or later - usually about the lower 
junior school stage - the question 'Is it true? ' begins to be aslied. If 
we are to be true to our understanding of, the nature of literature and 
fair to the emotional development of the pupils, the answer is-neither 
a simple 'yes' or 'no'. With older children - say upper juniors - we 
can pose the counter question 'In what sense true?; With younger children, 
for-wrhom such a question would be confusing or meaningless, -we need to 
tread delicately, for the area is a sensitive one. The answer we give to 
individual children will depend upon the context, the story in question, 
the intellectual and emotional maturity of the child, and so on; but it 
needs to be guided by recognition of two basic principles: (1) that 
imagination and fantasy are I important to our emotional life and can embody 
valuable truths; (2) that such truths are not the same as empirical 
facts dealing with objective physical reality. In other words, we should 
avoid debunking or devaluing the story in any way, while at the same time 
helping the enquirer to sort out his world view in such a way as'to be 
scientifically acceptable in terms of reason and probability. If the 
st. ory is one vAtich also involves religious or cultural beliefs, a 
third principle needs to be observed: (3) that we recognize and respect 
differences of opinion held by different people. A tactful answer based 
on these three principles should avoid doing viol'ence to a child's 
domestic loyalties while at flie same ijille helpiiig Iiiiii come 1, o terms with. 
the nature of story and actuality. Toleration of uncertainty and ambiguity 
are important things to learn, but we do not need to compound confusion 
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by leaving blurred edges where reasonable certainty and commonsense can 
clarify distinctions. And where there exists a varietY of opinions it 
may often be fairest to state clearly, but not dogmatically, our own 
point of view. Upper junior children can be helped by a fuller discussion 
of the distinction between histor3j legend and myth when such questions 
arise. 
'Is it true? ' 'Did it happen? l 'Did it really happen like thatV 
Each of these questions is of a different order and requires a different 
response. In answering them we must be guided by our sense of fact. as 
well as by our respect for fiction; and by our recognition that both in 
their different ways may nourish our understanding of truth. 
Tolkien (1964) believes that children are capable of"literary belief" 
'when the story-teller's art is, good. enough to produce it' This concept 
is somewhat akin to Coleridge's 'poetic faith' (before which our 'common 
notions of philosophy give way" (Coleridget 1960, v. PP-130-140); and 
17q - ?- f2 to Matthew Arnold's 'imaginative reasont v. pp. k anove ). Iliere is a 
sense in which the mathematician Lewis Carroll 'believed in' his creation 
Alice in Wonderland. (Certainly its paradoxes reflect the real world. ) 
And the art of the historian and novelistt Anatole Francet enables us to 
believe, with him, in the fairy that enters anti interrupts the reveries 
of the ageing archivist, Monsieur Bonnard, in his novel Le Crime de 
Monsieur Bonnard. From these writers we learn that the complement to 
reason and logic need not be sought in magic and the supernatural - that 
is to say, pseudo-objective Aberglaube - but in imagination, recognized, 
cultivated and enjoyed as such. Imaginative literature is autwý. omous. 
It stands or falls by the integration achieved within it. In So1zlienitsyn's 
words (1973): 
A work of art contains its verification in itself; artificial, strained 
concepts do not withstand the test of being turned into images; they 
fall to pieces, turn out to be sickly and pale, convince no one. Works 
which draw on truth and present it -to us in live an(] concentrate(] form 
grip us, compellingly involve us, and no one ever ... will come forth to 
refute them. (p 
-pxoeý, -77,4, lý? 7(4 
'7f'. 17o), ' zi / 
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The psychologist WD Wall (1977) affirms the educational value of 
literature in this respect, comparing the 'non-linear ways of tbinkiiia 
and feeling' which give status to literature with the linearg logical 
structures of scientific thought' to which they are complementary, and 
equally important if we are to 'prepare people to reach... self-awareness and 
develop a secure identity which is truly independent and autonomous, (p. 230). 
And Frank Whitehead (1966) in The Disappearing Daisp (a title which ref- 
lects the move in English teaching from authoritarian to autonomous) 
develops this concept in a passage which deserves to be quoted at length. 
Writing of the power of words in helping us Ito control and manipulate our 
environment' he continues: 
No less important, however, is the power they give us to control our- 
selves - to bring order and coherence into the bewildering flux of wishes, 
impulsesp and emotions which would otherwise submerge us. Here, indeed, 
lies the key to the supreme power of literature; it is able, through its 
symbolic representations, to insinuate stable forms oP organisation 
into the feeling-aspect of our livest and so help maintain a balanced 
integrity between the conflicting claims of inner and outer reality. 
There is a discernible continuity of function here 
(from nursery rhyme 
through Treasure Island to the tragedies of Shakespeare) which, once we 
have grasped it, permits us to see our work with literature as the cul- 
minating aspect of our work in English. (p. 15) 
Literature and eniovment 
It is frequently argued that the main function of literature is 
'to provide enjoyment. AN Whitehead (1954), for example, in Me Aims of 
Education, wrote half a century ago* 
Mere literary knowledge is of slight importance ... Me facts related are 
nothing. Literature only exists to express and develop that imaginative 
world which is our life, the kingdom which is within us. It follows that 
the literary side of a tech ' nical education 
should consist in an effort 
to make the pupils enjoy literature. It does not matter what they know 
but the enjoyment is vital. (p. 66). 
From another angle, reference has been made to Arnold's insistence on 
Wordsvorth's capacity to comunicate joy in nature (see pl? ýabove); and 
we might cite Arnold's objection to the dulness of too. many schoolbookso 
recorded in his educational reports, (14arvin, e. g. pp. 82-83,97-98, etc. ). 
Malcolu Yorke (1979) has recently queried the contention that literature 
should be Opurely for pleasuret. lie had foundq on administering a survey 
among 283 teachers of children between nine and sixteen years old, that 
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of 95 possible responses to his questionnaire 'the most overwhelmingly 
popular objective chosen by theMixole sample for all manner of ages, 
schools and classes was "that the pupil' derive pleasure from literary 
works"' (p. 21). Yorke fears that this attitudet too strongly heldg can 
result in teachers becoming mere 'entertainers' in classroom literary 
sessionsp in offering second-rate material and pandering to the urge for 
escapism. 
Yorke isnot against pleasure, bat argues that 'the teacher who 
takes "pleasure" as his highest eild and objective without grappling-with 
its definition and consequences ... is ... selling the children short? 
(p. 25). 
Pleasuret he argues may be an 'effect', but should not be a primark ob- 
jectivet since in any caset once the concept has been broken down into 
its various constituents - IsensationsIt 'feelings', etc. 'the differences 
in ple"ure yeil& in terms of kindst quantities and qualities depends upon 
all the complex sociall experientialt hereditaryt environmental, develop- 
mental, linguistic, etc. factors which make us different people and readers, 
(po22). He also fears that teachers mav be loath to expose their charges 
to 'the unpleasures of traSedyt and to Igoodl literature that is not, however# 
positive and optimistic,, thus distorting and unbalancing their view of lifee 
He quotes Barbara Hardy (1968) in support of this: 
** We shall simply be adding to the lies Robert Laing accuses us of ; 
elling our children if wet as teachers of the humanitiesp as parentep 
and as citizens, consciously or unconsciously put a mute on the literature 
which is not life-enhancing but eloquent of despair, confusion.. doubtv 
madnesso anarchy. We mast allow literature the whole of its eloqueneet 
its Sviftl Beckettt Sylvia Plath as well as its Shakespeare and Jane 
Austen. (p. 14) 
There is an important warning in Yorke's argument; but it would be unfor- 
tunate if it were pushed too far so that literature in schools became a kind 
of self-denying ordinance. Matthew Arnold distinguishes between 'pleasure' 
and 'joy', asserting that, 'by pleasure alone you cannot permanently bind 
men's spirits-to you. Truth illuminates and gives joy, and it is by the 
bond of joy, not of pleasure, that men's spirits are indissolubly held' 
( Super III, p. 210). 'Pleasure' in this sense in literature would 
presumably stop short at little more than vicariously titillating the 
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senses, for example, ý-%iiile 'joy' would engage the whole person in an 
active reciprocal re-creation of the truth to life evoked by the writer. 
Arnold agrees with. Schiller that "'The right art is that alone, which 
creates the highest enjoyment"? that it should "'Make men happy"I (Super 
I, p. 2)p and he observes with justice the ironic fact that 'In presence 
of the most tragic circumstances, represented in a work of art, the 
feeling of enjoyment... mak still subsist; the representation of the most 
utter calamity, of the liveliest anguish, is not sufficient to destroy it; 
the more tragic the situation, the deeper becomes the enjoyment... 
9(ibid. ). 
This recognition to some extent meets Barbara Hardy's. challenge above. 
It could be added that there is a sense in which all honest literature, 
however teloquent of despair, confusion, doubt, etc. ' is 'life enhancingi. 
If (to revert to Arnold's terms) literature is 'a criticism of lifelt 
literature -which reveals its dark side is a criticism of those forces 
which create the darkness, and is thus asserting (by contrast) the 
positive values against which the darkness is judged. 
I would suggest that one of the means by which grim and tragic lit- 
erature gives us pleasure is by demanding from us the exercise of our 
'beat selves' in sympathy with the suffering characters. In identifying 
and suffering with, for example, Tess (in Tess of the. d'Urbevilles). or 
Ifenchard (in The Mayor of Casterbridge) we are, so to spe ak, elevated by 
the quality of our suffering (perhaps of a kind and degree of which we 
may not have felt ourselves capable). At the same tim ep of course, we 
are protected fromthe direct effects of the suffering by the distancing 
of vicarious experience from actuality, which is another (rather more 
selfish) source of literary pleasure. This is the 'third ground' principle. 
A further pleasure and value we derive from literature is that we can 
simultaneouslY- enjoy the thrust of the assassins'dagger as we enjoy giving 
our sympathy to its victim. OurAbest' and 'worst' selves are thus both 
engaged at the same time - apparently to no ill effect. It 'would seemp 
although I suppose it could not be ý, uaranteed, that we derive in this 
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'way the double benefit of 'catharsis? for our worst side and moral 
enrichment for our best. Me term 'catharsis' has been loosely used 
here. To discuss it fully would be to examine the way in which througl, 
literature we can achieve valuable emotional release of our unacknowledged 
pent-up feelings - another argument favouring an important place of litera- 
ture in the school curriculum* 
But to return to Malcoln Yorke's challenge respecting the place of 
-pleasure in literature teaching. Pleasure and enjoyment would seem to me 
to be important cons., tituents of a pupil Is encounter with literature. 
However, this does not imply a demand for a constant state of euphoria in 
literature lessons. Pleasure, moreove-ro. cannot exist alone; it exists 
only in relation to its context. If the context is regarded as the 
nature of the engagement between readers and the textv then the resulting 
pleasure could be said to be a measure of the quality of the engagement. 
The pleasure derived should not simply be restricted to immediate and 
obsolescent pleasure; and therefore the standard and quality of tile 
literature offered cannot be ignored, In short, although enjoyment is 
one of the prime values to be derived from engaging with literature, it 
should not be regarded as the be-all-and-end-all; but as a quality 
without which whatever is offered risks becoming useless or counter- 
productive. 
Moral value of literature 
Matthew Arnold defined religion as 'morality touched by emotion' 
(see above, p. jot). This could almost as well be used as a definition of a 
great deal of literature. Perhaps this is why Arnold comes very close at 
times to seeming to seek to replace religio .n by poetry 
(seepp. 1814). How- 
ever, lie recognizes religion to be a 'binding to lifel, whereas poetry 
lie defines as a 'criticism of life', all(] so its treatment of morality and 
emotion -will not be of the same order. The meaning Arnold attaches to the 
phrase 'criticism of. lifel is misco+rued by Wellek 
(1966) when the 
. 
latter 
says that Arnol(Ils conception of poetry is narrowly reduced by it to 
'didactic poetry' (p. 164). Arnold does mean that poetry 
is in some sense 
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f didactic I-i. e. that as a resu 16 of the particular way in which it poet 
brings beauty of form in relation to truth of content we are enable(] 
to learn something; but he is certainly not referring to a didactic 
genre of poetry when lie describes poetry as a 'criticism of life'. lie 
simply mea" that literature is inevitably evaluative in its interpreta- 
tion, of life. 
Speaking of Homer, and later of Wordsworth, Arnold affirms that ? the 
noble and profound application of ideas to life is the most essential 
part of poetic greatuessl (Super IX, p. hli). Praising Voltaire for 
'his signal acuteness' in remarking that 'no nation has treated in poetry 
moral ideas with more energy and depth than the English' 
(ibid., p-115), 
Arnold continues, 'Voltaire does not mean, by "treating in poetry moral 
ideas", the composing moral and didactic poems; - that brings us but a 
very little way in poetry' (ibid., p. 46). Catherine Runcie 
(1969), dis- 
cuss. ing some quotations from Arnold on Milton, Keats and SkIlakespeare, 
conveniently sums up her view. of 'the keyto what Arnold means by moral: 
What is against life is not moral, he says. What is for life is moral. 
Moral ideas to Arnold are ideas that make for life - ideas-that bave vital 
value. These quotations from Milton, Keats and Shakespeare contain vital. 
value; in varying degrees they contain ethical, intellectual, naturalis- 
tic and affective value. This is indeed what myth bears, vAiat the great 
or noble or significant action that permanently moves us bears - vital value, 
value that makes for life gleaned from our original experience of existence, 
, 
of being in the world. (PP-38-39) 
Here again, in Runcie's accurate summary, Arnold's ideas approximate very 
closely to Schweitzer's (see p. ZF3 ). It should be po, inted out that the 
'ideas' in question here are not simply abstractions, but relate to 
quotations from Milton, Keats and Shakespeare embodied in concrete char- 
acter and situation. In this resides the power of literature as against 
the treatment of morals lbound up with systems of thought and belief which 
have had their day' and which 'have fallen into ýhe hands of pedants and 
professional dettleral (Super IX, p. 46). 
Karl Popper (1966) illustrates the importance of the embodiment of 
moral ideas in. concrete literary characterization: 
Whenever we are faced with a moral decision of a more abstract kind 
(lie 
317 
'writes) ii, in most iieipriii to uiwlyse carel'tilly the conmequences Which 
are likely to result from the alternatives between which we have to 
choose. For only if we can visualize these consequences in a concrete 
and practical way do we really know what our decision is about; otherý 
wise we decide blindly. (p. 232) 
Popper then (luotes a passage from Shawls Saint Joan in which the Chaplain 
vho thas stubbornly demanded Joan's death' at the stake is brought to 
realize its significance when he witnesses the scene of her burning: 
I meant no harm ... 
(lie cries out) ... I did not know what 
it would be like... 
You don't know ... You madderl yourself with words ... But when you see 
the 
thing you have done; when it in blinding your eyes, stifling your nostrils, 
tearing your heart, then - then -0 God, take this sight from mel 
As with this example from dramatic literature, so too a novelfs purpose, 
according to Joseph Conrad, is 'to make thew see; to make them hear; to 
make them feel'* - the moral value of Oich lies in the deeper felt level 
of understanding'the reader gains from the text. Solzhenitsyn 
(1972) 
develops this idea: 
Art and literature can perform the miracle of overcoming man's character- 
istic weakness of learning only by his own experiencep so that the 
experience of others. passes him by. Art extends each man's short time 
on earth by carrying from man to man the 'whole complexity of other men's 
life-long experience with all its burdens, colours, and flavours. Art 
recreates in the flesh all(experience lived by other men, so that each 
man can make it his own. P. 111) 
Good literature by combining complexity and variety of experience with 
unity and wholeness of form can give us increased tolerance of diversity 
'within the security of aesthetic satisfaction. Moral values vary from 
person to person and from culture to culture. Whether or not there is 
an ultimatep ideal 'Morality', in practice ethical ideas are relative, 
disparate, idiosyncratic -a problem of increasing 
importance as the 
world shrinks, bringing diverse viewpoints into close proximity. Culture- 
clash and'ethical uncertainty are a main concern of Alexander So1zhenitsyn 
(1972) when he asks: 
But who will reconcile these scales of values and how? 
Who will create 
for mankind*a single system of evaluation - for e'vil deeds and good 
deeds, 
for what is intolerable and what is tolerable, for how the line is to be 
drawn between them today? Who will explain to mankind what is really terrible 
*Quoted by John le Carre, BBC2 Television, 25 September, 1977 
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and unbearable, and what only iriitates our skin because it is near?... 
Who would be able to bring home to a bigoted and obstinate human being 
the distant conceptions that he himself has never experienced? 
Propaganda, compulsion and scientific proof are all powerless here... (p. I't) 
Whether a Isingle systein of evalutaiont can ever be achieved is doubtful, 
and may not even be desirable. But the moral need to learn what latitude 
to tolerate and what evils not to tolerate is of continual pressing 
importance* Propaganda and dogma only exacerbate the problem. And 
compulsion compounds the resultant evils. Solzhenitsynts view that 
literature is a wiser means to moral insight is worth consideration. 
Literature in a multi-cultural society 
The Green Paper Education in Schools (seepp. q7-V above) observes that: 
Our society is a multicultural, multi-racial one, and the curriculum 
should reflect a sympathetic. understanding of the different cultures and 
races that now make up our society.? Furthermore, the Green Paper continues, 
'We live in a complex interdependent world, and many of our problems in 
Britain require international solutions. Die curriculum should therefore 
reflect our need to know about and understand, other countries' (paragraph 
In confirmation of the multi-racial nature of at least one of our 
inner city populations, an Inner London Education Authority paper, Multi- 
Ethnic Education (1977), gives relevant statistics including the figures 
for 1975 of 41 per cent live births to mothers from'outside the United 
Kingdom 23 per cent from New Commonwealth countries and 19 per. cent from 
the Irish Republic and other, countries. Therefore of 30,300 births in Inner 
London that year 12,390 were to mothers of non-United Kingdom origin.. 
This situation multiplied in a number of inner city areas, presents a 
challenge and an opportunity, as well as a number of problems, to our 
educational provision in general and in particulýr to the humanities field 
'Within the curriculum. Literature, as a culture-saturated phenomenon, is 
of obvious importance in this context. 
WD Wall (1977) distinguishes three possible solutions to the problems 
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inevitably created by cultural diversity- (1) multiculturalism, (2) ass- 
imilation, or (3) biculturalism. Ile observes that 
any of the solutions - 
(1) a multicultural society recognizing and exploit- 
ing the richness of human difference and the value of different cultures, 
or (2) more or less complete assimilation of individuals to the surroundin'g 
culture, or (3) the maintenance in equilibrium of the two cultures in the 
individual and his group - can be satisfying to the individual, and, if 
successfulq contribute greatly to mental health. (p. 200) 
On the other hand, lie continues, fit has to be recognized that ethnic, 
linguistic and cultural differences do propose very considerably augmented 
difficulties of adjustment, particularly in adolescence; and that special 
steps have to be taken to ensure that such adjustments are madet (pp. 2100-201). 
T'his is a task in whiell schools can make a major contribution, and in which 
a sensitive use of literature has much to offer. 
It is not the object of this thesis to seek to promote any of the 
three solutions indicated by WD Wall; in any case it is most likely 
that different situations will demand different solutions., one group wil. 1 
welcome an opportunity for total assimilation within the society chosen 
as its new home; another will wish to maintain its cultural identify*in 
certain areas of life while adopting the host countryls cultural norms 
in others; and in another situation it will seem appropriate for a 
cultural mix, members seeking unity in the shared diversity of elements 
offered to the whole. The task for literature in the curriculum is to 
help ease the way for individuals into whichever of these solutions is 
most appropriate. 
It is probably true to say that the more complex a society becomes 
and the more potentially bewildering the external world seems, the more 
vital does self -knowledge become for the individual. To be a member of 
a minority group surrounded by a ljost of more or less suspicious neighbours 
and to be a-member of the indigenous group feeling threatened by the 
presence of new and alien neighbours are different experiencesp but 
potentially they have certain elements in common; a fear of the 'other- 
ness' of one's neighbours; some risk of a crisis of personal and social 
identity; a tendency to seek for group solidarity; a readiness to 
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rationalize anxieties by stereotý, ping and to exorcise aggressive impulses 
byýscapegoating. All or none of these characteristics May feature in 
specific situations, but they indicate something of the range of possib- 
ilities. Me intelligence may feel baffled and the spirit dwarfed by the 
situations that arise, and the need in such circumstances for promloting 
A secure sense of identity and raising the self-confidence of individuals 
is clear. By its inwardness good literature can help establish self- 
awareness; by its honest delineation of a human being's moral complexity 
and diversity of motivation it, can help us come to terms with our darker 
side, our shadow, without lose of self-respect; and by its confident expos- 
ition of paradox, irony, doubt and tentativeness it can help reduce the 
need for the uncritical dogmatic assertiveness that tends to accompany 
fearof the bewildering or the unknown. lbe faculty for empathy is equally 
important in this area. 
In an editorial to English in-Education,, Leslie Stratta (1979) writes 
that 'part of... groving wise ... comes 
in being forced to consider values 
and experiences from other people's worlds; and it is still literature 
that gives us that most powerfully' (p. 2). This means developing insight 
through entering imaginatively and sensitively into the private worlds of 
other people. Alexander Solzhenitsyn believes -that we should encourage 
this on a wide scale. It is as though by extending our imaginative range 
across cultural barriers we may gradually come to approach a sense of 
the highest common factors and the lowest common denominators shired by 
humanity at large regardless of local and relatively superficial idio- 
syncracies.. Solzhenitsyn writes: 
In my opinion it is within the powers of world literature 
in these troubled 
time's to help humanity to comprehend its own nature in spite of what 
is 
being instilled into peoplets minds by biased persons and parties. 
World 
literature can transmit the concentrated experience of one land to another 
in such a way that we stop seeing double and beink dazzled? 
the different 
scales of values coincide, and each nation can learn the 
true history of 
other nations in an accurate, condensed form, grasping 
it fully with Utat 
sensation of pain that comes from living an experience oneselfg and as 
a result of that knowledge be protected from eventual error. 
(P-25) 
Such a view is closely in tune with'that of Matthew 
Arnold when he writes. 
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of the spectacle of 'the collective life of humanity': 
Everywhere there is connexiono everywhere there is illustration; no 
, 
single event, no single literature, is adequately comprehended except in 
its relation to other events9 to other literatures. (Super L, pp20-21) 
Insularity and parochialism -were anathema to Arnold who recognized even 
in the jingoistic ethos of Victorian Englandq that 'by the very nature 
of things, as England is not all the world, much of the best that is known 
and thought in the world cannot be of English growtht and therefore we 
need to 'dwell much on foreign thoughtl (Super III, pp. 282-283). Only 
thus can the 'free spontaneous flowof consciousness' that defeats 
dogmatic insularity and mechanical stereotyping be developed. Arnold1s 
own readiness to assimilate foreign thought has already been referred to 
(see pp. M-7), and is ev-ident throughout his wor1c. 
There is in Arnold's writing, it must be admittedt a degree of national 
and cultural stereotyping asserted with a confidence well beyond what we 
would be prepared to acknowledge a century later. In gn the Study of Celtic 
Literature, for example, he writes boldly of 'the characteristics which mark 
the English spirit, the English gonius' (Super. 111, p.. -)Iil), and fie con- 
trasts Germanic with Celtic characteristics without trepidation 
(ibid. 
PP-341-344). In Culture and Anarchyt he compares the Hebrew character with 
its Hellenic counterpart (Super V, chapter 4); and in Literature and Dogma 
similarly distinguishes the characteristic traits of Jew and Greek 
(super, 
vi, pp. 196-197). Vien writing in Literature and Dogma of 'the German 
mind' lie does, to give him his due, wonder 'if one may allow oneself to 
speak in such a general wayl 
. 
(Super VI, P-158), but this doesn't stop him 
doing so. In such stereotyping Arnold's writing is tainted with a short- 
coming of his age- a shortcoming which we have scarcely outgrown 
today, 
although its dangers are now beginning to be more fully recognized. 
Arnold. did recognize, however, the danger of' a people allowing a 
sense of racial superiority to dominate their outlook wheng 
for example, 
he wrote of how Ithe Hebrews were perplexed and indignant when the privil- 
eged seed became unprosperous' (Super VI, p. 208). A mechanical pride in 
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being ? the seed of Abraham' had come to replace an earlier intuition of 
moral truth. Arnold's cultural stereotypes, moreover, are alvxlys balanced: 
a profile rather than total praise or condemnation is sought, and lie is 
scornful of the simplistic ethnological theories of Emile Burnouf which 
favoured the Aryan over the Semitic. race. (see Super VI, pp. 239-240 and 
Note, pp 479-480). Moreoverg his awareness of the reciprocal influence 
of language on cultural thought and development, demonstrated in his 
conception of the Zeitgeist, -meant that his emphasis was always on cultural 
characteristics rather than racial features. It was the 'ethos of t1lought 
of a given time which characterised a people in Arnold's discussion, and 
as this changed the people changed with it. That Arnold believed in the 
protection of minority groups within a community is borne out in Culture 
and Anarchy by his staunch satirical defence of the Roman Catholic minority 
in Birmingham against the inflammatory verbal onslaughts, of. Mr Murphy 
(Super V, pp. 119-120 and 426-427). 
But to revert to our own times, we need to consider in what kinds of 
'ways literature can be. employed in schools to promote the integration of 
minority groups in our multicultural society today. Whichever of the three 
pattera of integration distinguished by Wall above (seepp. 31ý-9) is adopted 
there are certain specific ways'in which literature can help: (1) it can 
provide some degree of shared cultural content; (2) it can extend the 
range of this content to include third world and other non-parochial 
literature; (3) items can be chosen to support the individual identity 
and self-confidence of specific minority members; and (4) literature of 
appyopriate quality can serve to enlarge sympathies ant) reduce the incidence 
of stereotyping and prejudice. Iliese will be considered briefly in order. 
(1) 'Me study of literature as a 'body of knowledge' - it shared culture 
to be transmitted from generation to generation -'is often condemned as a 
conservative exercise leading to redundancy and irrelevance. 71tere is 
something in this criticism, if the principle is carried to excess. But 
it would seem to be a pity to condemn a community to mutual cultural 
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isolation by ignoring in education at least a minimal sequence of shared 
iitirsery rhymps, ron utles, jiiy-Lliti, legreii(Im, poeins, sl, ories aiid iiovels. 
'llie search for novelty, relev4nce and up-to-dateness too diligently pur- 
sued can lead to the dropping of time-honoured material which seems to 
i 
retain its value and appeal regardless of changing outward circumstances. 
, It was found by the author, for example, in some research on Radio and 
. 
Television Broadcasting in School and College (Andrews, '1969), that in 
a class of eight-year-old children the Greek legends (in a miscellany- 
series including many more modern tales transmitted) were the stories 
by far the most highly appreciated by the children (pp. 22-23). (Signifi- 
cantly enough, the psychological truth of these stories seems to be much 
more readily believed in by the modern generation of teachers and pupils, 
than does that of biblical stories where the wrong kind of 'truth' - 
'historical' and 'scientific"- has too often been insisted upon. 
) By 
promoting some measure of shared culture, imaginative communication 
including readily understood allusion and metaphor is facilitated and a 
bond of belonging established. 
(2) The range of our common stock of literature, however, clearly 
ne . eds to be enlarged to be more representative of our expanded cultural 
and ethnic composition. Just as diverse Anglo-Saxon, Norse, Greekýand 
Christian elements have enriched our culture in the past, so African, 
Indian and Carribean material can now play their part in extending cultural 
and world-consciousness. Some recent anthologies of poems and stories are 
beginning to take this need and challenge into account, but there is room 
for widening the range of class school and public libraries along these 
lines. Of course there is a limit to the number of works an individualls 
education can cope with and a corresponding danger of dilution; but it 
is early'to worry about limitS when we have scarcely opened the gate's on 
these new areas. The enlargement suggested here should not be confined 
to patently multicultural areas of the countryp but should be undertaken in 
districts where the fact of our changing national and global identity has 
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only dimly be6n recognized, or haq not, yet been recopized at all. 
(3) Third World literature is sometimes used in what are designated 
Iplack Studies' courses. Arguments against such courses include concern 
that they may have an isolating and alienating effect; that they encourage 
dissatisfaction and hostility; that they inevitably dwell on a long role 
of subservience and suffering under white exploitation, and so on. Argu- 
ments in their favour recognize the importance of developing a sense of 
identity; acknowledge a psychological need for knowing something of our 
roots; and stress the value of drawing attention to the many valuable 
contributions to music, art, science, medicine and literature etc. made 
by black men and women. There will. be situations where, provided their 
strengths and weaknesses are recognized, courses in 'black studiest and 
'third world literature' can make a valuable contribution to the curriculum. 
In other situations, their imposition could be counter-productive. Only 
a sensitive weighing of an individual situation can prescribe idiat is 
appropriate. 
(4) Enough has already been said about the importance of literature 
generally as a potential enlarger of our sympathiesp self-knowledge. and 
mutual understanding. Shallow literature may simply reinforce our 
prejudices, or distort our sense of values; literature which is truly an 
imaginative criticism or 'interpretation of life' can provide us with a 
genuine learning experience; and 'to learn' (in the words of John Scupham 
(1967V: 
. is to revise the stereotypes with which life, art and the formal ýusiness 
of education have endowed us. It is to modify the complex of 
assumptions and expectations, concepts and attitudes with uffiich we 
confront the world; 'which constrains us unconsciously to hear What 
we 'want to hear and see what we want to see, and governs our, interpreta- 
tion of all that we ... perceive... 
(PP-103-104)o ' 
This is a lofty aim for literature in school, but worth holding up none- 
theless. 
Perhaps it goes without saying that the enlargement of literary range 
suggested in this section needs to be reflected in the examination syllabuses, 
Wr 
for example for 101 and 'At Geneval Certificates in Education and the 
Certificate in Secondary, Education, as long as these examinations continue 
to have the all-pervasive influence on-the curriculum that they now have. 
The question whether syllabuses should be governed by examinations must be 
left aside for the time being; but-while this tendency exists, changes of 
content will not occur unless incorporated in such machinery. 
Literary standards: selection of material 
Reference. has already been made from time to time to the importance of 
using literature of good quality in the classroom, in line with Arnold's 
insistence on 'the best that has been thought and said in the worldt. 
For since literature is concerned with life-experience and self-knowledge 
it would seem to be important (1) that 'good)literature should be made 
available - that- is, literature dealing with significant, experience in a 
valid way; and (2) that children should be helped and encouraged to 
evaluate critically the literature they encounter. 
There is no reason to assume that the values and quality of writing 
of a 'children's book' should be inherently different from those applic- 
able to adult literature. CS Lewis, a notable scholar and writer of 
childrents books, was 'inclined to set it up as a canon that a children's 
story which is enjoyed only by children is a bad children's bookI and 
Marpret Spencer (1971) writing of 'the increased interest in and criticism 
ofýimaginative fiction for children' asserts that 'children's books differ 
from adult books in degree rather than in kindp that good authors of books 
for children are informed by the same concerns as writers of adult liter- 
ature but that they take the matter of childhood as their theme. ' (p. 133) 
For these reasons virtually the same canons of judgment can be applied in 
selecting material. 
This emphasis on quality, howevert must not'be regarded as a plea for 
censorship. There is a considerable difference between prescribing desirable 
texts and proscribing alien material. Arnold inVeighs harshly against 
reading material of which he disapproves, but I cannot find in his writing 
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any . support for the principle of ,. -ensorship. The notioh of seeking to 
control ments minds by censorship is a kind of negative dogmatismt and 
runs counter to the principle of critical eclecticism which demands 
variety for the formation of comparative standards. 
However, the powerful suggestiveness of imaginative literature places 
a responsibility on the teacher for selecting material which will nourish 
adequately the minds of his pupils. Arnold's concern for literature that 
would have a humanising influence meant that lie was often disappointed in 
the single 'reading bookt with which the schoolchild of his day was presented: 
If ... his reading book, as is ... too often the case, presents him with bad literature instead of good -with the writing of second or third-rate authors, 
feeble, incorrect,. and colourless - he has not, ' as the rich have, the 
corrective of an abundance of good literature to counteract the bad effect 
of trivial and ill-written school-books; the second or third-rate literature 
of his school-book remains for him his sole, or, at least, his principal 
literary standard. (Marvin, 1908) 
Such material can 'actually spoil his taste' whereas better chosen material 
would 'afford the best chance of inspiring quick scholars with a real love 
of reading and literature ... by, animating and moving 
theml (ibid. p. 83). 
Where there is time enough and scope, the biblical adage 'Prove all things, hold 
fast that which is good' would be Arnold's principle; but within the limits 
of schooltime , provision of 
'that which is good' becomes a priority. Wbile 
we can tolerate and forgive rubbishg as a means of developing comparative 
standardst there is no need to disseminate it., We need to provide worthý- 
while material for our groups and classes, while being prepared to discuss 
'all things' which individuals in their own reading may be 'proving' 
testing out - in order to help them, in their understanding and self- 
discovery. 
A perennial problem facing societyt and'h. ence social education, is how 
to-maintain a high level of aspirationg combined with a liberal degree of 
. tolerance-for those whose circumstances 
for various reasons force them to 
fall short of such aspirations. It ýseems, however, that the degree of 
tolerance s. ociety allows is a function of the level of its aspirations. 
Judgment of others correlates highly with the range of approbation and 
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disapprobation accorded to ourselves. Either the aspirations get pegged 
too high, as for example in Victorian England, leading to the kinds of 
tragedies symbolized in Hardyf@. Tess of the VIArbevilles and Jude the 
Obscure, etc. or the level of tolerance drags the general level of a$pir- 
ation down with it, leading to the wide acceptance and currency of jejune 
'candy-floss' literature (see Hoggart, 1959) with its accompanying debased 
standards and values. There seems to be no easy solution to this problem. 
Since however, it is closely linked with commercial supply and demand, 
schools (as constuilers) can help to promote Hle demand, III)d 1,11,18 the supply 
of more, rather than less, worthwhile literature. Me Newsom Report (1964) 
echoes views Arnold expressed on this issue of standards: 'All pupils, 
including those. of very limited attainments, need the c ivilising exper- 
ience of contact with great literature and can respond. to its universality'. 
However, the Report continues, 'they will depend heavily on the skill of 
the teacher as an interpretorl. Such literature 'sympathetically pres- 
ented... can stretch the. minds and imaginations of the pupils and help to 
illumine for them, in wider human termal their own problems of living., 
(para. 473, P-155). 
Criticism and experience of literature 
Allied to the critical selection of worthwhile literary material for 
use in schools is the cultivation of critical insight in the pupils them- 
selves. Literature, to justify its existence, demands to be experiencedl 
imaginatively approbended; it also requires to be Judged. How to mainLain 
a fruitful balance between these two aspects in schools is a major task 
testIng the teacher's sensitivity to both text and pupils. 
Part of this problem is well illustrated by R 11 11iouless 
(1951), 
discussing the teacherls task in extending the range of his pupilst 
aesthetic appreciation: 
Ile cannot do so by explaining a system of rules w1lich will enable his 
pupils to distinguish good art from bad. ' There are probably no rules which 
can cover the essential uniqueness of an original work of art. If there 
werev the learning of them might create art critics but not art appreciators. 
No one who had the task of teaching humour to a class would think he had 
32Y 
achieved his objective if, on hearing a joke, they correctly but unsmilingly 
stated whether it was a good or a bad joke by seeing whether or not it 
conformed to the rules of humour. There is no better, re6son for supposing 
that a parallel method will bring a class nearer to appreciating poetry... (p. 402) 
Thouless points out that intellectual curiosity, however, can develop out 
of appreciation, and that appreciation can be nurtured by con-tact with the 
teacher's own $real appreciation of poetryl and-enthusiasm for it. 
Jerome Bruner (1963) similarly recognizes the delicacy and subtlety 
of the process involved in the transmission of critical appreciation, 
referring to the 'intuitive confidence' needed 'in the absence of specific 
and agreed-upon criteria. ' It is difficult (lie writes) for a teacher 
to make explicit provision for the cultivation of courage in taste. As 
likely as not, courageous taste rests upon confidence in one's own 
intuitions about what is moving, what is beautiful, what is tawdy. In a 
culture such as ours, where there is soniftch pressure to-ward uniformity 
of taste in our mass media of communicationp so much fear of idiosyncratic 
style, indeed a certain suspicion of the idea of style altogether, it 
becomes the more important to'nurture confident intuition in the realm of 
literature and the arts. Yet one finds a virtual vacuum of research on 
this topic in educational literature. (p. 67) 
The research'gap here is not sui-prising. What statistical tools exist 
for the measurement of intuitive appreciation and judgment? Any such 
devices. vould surely be a contradiction in terms. Nevertheless there are 
'Ways of helping the learner to develop techniques of literary judgment. 
Robson (1965) holds, for example, Itbat it is possible, ideally, to 
separate the criticts tasks of description and interpretation from his task 
of evaluation': 
that is, I believe (be writes) that the descriptive judgment typified by 
"There is a character in Hamlet called Osric", the interpretive-judgment 
typified by"ffamletis the tragedy of a man who could not make up his mind", 
and the evaluative judgment typified by "Hamlet . is most certainly an 
artistic failure", are logically (lifferent. 
(p. 219) 
Robson believes that none of these judgments entails either of the others: 
they are independent. IA Richards (1964) believed that if we first dis- 
iinguish and asses the 'sense', the Ifeelingl, the 'tone' and the 'intention, 
of it poem, its final evaluatimi is' incilitated. Wellek and Warren 
(1973) 
observe that a just critical evaluation of a novel depends on bur first 
being able to enter the novelist's world, for 'the great novelists all 
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have such a world - recognizable as overlappitig the empirical world but 
distinct in. its self-coherent intelligibility' (p. 214). In assessing its 
truth to life we look for an artistic, not a factual correspondence.: 
This world or Kosmos of a novelist - this pattern or structure or organism 
which includes plot, characters, setting, world-view, 'tone' - is what 
we must scrutinize when we attempt to compare a novel with life or-to judge, ethically or socially, a novelist's 'work. Me truth to life or 'reality', is no more to be judged by the factual accuracy of this or that detail than the moral judgment is to be passedp as Boston censors 
pass, it, 
(on 
whether specific sexual or blasphemous words occur within the 
novel. p. 214) , 
This fictional, artistic world of a-novel is likely to make more Isenselp 
by its compact organization, than the sprawling world of*actuality it 
symbolizes. We judge its truth by its mature comprehensiveness, cathol-'. 
, city and inclusiveness of the 'hierarchy of elements' we find in the real 
world we inhabit. 
Whether we adopt the approaches advocated by Robson, Richards, or 
Wellek and Warren, there are always two aspects of literary criticism 
which cut right across the principles indicated so far: these can be 
designated the 'mechanical' and the linorall assessment of a literary text. 
The mechanical analysis takes account of technique - rhyme, rhythm, 
metaphor, symbol, etc. at the tactical level; and of forms such as the 
sonnet, epic, novel, tragedy, etc. al the strategic level. The moral ass- 
essment of a literary work is concerned to evaluate its 'truth' in relation 
to 'fact' and Irealityl, and seeks to distinguish legend, myth and various 
kinds of fictionality from history and actuality. Criticism can be a dull 
and arid study;. but it has a vital function in helping readers understand 
the relation between literature and life and to recognise the technical 
filter. 1wing used to convert life into art. For example, the concept irolly 
must be grasped to appreciate Swift's A Modest Proposal or Gulliver's 
Travels or much of Sassoonts war poetry. Silitoets The LotAiness of the 
Long-Distance Runner cannot be properly understood without an appreciation 
of the device of a persona, adopting a frame of reference which-is not 
necessarily that of the author. Blake Ia 'A Poison Tree I depends upon under- 
standing symbolism I and so on. It, is as though 
life is translated, encoded 
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into art, and criticism requires a knowledge of the special language 
of literature, its technical codes, in order to re-interpret and under- 
stand the nature of the truths embodied in the text. Literary criticism 
understood in this way in schools helps to keep alive the recognition of 
the relevance of poetry, novels and drama to the acLual lives of the 
pupils concerned, and to elicit from the pupils a genuine felt response. 
The importance of the child', s response is recognized by Jean Blunt (1979): 
Me research (lone by others and nky own findings in -the classroom suggest 
that the full and satisfying response to reading fiction has several 
requircinciiCs. Readers need 1, o come wiltingly Co ficCion; llilderslmlid I'lle 
intricacies of the plot; empathize with the characters of the novel; 
evaluate the actions of the characters; and, finally to come nearer to 
the maturing responsep they should try to verbalize opinions on the whole 
'work and recognize something of the author's technique. (p. 26) 
Blunt's concern is to find ways 'to assist literary judgment without 
stifling the direct response'. The empathy involved in a direct response 
is well brought out in some comments from young readers -, uoted by Gill 
Frith (1979) im the same issue of Zriglish in Education. 
. 
11 liked the 
book because it was exciting, ' writes an eleven-year-old reader offive 
Go Camping, 'While I was reading it I imagined that I was in it and my 
friends were in it. And that my mum's friend who has a farm was the- 
fanner's wife and ... I imagined that I was George... 
(etr, )' (p. 30). A 
seventeen-year-old 'At level English reader has a more complex re spqnsep 
but the empathy is still apparent: 
As I read a book my imagination pictures the scenes of the book as if I 
was actually there and the people in the book I really know. Even as 
far as the people are myself but somehow I am always looking at the people 
even if I know their feelings as well as mine own. It seems as if I am 
somehow detached but my feelings are very much involved in the book and... 
I have to concentrate in order to stand aside. 
(P-31) 
A third reader '(a third-year secondary modern girl) quoted irk a companion 
article by Geoff Fox (1979) observes that 'It's as if I'mport of dark 
'watcher, who is there at the scenet. but none of tI he characters pays any 
attention to me. I'm like a p6werp as if everything'is happening because 
Ilm there. ' Fox justly comments that this child's experience of, novels 
'draws out both the passive and active characteristics of an, absorbed 
reader' (p. 32). Her sensitive observation bears outt in relation to 
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literature, Piagetts dictum: 'To know, an object is to act upon it and 
transform it' (quoted by Ing, 1978P P-31). It is clear that this child 
is acting on the text in an imaginative way, creating for herself an 
experience from the words provided on the page. Activity in relation to 
literature ist thereforeq not necessarily overtly critical to be valid 
and worthwhile. The first call upon a book or poem is for imaginative 
engagement. Only if this-is first achieved does subsequent criticism 
become truly meaningful. Perhaps this accounts for the apparently counter- 
e hi cl( productiveness of much poetry "aching it, schools evidetIc"I it' tile 1 110 
Report (see above, p-T9). 
Examinations and literary experience 
Matthew Arnold's comnenis on the ill-effects of the Revised Code 
are perhaps equally applicable to much that now takes place in the name 
of G. C. E. 101 level and 'At level English Literature examinat ions, and 
even wany C. S. E. courses, initially designed to counteract such ill- 
effects. 'To take the commonest iustancety Arnold writes in connection 
with the Revised Code in his Report for 1869 (Marvin, 1908), 'a book 
is selected at the beginning of the year for the children of a certain 
standard; all the year the children read this book over and over again, 
an(] no other ... The circle of the children's reading has thus been narrowed 
and impoverished all the year for the sake of a result at the end of it, 
and the result is an illusiong (p. 126). True today's literature students 
in schools study more than one book in their preparation for examinations$ 
but concentration on the 'result' tends to warp the treatment. of the 
texts from genuine engagement and literary experience towards rote- 
learning and stock answers. 
'Certainly', Arnold acknowledges in the same reportj 'if a man wants 
a certificate, or a diploma, or fionours, of you, 
'you must fix Just what 
he shall get them for, which is by no means of the same extent as a 
liberal educationI (P. 134): 
Ait thin is a reason against making an excessive use of such test exam- 
inations,. of turning too much of a man's reading into reading for certif- 
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icates, diplomas and honours. 
... To make a narrowing system of test examinations govern the idiole inspec- tion of our primary schoolst when we have before us, not individuals want- 
ing a diploma from us but organisations wanting to be guided by us into 
the best ways of learning and teaching, seems like saddling ourselves 
with a confessed cause of imperfection u+cessarily. (P-1311) 
Again in a letter to the E4itor of the Pall Mall Gazette (October 5,1870) 
Arnold wrote: 'We are suffering from an excessive development of the 
competitive system... Education, instead of consisting in a careful and 
systematic development of the faculties, is in danger of reducing itself 
to preparing children for a series of spasmodic effort's... (and) ... tile 
whole theory of education becomes disturbed' (Super VI, pp. 412-416). 
He writes of examinations as 'mental gymnastics' and training selected 
youths in Ithe art of catching marks' when the tutor or schoolmaster 
should 'be strongly induced to work up the whole of his pupils to a 
definite standard' (pp. 413-411t). Examinationsv in Arnold's view sub- 
stitute 'machinery' for human judgment: 
One ingenious argument is that we cannot trust our officials to appoint 
their subordinates on the faith of their own judgment, and therefore we 
insist on their appointing' them by machinery. No machinery, whether 
competitive examination or anyth. iiig else, will ever equal tile tact and 
diacretion of a good observer. (p. 415) 
(Arnold does not, however, deal with the problem of assessing and appoint- 
ing a 'good observerfl) Finally Arnold laments that 'it will probably 
take a long time before these. considerations can be made intelligible to 
the public, who applaud every extension of the competitive principle; but 
it is as well to try to keep them more or less in view iii, hopes of a return 
to common sense' (p. 416). 
A century's development since Arnoldls letter to the Pall Mall Gazette 
hns increased rather than decreased the encroachment of examinations on 
the educational curriculum, putting farther off than ever what lie would 
have regarded as la return to conunon sense 1. qlie problem for teacbers 
of literature in schools today is to maintain the status of their subject- 
matter without sacrificing the uniqueness of the experience it embodies 
and the spontaneity of an engaged response from the pupils, to the 
machinery of competitive examinatinns.. Fortunately stories and poetry in 
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the primary school are still rel-if. ively safe; it is in the upper forms 
of the secondary school in particular that vig; ilance is necessary if 
the integrity of literary experience is to be safeguarded. It may be that 
the establishment of the proposed tcore curriculum' can help - particularly 
if the Inspectorate remember their question - 'How can a school ensure that 
preparation for examinations does not stunt the development of qualities 
of curiosity, inventiveness an(] imagination? ' (DES, 1977, p. 11) in planning 
its implementation. Their recognition of the importance of' 'the contribu- 
tion of the curriculum to the woraly ethical. and spiritual areas of 
experience' (ibid. ). iS encouraging, a sis their concern to 'encourage 
flexibility[. This chapter has sought to suggest*that imaginative liter- 
ature has a prime role to play in these two, important respects. 
3 2, ý- 
CHAPTER TWELVE 
CONCLUSION 
Ille word evaluation is one of the most difficult concepts in the whole of curriculum studies ... in educational settings the 'processt is as important 
as - or more importani than - the 'product'. I Denis Lawton (1978) 
The individual mind that thinks for itself 'will, in the course of its devel- 
opmentg provide its own intellectual contentg drawing on its environment at 
will, As for ... minds that are not prepared to provide for themselves, what 
serves for content is, to a large extent, ready-made ideology or the assort- 
ed products of ideological thinking... If all men ... should surrender their 
Ininds to one or another of the rival ideologies that contend for dominance, 
mankind's most precious qualities would be lostj its most hopeful possibil- ities would be foreclosed, and perhaps this earth would become a stage on 
which mindless hordes tore each other to pieces in the name of unquestion- 
able truth. 
Louis J Halle: The Ideological Imagination (1972) 
I do hope that-what influence I have may be of use in the troubled times 
'which I see before us as a healing and reconciling influence... 
Matthew Arnold (in a letter to'his mother, June 1870) 
The foregoing chapters have been an endeavour to explore four concepts: 
literature, dogma, Zeitgeist and Weltanschuunp to examine what contrib- 
utions ban be found in Matthew Arnold's writing to clarify and enlarge our 
understanding of these concepts and their relationships; and to consider 
their relevance to certain principles which need to be taken into account 
in curriculum construction., The present chapter will endeavour to su - 
arize the main lines of what has gone before; to draw certain tentative 
conclusions in relation to the questions posed in the Introduction; and 
to raise a number of associated issues which have bearing on. curriculum 
construction and orientation. 
In seeking to evaluate the importance of imaginative literature in the 
school curriculum we are faced with a double difficulty. In the first place 
literature itself is an evaluative (or to use Arnoldva term an linterpretivel) 
medium where th quality of its own manifold evaluations 
(its varied 1crit- 
icisms of life') must be taken into account in its assessment; and second- 
ly because it is a subject -Aere)-'above all, lithelýrocess" is... more 
important than the "product"? (Lawton, 1978, p. 177). In fact there is no 
discernible product, except perhaps for the enjoyment sometimes 
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evident as a result of pupils' encounters with literature, or occasional 
evidence of a sharpened response to its significance in subsequent dis- 
cussion. However, the attempt must be made to evaluate the place of 
literature in the curriculum, and-to consider something of its relation 
to dogma (and its successor 'ideology'), to religious and moral education, 
and to science. 
Part One of this thesis sought to survey certain relevant aspects of 
previous research on Arnold and to examine developments in moral and 
religious education and in the teaching of English literature which have 
a bearing on the acquisition of values. A number of significant features 
of the current scene emerge from the brief survey given. Pirstly, that 
the past century has witnessed in Western society at large and notably 
in education, religion and ethics, a general movement from reliance on 
authority toward individual autonomy. Secondlyp that despite the steady 
secularization of society, there remains among many young people a concern 
for spiritual understanding, and an interest in tultimatet things and 
the Inuminoust. Thirdly,. there is also among young people an urgent 
concern to explore problems of relationships, personal identity and so 
on. Fourthly, that religious education hasp so far, largely failed to 
meet these needs; and moral educationg still in its infancy, may not be 
able or willing to meet al1of them. And fifthly, that the study of 
literature for examinations (as evidenced by the Bullock Report's obser- 
vations on 101 and 'At level examination courses, DES, 1975, p-135) 
a carcely seems to encourage enjoyment of literaturet since relatively 
few candidates say they want to read more poetry, for example, after the 
conc-)Usion of their examinations. 
In Part Two of this thesis the focus has been on a particular work - 
Matthew Arnold's Lit6rature and Dogm examining its content, describing 
its reception and analysing the implications of its ironic tenor. It 
was suggested that Arnold's use of irony was an intrinsic aspect of his 
modernity and of his ropen' literary orientation. He was seeking to 
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overcome and reconcile the clash of the new scientific values with the 
traditional values of the Christian religion. His irenic aim was to 
salvage the spiritual and ethical dimensions of Christianity from the 
vulnerable edifice of theological dogma in which miraculous, prophetic 
and speculative elements were blanching and withering under the intensi- 
fying searchlight of the principle of scientific verification. And his 
"Wit"s of seeking it reappraisul of ChrisiJanity wits -to press for Lhe rec- 
ognition of the essentially-poetic nature of scriptural writings. 
In Part Three the concepts fliteraturelp 'dogma? andlZeitgeistl 
were considered in turn, and Arnold's view broadly approved - that the 
movement of the Leitgeig-t with its constantly accelerating change in our 
intellectual environment makes the maintenance of dogma untenable as a 
means of value-acquisition and a guide to conduct. The social and poli- 
tical effects of enforced dogmatic systems and ideologies were subjected 
to criticism; and the inwardneast 'openness? and autonomy of literature 
recommended as a humanizing agent more in tune with an open scientific 
cu I ltural ethos and a pluralistic society. Arnold's concern that education 
should include the full 'circle of knowledge' 
(i. e. science as well as 
literature) was supported, and over-specialization, resulting in 'two 
cultures' (or more) condemned. The cross-fertilization of disciplines 
can be healthy, it was suggested, provided that the 
differences in the 
language used in science, religion and literature are recognized. 
Thus 
theology and religious education need not fear a prevailing spirit of 
verifying science; and science loses nothing 
by recognizing its short- 
comings in the spiritual sphere, and yielding questions of 
its applica- 
tion' to moral and ethical considerations. 
Part Three concluded, however, 
with some criticism of ArnoldIs over-optimistic 
Weltanschauung in the 
light of subsequent developments, and'favoured the more existentialist 
approach advocated by Albert Sqhweitzer. 
Part-Four began by considering Arnold as an educational product 
before examining certain aspects of his epistemological orientattion. 
It 
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was suggested that his unusual flexibility and openness of mind coupled with 
the self-confidence to resist prepackaged thinking from all sides was the 
result of an upbringing which combined a high, degree of emotional security 
with encouragement to ask questions without fear of the consequences. 
And it was further suggested that this type of personality (which matches 
certain recently established psychological parudigms) is particularly 
suited to meet the tensions and changes inevitable in our modern environ- 
ment. The educational significance of this was considered, as were the 
implications of Arnold's stress on self-knowledge, tolerance and eclect- 
icism; his distrust of system-makers; and his intuitive and practical 
understanding of the strengths and dangers of suggestion. Chapter 
Eleven focused on the place and value of imaginative literature in the 
school curriculum, recognising that it is impossible to prove its moral 
efficacy, but examining some of the arguments and evidence forxecommending 
its secure embodiment in any core curriculum which may be established, 
preferably in a form relatively unshackled by the inhibiting influence of 
examinations. In a contracting Imult(tudinous' world, and a multicultural 
society, it would seem that imaginative literature has much to offer as a 
means of ordering emotionsg conveying values, enhancing our capacity for 
empathy, and communicating insights, both universal and culturally 
determined. 
It now remains to advance a little further along some of the lines 
indicated in the foregoing summary. Qualifications need to be made in 
certain areas; and in others certain further implications need to be 
indicated. 
Literature versus dogma 
It may be helpful to summarize here some of the arguments for and 
against dogmatic and literary value-*ransmission respectively, lest 
it 
be thought that dogma has not been. given a fair hearing. 
In favour of the authoritarian establishment of dogmatic or 
ideo- 
logical beliefs, we can enumerate among other things:, 
(I) the sustaining 
value of a widelyý-held dogma, which provides a temporary or perm nent 
resting place for the emotions and intellect of an individual adherent; 
(2) since 'ultimate truth' and future prognostications can never be 
certainly known, dogmas could be said to provide as good a framework of 
reference for the intellect as any other (or better than the total absence 
of framework with which a freethinking individual may have to cope); 
(3) such an intellectual framework can free the individual to find 
emotional security and the necessary motivation for purposeful action; 
(4) the adolescent, in part icular, seeking personal autonomy and independence 
I rom family constraints may find religious or Marxist dogmas a valuable 
support for his developing self-construct whether or not such a support is 
later to* be discarded; and (5) dogmatic adherence is indicative of indivi- 
dual humility and respect for the strength of socially approved doctrines. 
In addition the holder of dogmatic beliefs is free to reject the use of 
literary culture as a means of value acquisition on a number of grounds. 
For example; (1) evidence of the ineffectiveness of imaginative literature 
to affect the springs of conduct of (for example) a well-read Nazi 
concentration camp guard; (2) the poor quality of the bulk of published 
literature which the average reader is liKely to attend to; 
(3) the negative 
effects of frequent poor teachingo or the cramping effects of the examina- 
tion of literature; or (4) the liability of individual reading to lead 
to anti-soCial and non-conformist ideas. 
W'D Wall (1959) has written of the magnetic pull of dogmatic thinking 
for many individuals in the following terms: 
Doubt is threatening -*bonviction measuring; and 
the conviction shared 
by a group all subscribing to the same views provides a refuge 
for the 
individual, who will, with reliefq relinquish the liberty of 
doubt and 
tolerance for that freedom from anxiety vhich conformity and its pre- 
ordained problems of behavior and attitude will give 
(p. 29) 
And. John Hicks (1970) has spoken of theological dogmas as 
'attempts to under- 
stand the meaning of (the experience of contact with divine reality)... 
and to relate it to other aspects of our experience. 1 Howeverg as Hicks 
continues, 'The various concepts and thought-patterns used 
in these 
attempts are part of the ever flowing and changing stream of 
human culture. 
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Concepts are born and flourish and die; patterns of thought form and 
develop but can also fall into disuse and decay. So the interpretive 
ideas used in theology cannot be permanent or sacrosanct... I They must, 
therefore, being subject to the ý ýtejýAt, be rethought and restated for 
each new generation. Such reinterpreted doctrines can provide NY. - tho8e 
young people whom Wall describes as 'hungry for faith' an authority 
Iexl, ertiul Lo tilemselves, agailist w1iich 'Lo rclwl mildly and iii 80)mismlon 
to which they may find security, tranquilityp and peace from the need to 
make difficult decisionst (p. 29). 
However, the arguments against adherence to dogmatic authority are 
in WD WaIlls view, and of course Arnold's 
(and mine) more compelling than 
those favouring it. For example: (1) the temporary resting places of 
dogmatic or ideological speculation may outlive their credibility and 
useful., --ness as changing times and circumstances bring changing frameworks 
of thought; (2) a schizophrenic situation may thus arise for individuals 
where their religious or political beliefs, for example, are incompatible 
with their Iscientifict beliefs; (3) adherents of told' and 'new' ways 
of thought may split into rival camps creating 'two culturesI9 working 
at loggerheads; (4) different dogmatic systems may be brought together 
by new cultural contacts, causi ng dogmatic beliefs to collide headlongp 
with consequent loss of faith and of the motivation and the framework 
for living which has previously sustained individual adherents; 
(5) Sys- 
tematic dogma which demands allegiance is more vulnerable to social and 
political change than are 'principlesi or 'ideals' which simply 
invite 
our free response. It is not proposed to repeat here all 
the arguments 
favouring literature as a means of value-acquisition 
(for which see 
chapters 7 and 11); but among the more prominent are: 
(1) the autono- 
mous nature of fiction (i. e. the freedom of literature 
to explore important 
psychologi cal' Itruth8l. without j)qin 
Ig bound by 'facts'); (2) the autonomy 
of the reader (i. e. his freedom to engage emotionally with 
the writer's 
imaginative creation without being obliged to give 
intellectual assent to 
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its details); (3) the consequent emotional value of literature, both as 
a means of catharsis and as value-sustaining material; (IL) the suggestive 
power of values implicitly embodied in concrete representations rather 
than being presented as explicit didacticism; and (5) the fact that 
literature tends to engender the interest needed to sustain our willing att-. 
ention to it. 
Finally, it could be said that both literature and dognua are concerned 
with knowledge unattainable by empirical methods; but whereas dogma 
attempts to systemize external ImysteriesIp literature seeks to make 
concrete by symbolism something of the mysterious functioning of the inner 
world we all to some. extent share. Dogma seeks to provide or construct 
knowledge of (essentially unknowable) external 'otherness'; literature 
provides the means and opportunity for exploring and shaping our inner 
reality (as we identity with or react away from this or that character or 
idea),. thus promoting and nourishing the self-knowledge upon which the 
development of personal autonomy and emotional security depend. 
Irony. literature and world-view 
Arnold's ironic approach to Literature and Dogma reflects, it bas 
been suggested an early response to changes in our world-view which have 
subsequently become intensified. These changes seem basically to result from 
the fact that science, having rudely invaded the mysteries formerly guarded 
by theologians, has created in their place more pregnant mysteries of its 
own, and indeed proudly asserts its own tentativeness and incompleteness. 
As Eugene d'Ors expresses it: 'Science is irony: science is in a sense 
aesthetic like art. At every point of its progress, science accepts, 
implicitly, notes in its own margin, the possibility of contradiction, 
the 
progress to come. It defines, it cannot dogmatize' 
(see Muecke, 196y, 
p. 129). This ironic element inherent in the unprecedented movement of 
the 
Zeitge ist as we now experience it, is inevitably reflected 
in other spheres. 
. 
In literature, for example, as LukAcs (1971) observest 'Irony with 
in- 
tuitive double vision, can see where God is to be found in a world abandoned 
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by God ... When it speaks of the adventures of errant souls in an 
essential, empty reality, it intuitively speaks of past gods and gods 
that are to come. ' (Abandoned by the god ? out therel, the external god 
of dogma, the 'errant soul' of the searching individual, looks inward 
and forward for a more secure God at the base of its own operations - 
a point at which at least some of the ideas of Arnold, Schweitzer and 
John Robinson converge). Dint this sense of irony, comI)ined witli a 
search for new, more inward9 directions is now deep-seated in our culture 
is evident from the report of the Methodist Conference Commission on 
Educationg Chr istian Commitment in Education (1970), quoted in chapter 2 
(above, seefp. 71-72). Recognizing the need for more 'open-ended conditions 
of debatelp the. report spoke of the desirability for the introduction of 
'some element of satire or irony ... to prick any 
incipient self-inflationtv 
regarding such an approach as 'the best hope of future moral growth in 
asociety without agreed values. ' This is an extraordinary development 
within the sphere of religious faith and religious education, not only 
risking the non-conformity of adherents, but clearly designed to cha-Ilenge 
the principle of uncritical conformity altogether. 
The challenge of irony and humour to conformity is equally relevant 
whether we are discussing traditional theology or new ideologies. Por 
example, Ninian Smart (1974) writes of the time when as a youth he was 
studying Chinese at the School of Oriental and African Studies: #In those 
days I was a kind of Marxi st, but (my tutor) correctly predicted that my 
sense of humour would ruin my ideological conformity' 
(pp. 7-8). Muecke 
(1969) distinguishes between the founders of new ways of thinking and their 
less adventurous followers: 'The theories of Marx and Freud 
(he writes) 
encouraged relativistic thinking and are therefore compatible with the 
openness of irony. But communism and psychoanalysis when rigidified into 
dogmas and systems cannot toleratd irony any more than a bishop can' 
(pp. 246-7). 
Arnold's concern 'to see life clearly and to see it whole' brought 
him 
into oppositiong as we . have set; n, with both the bishops and the new scientists 
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und the utilitarians. A further observation of Mueeke (1969) is perti- 
nent to Arnold's endeavours; "Ilre business of irony is to see clearly and 
to ask westions. Its victims are the blind; its enemies are those who 
do not wish to be pressed for answers. Irony (he continues) mobile and 
I 
disengaged, has always been an object of suspicion in the eyes of estab- 
lished authority and-those who feel a need for its blessing# (p. 246). 
Some further observations of Mueeke indicate that Am old's outlook is (in 
Mueeke's terms at least) typical of the modern General Ironist, for 'the 
'bpenness" of General Irony, the General Ironist's distrust of systems, 
his acceptance of impermanence as norrnal, (and) his ability to see "that 
it might just as well have happened the other -way round, "' (p. 127) are 
all featums of Arnold's approach. Muecke regards 'the change-over from 
a "closed" to an "open ideology" as 'a crucial chapter in the history of 
European thought' as well as 'of central importance in the history of 
ideas' (p. 127). If Muecke is correetv Arnold is an early representative of 
a major d evel, opment in our European world-view, and as such (if for no 
other reasons) would warrant our interest. 
There are, it must be recognized, degrees of irony from mild 
scepticism to bitter cynicism. The scepticism discussed by Mueeke and 
evidenced in Arnold's writing, seems to be a healthy defence against dog. - 
matic rigidity; but a conviction of the. total disparity and irrelevance 
of things which errupts into cynicism is an unhealthy phenomenon, and can 
become the backdoor entrance to totalitarianism. 
The main argument favouring a moderate ironic stance seems to me to be 
from the standpoitit of economy. Mange is inevitable, and in many rcspectsý 
but theýpatient revolutionary appetite for change assumes that cha 
. 
nge can 
only be brought about by opposition: the necessary dialectic must in- 
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evitably take place between opposingýindividuals and groups. The result 
of this - the 'dissidence of disseýtl abhorred by Arnold - is much waste 
of human energy. An eclectic approach to problems and situations allows 
the dialectic to take, place within the individual who is prepared to 
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assimilate disparities and reorganize his thinking accordingly. This 
is the essence of irony. The school curriculum which reflects disparities 
and incongruities without rancourp within and between its subject 
areas, is helping its pupils to develop that dispassionate sense of 
irony, that flexible 'spontaneity of consciousness' and concerned objec- 
tivity which is more and more necessary to cope with the clashes and 
collisions of our'multitudinous' compleX and contracting world. 
Literatur_e-and dogma across the curriculum 
Although space will not allow the full development of this themep it 
seems appropriate to point out that in the teaching of various subject 
areas of the curkiculum there exist alternative attitudes and approaches# 
which can reasonably be characterized as 'literary' or fdogmatict in 
essence* The existence both of an 'open' approach involving imaginativep 
personal reflection, and afelosed' approach based upon didactic authoritarian 
principles is obvious in the teaching of religious and moral educationg 
perhaps, bat less evident in certain other subject areas. Two additional 
examples from the sqhool curriculum, -ffieivf ow, will be briefly considered to 
illustrate the principle. I have selected science and 
. 
history, as being 
closedly bound up with the concepts of Z2itZeig't and Weltanschuang, 
two 
important themes of this thesis. Clearly it is only possible to raise 
the issues here# not to pursue them in depth 
(which would require another 
thesis). 
(i) Science 
To begin at a relatively superficial levelp it is of course possible 
to point 
to the use of scientific data as dogma on the one hand and the literary 
expression of scientific thought on the other. 
As an example of the 
first, Kenneth Walker (1950) points out how Darwinian doctrines were soon 
converted to dogmas after the appearance of The Origin of Species: 
new meanings were read into it and new confirmations 
for old prejudices were 
extracted from it. Like the Bible 
(it) provided texts by which almost 
any line of thought could be justified with the help of 
the necessary. 
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adjustments. In Germany the docl, rine of the survival of the strong and the elimination of the weak was used to support the views of the Prussian Junkers. -The glorification of warfare expounded by Treitscb: -e and Bernhardi was amongst the fruits of this Prussian version of Darwinism. In England... the idea of evol, 4t-i6n by natural selection provided excellent 
support for ruthless commercial competition and for a total disregard of the welfare of the sweated workers in England's fine new factories... (p. 53) 
t 
and so on. DJ Foskett (1964) provides examples of the second phenomenon 7 
the poetic expression of scientific ideas - culled from the writings of 
Thomas Huxley and Alfred North Whitehead among others (see, e. g. pp. 232-233 
of Sc7iencq HuMgnism and Libraries). 
But my concern here is with the deeper issue of science as initiation 
as opposed to science as discovery raised by David Layton in Science for 
the People (1973) when he writes that 
it is-difficult to see how both objectives, i. e. an understanding of the 
mature concepts and theories of science and an understanding of the 
processes by which scientific knowledge grows, can be achieved simul- 
taneously. The former involves the initiation of the learner into a 
developed conceptual system and his task is to come to terms with an 
established and largely uncontroversial body of knowledge. (P-176) 
In other words, science in the school curriculum can scarcely be concerned 
'with scientific 'processt until a pupil is securely acquainted with the 
scientific 'products' of the I past epitomised in text-books, for tat the 
school level, the return to original sources is clearly impossible on 
the scale required and the acquisition of scientific knowledge is inescapably 
tinged with dogmatisml (ibid. ). The main protagonists of two fundamentally 
opposed points of view in this'area are Karl Popper (1959) and Thomas Kuhn 
(1970), the latter advocating a relatively 'closed' approach and the 
former opting for 'openness'. 
In Kuhn1s view scientific progress is dependent upon the initiation 
of each new generation of scientists into rigidly conceived 'conceptual boxes 
supplied by professional education' (p. 5). Such an, education lboth rigor- 
ous and rigid' will 'come to exert a deep hold on, the scientific mindt 
fa-cilital, itig the exercise or Inormal sclence. l. AL I-he hitsis 
of Kuhnis thesis io the concept of what lie terms fparadigms! - funiver- 
sally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model 
problems and solutions to a community of prac-bHoners' 
(P. viii): 
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The study of paradigms, (he writes),... is what mainly prepares the 
student for membership in the particular scientific community with which 
he will later practice. Because he there joins men who learned the bases 
of their field from the same concrete models, his subsequent practice will 
seldom evoke overt disagreement over fundamentals. Men whose research 
is based on shared paradigms are committed tothe same rules and standards 
for scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent consenses it 
produces are prerequisites for normal science, i. e. for the genesis and 
continuation of a particular research tradition. (p. 11) 
Consequently the steady acquisition of recognized facts and procedures is 
the prime educational aim, and 'until the very last stages in tbe education 
of a scientist, textboo'ýs are systematically substituted for the creative 
scientifc literature that made them possible' 
(p. 165). The term 'para- 
digmt is used by Kuhn in two complementary senses: 
On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, 
techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community. -On the 
other, it denotes one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete 
puzzle-so. lutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace 
explicit rulesa5exbasis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of 
normal science. (P-175) 
Kuhn compares the use of these paradigms to the playing of a game of 
chess (P-145)9 in that the solut ions to the scientist's problems must 
be sought within the rules of the game; and the rules are only to be 
changed as the result of what amounts to a periodical 'scientific revol- 
ution'. Such a revolution is 'the tradition-shattering complement to 
the 
tradition-bound activity of normal science' (p. 6), and it brings with it 
i: nev*tably a change in world-view for the scientist 
(p. 111). Even after 
a Irevolution' no paradigm is ever completev and 'normal science consists 
in its actualization ... achieved 
by extending. the knowledge of those facts 
that the paradigm displays as particularly revealingg by 
increasing 
the extent of the match between those facts and the paradigmts predic- 
tions, and by further articulation of the paradigm itself' 
(p 
. 24). 
Kuhn points oýit that the independence of scientists can 
be exaggerated, 
for scientists (like laymen) 'take mpch of their 
image of creative scien- 
tific activity from an authoritatiye sourcel - such as a scientific 
text- 
book, or a popularization or phi'losophical work modeled on text 
books 
(P-136). 
Of course, it is a narrow and rigid education (lie writes), probably more 
so than any otlierexcept perhaps in orthodox theology. But for normal- 
scientific work, for puzzle-solving within the tradition that the text- 
books define, the scientist is almost perfectly equipped. (p. 166) 
Mien a scientific revolution is due, it is the 'very rigidity' whicli 
'provides the tonmiunity with a sensitive indicator that something has 
gone wrong' (ibid. ). 
In contrast to Kuhn, Popper places his emphasis quite differently: 
vhere Kuhn stresses the practical, regularity of 'paradigms', Popper' 
stresses the continual flux of scientific development, and the necessity 
for the questing scientist. to seek to falsify our solutions and current 
facts and theories rather than to maintain them 'we ought to try as 
hard as 'we can to overthrow our solution, rather than defend it? as he puts 
it in The Logic of Scientific Discove (1959, p. 16). Every conclusion 
or resting point is purely tentative - 'Every test of a theory, whether 
resulting in its corroboration or falsification, must stop at some basic 
statement or. other which we decide to accept... But considered from a logi- 
cal po int of view, the situation is never such that it compels us to stop 
at this particular basic statement rather than that... For any basic state- 
ment can again in its turn be subjected to tests... ''(p. 29): 
The basic statements at which we stop, which we decide to accept as sat- 
isfactory and as sufficiently tested, have admittedly the character of 
dogMas, (he writes) but only in so far aswe may desist from justifying 
them by further arguments (or by further tests). But this kind of dogma- 
tism is innocuous since, should the need arise, these statements can 
easily be tested further. I admit that -this too malies the chain of 
deduction in principle infinite. But this kind of 'infinite regress' 
is also innocuous since in our theory there is no question of trying to 
prove any statements by means of it... (P. 105) 
The absolute certainty of demonstrable knowledge - Ithe old scientific 
ideal' - 'has proved to be an idol' since 'the demand for scientific 
objectivity makes it inevitable that every scientific statement must 
remain tentative for ever$ (p. 280). Scientific knowledge, therefore, 
cannot be 'possessed', only sought-after. For Popper it is lbold conjec- 
tures or "anticipations"Ithat make for scientific advancep though these 
must belearefully and soberly controlled by systematic tests' 
(p. 279), and 
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constantly challenged in an effort to falsify them rather than to 
dogmatically uphold them. Arnold's definition of culture as 'the best 
that, ]ILLS bcell 1,11011-11C ItIld said ill Uie wor. 1d... I 1, illds till echo ill Popper's 
view of the application of the historical uethod in science (the unfashion- 
ableness of which he regrets): 
It consists, simply in trying tifind out what other people have thought and 
sakid about the problem in hand: why -they had to face if,: flow they forill- 
Uluted it: how they tried to solve it. This seems -to me importalif, be- 
cause it is part of the general method of rational discussion. If 'We 
ignore what other people are thinking, or have thou ht in the past, then 
rational discussion must come to an end. (pp. 16-M 
Finally: 
Science is not a system of certain, or well-established, statements; nor 
is it a system which steadily advances towards a state of finality. Our 
science is not knowledge (epist-em-e): it can never claim to have attained 
truthp or even a subjtitute for it, such as probability. 
Yet ... although it can attain neither truth nor probability, the striving 
for knowledge and the search for truth are still the strongest motives of 
scientific discovery. 
We do not know: we can only auess. And our guesses are guided by the 
unscientifict the metaphysical (though biologically explicable) faith in 
laws, in regularities which we can uncover - discover. (p. 278) 
Perhaps, when all is said and doneg Popperts faith in laws' and 
'regularities' is not so far removed from Kuhn's trust in 'paradigms', 
since Kuhn acknowledges that these survive only until -the next scientific 
revolution. However, from the point of view of the school curriculum, 
it makes a considerable difference whether we adopt the open approach 
advocated by Popper and largely embodied in the Nuffield School Science 
Project where emphasis is upon 'the involvement of pupils through their 
own experimental investigations of problems -which are real to theml and 
where pupils are encouraged to look 'critically at the evidence collected 
by others' (Schools Council, 1976, p. 87) or whether we adopt the more 
traditi onal approach of initiation into the world of 
'normal science'. 
Clearly there are strengths and dangers in both approaches, 
but bearing in 
mind the tendency of the scientifica lly minded to authoritarian conformity 
(see above, p, L(-I) it would seem 
'to be important that, either within their 
science courses or in complementary studies outside them, pupils should 
have the opportunity to develup also their capacity for open, 
flexible 
3(ý-k 
thinking and imaginative creativity. 
(ii) Histor 
(LIhistoire 
nlest pas une science, clest un art et on nly r4ussit que par 
Ilimagination. 1 Anatole France, the. literary historian, allows the hero 
of his novel Le Crime de Sylvestre' Bonnard to express this sentiment; and 
this is a view which was probably shared by Arnold ulien he wrote in one 
of his Reports that 1perhaps there is nothing so animating, nothing so 
likely to awaken a man's interest' as the study of history (Marvin, 1909, 
P. xxxi). And Heinrich Heine (an author regarded by Arnold with respect) 
streases the literary side of history in his comment. on the response of 
the public to the novels of Sir Walter Scott: 'They demand their history 
from the hand of the poet and not from the hand of the historian. They 
demand not a faithful report of bare facts, but those facts dissolved back 
into the original poetry whence they came. ' (quoted in Lucaks, 1962, p. 56), 
Inevitably this view of history is not universally shared by historians, 
and this is reflected in the curriculum by those who would teach history 
in a relatively closed fashion - deductively, looking for anJapplying 
general laws in relation. to the facts available, as opposed to those who 
adopt an inductive approach, more tentative and open and concentrating on 
develop ing an empathetic capacity for vicarious, living in former times. 
Pre-eminent among attempts to reduce history to a science with fixed 
laws is of course, Hegel, already referred to in connection with the Zeit- 
geist concept) with his cyclic principle of thesis, antithesis and synthesis 
to which historical events are supposed to conform. More recently and 
perhaps on a more modest scale, Carl Hempel (1970) asserts that 'in history 
no less than in any other branch of empirical inquiry, scientific explana- 
tion can be achieved ... by means of suitable general hypotheses, or 
by 
theories, which are bodies of system . atically related hypotheses' (p. 239), 
contrasting his own view with that of the supporters of 'the method of 
empathic understandingf, which lie characterizes as simply a rheuristic 
device' inferior to a scientific lexplanationt: 
4-9 
In history as anywhere else in empirical science (he writes), the ex- 
planation of a phenomenon consists in subsuming it under general 
empirical laws; and the criterion of its soundness, is not whether it 
appeals to our imagination, whether it is presented in terms of sugges- 
tive analogies or is, otherwise made to appeur plausible - all this way 
occur in pseudo-explanations as well - but exclusively whether it rests 
on empirically well confirmed assumptions concerning initial conditions 
and general lalws. (p. 240). . 
Just as historians make use of universal hypotheses from other empirical 
sciences to assess their data and reach their conclusions, Hempel believes 
'universal' hypotheses can be generated within history itself as Lhe 
historians' contribution to 'the methodical unity of empirical sclencel. 
Indeed, Ithe elaboration of such laws with as much precision as possible 
seems clearly to be the direction in which progress in scientific ex- 
planation and understanding has to be sought' 
(p. 242), in history as 
elsewhere. Within the curriculump Ray Hallam's research 
(1975) reflects 
this deductive approach to teaching history. To quote from Martin Booth's 
(1978) paraphrase of Hallam's approacht Hallam is concerned 'with the 
extent to which a child can logically "home in" on a conclusion when 
confronted with a probl6m$ And asks of a child studying history 'is he 
able to pose a hypothesis and then rigorously deduce the conclusion, using 
abstract thought; or is his reasoning limited to the immediate data in 
front of him? In fact, is he capable of proving an argument At all, 
either at the concrete or-abstract level or is his thinking illogical, 
moving haphazardly from point to point? "' 
(see Boo . th, 1978, p. 3). 
Martin Booth, in common with Hexter (1971) and Collingwood 
(1946) 
is opposed to this deductive approach to history, preferring a more Open, 
indiietive and imaginative orientation, partly because he believes that 
'in the scientific sense, it is literally impossible to solve problems 
in historyl G-3) - the data, ultimately, is too complex, amorphous and 
intractible; the historian's job, therefore, is 'to put forward the. most 
convincing account of the past' speculating critically and 
imaginatively 
on such data as is available to him. Booth argues that -whereas 
'in the 
past, history teachers concentrated on memory work and 
the accumulation 
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of discrete pieces of information' and 'more recently, following the 
research of Hallam, attention has been given to the development of 
logical deductive thinking and. -teachers and examiners have made exten- 
sive use of written primary 
ývidence to extend and test this cognitive 
acti 7ity's in his view 'open endedp inductive thought is. more character- 
istic of historical enquiry', a mode of thinkin g which 'can be attained 
at an abstract level by a high proportion of 15 year oldst given suitable 
teaching (p. 8). Inductive conceptualization can be developed by drawing 
upon the pupils' own experience, a factor which increases their interest 
and their sense of the relwance of the subject. ln conclusion, Bootb 
affirms: 
Inductive thinking involves the creation of personal constructs; it is 
essentially a synthesizing acAivity, whereas deductive thinking is 
destructiveg in the sense that it analyzes and breaks down the evidence. It is the emphasis on personal researchv personal inductive thinking 
that-has made the course followed by the pupils in this research project 
so popular with the majority. (p . 8) 
Boothts orientation is in line with that of RG Collingwood (19116) vAio 
characterizes the inductive approach as follows: 
The historian's picture of his subject, whether that subject be a sequence 
of events or a past state of things ... appears as a web of imaginative 
construction stretched between certain fixed points provided by the state- 
ments of his authorities; and if these points are, frequent enough and the 
threads spun from each to the next are constructed with due care, always 
by the a priori imagination and never by merely arbitrary fancy, the whole 
picture is constantly verified by appeal to these datap and runs little 
risk of losing touch with the reality which it represents. (p. 242) 
Naturally, he pcýints out, we must avoid 'swallowing what our authorities 
tell us uncritically' otherwise the 'fixed points' between which the web 
is stretched may be invalid. Evidence and critical imagination are 
therefore the stuff of history; vMle dogma is to Iýe shunned: 
The old dogma of a single historical progress leading to the present-, and 
the modern dogma of historical cycles, that is, of a multiple progress 
leading to 'great ages' and then to decadenceg' are ... mere projections of 
the historiants ignorance upon the screen of the past. 
(P-328) 
The pursuit. of scientific certainty in history will more often than not 
prove a Will-ol-the-wisp; for ? science is and can be mistress only in her 
own house? (P-332) and history is essentially an artq not a science. 
3 rt 
JH Hexter (1971) takes a similar view. Faced with the spurious 
scientific certainties apparently adhievable in historical research by 
modern computers, Ilexter comments: 
The computer is a inagnificant aid to research with dazzling potentialities 
for historical-investigation. They are so dazzling that they may adversely 
affect the vision even of a wary historian who seeks to exploit them... 
What historians see with. 1computer eyes' ... are still human beings and human doings and sufferings. To avoid or correct distortion historians occasion- 
ally need to look at the past in a very old-fashioned way with liuman eyes. They fail to do so at peril of error for themselves and disaster for their 
discipline. (p. 127) 
The ope=ess advocated by Hexter is evident in the methodology he, advoc- 
ateH iii an essay concerning 'A New Framework for Social History' (Ilexter, 
1961, chapter 2) at the conclusion of which he comments that: 
It does not offer an explanation; it seeks one. It involves a minimum 
of direction about what to find and a maxiimim of openneseto whatever answers 
investigation brings to light. To those who regard history as a disordered 
scrap heap which exists only to be scavanged for usable parts by the con- 
structors of unavowed but predetermined eschatologies this opennestwill 
scarcely seem desirable. Working historians, howeverv who in their 
slovenly way would rather arrive at conclusions than start with them 
may see some small virtue in a work plan that places the conclusion at 
the end rather than at the beginning of an investigation. (p. 25) 
This consideration of open as opposed to closed approaches to the 
I 
teaching of history has so far been conducted purely on an either/or 
basis of opposing factions. I therefore wish -to make brief reference to 
a further view which subsumes and to some extent transcends these approach- 
es in a way curiously relevant to the present thesis. Kieran Egan (1978) 
sets out a developmental scheme of history teaching in an article entitled 
ITeaching the Varieties of Historyl. Briefly Egan distinguishes 'four 
more or less distinct stagea in the typical person's development of histor- 
ical understanding' to which he gives the names Imythic, romantic, 
philosophic, and ironic' (p. 20); and the characteristics of each of these 
stages are described in some detail in the course of the article. Finally, 
however, he suggests'that 'these at Y es should not be seen as discrete 
steps, progression up which entails leaving behind all that formed the 
focus of interest in the previ I ous stage'; they should rather be seen as 
cumulativeylinvolving a progressive mastery of elements all of which are 
3s-z 
necessary to a mature historical understanding'. He then summarizes 
this overall development as follows: 
A mature historical understanding ... will involve aI, okythic ,I 
abilityto 
vivify past events and characters by imaginative projection; an ability 
to inhabit imaginatively the strangeness or lotherness' of past times 
and Iýormiq or nre. itto riwic, Irmwaitic' 118HOCiWO. 0118 W. HAI j, d(NtH, (! V(! 11t8, 
and characters; a 114jilosopliiet ubility Lo see part. i. cI11.111's US InIrts 
of more general schemes; and all these controlled by thetironic' 
purpose to understand the past on its own terms and for its own sake. 
(p. 23) 
In this scheme, it seems to me, we have a progression from a 'literary' 
(mythic and romantic)approach, through a Idogmatict (i. e. philosophically 
systematized) stage to a further 'literary? stageg more mature than before, 
where an ironic stance can cope disinterestedly with contrarieties and 
+C 
unresolved tensions and transcend the relatively closed system3kations of 
the penultimate sýage. Needless to sayq not everyone would work through 
this model precisely from the beginning to the end of their historical 
education, and many would never achieve the last two stages; but the 
model nevertheless seems to me to be a realistic and useful one with 
helpful im plications for curriculum construction. 
(iii) Religious Education 
In chapter 2 of this thesisp where an attempt was made to sketch out some 
I of the main developments in religious education since the Education 
Act 
of 1944, it was suggested that there was a general movement traceable from 
fairly confident, and relatively dogmatic, teaching in the years immed- 
iately following the Act towards a progressively more open approach in which 
personal experience, -imagination and an understanding 
of religious language 
have come more and more to the fore. A quarter of a century after the 
1944 Act and a full century, after Arnold's Literature and Dog-mag 
Martell 
(1972) could fairly sum up the situation: 'Our "gurus" no longer see 
religion as a set of dogmas to which4the believer must subscribe; 
instead 
it is an open search for truth' (P-54). it must be.; it could be accept- 
able on no other terms. The flay current' already remarked by Arnold 
is 
now a tidal wave. 
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WD Wal-I (1959) observed that 'in spite of .. the legal embodiment 
of religious teaching in our educational system, ours is now largely a 
non-religious society. Its sanctions for the moral code are social and 
ethical, legal and pragmatic, rather than doetrinalt dogmatic or even 
generally religious? (p. 19). Alves (1968) describing the impact of 
the scientific revolution on religious thought, noted that 'the emphasis 
of' Lhe sciciitil'icl Lemper upon Life conLinuous discovery of flew Lruch 
tends to play down the value of truth which appears to base its claim 
upon its antiquity and permanence' (P-156) while 'the linguistic 
examination of the 'propositional? character of religious language, 
tends to the adoption of an existentialist position'; as a consequence 
of such changes in outlook, 'We cannot ask whether God is our rather, 
but only what such a statement means to those who make it' (ibid. ). More 
recently a Department of Education and Science publication (1977) reminds 
us that four society is a multicultural, multiracial one, and the curri- 
culum should reflect a sympathetic understanding for the different cultures 
and races that now make up our society' (para 10). Today's religious 
education, therefore, must operate in a secular, scientific, and. multi- 
cultural context. Arnold's Literature and Doarma (see chapter 4 above) 
has much to say that is highly relevant to such a society. Unfortunately, 
it is for the most part couched in language which presupposes an acquaintance 
with the Bible, being written for a generation -which-was yet in the process 
of abandoning it; it is not really suitable, as it stands, for a genera- 
tion which as flow, has little or no knowledge of it. However, it is 
worth drawing attention to certain items in Arnold's book which have a 
bearing upon the #open' approach to religious education required today. 
The object of Literature and Dogma, it will be recalled, was $to 
reassure those who feel, attachment -to ChristianitYp to the fJible, but Who 
recognize the growing discredit b6falling miracles and the supernatural' 
(Super VI, pp. 142-143); in place of the unverifiable assumptions em- 
hodied in theological dogma, the viiatural truth of Christianity' was to be 
emphasized. The work was lan endeavour to free the Bible - by showing 
that it is not science but literature' (p. 280), and that its language, 
Irluid, passing and literary, not rigid, fixed and scientific' demands 
for its understanding 'some experience or flow men have thought an(] ex- 
pressed themselves, and some flexibility of spirit' 
(p. 152). All this is 
consonant with an ? open' approach to religious education. Among the 
findings of RJ Goldman's (1963) research into the development or rel- 
igious thinking in young children was the fact that 
There is a gap, widening in adolescence, between the pupil's theological 
view of the world and his logico-scientific view. This gap, appearing at 
tile end of the junior school, may be closed if -tile ptipil is encouraged in 
a critical but reverent apprýoach to the Bible. 
The approach advocated by Arnold is designed to bridge the gap later 
identified by Gol dman. Arnold, of coursep was addressing his observations 
to adults; Goldman's finding was ostensibly related to the religious 
development of children. However, the 'regressive' and 'concretistic' 
thinking vAiich Goldman regarded as characteristic of retardation in 
religious development is still not always so regarded by all Christians, 
so that the research strikes home at much 'adult' mis-conceptualizatiQn; 
and is virtually identical with the kind of mis-conception objected to by 
Arnold. 
Both Arnold and Goldman were concerned to encourage 'a critical 
but reverent' approach to the Bible. The 'natural truth? of-Christianity 
was by no means diminished for Arnold by his acknowledgement that 'miracles 
do not happen' and that prophecy, properly understood, is not a kind of 
elevated fortune-telling. In fact Christianity becomes more 'natural', 
more accessible, if our conception of it does not demand incredible rever- 
sals of the natural order of Creation. And prophecy as insight has more 
genuine sustaining power for the humhn spirit than 'prop! iecyl as fore- 
sight, depending as the latter is on plausible interpretations of the most 
tenuous relationships by the exercise of partisan hindsight. 
Arnold's emphasis on 'conduct' rather than doctrine is in line with 
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movements within the various Cbriý-Aian communities to take a fuller part 
in social and political affairs, evaluating social needs and political 
action against Christian . principles. His view of religion as 'morality 
touched by emotiont (Super VIv P-178) stresses the importance of an anchor- 
age or point of reference. for estimating the quality of our conduct coupled 
with a touchstone capable of motivating us to action. Such an approach 
provides openings for Christian teaching without prejudice to ii)sigbts 
f rom, other f ai tbs -Aii ch may, be introduced to advantage in a mul ticul tural 
society. 
Equally vilable in a multifaith society is Arnold's insistence upon 
tentiveness in the kinds of assertions we make about God, and his recog- 
nition of man's tendency to anthropomorphism - lappropriate and seemly, 
in poetry and eloquence, but liable to 'lead him astray' in science. Rec- 
ognition of-an 'enduring power, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness, 
(Super V1, p. 200) is common to many religions, and acceptable to many 
humanists, at least as a point of departure in open discussion of the 
nature of faith and morality. Other tentative 'definitional of God as 
Ithe best that man knows or can know' or 'the stream of tendency by which 
all things seek to fulfil the law of their being' can serve as starting 
points for serious contemplation of mants relation to his cosmic environ- 
ment; and the avowal that God is not a 'magnified non-natural man' does 
not abolish the value of religious symbolism although it can help to 
reduce the incidence of cinudely anthropomorphic thinking. 
In designating superstition as tAberglaub I Arnold sought to malce his 
determined dismissal of it as gentle as possible' fbixtra-belief It although 
almost identical etymologically, some how seems more generous -toward -the 
believer., Nevertheless, the dismissal is important; superstition in an 
age dominated by a scientific, or Ips"do-scientific' framework of thought 
is no help to religion of wliatever denominatJoii. 11,11c 11111111til milld is 
assuredly passing away ... from this hold. of reliancelp 
Arnold observed, 
tand those who make it their stay will more and more find 
it will fail 
-k% 
them, will more and more feel themselves disturbed, shaken, distressed 
. and 
bewildered' (Super VI, p. 245). This is particularly true when 
diverse religions are brought into contact with one another. Arnold 
noted how within Christianity Protestants and Catholics tried vainly to 
mainl; ain the miracles wit1jin -their own deitomination wbilst dismissing those 
of their rivals. Inevitably, whether within or between religionsi such in- 
tellectual friction has a tendency steadily to whittle away credence in all 
miraculous events. The human mindt8ees, as its experience widens, howthey 
arise'. If a dogmatic system clings rigidly to them, experience will 
eventually undermine the whole edifice. 
Arnold's treatment of the Trinity inevitably angered the orthodox 
church of his day, (see chapters 4 and 5 above), but there are more and 
more Christians who would appreciatb his intentions 'An, ] 1141opt the 
Christian-flumanist standpoint in relation to Jesus that 'Christendom with 
perfect justice ... made him the Messiah' 
(my italics), thus putting the 
emphasis on man's recognition and acknowledgement of the divine qualities 
in Christ rather than upon the traditional 'sending' and 'sacrificing, 
interpretation entailing a curiously manipulative God. 
Finally, Arnold's emphasis. on inwardness, and 'the feelings and 
dispositions whence conduct proceeds' is conducive to an open approach in 
religious education, Since the importance of conscience and self-knowledge 
is commonly recognized within other religions as well as Christianity, 
and by 111amanists as well. For Arnold, inwardness and self -renouncement were 
the keystones of Jesus's teaching, and Jesus's approach is shown to be 
essentially literary as opposed to the dogmatic teaching of-the pharisees. 
In preference to dogma and rule-making Jesus preferred to tell a story: 
'A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho... IA concrete indiv- 
idual in a concrete context, and an ironic context 
(as in this example) 
as often as not. 
Many Christians in the past have objected to editions of the scriptures 
under such titles as 'The Bible Designed to be Read as Literature. '. Their 
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number must be diminishing; the question now is whether the Bible 
is to be read at all. Arnold was convinced that the Bible needed to be 
read with the same literary tact and sensitivity that we adopt towards other 
literature. In turning from theological to literary writing again in his 
Last Essays (Super VIll) lie wrote: 
I am persuaded that the transformation of religion, which is essential 
for its perpetuance, can be accomplished only by carrying the qualities 
of flexibility, perceptiveness, and judgment, which are the beat fruits of 
letters, to whole classes of the community which now know next to nothing 
of them, and by procuring the application of those qualities to matters 
where they are never applied now. (p. llj8) 
lie believed that fie was t1jus returning to a field fwliere work of the most- 
important kind has now to be (lone, though indirectly, for religion' (ibid. ). 
From the point of view of the curriculum, it seems desirable, and in line 
with ArnoldIs way of thinking, that there should be free flow between lit- 
erary and religious studies. Obviously each has its special emphasis and 
core. Ninian Smart (1968), for example, lists the dimensions of Christian 
study as ritual, experiential and social understanding (constituting its 
historical elements) and doctrinal, mythical and ethical elements 
(as its parahistorical fields). Literature, for its part, is just one 
of the aspects of the teaching of English. I'loweverg without disrupting 
the autonomy of English and Religious Education, respectively, advantages 
can be taken of opportunities for fruitful cross-fertilization., George 
Eliot, Bernard Shaw, HG Wells and Bertrand Russell are among the many 
free-thinkers who had the advantage of sharing in the Western biblical 
heritage b efore (and after) they renounced dogmatic religion. Schools, 
at a modest level, can make some provision for pupils to share something 
of this opportunity; and perhaps scriptural material 
(not only 
necessarily of Juaaeo-Ghristian origin now but also from other Eastern 
religions) can be better enjoyed and, more fully appreciated when it is 
offered freely as story or literature than when it is-brandished as a 
talisman. On the other sidej literature has made many contributions 
relevant to the teaching of A-ligious Education - for example in the 
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works of Shakespearet Gerard ManI, 3y Hopkins, T'S Eliot and Wilfred 
Oven, etc. Spiritual nourisbment and a sense of the numinous can no - 
longer (if they ever were) be gained from catechistical and mechanical 
indoctrination. 
(iv) Moral Education 
The year after Matthew Arnold died, in 1889 that is, a ballad published 
by Rudyard Kipling bore the well-known lines: 
Oh, East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet, 
Till Earth and Sky a-Land presently at God's great Judgiiient Seat. 
Not much more than half a centuryls movement, of the Zeitgeist later another- 
publication announced that 
At exactly fifteen minutes past eight in the morning, on August 6th 19115, 
Japanese time ... a tremendous flash of 
light cut across the sky. Mr 
Tanimoto has a distinct recollection that it travelled from east to West, 
from the city toward the hills... 
If in John Hersey's account of Hiroshima (1946) the Ilight'travelled from 
east to west', the dark significance of the event was a conimunication from 
West to East. At all events, the two hemispheres could never again be 
regarded as separate. The significance of some 'words from one of Matthew 
Arnold? s Reports of Elementary Schools was grimly enhanced by this and sub- 
sequent events: 
To have the power of using, which is the thing wished, these data of natural 
science, a man, must, in general, have f irst been in some measure moralised: 
and for moralising him it will be found not easy, I think, to dispense 
with those old agents, letters, poetry, religion. So let not our teachers 
be led to imagineq whatever they may hear or see of the call for natural 
science, that their literary cultivation is unimportant. The fruitful 
use of natural science itself depends, in a very great degreev on having 
effected in the vhole man ... a rise in vhat 
the political economists call 
the standard of life. (Marvin, 1910; p. 148) 
vrr4t WhetherkArnold is correct in his conclusion as to the lagents' which will 
moralise mankind, we can no longer doubt his premise. The need for moral 
education is widely recognized, altbough there is a good deal of uncertainty 
about the meatis. 
E, P Schumacher (19711) sees the growth of material isin as a major 
contributory factor to moral malaise: 
As a society, we have no firm basis of belief in any meta-economic valuest 
and when there is no such belief the economic calculus takes over... 
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Nature, 'it has been said, abhors a vacuum, and when the available 
(spiritual space' is not filled by some higher motivation, then it will 
necessarily be filled by something lower - by the small, mean, calcul- 
ating attitude to life which is rationalised in the economic calculus. 
(pi. 96) 
The lack of spiritual motivation is also acknowledged by WD Wall (1959) 
in his cotwiients on the reduction of doctrinal sanctions atid tile groAll 
of anti-religious and anti-clerical stateav: 
The effect of this is to remove a major element of certainty and to leave 
-the individual to find for himself a philosophy and a rule of life. It 
naturally increases anxietyand displacesg if it does not actually increase 
the possibilities of conflict. It also takes away an explanatory principle 
and the basis upon which resignation and acceptance can be justified as 
well as sweetened. (pp. 19-20) 
However, Wall continues, IParadoxically too it tends to elevate the 
individual conscience to the position of final arbiter' (ibid. ), - some- 
thing -which he would not entirely deplore. The development of invardnesal 
personal autonomy and responsibility become increapingly important in a 
society u4tere external sanctions are reduced. 
John Wilson has perhaps done more than any other individual to pro- 
mote an understanding of 'moral development' and to analyse the concept- 
ual complexities inherent in this difficult field. Ile recognizes more than 
many contributors to this problem the dangers of partisanship in moral 
education: 
It is one thing to try to produce (by whatever methods) good'Christians, 
good Communists, good middle-class Englishmeng good liberalsp good 
supporters of a technological society, etc. and quite another to try to 
produce people who are reasonable 
(educated, sane, sensible, etc. ) in this 
area: people who will raise seriously the importruit question 'Wliat 
ought I to do and to feel? ', answer them seriously, and act on the answers. 
(Wilson, 1974, P-7) 
His, like Arnold's is a 'disinterested endeavour to learn and prop&gate... 
the means-towards a better life-, but in his case the approach is Iscien- 
tific', or at least, analytical. His first principle is to establish a 
taxonomy of moral education, analysifg the relationship between the nature 
of justice, equality, human feelings, and empathyg the acquisition of 
knowledge in relation to these; and the application of such 
knowledge as 
is acquired# For example, in relation to 'justice' the 
first need is for 
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a cognitive grasp of the concept 'person?, then for an understanding of 
cognitive reciprocity in relation to other persons, and finally of 
affective reciprocity towards them, and so on. This is not the place to 
attempt a full, development of Wilson's analysis, still less a critique, 
which would require a thesis to do it justice. But in the shadow of my 
admiration for Wilsonts work, I would like'to voice one minor criticism, 
and that is in connection with his use of pseudo-scientific symbolism to 
refer to the 'componenist of his taxonomy. To refer to these components 
as: PHIL (HC), PHIL (CC), PHIL (RSF), EMP.... GIG..., KRAT, etc. 
seems to me to be an unnecessary complication to an otherwise invaluable 
achievement. 'Our business (fie writes) is to encourage our students in 
forms of understanding and criteria of action which are public and demon- 
strable, not ý, hose which are the peculiar property of partisan groups. ' 
(p. 12). It is all the more surprising therefore to find hiYA producing 
statements like the following: 
Particular "sources of moral stre , ngth", 
whether religious or not, are 
for empirical researchers to discuss: in my list, they would fit into 
the area I have called KRAT. (p. 12) 
A page. of sentences loaded with INN, GIGs, KRATs, and PHTLs certainly 
gives the impression of being the 1peculiar property of a partisan 
group' - or at least of a highly esoteric mysteryp and 
to that extent 
verges to my mind on doginatism. Wilson is capable of the most lucid ex- 
position; it seems a pity therefore ib resort to a style that smacks of 
pedant ry. In 1A Comment on Christmasl 
(Super X), Arnold had some harsh 
words to say on Comte for a similar lapse: 
It is a mistake to suppose that rules for conduct and recommendatlons 
of virtuev presented in a correct scientific statementt or in a new 
rhetorical statement from which old errors are excluded, can have any- 
thing like the effect on mankind of old rules and recommendations to 
which we have been long accustomed, and with which our feelings and 
affections have become intertwined. 
'Pedants always suppose that they 
can... (p231) 
If this observation from Arnold seems harshly misapplied to Wilson's 
jargon, perhaps Occam's razor is an acceptable criticism: 'Entities are not 
to be multiplied without necesdityl. 
In an articl e on 'Common ýichools Abroad' 
(Super XI), Arnold makes 
a curious statement in relation 1. o literature and morality: Moral 
teaching for young peoplep except when it is indirectly conveyed in 
stories ... is in general dull: and when it is conveyed in stories, the 
story may interest, but the moral is apt to be lost sight of' (P. 95). 111C 
first part of this observation, in the light of his other writing, and 
from the point of view of this thesist is unexceptionable; but the second 
part seems to have 'lost sight of' the nature of story. If the moral of 
a story is too blatantly explicit, it is likely to be resisted anyway; it 
is the suggestiveness of the values embodied implicitly in literature which 
it seems is likely to produce the most lasting effect on the reader. This 
is an inward operation, such as Arnold usually recognizes and approves. 
Stories 'show us how things are$ (see chapter 2 above): and to the extent 
that they moralize explicitly, they are less effective an literature. 
Specialization. integration and values 
As was pointed out in chapter 3 of this thesis 11 M Inspectorate's 
recent working paper on the secondary curriculum maintains that 'the 
contribution of the curriculum to the moralq ethical and spiritual areas 
of experience remains of prime importancel (DES, 1977, p. 11). The same 
paper urges schools to encourage 'flexibility of mind' (akin to Arnold's 
ISpontancity of consciousness? )and lists the areas of. experience with which 
the curriculum needs. to be concerned as (1) aesthetic and creative, (2) 
ethical, (3) linguistic, (4) mathematical, (5) physical, (6) Isocial 
and political, and (7) spiritual. A degree of development upon each of 
these lines is to prepare the individual teenager for life beyond school. 
Matthew Arnold in Literature and Science offered a rather simpler cate- 
gorizationp although his general aims were much in line with these. 
'The powers which go to the building up of humanlife (he wrote) are the 
power of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of 
beauty, and the power of sobial life and manners"(Super X9 pp. 60-61): 
We. can equate 'ethical and creative' with Arnold'stpower of beautyl; 
-the 'social and politicall area with his 'power of social life (V-, eugh 
perhaps not of manners)$; 'the lethicall area with his 1power of conductl 
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and the Ilinguisticl, lmathematicall and Ophysicall areas can reasonably 
be subsumed together under 'the power of intellect and knowledge' - all 
which (oddly enough) leave the 'spiritual' area unaccounted for in ArnoldIS 
taxonomy* Our main concern beret however, is not to debate the refinement 
or crudity of ArnoldIs classification in comparison with its modern counter- 
part, but to consider his moral orientation with regard to the whole. His 
first concern is to recognize that these 'several powers-are not isolated, 
but there is ... a perpetual tendency to relate them one to another in divers 
ways'. Furthermore, 'we have need of them all' and 'when we have rightly 
met and adjusted the claims of them allp we shall then be in a fair way 
for getting soberness and righteousness, with wisdom' (p. 62). By means 
of a broad education, thereforel Arnold seeks to promote an end similar 
to that of our contemporary Inspectorate with its 'prime importance' of 
'the moral, ethical and spiritual areas of experience'. 
ILet us ... avoid, 
f -he writes in the same essay 
" 
.. any invidious 
comparisons between the merits of humane lettersp as means of education, 
and thelit icrits of the natural sciences' 
(p. 69). As has already been 
remarked, Itbe circle of knowledgemust be complete' in Arnold's view. 
Literature, however, is to be the catalyst to transmute the benefits of 
general education into moral behavior: 
How, finally (he asks) are poetry and eloquence to exercise the power of 
relating the modern results of natural science to man's instinct for 
conduct, his instinct for beauty? ... Here again 
I answer that I donot 
linow how they will exercise it, but that they can and will exercise it 
I am sure. 
His conclusion is based on faith in the 'fortifying, and elevating, and 
quickening, and suggestive power' of creative literature, regardless of 
its time and place of composition, and regardless of the authors, know- 
ledge of modern science - since their operations are on another plane, 
their use of language is different, and their intentions are not the same. 
'If ... there is to be separatiorý ýnd option 
between humane letters on the 
one hand, and thenatural sciences on the otherl, however, a partisan 
note creeps into Arnold's judgment: 'the great majority of mankind... 
. us 
would do well, I cannot but think (he writes), to choose to be educated 
in humane letters rather than in the natural sciences. Letters will call 
out their being at more points, will make them live more' (P-70). 
The interrelationship of subjects was important for Arnold, despite 
11ýis bilts I. owar(18 141'erithire., 111141 IIC 11MI IWAV J-00111 T01- 111tt-1-0-Mle88 ill Itily 
field, or for specialization. Of narrow theologians lie wrote 
(in Culture 
and Anarchx): 'No man, who knows nothing else, knows even his Bible I 
(Super V, p. IIRý). And when in Literature and Science he wrote that 'A 
man who passes his life in instrument-knowledges is a specialist'-(Super X, 
p. 63), he meant by 'instrument knowledges' disciplines such as Greek 
grammar, etc, which (in his view) 'cannot be made to directly serve 
the instinct... for beauty... (or) the sense for conduct' but merely 'lead 
to other hnowledges which can' 
(p. 63). His view on the following olmer- 
vation of Professor Andrade can be imagined: 
We no longer have men of learning writing for other men of learning, or 
men of science writing for other men of sciencep or disciple-s of 
exact science writing for other disciples of exact science, or physicists 
writing for other physicists, or students of optics writing for other 
students of optics, or spectroscopists writing for other spectroscopists, 
but rather infra-red spectroscopists writing for other infra-red spectro- 
scopists. (quoted in Foskett, 1964, pp. 22-23) 
And the esoteric and irrelevant hair-splitting criticised in Louis 
Kampf's 
(1969) article 'The Scandal of Literary Scholarship' would have 
been 
equally objectionable to him - probably more so, 
because at least the work 
, 
of the linfra-red spectroseopisist was of potential benefit to mankind. 
Like Snow (1963) he would doubtless have mourned the fact that 
'in our 
society ... we have lost even the pretence of a common 
culture. Persons 
educated with the greatest intensity we know can no longer communicate 
with each other on the plane of their major intellectualto 
let alone moral, 
concerns. And HJA Hargreaves 
(1970) points out that the tendency 
towards-early specialization is not only immoral but 
'inappropriate' for: 
the person -who finds that his specialized knowledge 
is obsolescent, and 
has no particular facility to le . arnt has the ground cut 
from beneath his feet. 
Although this is a scientific age... science must be tempered and 
balanced 
by an understanding of the humanities... As in other crucial periods of 
history, 
there is a need for whole men and not split personalities. 
(p. 18) 
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(hir biglish system of early specialization is based on Che principle of 
'subject-mindedness', but as Wall (1968) acImowledged, IADC Peterson (1960) 
and others have pointed ouL Lhat the Crowther cmice[A of Isubject miridednessl 
is supported by no published evidence, that it is an aspect of Inunan nature 
Inallife-Sts iLseIr only ill Ellglillitt al, 11 Wales? And wore recently 
Wall (1977) Itas writtert: 
Specialization which is premature or which insists more on the acquisition 
of facts than on the perception and generalization of relationships within 
the specialization itself, between branches of knowledge, or on their 
application to life, is likely to give a false confidence and to decrease 
the possibilities of contact with others differently formed. It is also 
likely to inhibit the growth of those very forms of thought on which it 
purports to be based and to prevent by its rigidity any ca acity to 
transfer learning to other fields in creative ways. (p .7 
It is hoped that the concept of a 'core curriculum' - provided that 
it is not too rigidly and dogmatically applied - may help to foster a 
reno-wed recognition ol the importance of all-round education, and reduce 
the excessive early specialization which is an unfortunate feature of 
our school curricula at present. Specialized teaching is another aspect 
of this issue, and it may be wondered uliether secondary school pupils need 
to be divided and re-divided into different groups-for different subjects 
quite so much as many are at presentl especially in the early secondary 
stages. Arnold appears to have favoured keeping groups together for 
teaching as much as possible, and writes ofIthe increased regularity and 
steadiness of attention that a child gains by going through his whole day's 
work with the same associates, and under the same teacher'. 11 am convinced', 
he continues, 
that the bene-Fit to the children themselves and to the discipline of the 
schoolp which. would result from retaining them in the same divisions, would 
more than compensate any additional trouble which the necessity of varying 
the instruction in particular subjects, such as arithmetic, to children 
equal in most subjects, and therefore classed together, might impose upon 
the teacher. (Marvin, 1908, p. 1.4) 
The hint of Istreamingt towards the end of this quotation is, I believe, 
illusory; the grouping of'scholaýs in ArnoldIs view, requires only 
'a 
surricient degree of correspondence itýtheir attainments 
to render their 
CA 
working together perfectly pr&ctolel; for an organization 
'where 
3 G5- 
classification is as various and as little uniforlit its are the actaill- 
ments of individuals', (Marvin, 1908, p. 55) is repugnant -to Arnold. The 
grouping, moreover, should be independent of sex differences: 'I must 
say (lie writes) that I have never yet seen any inconvenience arise from 
bringing together boys and girls-in the same school' - adding rattler coyly 
... if their playgrounds are kept distinctli (Marvin, 1908, P-15). Arnold's 
views on grouping and specialization were expressed, it must be admitted 
in circumstances. very different from our own. But they reflect a concern 
for maintaining genuinely human relationships and for promoting the 
development of whole persons. 
Literature, Dogma and Democracy 
'The growing power in Europel, Arnold wrote, 'is democracy' (Super II, 
pp. 10-11); but -whereas in France the democratic advance towards equality 
has given 'to the body of the common peoplev a self-respectt an enlargement 
of spirit, a consciousness of counting for something ... which has raised 
them in the scale of humanity' (ibid., p. 9), in England, democracy has 
been slow in developing itself' (p. 12). Nevertheless such a development 
was inevitablet Arnold believed, and to be welcomed. Although by the 
nature of things 'perfection will never be reached'-. 
to recognize a period of transformatic. n when it comesp and to adapt them- 
selves honestly and rationally to its laws, is perhaps tf+earest approach 
to perfection of which men and nations are capable. No habits or attach- 
ments should prevent their trying to do this; not, indeed, in the long 
run can they. Human thought, which made all institutions, inevitably 
saps them (: L, to(. f. - V- ZI) 
Thus the dogmas, instituted by human thought, will in like manner be sapped 
by human thought. 'Openness and flexibility cf mind are at such time the 
first of virtues$ (ibid. ), Arnold believed. With the growth of democracy 
combine(] with the increusing reliance oil tile scientific principle of 
verification, Arnold later wrote in Literature and Dogma, people now 'are 
asking for the reason, and authority for the things they have been taught 
to believe' (Super VI, p. 148); and this again was to be welcomed. As 
the reign of unquestioned authority fades outp the growth of democracy 
demands that education shall improve the general culture. And Culture - 
U6 
'with its 'ideal of human perfection' was 'an inward spiritual activity, having 
for its characters increased sweetness, increased light, increased life, 
increased sympathy' (Super V, p. 1,08) - an activity depending in large 
measure on wide reading - on 
I 
literature - in Arnold's view. This thesis 
has been an attempt to justify Arnold's position. As was stated at the 
outset, it would be impossible to prove it - statistically, or by any other 
means; but it was felt worthwhile to map out some of the issues. 
Clearly not all the evidence points one way. When in Literature and 
Nona Arnold speaks of authority and absolutism giving way to democracy and 
rela: tivism (which was largely true of the direction at the time), lie could 
scar-cely have foreseen the emergence of new forms of authority and absol- 
utism - of totalitarianism of the kind feared by Orwell and foreshadowed 
in his novel Nineteen-Eightv-Four. The very growth of democracy has pro- 
voked its opposite principles. Karl Popper (1966), in. The Open Society 
and its Eriemiesy has attempted to show that 
civilization has not yet fully recovered from the shock of its birth - the 
transition from tribal or 'closed society I, 'with its submission to magical 
forces, to the lopen societyl which sets free the critical powers of man... 
(and that) ... the shock of this transition 
is one of the factors that have 
made possible the rise of those reactionary movements which have tried, and 
still try, to overthrow civilization and to return to tribalism. 
(pl) 
And similar in certain important. respects is the thesis of Eric Fromm's 
work, The Fear of Freedom, (1942), that 
freedom has a twofold meaning for modern man: that he has been freed from 
traditional authorities and has become a" lindividuallp but that at the 
same time he has become isolatedt powerless, and an instrument of purposes 
outside himself, alienated from himself and others ... 
Freedom has reached 
of its own dynamism, it a critical point where, driven by the loric 
threatens to change into its opposite. kp. 233) 
In Frommls view 'the future of democracy' depends upon 'the full realiza- 
tion of the individual's potentialities, together with his ability to 
live 
actively and spontaneously' -a realization w1iich must be fearlessly and 
4 
positively embraced if we are to avoid a new thraldom to auth I oritarianism. 
Clearly, literature is no, pdnacea for the ills of mankind and-dangrers 
to democracy. Its value can be defended and attacked 
in curious ways. 
Trotsky, for example, (as int(ti-preted by Eagleton 
(1976))wrote that 'in a 
capitalist society (art) is cm, verted into a conunodity and warped 
by 
ý67 
ideology; yet it can still partially reach beyond those limits. It can 
still yield us a kind of truth - not, to be sure, a scientific or theoret- 
ical truth, but the truth of how men experience their conditions of life, 
and of how they protest against them' (P. 74). This observation, turned 
about, applies neatly to Alexander Solzhenitsyn in context; and one wonders 
whether a hidden Arnold is somewhere writing a companion volume to Literature 
and Dog entitled 'Samizdat and Ideology'. 
One of the*reasons for the recrudescence of authoritarianism is doubt- 
less the felt need for certainty and security in a world whose multitudin- 
ousness can bear down upon the individual with a menacing complexity. Life 
in a contracting, technologically-oriented world inevitably loses something 
of its simplicity. Perhaps this increasing pressure was in Jerome Bruner's 
mind when lie wrote that 'cognitive mastery in a world that generates stim- 
uli far faster than we can sort them out depends upon strategies for reduc- 
ing the complexity and clutter' (quoted by Ing, 1978, P-33). It has been 
one of the objects of this thesis to suggest that literature is one of the 
means, one of the strategies, for reducing the clutter in the sphere of 
emotional experience, and for giving it shape and order. Imaginative lit- 
erature'also has the capacity, as I have tried to show, for replacing the 
certainties lof dogma with a fearless recognition of uncertainty and diver- 
sity, a factor which is vital to the maintainance of democracy. In The 
Ascent of Man, Bronowski (1973) expresses this idea: 
The Principle of Uncertainty or, in my phrase, the Principle of Tolerance, 
fixed once and for all the realisation that all knowledge is limited. It 
is an irony of history that at the very time when this was being worked 
out there should rise, under Hitler in Germany and other tyrants elsewhere, 
a counter-conception: a principle of monstrous certainty. VVhen the future 
looks back on the 1930s it will think of them as a crucial confrontation 
of culture ... against the throwbacks 
to the des ots' belief that they have 
absolute certainty. (The Ascent _ofMan, p-3675 
That a confident tolerance of uncertainty and diversity, which is the 
hallmark of literary culture, can begin to be developed in school is evid- 
enced in the work of Walter Loban (1963) whose research showed that 'those 
subjects who proved to have the greatest power over language ... were the 
subjects who most frequently used language to express tentativeness... 
3,62 
suPPosition, bypothesis and conditional statements. ' Rosen (1973) 
conunenting on this rightly observes that fit is a high level of achieve- 
ment when children can verbalize doubt and not find the state of doubt 
intolerable. 1 (p. 67). At a mature level, this was Matthew Arnold's 
achievement. 
Arnold, the opponent of dogma, is sometimes doonatic; a propormil. 
of, I Hwee I'lle HS mid Ile im occitiliollltlly 11111.811 Itild N-viltmillAy (, Oil- 
troversial; advising us 'to see life steadily, and to see it whole, f fie 
himself is sometimes biased and inconsistent; the apostle of buiniliLy 
lie is frequently pompous. Nit for those who care for the freedom of the 
individual, and the value of imaginative creativityg he is always inter- 
esting, and usually pertinent; anti, as I have tried to show, his views 
on an 'open' literary, yet balanced education are as relevant today as 
vAien lie expressed them. 
4 
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